



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>




THE
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY

AND
CLASSICAL REVIEW.

EDITED BY
JOHN HOLMES AGNEW.

THIRD SERIES.



NEW-YORK:


LEAVITT, TROW AND COMPANY,
194 BROADWAY.

BOSTON: SAXTON, PIERCE & CO., 133 WASHINGTON-STREET.

LONDON: WILEY & PUTNAM, 33 PATERNOSTER ROW.

MDCCLV.

ENTERED, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1845,
By JOHN HOLMES AGNEW,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of
New-York.



J. F. Trow & Co. Printers,
38 Ann-street.

THE
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY
AND
CLASSICAL REVIEW.

THIRD SERIES, NO. I.—WHOLE NUMBER LVII.

JANUARY, 1845.

ARTICLE I.

THREE PROGRESSIVE EXPERIMENTS IN HUMAN GOVERNMENT.

By JOSEPH F. TUTTLE, Marietta College, Ohio.

Ours is a world of experiment. Oft-repeated experiment, and as oft repeated failure, are necessary to secure even an approximation to perfection. Art has its infancy, its uncultivated youth, and then the ripe beauties of manhood. Science at first shoots out rays dimmer than starlight, then come the long and joyous beams of light, flashing from beneath the horizon, then the sun itself emerges, and careers upward to the full blaze of noonday. Literature at first stammers with harsh utterance, experiment converts this into the mellow tones of luxuriant but undisciplined manhood, and finally chastens this unpruned luxuriance into the angelic strains which flow from the lips of a Shakspeare and a Milton.

The Creator has not enthroned his creatures on the pinnacle of perfection. Effort must be expended, mind developed, genius waked up, energies fired, to realize the ideal perfection which burns so brightly in the human soul. Wheresoever the creature may rank, or whatever his original

power, he will behold reared above him mountains which his spirit will strive to scale, and when these have been attained, still other and mightier mountains will greet his eye, and arouse the godlike energies of his soul. Progress is a law of the rational universe. It was never intended that the soul, the offspring and image of Deity, should remain the passive recipient of blessings conferred by Omnipotence. That were an unworthy destiny. Thought, ceaseless and pleasurable, was destined to range over an infinite field, forever winging a bolder flight, and exploring the beautiful and grand so munificently scattered throughout infinity. In a word, it was the design of God that mind should revel in the delicious joys of activity, of progress, of eagerly reaching forward to its ideal perfection, and yet forever realize that such an idea of perfection is only consummated in God.

With these thoughts in mind, it will not seem strange that men were left to experiment on the different modes of national government. For ages this world has been one vast workshop, and the genius of man the indefatigable statuary. At one time he has chiselled, from the rough marble of society, a form beautiful as ever greeted the eye of an artist, and his heart has throbbed wildly, as he fancied his hope fulfilled. But this form was as the lifelike statue of Pygmalion. As the artist gazed on the delicate image, he became enamoured with its bewitching loveliness, but with all its delicate beauty and bewitching loveliness, it was cold marble. No ethereal fire warmed it into immortality, and it soon perished. Again the statuary toils for the desired end. At length his breath is almost suspended with joy, as he beholds another form moulded into full proportion, not so symmetrical as the former, yet not destitute of symmetry. Its magnificent bust, its brawny limbs, its iron sinews, gave token of extraordinary power. It moved and breathed, but its lustreless eye gave no evidence of immortal fire kindled at the seat of life. Its countenance was stern, and its hand swayed an inexorable sceptre. As the elated artist gazed upon this child of his genius, he thought that beauty, power, life, were here combined in per-

fection. For ages it remained apparently the heir of immortality. The nations bowed submissively to its yoke. Then it began to decay, it tottered, it fell ; it was not immortal.

Despair now seemed to gather around the artist, as he beheld the signal defeat of his cherished hopes. It was then—if I may be permitted to follow out the figure—that a beam of light from heaven flashed upon his soul and inspired his energies anew. Under the master-touches of genius another magnificent form was developed from the massive marble. The delicate beauty of the first creation combined with the lordly grandeur of the second. But the current of life leaping through the transparent veins, the eye kindled into the impassioned light of thought, and the countenance resplendent with the emotions of soul, all showed that the breath of immortality had waked the lifeless marble into deathless life. That was the ideal perfection, realizing the combination of *beauty, power, immortality*.

But to speak in plain terms, may not these figures be representatives of three grand experiments in human government, which either have been made or are now making in the world? In a certain sense all the experiments conducted among different nations, may be considered as modifications of these three, *Grecian Democracy, Roman Law, and Christian Republicanism*. It is proposed to develope at some length each of these systems, considering them as steps of progression toward perfection in human government.

Democracy in its purest form was the prevailing system of government in Greece. In other countries the patriarchal rule of families ripened into despotism, reducing the masses under the power of irresponsible men. But in Greece, from the very first, there was manifested a passion for popular freedom, which burnt brightly until quenched in blood by Roman power. Nor is it any well founded objection to this assertion, that such men as the thirty tyrants, Pericles, and Themistocles, exercised arbitrary power over the people ; for “the thirty,” by their horrid excesses during a single year, endeavoring to stifle the spirit of freedom, really added fuel to the flame, and

fanned it into uncontrollable fury : whilst such men as Pericles and Themistocles perverted eloquence, the true child of freedom, to lull the people to peace, and then lead them to tyrannize over themselves.

But let us glance at the theory of a government occupying 2000 years in working out its appropriate results. Sixteen centuries elapsed in bringing this system to its acme. The democratic principle was diffused throughout Greece, but often manifested itself in outbursts of popular passion, at times threatening the very existence of the different tribes. Of course, at first, every thing was as rough as the block of marble just taken from the mountain, but every war, every insurrection, every revolution, every law enacted, tried and repealed, every step in the arts, science, and literature, were like the skilful strokes of a statuary. As age after age passed, democracy in theory assumed a beauty which can only be figured forth by the master works of their own sculptors. The Athenian government may be considered as the model of Grecian democracy, and he must indeed be destitute of enthusiasm, who has looked upon this without admiration. Their fleets and armies are led on to victory by men whom the people elected : if these commanders acted a noble part, from the people they received their richest reward, whilst the coward and the traitor were hurled headlong to ruin by the same potent sovereign. Had a citizen been wronged, he plead his cause before the people. Had high-handed crime been committed, the people pronounced the condemnation. Had the state suffered loss or insult, the people in full assembly weighed the wrong or insult, and denounced public vengeance. This was the great tribunal of the nation, the supreme arbiter, the fountain of law and power.

Nor was this assembly in its perfection the tumultuous rabble some have supposed. No indecent levity or trifling disgraced the deliberations of these popular governors, but all their assemblies were opened with solemn sacrifices to the gods, with invocations for wisdom and prudence to be communicated to every citizen. The rich did not overshadow

the poor, but the meanest citizen weighed as much as the loftiest in the enactment of public decrees. Nor did the youth forget to pay due respect to old age ; all waited for the words of wisdom which might fall from the lips of their ancestors. Indeed, in some respects, the Athenian Assembly might be held up as a model for some modern legislatures making far higher pretensions to decorum and dignity. The influence of this body in kindling sons of eloquence, whose brightness has astonished all succeeding ages, need not be mentioned, nor is it necessary to allude to the very defect, so far as the purposes of justice were concerned, exhibited in this fact. Suffice it to say that the very deformity, gross though it be when squared with justice, has added an imperishable grandeur to Grecian democracy. The potent energies of eloquence no doubt were perverted, but with all its perversions we mention admiringly the singular instrument which swayed the minds of multitudes, and gilds with bright rays the system which gave it birth.

And in glancing rapidly over this system, we must not omit the venerable tribunal of wisdom, the Areopagus. At first sight this may seem inconsistent with pure democracy, but really is not. For none but men who had discharged faithfully the duties of the Archonship could be admitted to membership in this court. The people elected the Archons, and for ten years must these officers, having reached a full maturity previous to election, discharge their high and responsible trust, as a probationary trial before admission into this august body. The nobility of the Areopagus may be inferred from a single fact. Pericles, a man of lofty genius, adding glory to his country's name by a series of brilliant public actions, and by a liberal patronage of art, science, and literature, rendering Athens illustrious to this day, was not able to secure admittance, because he had not discharged the preliminary duties, and obtained a character of unblemished probity. And it is the darkest stain on the fame of this remarkable man, that with all his munificent patronage of genius, he

sought to ruin the Areopagus, because he could not share the highest honor conferred on an Athenian.

It was in the hands of such men that the Athenian people intrusted the care of the public morals, of having the public decrees faithfully executed, and of judging in some criminal cases of a difficult and trying nature. No breathings of eloquence kindled the Areopagite's soul, except the eloquence of simple truth; no culprit's countenance, clothed with the woes of a saddened heart, in mute yet eloquent sorrow appealed to his pity and sympathy. In silence only disturbed by the brief testimony of the witness, and in darkness only relieved by the dim starlight of heaven, this magnificent court of ancient men uttered their authoritative decisions. A more impressive scene of judicial grandeur has never been witnessed on the earth. It will be readily perceived that such a tribunal, situated in the very centre of the democratic system, exerted a powerful influence in conducting Athens to the zenith of its prosperity.

The perfection of Grecian democracy was attained during the period embraced between the years 600 B. C. and 322 B. C., a period of 278 years. The boundaries of this period are the birth of Solon and the death of Demosthenes. Noble names in the arts, sciences, and in literature, preceded Solon and succeeded Demosthenes, but the bright constellations, bestudding the intellectual firmament and reverentially mentioned by the scholar, are found in the period specified. This was the age of Socrates, and Plato, and Aristotle, exhuming from the rich quarries of truth, thoughts exalted and immortal. This was the age of Hippocrates and Asclepiades, extorting from Nature her remedial secrets. This was the age of Herodotus, and Thucydides, and Xenophon, recording on imperishable tablets the achievements of nations, the glories of their rise, the fatalities of their fall. This was the age of Æschylus, and Sophocles, and Euripides, calling from the human soul its deep and pent-up emotions, by their sublime delineations of nature. This was the age of Zeuxis and

Parrhasius, the first duping the birds by his grapes painted so naturally, and the last deceiving Zeuxis himself by a picture apparently veiled with silk. This was the age of Philo and Scopas, and Phidias and Praxiteles and Ctesiphon, whose genius conceived and erected the Temple of Diana, the Acropolis with its Parthenon and Temple of Jupiter, and filled the Grecian cities with palaces and temples of the most gorgeous magnificence ; whose genius wrought into lifelike perfection a thousand matchless statues of men and gods. This was the age of heroes in eloquence, when profligacy and corruption trembled before the consuming indignation of Demosthenes, when Pericles by this magic weapon swayed, for forty years, a despotic sceptre, when eloquence became so mighty as to madden the people to ostracise and slay the great and good, when it fired national indignation, and discharged terrible vengeance on its enemies.

Such was the period during which Grecian democracy reached its acme, when the genius of man placed upon it the delicate lineaments and exquisite polish of perfection. It was a superb statue chiseled into symmetry and beauty. It was the magnificent representative of life, and for a time it seemed incredible that such magnificence and beauty could be otherwise than immortal. But it was only a beautiful, lifeless image, unlike the fabled beauty which Pygmalion wrought from the rough marble, and which, at his impassioned prayer, the Goddess of Beauty inspired with life. No genial breath from Heaven gave this a beating heart, and bounding life-current, and in a short time it perished. The first great experiment in human government was completed in its fall.

Let us now trace out the second governmental experiment, *Roman Law*. This will be found to possess no less interest than the former, since it bears directly upon those grand evolutions in government, which it requires ages to perfect. With as much certainty, as the torchlight of history can give, we learn that about four hundred and fifty years were occupied in preparing the elements, which when combined constituted the Roman State. The Pelasgi from the southeast of Europe

and the Trojan fugitives, mingling with the petty tribes of Italy, prepared the materials for the most terrible government that has ever controlled mankind, and when at length the fabled son of Mars commenced the work, every thing was ready for genius and ambition to lay the foundation of a mighty state.

From the time when Tullus inflicted summary vengeance upon the traitor Mettus, until Cato perished in a mean African city, by his own hand, the striking characteristic of the nation was the enactment of the severest laws and the most rigid submission to them. It is this feature which claims our particular attention, since it was this which rendered Roman legions invincible, Rome the empress of nations, and inspired the hope that now the element of national immortality had been discovered. In all the outlines of this system there is nothing so beautiful and fascinating as in Grecian democracy. Beauty even in cold marble excites admiration and delight. But in this second creation, produced by the ingenious statuary from the rough materials of society, beauty is not the predominating characteristic. It is power, the *power of law*, which clothes its mighty limbs with brawn and muscle, placing in its hand a rod terrible to the transgressor, and freezing its very countenance into the relentlessness of justice. This characteristic is observable throughout the whole Roman polity. The child was subjected to the arbitrary power of the parent, for life and death, and the parent's decision was final; the sceptred ruler, the sacred priest, the idolized general, not being exempted. In this severe school the first stern lessons of implicit obedience to law were branded deeply into the Roman's heart. The influence of that one lesson was felt throughout the state, and perhaps contributed more than any single cause to the accumulated power of "the eternal city." In this one particular Rome may justly share with Sparta what the historian terms her "magnificent epithet," *Δαμασίου-βροτος*, tamer of men, since most truly this patriarchal despotism crushed the passions of childhood into submission, and disciplined a nation of men obedient to law. To such an extent

was obedience to law carried that we seldom read of infuriated mobs trampling on law, and hastening in pursuit of vengeance. And when such scenes were exhibited, the laws were so interpreted and executed, that even Romans could no longer endure them.

In a state like Rome, it was essential that law should exert a perfect and absolute control over the soldiery ; and here we see the perfection of obedience. The law committed to the commander despotic power, with the single check of being held answerable to his country for its correct exercise. The most fearful penalties were suspended over the soldier, and at any moment he might be hurried away to execution. Cowardice was the most disgraceful crime. To sleep, when a post had been committed to him, no matter how arduous the march or battle of the previous day, caused the soldier to be executed. Disobedience to any issued command resulted in the same condign punishment ; and it is worthy of notice, that seldom does a murmur escape the criminal's fellows. So completely had the doctrine of obedience been inculcated, that the most flagrant outrages were held sacred, if they only issued from the legal tribunal. When the soldier had taken the military oath to his general, bribes and threatenings were powerless. The obligation to obey was sacred as his honor, cherished as life, and controlling as his hope of an honorable death.

Perhaps no one thing illustrated the stern adherence of the Roman soldiers to law so strikingly, as the cheerfulness with which they completed the most fatiguing marches by securing their encampment with the deep ditch and high rampart. This was a labor of hours, but was never omitted. The Roman would as quickly violate the law of nature demanding food, as the martial law commanding this laborious precaution against enemies. It was this fact which elicited the admiration of their enemy, Pyrrhus. "Megacles, the array of these barbarians is by no means barbarous : we shall see whether other circumstances will correspond with this appearance." Threats, flattery, importunity, were lighter than vanity when urged on Fabricius, the noble personation of Roman regard

for law in that age ; and the magnanimous courage of an army like him, at a cost of 15,000 slain, extorted from the astonished Pyrrhus the exclamation, "If we gain such another victory, we are inevitably ruined." And whose mind has not been filled with admiration at the regard for the laws of nature shown by Fabricius, whilst warning Pyrrhus against his traitorous physician—by Camillus, scourging back to his own city the execrable wretch offering to betray his patrons' children, although those patrons were the enemies of Rome ! And does the Roman General prohibit duels with the enemy on pain of death, and his own high-spirited son, exasperated by the insults offered his country, in defiance of law rush to the conflict, and return with the spoils of the slain insulter ? Law must take its victim. The young hero is ordered to instant execution, that his fate may impress on all the stern nature of law, and the fearful penalty of transgressing, even nobly. Are the sons of Brutus convicted of treason ? Brutus ceases to be a father, and assumes the sternness of a judge. The tears of his sons, the sympathy of his friends, the yearnings of natural affection, are completely swallowed up in his reverence for law. Law must be maintained, though it blight the dearest longings of the soul, and convert earth into the grave of all that is lovely and cherished. And even in the mad riotings of the mob may be traced the same reverence for law. The populace were roused to vengeance when Virginus, brandishing the blade dripping with the blood of his beautiful daughter, frantically shouted, "Tyrant, by this blood I devote thy head to the infernal gods !" The nation, maddened to frenzy, grasped the tardy sword of justice and smote down an infamous royalty, when Brutus, flinging aside his assumed idiocy, raised toward heaven the dagger reeking eloquently with the blood of violated innocence, and in terrible tones imprecated the curse of the gods on the fiendish violator. In these cases, the laws of nature and of Rome had been torn from their sacred pedestal, and outraged Romans only executed a just vengeance on the sacrilegious wretches who dared to lay unholy hands upon the enshrined object of a Roman's adoration !

Nor may we entirely pass by one feature of this system in its nature highly conservative—the Roman Senate. The wisest men in the nation were embraced in this legislative body. No means were spared to render it the most august tribunal on earth, and, except the Areopagus, it actually stood unrivalled among the ancients. The nobleness of this body was greatly promoted by the singular power conferred upon the Censors. These were constituted the guardians of the public morals, and no class of men were exempt from the tremendous power of their sentences. A very peculiar fact concerning this office is, that during the four hundred years of its existence it was occupied by men, with few exceptions, distinguished for their probity, intelligence, love of law, and morality. To such men, elected not because they might be Plebeians or Patricians, but because they were the best men in the nation, was committed the guardianship of the Senate. At the end of every fifth year this high officer was privileged to expel any Senator judged by him to be unworthy of membership. In the hands of men of whom great Cato stands the noblest representative, we may well infer that the Roman Senate, in its days of glory, was one of the noblest assemblages ever seen. The Roman aspiring to become a Senator must pass his probation in civil and military life, and possess a character so unblemished that the Catos of Rome could not prohibit the honor. Gravity, wisdom, moderation, piety to the gods, characterized their movements, and the majority of them wore the most splendid of ornaments, *the crown of honorable gray hairs*.

Such was the assembly which wielded an immense influence on the destinies of Rome. Cicero called it “*Ordo amplissimus et sanctissimus ; summum Populi Romani, populorumque et gentium omnium ac Regum consilium.*” No wonder that Cinneas, the ambassador of Pyrrhus, after beholding this magnificent and venerable body, exclaimed to his master, “that the Roman Senate seemed to him an assembly of kings.” No wonder that Brennus and his savage Gauls, entering the Senate-chamber, mistook the venerable Senators for the gods of the city, and regarded them with

reverence, until the kinglike rebuke of an insulted Senator kindled the passions of the barbarians, and gave up the city to the unmitigated horrors of sword and fire.

But in this luxuriant field there is danger of satiety, and enthusiasm must be checked. And yet, who can traverse this field without drinking in the inspiration of the past, and standing by the side of the noble, the unforgotten, the *living* dead? Cincinnatus and Fabius, Fabricius and Cato, of loftier nobility than kings can confer, awake our admiration, and compel our praise. Regulus still lives, the hero of patriotism. Brutus and Manlius vindicating the law, whilst its wheels crush their own sons, can never die. Terrible-visaged Marius, and noble Scipio, with an hundred others, start up before us, like the living realities of the present, and extort from us exclamations of delighted wonder! They were the great sons of a stern mother. From her they derived a countenance cold as the frown of justice, a step and carriage haughty as the tread of power, a courage unquailing as the onward rush of a thunder-cloud, a love of law which spurned the movings of pity, and which rent asunder the cords of natural affection.

Rome reached her zenith about the time Carthage and Corinth were overthrown, and the great principle running throughout her entire history, is, the binding power of law. This was the moving energy of the nation from Romulus to Cicero, and in this respect Rome stands unrivalled. In this consisted her true sublimity, her proudest glory, her mightiest energy. In this consisted the real experiment she was destined to make in the science of human government. As the inspired statuary wrought into perfection this gigantic figure, erecting it proudly among the nations, the representative of legal power, a figure whose mighty proportions excited within the mind, not so much emotions of beauty as of power, for ages he fancied this to be the realized ideal, perfection in government. The perfect, yet lifeless beauty of its predecessor arrested the beholder's attention, but in this, though not destitute of symmetry, the gigantic frame, the hardened mus-

cle and brawn which fleshed that frame, its proud step, its unquailing courage, its tremendous strength, these riveted attention and compelled homage. Whilst the earth trembled before it, it seemed a being of real life, and its energy the inspiration of heaven. But it was not a being of real life. Its power was that of a mighty automaton, driven on by an energetic, yet perishable principle, which so nearly resembled the principle of immortality that the nations were deceived. For ages it stood the sublime image of perfection; the world admired and were duped. But when ages had passed away, its earth-born nature was disclosed. It began to stoop with decrepitude, its matchless energy waned, its stern frown gave way to an imbecile stare, and when the barbarian smote it, it fell. The power of law was not sufficient to save it from destruction, and many centuries since, the history of this long and momentous experiment was completed. It was a failure.

“Rome—Rome imperial, bows her to the storm,
In the same dust and blackness, and we pass
The skeleton of her Titanic form.”

“Come and see
The cypress, hear the owl, and plod your way
O’er steps of broken thrones and temples, Ye!
Whose agonies are evils of a day—
A world is at our feet, as fragile as our clay.
The Niobe of nations! there she stands
Childless and crownless in her voiceless woe;
An empty urn within her withered hands,
Whose holy dust was scattered long ago;
The Scipios’ tomb contains no ashes now;
The very sepulchres lie tenantless
Of their heroic dwellers.”

We have thus traced the history of two grand experiments in government. The first system was beautiful, but lifeless. Such symmetrical beauty in government is one grand requisite, and for this reason this gorgeous beauty did not sweep over the stage of life, a vain display. It accomplished its destined part, it evolved and demonstrated its important principle

and then perished. The second experiment combined much symmetry with a new feature of an important nature, the power of law. This was a marked advance upon the former. A wreath of flowers may be exquisitely beautiful, but can it restrain the frantic struggles of a madman? A glass palace, bedizzened with gold and bestudded with gems, may be exceedingly beautiful, but can it sustain the furious bombardment of a besieging army? Thus in government, mere beauty is not sufficient of itself to secure perpetuity. The boisterous heavings of human passion, and the terrific tempests of human selfishness, sooner or later defy and overleap such restraint. The addition, then, of the element of legal power, whose stern energies should restrain within defined boundaries, at least, the outward manifestations of human passion and selfishness, was a noble stride toward perfection. And we do not wonder that a government based upon this principle so long stood firm, giving hope of deathless perpetuity. It was like its own Coliseum, with its massive foundations, its stupendous columns, its vast capaciousness, the grandeur of whose ruins even now astonish the beholder.

“ While stands the Coliseum, Rome shall stand,
When falls the Coliseum, Rome shall fall ;
And when Rome falls—the World !”

The feelings of mankind are well expressed in this metrical version of an old prophecy. The Coliseum is now in ruins. Rome also is in ruins, but the World is not in ruins. The grand experiment has not yet been consummated, the sublime evolutions of ages have not yet reached their completion, and till this be true, great nature will calmly move forward in her simple and majestic operations.

And here we may notice one particular in which the figure of the statuary fails, when applied to these governmental experiments. It is in this ; for many ages these systems were moving along parallel with each other, and not successively. Thus when Grecian Democracy perished, the Roman power was nearly at its zenith. Of course the real value of the

results in each case is not affected, since to all intents the two nations were isolated. We now enter upon an examination of the last experiment, which, for want of a more appropriate phrase, we choose to denominate *Christian Republicanism*.

And here we would not fall into some common mistakes about the perfectibility of human government. It has already been remarked that the higher the mind soars, and the loftier its aspirations after its ideal perfection, the more deeply will it realize that this is found only in God. From the very nature of the case, this absolute perfection cannot be attained by creatures imperfect in knowledge and virtue. It seems an axiom, that knowledge commensurate with omniscience, and virtue pure as that enthroned in the heart of Deity, are essential to such a quality as absolute perfection. When perfection in government is mentioned, it is in a qualified and relative sense. The absolute perfection belongs only to that mighty sovereignty whose "flaming boundaries" encircle an infinity of worlds.

This last experiment belongs not to a single nation ; it does not reach its perfection in a single age. Its constituent elements belong to *man* ; they are the offspring of centuries, and all nations, directly or indirectly, have contributed to their evolution. These combined into a perfect, glorious, immortal whole, is the realized perfection in government. This experiment, in different forms, and by diverse processes, has been progressing ever since the formation of nations. According to the analogy of divine operations, ages were occupied in preparing mankind for a demonstration reaching onward through thousands of years. Sixteen centuries were employed in solving the problem of what men would be, given up to the unchecked control of vice. Then came the awful result in the whirlwind rush of tempests, the gathering fury of oceans, in an earth rent asunder, disgorging its fountains of wrath, in the stifled wail of a drowning race, whilst the Ark, with its sole representative of virtue, rode sublimely over a sepulchred world. The path of national as well as individual virtue

is hedged in with strong defences, and nations leaving that path will find broad but thorny roads leading down to ruin. The truth of this was demonstrated by the flood. Again the grand preparations were carried on for the noble experiment, and when all things were ready, its first developments were made in the history of God's chosen people. The scale upon which these things were conducted was worthy of Deity moving among men. No haste nor confusion is apparent. The movement was steady and glorious as the onward march of the sun, and when at length it was completed in the indescribable woes which burst upon the Holy City, a grand and most instructive chapter in human government was laid open before the nations. It is believed that the history of the Jews heretofore has not occupied so prominent a place in the science of government as it deserves ; for this reason we crave pardon for dwelling at some length upon it, inasmuch as it has an important bearing upon our general subject.

Throughout the Jewish polity we witness one astonishing phenomenon, the union of two widely separated extremes. The democratic principle prevailed, and yet God was the Sovereign of the nation. Democracy and monarchy, in their purest forms, were combined. But we shall not be prepared justly to appreciate this government, without examining its fundamental principle. The concentrated energies of the created universe cannot produce so sublime and effective a principle. It comprehends the most distant extremes ; it descends deep into the mysterious fountains of human action ; it lays an authoritative hand not only upon actions apparent to human vision, but on the secret motions which no eye but God's can detect. This principle may thus be stated :—Every Jew was commanded to render heartfelt and perfect obedience to God as his King, and perfect affection to his fellow-subjects as brethren. We are not speaking in reference to the high awards of another world, upon which this principle exerts a determining influence. We refer to it simply as the controlling principle of a national government ; and as such it has no parallel. It is wonderful. Its very face bears the signet-

stamp of Deity. It bodies forth democracy in its divinest form, beautiful as ever filled the dreamy imagination of an enthusiast, whilst it concentrates all the executive energies of monarchy in its highest perfection. One vast obligation from heaven presses all to a common level, and the same obligation imperatively challenges a bended knee and an affectionate heart to one supreme Sovereign above. This is the fundamental principle of the theocracy, which even under the kings was never abrogated.

And here it is not asserted that the details of this system constituted a perfect model for all nations and circumstances. These were perfect thus far, that they were precisely adapted to the wants of the nation to which they were given ; but it would be the height of absurdity to suppose that all the minutæ could be obtained for all nations from a single model. But the mighty energy, propelling steadily the complicated machinery in different governments, may be the same. In this light the Jewish history assumes a peculiar interest in the present discussion, for it may appear that in this was discovered the true principle of national immortality, the details being left for other and future ages to discover.

In all other national experiments, we have seen the elements of ruin at work ;

“ And history, with all her volumes vast,
Hath but one page,”

and that page has been the register of birth, of manhood, of death. The destroyer's seal was upon them from the first. What if the Greek should point exultingly to his beautiful statue ! its icy heart could not send the bounding blood throughout the limbs, to vivify with a generous vitality. The Roman might gaze with profoundest reverence upon the stern being whose frown and sceptre reduced all into submission to law ; and yet he must acknowledge the existence of a fountain deeper than mere law can reach or human vengeance cleanse. That fountain was pregnant with national ruin.

Let us now glance at the relation of the fundamental prin-

ciple of the theocracy to the great cause of national ruin. And what is that cause? The want of a pure and controlling moral power in the individuals composing a nation. Of course this assertion of a negative fact implies its opposite affirmative, an impure controlling moral power in individuals. If proof is demanded, the private virtue of the noblest representatives of Grecian Democracy and Roman Law may be cited. The first devotes his energies to live out the theory of democracy, and crowns his labors by calmly quaffing the poison, because the people commanded it. And yet Socrates, the idol of philosophy, the caressed child of natural religion, the boast of all disbelievers in revelation, even he at times indulged in low vice. The second is a living personification of Roman regard for law. To him, *Law* is the real Jove, at whose nod all tremble, and at whose throne all kneel. And yet Cato, whose frown made the Roman Senator quail, and whose sentence was inexorable as Roman destiny, could smilingly commend a noble issuing from a house which "inclineth unto death," could encourage gross sensuality among his numerous dependents, and himself not unfrequently stoop to the control of like passions. If such the virtue of the best, what must have been that of the multitude! These examples are adduced to show that real purity of heart was a thing unknown among Grecians and Romans, and in this we see the fruitful cause of ruin.

But mark the principle of the Theocracy when applied to this cause. It has a twofold bearing, which encompasses the whole ground. Under the weightiest sanctions it absolutely prohibits the existence of impure moral principles in individuals, it descends to the very fountain of those principles, the heart. But it stops not here; it demands, under equally weighty sanctions, the existence of a pure source of action, from which might flow continually obedience to God and love to man. In a word, it enjoined that the Israelite's heart must be so perfect toward his sovereign and his fellow subjects, that even Deity might approve. Let it be remembered that we are now considering a governmental maxim; and is any

eye so piercing, any ken so discriminating, as to notice a single defect, a single weakness? Socrates and Cato are condemned by it. The lauded systems of ancient morality are weighed by it and found wanting. In beauty it surpasses the Grecian model, in the power of law it is more inexorable than the Roman model, whilst it fathoms depths, and scales heights, and defines boundaries, which human wisdom unaided could never attain. In beauty, grandeur, and strength, it resembled the glorious Temple of God,

“ In undisturbed and lone serenity,
Finding itself a solemn sanctuary
In the profound of heaven ! It stands before us,
A mount of snow, fretted with golden pinnacles !
The very sun, as though he worshipped there,
Lingers upon the gilded cedar roofs ;
And down the long and branching porticoes,
On every flowery-sculptured capital,
Glitters the homage of his parting beams !”

Thus far we have considered this principle theoretically, and are safe in pronouncing it worthy its birth in heaven. Let us now trace some of its practical results. A partial view can only be taken, from the fact that the Jewish nation was not under the complete control of its theory. There is one respect in which this principle produced wonders. This may be called its expulsive power. The meaning of this phrase can easily be illustrated. Call up before the mind a spring sending up its crystal treasures in a beautiful jet, gushing up delightfully through the sand upon its bottom. Let a person attempt to destroy that fountain by forcing, with an engine, poison down its vein. For a short time that vein will throw out poison ; but the pure fountain, deep in the earth, sending up its tide of health, flings off the poison and cleanses it completely away. This is its expulsive power. The human body, also, in perfect health, possesses an inherent power of throwing off disease. It seems to guard the citadel of life, by driving outwardly all injurious juices and substances, and

thus presents another beautiful illustration of the expulsive power.

The Jewish Government possessed an inherent energy analogous to these, an expulsive power, the tendency of which was to throw out of the system every thing injurious. Only two illustrations of this power will be given, from which the movements of the whole system may be inferred.

Oppression has ever been ranked as an efficient cause of national ruin, as may be learned from history. A species of slavery existed in the Jewish polity, and, if permitted to act out its real tendency, would prove as fatal here as elsewhere. The reason of its permission seems to have been the nature of the Jewish law, which prohibited any but Israelites from holding landed property in Canaan, and no stranger might remain in the country on any condition but that of scrupulously observing all the religious ordinances of the nation. If, then, any stranger were admitted to share the religious privileges of Israel, it could only be by becoming a member of some Jewish family, which would stand responsible for his religious conduct. Now it can easily be seen, that whilst this relation happily existed between the master and servant, the power of the state was augmented by the addition of those who felt gratitude for rescue from heathenism. But suppose these servants become dissatisfied, evidently they constitute an element destructive to the state ; and here we see the expulsive power of the system. By neglecting to observe any one or all of the great feasts instituted by the Head of the nation, the dissatisfied man-servant could put an end to his servitude, and at the Passover every servant in the land might free himself by not observing the feast. For, no matter how avaricious the master, or how desirous of retaining his servants, the command of the sovereign was implicit, to banish every such person, as violating the principle of obedience to the King and of affection to fellow men. How simply and beautifully the system operates ! Whilst the slave, so called, complies with the laws, he is an addition of strength ; but the

moment he becomes disaffected, the system, like a strong fountain, casts him out, and frees itself from his corrupting influence.

The same thing may be seen in reference to property. Rome was mighty whilst poor, but weak when rich. Riches, especially when unequally distributed, bring a train of corruption, effeminacy, and insubordination, tending to national ruin. The single fact, that multitudes are dependent upon a few of overgrown wealth, tends to this ruinous direction, either by making those multitudes the passive tools of designing men, or kindling popular vengeance as exhibited in frenzied mobs or universal revolutions. The expulsive power of the Theocracy is here observable. Every fiftieth year, at least, the yeomanry of the nation were reduced to an equality in respect to landed property. The edict was peremptory. He who refused obedience, be he ever so lordly, was cast out of the nation, and the lowliest Israelite was reinstated in his patrimonial inheritance. The tendency here is plainly to free the system from that which might injure. Like the human body in vigorous health, it flings every injurious and deadly element away from the seat of life, and guards it sacredly from death.

We might illustrate this beautiful and wonderful principle, by reference to every species of crime and punishment recognized in Jewish law, but indulgence must be curbed. Indeed, so mighty was this expulsive energy, that the very land seemed to sympathize with its King in the administration of his government, at times, as though nauseated by the abominations of the people, and casting them out.

The principle referred to as fundamental in this government, retained a greater control during the period of Joshua, than in any other. And who has not given way to his exclamations of delight, at the wonderful power it exerted over more than three millions of people? Their Mount Ebal utters its deep amen to the dreadful imprecations invoked on transgressors. Their Mount Gerizim, clad in the bright garments of fertility, stood a monumental pledge of blessings on the obedient.

“ And Israel served the Lord all the days of Joshua, and all the days of the elders that overlived Joshua, and which had known all the works of the Lord that he had done for Israel.”

But it is a fact of the utmost importance, that the principle was not deep-seated in the nation's heart, throwing out its vitalizing energies into every part. At times it seemed to become the nation's life-current, and then its expulsive power was wonderful, throwing away from the citadel of existence every noxious influence, and revealing the whole system in surpassing beauty. It remained in health long enough to test the principle on which it was based ; and then, because infatuated men sought to dethrone this child of heaven, the nation fell headlong from its lofty eminence. They madly burst asunder the restraints of their Sovereign, they bathed the earth in the blood of his servants, and consummated all by crucifying perfected humanity. Then came the close, sublimely terrible, in the unmitigated desolation which stripped the Holy City of her children, and drove the pitiless ploughshare through streets sanctified by the footsteps of legislators and prophets and the Son of God. Then, indeed, did the city “ sit solitary,” her “ gates became desolate,” and “ she was in bitterness.” And the Jew, as he saw the Temple wrapped in flame, and the sacred “ vail rent in twain,” may well be represented as shouting out his frantic imprecation and defiance,

“ We are then of Thee

Abandoned—not abandoned of ourselves.

Heap woes upon us, scatter us abroad,

Earth's scorn and hissing ; to the race of men

A loathsome proverb ; spurned by every foot,

And cursed by every tongue ; our heritage

And birthright, bondage ; and our very brows

Beaming, like Cain's, the outcast mark of hate :

Israel will still be Israel, still will boast

Her fallen Temple, her departed glory ;

And, wrapt in conscious righteousness, defy

Earth's utmost hate, and answer scorn with scorn.”

In this nation was evolved the principle of national immortality, and its power is yet to be seen in the living miracle of a nation deprived of sovereignty for ages, and yet a distinct peo-

ple. They have been stripped, and scorned, and persecuted ; kings have sought to exterminate them ; the powers of earth have been in league for their ruin ; for centuries the Mussulman and Christian struck hands for this end ; and yet the Jews live, a nation as truly as in the days of David. Greece and Rome perished, and their numerous millions perished with them ; Jerusalem has been in ruins, or in the power of the Moslem, for eighteen hundred years, and yet Israel is Israel still. They remain a living demonstration of the imperishable nature of that principle which God breathed into their government, preserving the nationality of a numerous people, even whilst passing through the furnace of vengeance. Like the son of Thetis cast into the fire to test his immortal nature, Israel has passed through a "furnace heated seven times," but does not perish ! A thousand vultures have torn his quivering flesh, and driven their relentless beaks at the seat of life, but the immortal principle fills out the flesh fast as devoured, and guards the heart, throbbing with a deathless pulsation ! A burning robe of wrath has been bound about Israel, yet, less fortunate than the fabled ancient, he cannot die ! This is national immortality, when the very current of life tortures but cannot consume. What would Israel now be, had he not forsaken his Sovereign ? Still immortal, but in joy ; robed in the beauteous vestments of heaven, the favored son of one Great King on high !

We have dwelt so long upon the history of this remarkable nation, for a number of reasons. In this we plainly trace the work of God ; its history has been written under the same guidance, and may therefore be relied upon with confidence : and by this history was demonstrated the only principle of national immortality, that of *perfect and loving obedience to God and hearty affection to men, by every individual in a nation.* This glorious truth has been discovered and tested, and now is deposited in the treasure-house of nations, offering to become the germ of immortality to all.

We now proceed to notice briefly some details as discovered by other nations and experiments. The ambitious Constan-

tine thought to found his throne on this adamantine rock ; but secured only its shadow, and his throne soon perished. Then succeeded the long and terrible reign of spiritual despotism, and not in vain. It disclosed the fearful effects of a system which absorbed and controlled the consciences and hearts of individuals, which in fact struck individuals out of existence, and concentrated all in the "little old man at Rome." Whilst it professed to hold sacred the principle beaming so brightly on the page of Jewish history, it really had passed around to the opposite extreme, and sought only unity and power without regard to individuals. But this could not always continue. Mind stripped of individuality began to move. The spiritual yoke became too heavy, and the arousing spirit of man chafed under the burden. A mighty array of causes were marshalling themselves for conflict. Then came the shout of onset, the rush of armies, the peal of victory. The vindication of a noble principle was in part achieved. Jehovah was abroad in the earth, consuming and destroying this monster, "with the spirit of his mouth and the brightness of his coming." Of course this part of the experiment was negative, demonstrating that it was not a part of a perfect government to arrogate the sacred prerogatives which belong to individuals.

But in tracing out the different governmental evolutions belonging to the third great experiment, we may not pass one bright link in the chain, especially as it has exerted a controlling power on events, in which our own nation is concerned. How pleasantly does the reign of Alfred the Great greet the eye, wearied and disgusted with the abominations of contemporary nations ! Among them it seems like a lake of beauty embosomed in sterile mountains. To the mind contemplating the history of mankind, during those ages of rapine and blood, of crime and cruelty, of oppression unrebuked and fiendishness incarnated, this reign beams out like a jewelled star in its deep setting of blue, the signal of heaven to man, in all his sorrows, that

"Bright joy stands waiting for the morning light."

Alfred was a great king. In an age of deep darkness he kindled intellectual and moral lights. In a barbarous nation, oppressed by fiercer barbarians, he swayed such an authoritative sceptre as to control perfectly his own subjects and subdue his enemies. Driven from his throne, fleeing for his life, the inmate of a herdsman's cottage, a disguised minstrel in his enemy's camp, firing the flagging zeal of defeated subjects, with fell rapidity visiting vengeance on his enemies, and in planting a firm foot upon a tottering throne—in all these, Alfred manifested greatness, and for these history will ever reverence him. Yet these are only the prefatory steps to that which constitutes his real greatness, and points him out as the man destined to live forever in national character. To Alfred belongs the glory of incorporating into government the sacred principle, that the accused, be he high or mean, may not be condemned, except by the judgment of his peers. And here the assertion of Blackstone is not forgotten, that this principle was known and practised among the northern nations of Europe. But even allowing this, it does not in the least detract from Alfred's glory, since most assuredly he first introduced it into the polity of a nation, the influence of which is felt throughout the earth. The right of trial by jury became the cherished birthright of every Saxon, and whilst Alfred lived, it was preserved inviolate. In an age of tyranny and brute force, this king stood like a mountain of strength, the assertion of heaven-born principles, the common boon of God to every human being. The sentiment which Alfred lived out and then inserted in his last will, is an index to the nobleness of his character: "It is just that the English should ever remain free as their own thoughts."

Such was the man who formed a nucleus around which, during passing ages, were to collect the constituent parts of a perfect government. Perhaps he recognized feebly the magnificent principle evolved in Jewish history, yet he performed his own part of the experiment nobly, leaving more enlightened ages to complete the work he commenced.

For a time the Norman Conquest exerted a disastrous

influence on the laws and institutions of Alfred, but in the twelfth century Henry I. was compelled to acknowledge them in form. For more than a century these laws were mere shadows of good things. Then flashed upon the eyes of mankind the immortal transaction of Runemede, re-enthroning sacred principles, breaking the arm of tyranny, and delivering back to every Englishman his birthright. "Magna Charta" is the magic phrase which makes the freeman's blood leap merrily. This is the morning star, ushering in the full-orbed sun which soon was to take its throne in the midst of the heavens, the light and guide of all nations. The reader is too well acquainted with this portion of English history, to render it necessary to enter much into detail. The importance of this transaction is incalculable, although for ages it did not seem to produce very striking results. But this is only an apparent inefficiency. The demands therein granted, and the principles established, are like the glorious luminaries of heaven; clouds may conceal them for a time, but the clouds will be rolled away, and those stars beam upon man kindly and hopefully. And no thanks to King John. The destiny of the age was upon him, driving him onward to what he abhorred. A life of horrid and unnatural crime, makes his last words, as uttered by the great bard, emphatic :

" Within me is a hell ; and there the poison
Is, as a fiend, confined to tyrannize
On unretrievable, condemned blood ;"

and yet the reign of John will ever be clothed in brightness, because then the tide of human affairs set strongly toward freedom.

Time will not permit us more than to glance at the influence of the "wars of the roses," in cutting off and crippling an overshadowing nobility, unfriendly to the cause of human emancipation. Nor can we do more than allude to another most important cause, big with results to our race, the reign of the Tudors. This produced in one class of society an imbecile and servile spirit, fawning to the despotic encroachments

of these sovereigns ; but in another and larger class, this despotism kindled a spirit which defied tyranny, cherished freedom, lifted itself loftily amid the howling tempest which swept over the land, and clung, with a grasp, like that on life, to the high gifts of God. Indeed, this was the fiery cradle in which were nursed and baptized the vindicators of freedom in the old world, and the sublime messengers of freedom to the new.

There is one important element more, contributing not a little to bring society to the point at which we have now arrived. "Charlemagne," to use the words of an elegant writer, "expired like a meteor, that, having broken suddenly upon the night of ages, and blazed brilliantly over the whole world for a brief space, fell, and left all in darkness even deeper than before." But in the great chain of causes, sweeping on to a splendid consummation, this reign was not useless. From its ruins sprang into life Chivalry, like a goddess full-armed and mighty, and for centuries numbering among her followers the noblest, the wisest, the bravest. The human mind, crushed and bruted, but like a drowsed giant starting up from slumber, was awaking to a sense of the fearful wrongs it had suffered, and put forth mighty but undisciplined efforts in the cause of vindication. Those efforts produced the age of chivalry, to act an important part in the world's history. The bigoted may contemplate this movement with a sneer, the unthinking may class all the sons of chivalry among the wild schemers of mankind ; but the more ridiculous do they appear for their pains. For the wants of mankind called this system into life, the spirit of the age gave it birth ; and having fulfilled its destiny, it passed from the stage. But let no man say that such a system is to be sneered at as the *Don Quixotte* of Christendom—that men who for centuries were the only champions of human rights, have deserved nothing better than a silly jeer. That system did *not* act an unimportant part in the upward march of society, which did so much to elevate woman to her rightful position, and exemplified before the world the thrilling truth that merit, and not the factitious circumstances of wealth or

high birth, constitutes Nature's patent to her highest nobility. With this may also be classed the Crusades, uniting the nations of Christendom for the attainment of a common object, and giving a powerful impulse to civilization throughout the world.

These causes, with those previously specified, contributed materially to the state of society found in England at the death of the maiden queen. This brings us to the next link in the chain, English Puritanism. Whatever may be said of particular men in this party, when Hume and Clarendon are forced to trace British freedom to this party, we shall not shoot far wide from the mark in asserting the Puritans to be among the noblest defenders of human rights. Among large classes it has been fashionable to sneer at the cant phrases of Puritanism, and to denounce contemptuously the fanatic Roundheads. But it may with reason be asked, whether it be right to denounce a system because its followers indulged in a few cant phrases, or wore hats and coats of a particular shape, or had their hair trimmed in a particular manner ; nor are the noblest principles of freedom to be sneered at as cant, because some of their vindicators, in the rush of events, did things not to be justified.

Take the two antagonist principles which then grappled in fierce conflict, irresponsible despotism and human freedom ; glance your eye along the men ranked under the opposed banners. On the one side stands Charles I., a man of no great importance except as the representative of civil despotism ; on the other is seen Oliver Cromwell, in appearance a despot, but establishing principles to this day the glory and boast of England, and adding a lustre to her name brighter than ever shone from the deeds of Nelson or Wellington ; a man of surpassing genius, and whose real glory is yet unrecorded ; whose genius and national policy shall at some future period raise him high on the throne of human gratitude, whilst such as Charles I. are reduced to their own proper level. On the one side behold Laud, the bigoted representative of exclusive prelacy ; on the other John Milton, the loftiest genius in the world of poetry, and the pure-hearted worshipper of prin-

ciples emanating from Deity. Under the one banner, you count up a host of debauched cavaliers, with here and there a noble name to relieve the eye ; whilst under the other banner you view a multitude of men, who, with all their cant and bigotry, as a body practise rigid morality ; in whose soul is enshrined the deepest reverence for God, and next to this, the love of liberty ; men willing to sacrifice fortune and blood to secure to themselves and mankind civil freedom and "freedom to worship God." Look at these parties, and judge ye which is the noblest. It is a loftier honor to be enrolled with such as Cromwell, and Pym, and Hampden, with such as Milton, and Baxter, and Howe, than to mount the loftiest throne, to be lauded by a thousand Clarendons and Humes !

It would be a miracle indeed if some excesses were not committed. But let it be remembered, that civil and religious despotism had long dammed up the current of freedom ; and when the barriers could no longer restrain the accumulating waters, singular indeed would it be if the rushing tide had not for a time threatened the annihilation of all that was beautiful and desirable. But a mightier than human arm directed and controlled that impetuous torrent, and produced glorious things for man. The excesses may not be apologized for, but may be palliated by the circumstances of the case. But these do not demand attention in this sketch. Here we wish to know who were the men, and what their principles, who founded the Republic of the New World. It would be no uninteresting task to trace English Puritanism as it has been progressing in the mother country, and to exhibit its awaking and energizing power at this very moment ; but this would be stepping aside from our original design. We now turn to the last step taken in the progress of the third great experiment in government, as exhibited in American Democracy.

English Puritanism was the fruit of experiments made beneath the frowning despotism of deep-rooted customs and tyrannical government. Under the shade of these it could not reach its maturity ; but that God who is "in history" had reserved a continent free from incumbrances, where it might grow luxuriantly, and without restraint.

It was an occasion of no ordinary interest, when the Pilgrims received from the venerated Robinson his last words of advice and comfort. It was an occasion of no ordinary interest, when the same man of God baptized the infant nation of the New World in prayer, solemn and effectual, and invoked from Heaven the inspiring breath of immortality. The loftiest heroism was displayed. The passionate grief of friends, the untried ocean, the unbroken wilderness, the dreadful savage, the grim spectres of disease, famine, and death, moved them not in the least. The prophetic mantle had fallen upon them; and in the distant future they seemed to seize the outlines of perfect, governmental beauty, such as never before had visited the earth. They walked by faith, and the present, crowded as it was to excess with sorrows, was not regarded. Indeed, so mighty was the resolve of their souls, that for a time they seemed contending against an overruling Providence. The blasts of winter and the howling tempest withstood them, but even here they triumphed.

And now we remember one scene around which concentrated the gathering interest of all the previous experiments. It is that which took place in the cabin of the Mayflower. National government was now to combine in one the different principles evolved by other nations. The treasure-house of nations poured out its precious deposits. The Pilgrims were not alone in that assembly. Grecian Democracy, beautiful exceedingly, was there; Roman Law, with its relentless sceptre, was there; the great Lawgiver of the Jews was there, to plead the cause of the noble principle he had received direct from Heaven; Charlemagne and Alfred, and the heroes of the Magna Charta, with a host of valiant champions for human freedom, were congregated in that august assembly. That was a moment in which high destinies "hung balanced." The Pilgrims were the delegated representatives of two hundred generations of governmental experimenters. The responsibilities of the past and the destinies of the future hung on them. The high-minded lovers of mankind in by-gone years, "as a cloud of witnesses," bent an anxious gaze on the legislators of the New World. And well did they discharge the

high trust imposed. The guiding Spirit of God led them on, and a thousand generations shall hail the Pilgrims as blessed.

The result of that meeting will ever be recorded with gratitude. There is sublimity in the very style of their first compact, and it comprehends the elements which we believe constitute a perfect government. It combines the extremes, monarchy and democracy, perfect obedience to God as King, and perfect and equal affection to every fellow-subject, and implies the adoption of all the noble principles in national government, demonstrated during a period of 6000 years. Did space permit, we might quote this interesting document, but must content ourselves with simply referring to it as found in Morton's "New England's Memorial," and as quoted in other works easy of access. In that compact were embodied the principles which sustained the Pilgrims through fierce and terrible trials, which led them trustingly to look forward to the future, which nerved them in their stern rebukes to encroaching royalty, which constituted every man an Argus-eyed sentinel before the Temple of Freedom, and flung out before the astonished nations a banner covered with the rich emblazonry of heaven! Here was found the germ of Christian Republicanism, as it had been in the process of evolution since the beginning of nations. It began to realize the living, glorious, immortal creation wrought into life by the inspired genius of man! Its beauty was bewitching as ever entranced a poet's soul, its Herculean form and strength would have awakened a complacent smile upon the rigid face of a Roman Censor! whilst the bounding current of immortality, and its countenance, the impassioned index to a living soul, proclaimed this offspring of ages to be the child of God!

It will be impossible to trace minutely the different steps taken by the Pilgrims and their descendants, in carrying into operation their magnificent theory. Suffice it to say, they were men liable to err, but their very errors were noble, and were corrected as soon as perceived. They remembered the injunctions of the beloved Robinson, and embraced the truth whenever discovered.

The principal interest which arises from the actions of the Pilgrims, is the fact, that they gave character, so far as fundamental principles are concerned, to the Republic which now embraces so large a portion of the Western Continent : and we are now prepared to glance over this result of the world's experiments.

Here it must be frankly acknowledged that, to a superficial observer, this government gives but little evidence of its high origin, and that many stains deface its beauty. In these respects it does not realize what we have chosen to denominate Christian Republicanism. The fault, however, is not in its theory ; that is as near perfect as is ever attained by the human mind : the Declaration of Independence contains that theory. The great difficulty consists in a departure from first principles, and the introduction of elements into the political system, at war with the letter and spirit of the theory. And is it necessary to enumerate the evidences of this assertion ? The facts are thrust before us continually, and we are compelled to look upon them steadily, whilst the question falls upon our ear with startling power, Can our government survive ?

Far be it from me to rank myself with religious bigots, or interested demagogues, croaking, like ill-omened birds, of coming ruin. The question of greatest importance here is, not whether the body politic is afflicted with some grievous diseases, ruinous if not checked ; but does it possess such an *expulsive energy* as shall at length throw off these diseases, and restore its natural and healthful action ? This is the true view of the subject, penetrating beneath the surface of things, and seeking for the real causes which are to produce the final result.

And in investigating this question, two considerations will throw light upon its answer. For instance, what is the relation of the individuals in our nation to what was demonstrated in Jewish history to be the only principle of national immortality ? In theory we occupy an enviable position, but our practice does not agree with that theory ; for it must be admitted, we are far from understanding perfect obedience to God, and perfect affection to our fellow men. Were this true, this

government, like a full fountain with its outgush of pure water, would indignantly throw out of itself every thing hurtful and poisonous. But that this is not so now, ought not to be a cause of despondency ; for if the heart of the nation is partially under the control of this principle, and if causes are accumulating and sweeping onwards irresistibly to make that control perfect, we have cause to exult in the goodness of the Supreme King of nations, who has brought us thus far, and will not now forsake us. And this is believed to be the fact. A thousand potent energies have awaked, and are bringing their mighty enginery to bear on the moral character of the nation. True, in the moral world there have been terrific tempests, and lightnings kindling the heavens into one fearful blaze of brightness, whilst clashing thunder has caused the earth to rock. The stoutest heart has shrunk in dismay, and trembled for the result. But that tremendous conflict is the hope and omen of glorious things to come. Truth fears it not, for her triumph is certain.

"Truth crushed to earth shall rise again,
The eternal years of God are hers :
But error, wounded, writhes in pain,
And dies amid her worshippers."

This terrific conflict of the moral elements will result in the same manner as a conflict of the natural elements. The fierce shock of embattled clouds, discharging their pent-up wrath, with a crash deafening and terrible, passes away, leaving the atmosphere pure and invigorating. Thus the agitations which have clothed our moral heavens with blackness, convulsing all things, will finally leave us a spiritual atmosphere so pure and invigorating that the fundamental energy of our government shall spring into full activity, with power augmented and control supreme.

The Pilgrims have long since entered upon the enjoyment of rest above, but their influence is still abroad. The baptismal prayer of the sainted Robinson, and the divine fragrance of importunate and effectual supplications for this nation, still live before the eternal throne.

"The pilgrim *spirit* has not fled :
It walks in noon's bright light ;
And it watches the bed of the glorious dead
With the holy stars by night.
And it watches the bed of the brave who have bled,
And shall guard this ice-bound shore,
Till the waves of the Bay, where the Mayflower lay,
Shall foam and freeze no more."

God also is moving among us, electrifying the lifeless, energizing the indolent, and concentrating at the seat of life of our government the expulsive energies of immortality. And this being true, shall we despair? Shall the ill bodings of false prophets paralyze our hopes and fill us only with "a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation?" The thought is unworthy, and we cannot for a moment indulge it. We will frankly acknowledge the presence of disease in frightful forms ; but so far from despairing, we fervently will trust that the expulsive principle breathed into this government at the passionate invocation of its founders, shall finally fling out of the system every thing noxious, and display it to the world in the rounded symmetry and proportion of unfading and deathless perfection.

But the anxious investigator as to the fate of this government, will find another joyous omen in the tendencies of the age. For long centuries the nations were wrapped in darkness, their degradation was extreme, and the tendencies of all things were to sink them deeper. The human mind, like an undisturbed ocean, was corrupting in its own stagnancy. Despotism in religion and state, brooded like a gloomy goddess over this ocean, reducing to quiet every rippling wave, which perchance might disturb its tranquillity. But there was an immortal energy in that deep, quiet sea, which soon was to expand, and heave the stagnant ocean into an uncontrollable tempest. That tempest has long since arisen, and the mighty spirits of the storm have rode forth in glorious vindication of oppressed humanity. Then a tide toward human emancipation set in, which is steadily and majestically rolling on to its consummation. De Tocqueville has splendidly expressed

the resistlessness of this tendency in human affairs: "It possesses all the characteristics of a divine decree; it is universal, it is durable, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress." In fact, we live in a wonderful age, when all nations are starting from slumber, and are moving upwards. Some mighty orb seems placed above them, attracting all from their debasement up to itself.

But in this remarkable and joyous tendency of our age, is our nation alone unaffected? As that divine decree, above human interference, and aided by all events and men, moves on to its accomplishment, are we alone excluded? Mankind unite in assigning us the highest place in this sublime movement. We shall enjoy its highest fruition; we shall be placed upon its loftiest pinnacle. Then away with despondency. Let the bigot declaim, the demagogue denounce indignation, empty as his own hollow-heartedness, but let us not cease to remember our high origin. The movements of a world through sixty centuries gave our nation birth, the solemn prayer of the Pilgrim is our representative at the court of heaven, and the breath of immortality our high gift from God. And the regenerating power of this immortality is accumulating, and fast transforming American Democracy into Christian Republicanism. When this takes place, the last, the sublime experiment in government shall have reached its perfection, Christian Republicanism will then become the exquisite model for the world, and under its guiding light all nations fast rise to the fulfilment of their glorious destiny.

ARTICLE II.

DR. POND'S LECTURES ON PASTORAL DUTY, REVIEWED.

The Young Pastor's Guide : or Lectures on Pastoral Duties. By ENOCH POND, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor. Bangor : Published by E. F. Duren. William Hyde, Portland ; Tappan & Dennett, Boston ; Ezra Collier, New-York ; A. H. Maltby, New-Haven. 1844. 12mo, pp. 377.

THIS book is in some respects a novelty. Treatises on Homiletics, indeed, are somewhat numerous : though even here, one does not find precisely what he wants. Dr. Porter's work is undoubtedly the best ; yet, as he himself tells us, there are some important topics that he does not discuss. A thorough, complete work on Homiletics, adapted to the latitude and longitude of New England, and to the peculiar exigencies of this nineteenth century, is still a desideratum. The Pastoral department of the ministerial office has still less engaged the attention of writers. At least very few books on Pastoral Duty have fallen in our own way ; and those few have confined themselves to specific portions of the subject, without aiming at any comprehensive discussion. Baxter's Reformed Pastor we regard as invaluable. Appeals to ministers, more solemn, more searching, never were made, than some which that book contains ; and there are many very useful hints in regard to modes of labor. We should like to see the work reprinted in a neat and separate form, placed on every minister's table by the side of his Bible, and made his daily companion. If ministers communed more with Baxter they would be holier men. But Baxter is not all that a minister wants. He wants a book not only urging him to fidelity, not only discussing some of the prominent branches of his work, but examining it in all its details, and counselling him how to act in all the varied circumstances in which he is placed.

This want Dr. Pond has attempted to meet: and we think, on the whole, with much success. He omits few topics, if any, whose discussion is desirable in such a book. He begins with the subject of pastoral *qualifications*; then proceeds to reply to the various questions that arise in regard to *settlement* in the ministry; next takes up the various relations and duties *after* settlement, which are enumerated and discussed with great particularity: and finally, in the last three lectures of the twenty-seven, canvasses the subjects of Dismissions, Withdrawment from the Ministry, and Results of Pastoral Labor. Dr. Pond has in fact given us a full methodical treatise upon the important subject of Pastoral Duty, in all its parts. A "young Pastor," or candidate for the pastoral office, need but glance his eye over the table of contents to discover that the book deals largely in topics with which he is personally concerned.

The book is very creditably got up. The form, binding, type, and paper, are all good. We notice a very few typographical errors; but in general the printing is accurate. We are happy to say that the book is in this respect very favorably distinguished from the last edition of the Doctor's work on Baptism, than which, though printed in Boston, we do not recollect to have seen a book more crowded with typographical blunders.

The style is eminently simple and direct. We know of few men, who can present an idea, or a train of ideas, more clearly than Dr. Pond. Even in his more metaphysical discussions, as all can testify who have heard him in the pulpit or the lecture-room, there is an entire absence of that element of mysticism and darkness in which some men so delight to move. The Doctor, we presume, rather congratulates himself that he knows nothing of those "depths" ("as they speak"): we certainly think that his students are to be congratulated, and all with whom his students do or will come in contact. In a book like the present, simplicity and directness are of the first importance. Dealing throughout with practical matters, it ought to be a plain, didactic, practical book.

And such it is. Yet not didactic in the sense of being dull : for the book has no inconsiderable animation and fire, and we think will be read with interest even by laymen. Something of this may be owing to the fact, that it consists of a series of lectures, prepared in the first instance for oral delivery, and actually delivered to a body of students.

We find no irrelevant matter—no tedious prolixity in the discussion of matters in point. There seems to be a somewhat studied avoidance of encroachment upon the department of Homiletics : though, in the lectures on Revivals, there are some remarks on what should be the general features of pulpit (along with other) effort, at such seasons, which constitute one of the most valuable portions of the book. As to conciseness, we think that in some of his discussions the Doctor has followed a rule which he lays down in regard to social meetings, namely, that they should close at a point of time when those present are still desiring to have them continued longer. If the rule is good in one case, we suppose it is in another : yet we wish there had been a little more fullness on some topics. We here refer, however, chiefly to some of the minor ones : and perhaps, after all, the Doctor has judged wisely in compressing the book within as narrow limits as he has. We confess, we have been surprised as well as pleased, to find him answering so many questions in so brief a space, and answering them at the same time so well.

From the views in general which Dr. Pond propounds, we presume few New England clergymen will dissent. A perfect unanimity on all points, where the points are so many, can hardly be expected. But we are very much deceived, if most of Dr. Pond's counsels will not commend themselves to his elder, no less than his younger brethren, as sound and safe. On most of the vexed questions, the arguments are given both *pro* and *con* ; and, so far as we are able to judge, with a good degree of fairness. The Doctor has generally a pretty decided opinion himself, and declares it boldly. This we like : and we like the other feature too. We thus learn not only his own conclusions in the particular case, but the

process by which he has arrived at them : and can examine this process at our leisure, step by step. A succinct statement of the grounds relied on to support the antagonist positions in any important question is of great value to the student. It furnishes him with the *materials of thought* : and with materials of a kind which the young man, in a case like the present especially, cannot always get at, without the help of another, whose observation and experience have been more diversified than his own. These statements in books are like those bits of paper two or three inches square, written in pencil and covered with short sentences, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., which are sometimes seen lying on the student's table ; and which embodying, as they do, the condensed results of past investigations, and the germs of future ones, have a value which it is notorious that a chamber-maid, or even a wife, does not always comprehend.¹

Many things in these Lectures we like exceedingly. There are some remarks about the delay of settlement after a young man's regular course of study is finished, which are as timely as they are judicious.

“Undoubtedly there are reasons which may justify a young man, when his course is finished, in declining a settlement for a season. Such are, want of health, extreme youth and inexperience, or a broken, imperfect education, requiring to be improved by longer study. Nor would I say, that there are not persons to whom neither of the foregoing reasons are applicable, who, if circumstances favor, may not properly prolong their course of study, or avail themselves of the advantages of foreign travel, and intercourse with the world. But this I think I may safely say, that persons who—having enjoyed the advantages of a full course of study, and still feeling unprepared for the pastoral office—resort to the expedients last named, for the purpose of removing difficulties, and increasing their sense of preparation, are very frequently disappointed. After having prolonged

¹ Some of the German books are very valuable for these condensed statements. And the Germans are sometimes clear and able logicians. We cite Hengstenberg and Bretschneider as examples. We know of few clearer writers in any language than they. The analysis of Schleiermacher's system found in Bretschneider's *Dogmatik* is masterly.

their studies another year or two, and visited other seminaries, and perhaps foreign countries, they feel the same shrinking from the pastoral office which they did before, and the same want of preparation to meet its duties and responsibilities. It is possible, indeed, that their *preparation* for this high office is not at all increased by the delay. They may have become better fitted for other employments, but not at all better fitted for the holy, humble, self-denying duties of a parish minister." p. 27.

Those who are pursuing the course here condemned, and are verifying in their own character and habits the remarks here made, will perhaps read this passage with a sneer; but most men who have actually entered upon the pastoral office, and have ascertained by personal experience what the wants of a pastor are, will subscribe to Dr. Pond's views heartily.

It is true, few can attempt pulpit labor for a succession of years, without finding reason to lament that their mental stores, be they great as they may, are not more abundant; and could they have protracted their years of preparatory study, *with the knowledge that they now have of what needs to be studied*, they might very considerably have augmented their qualifications for usefulness. But what *are* the studies in which the resident licentiates at our Theological Seminaries, and others, who delay entering upon the pastoral work, engage? We question very much, whether, in general, they are those which tend to qualify a young man for a clear statement and a forcible illustration of truth. The points inquired into, are the nice points of metaphysical theology, the minutiae of Biblical criticism, the curious matters of history or archæology, or other things of the same general description. We may mistake; but we apprehend that these are the directions which the efforts of an ardent student will rather naturally take, and do take as a matter of fact. And by and by, when he enters upon his work, what is the discovery which he makes? A discovery, one would think, which he might have foreseen, but which, in fact, takes him quite by surprise, and causes him not a little pain; namely, that he has yet to do many of the "first works" in biblical and theological study. He

finds that he needs a familiarity with the *plain* matters of these sciences, far more than any insight (which perhaps he has never really obtained, and never will obtain,) into the *abstruse* matters. He wants a stock of materials to draw from, not for scholastic debate, but for popular instruction. He is to "teach his people knowledge;" and his own knowledge must be of a kind which he *can* teach them, and which, when imparted, will be of solid benefit.¹ We believe most fully, that a young man, while in College, and in the Theological Seminary, had better keep closely to the prescribed course of study; and that when that course is finished, he is ordinarily *better* fitted for the pastoral office, than he would be after a longer term of preparation.

In many cases, it is to be feared, young men of a certain class deceive themselves, when they suppose that they *desire* a better preparation for the ministry. The *real* desire is to gratify their love of literary pursuits, and their ambition to shine as literary men. There are indications that the old-fashioned idea of a "call" to the ministry is, in many quarters, getting quite out of date. Many young men think that they are *called* to something else, and all their tastes and feelings flow in the corresponding direction. Their *call* is to cultivate fine scholarship—to enlarge the sphere of human knowledge—to fill professorships, or write books. They study for the ministry, as the Jew in the process of his education used to apply himself to some art or trade, namely, that they may have something to rely upon for a livelihood, if their favorite schemes fall through. The ministry is a matter by the by. We are sorry to say it, but we believe that there are many

¹ We say not, that he should have *no* knowledge which he does not mean to impart. We say not, that he should let *abstruse* matters entirely alone. Both of these positions we repudiate as emphatically as any one. The Queen of Sheba's "hard questions" it is well for all the Solomons, and all the would-be Solomons in the world to grapple with. But no sensible man will have a Queen of Sheba at his elbow always. As of old let her be a *visitor*, not a *companion*. A minister certainly, or a candidate for the ministry, can be in better business.

students in our Theological Seminaries—we might go further, and say, many men actually holding the pastoral office—to whom this description applies. We were struck with a remark recently made by an intelligent Christian lady in our hearing. She had shortly before, on a certain Sabbath, listened to the preaching of a young man whose sermons were more than commonly interesting. But on subsequently meeting him in private, she got the impression that he did not care about preaching, if he could only obtain an eligible situation at some college, or other institution. Said she, “I had supposed that every *minister* ought to feel, and *did* feel, ‘Wo is me, if I preach not the Gospel!’” When this *is* the genuine feeling in a young man’s mind, we imagine that little difficulty will be found in persuading him to assume the pastoral office. The difficulty will be, not to get him into it sufficiently *soon*, but to keep him out of it sufficiently *long*.

On a subsequent page of the Lecture upon Settlement in the Ministry, the question is briefly discussed as to the desirableness of a temporary itinerancy, as preparatory to the pastoral office. Dr. Pond decides it in much the same manner as the foregoing. He says,

“I would by no means have a young man over-anxious for settlement; so much so, as to lead him to take any unwarrantable measures to effect his object; or to feel discouraged, should God see fit to try him by some delay. But, as I have before remarked, when the preparatory studies of an individual are closed, and he is favored with health and strength, and God in his providence opens a door for settlement, I see not why he should hesitate to enter in; or why he should prefer to turn away from the open door, and wait for a more convenient season. He may think to gain some valuable experience; or to see more of the world; or to prepare a stock of sermons. But his experience as an itinerant will not be of much value to him as a settled pastor. A sufficient knowledge of the world he may have opportunities to acquire in other ways. And as to a stock of sermons prepared under such circumstances, and without any particular object in view, they are of less value than young inexperienced ministers generally suppose. They may save the labor of preparing new ones; but they will be less appropriate and effective than new ones; less creditable to the preacher, and less profitable to those who hear. Besides, if one door of usefulness is declined, another may not soon be

opened ; and the individual may deplore his error, when the time is past for him to retrieve it."—p. 30.

The question here discussed, is one of those on which we should have been glad if Dr. Pond's suggestions had been a little more copious. We had supposed that there might be a process of gradual initiation into the duties and trials of ministerial life, which should be better than entering upon them fully at once. Perhaps Dr. Pond's idea is, that there will be enough of this initiatory discipline connected with the usual vacational and other efforts of the last year of a young man's theological course. These, however, are very different from the continuous labors of a five or six month's sojourn in some particular place or places. In these latter circumstances, a young man certainly learns something in regard to reaching the minds and consciences of men. His sermons come to assume a somewhat more effective character. And it would seem that, after a six month's or year's experience of this sort, he might, to a certain degree, be better prepared to enter upon the duties of a settled pastor. Whether any perceptible influence would be exerted upon a man's permanent usefulness, we undertake not to say. We must confess, that we have some doubts whether it would ordinarily be of much consequence. Certainly it would not be of consequence enough to justify one, for the sake of it, in turning aside from any important field of pastoral usefulness.

The following Lecture contains, among other things, an able argument in favor of the Congregational position, that a pastor should be a member of the church to which he ministers. We should be glad to make some quotations ; but our limits forbid. Indeed, on this, and many other points, no short quotation could do any justice to the writer.

Two Lectures are devoted to the subject of pastoral Visiting. That it belongs to a pastor to visit his people, is a position which Dr. Pond thinks too obviously correct to require any protracted argument. Few, we trust, think otherwise. Many valuable directions are given in regard to the mode of performing the duty, and the treatment of different classes

of persons. This last topic, however, forms the subject of an additional and distinct Lecture.

In some of the subsequent Lectures will be found various judicious counsels in regard to the management of cases of Discipline, the solemnization of Marriages, the conducting of Funeral Services, the administration of the Sacraments, the admission of members to the Church, etc. Some excellent remarks, which we wish had been more extended, are made on the duties of a Pastor as the presiding officer of his Church in their business meetings. A Lecture is devoted to the subject of Sabbath evening and other extra services. Many hints are thrown out in regard to the number of these which should ordinarily be held during the week ; the manner in which they should be conducted ; the dangers to be avoided, etc. The question respecting the propriety and desirableness of lay-exhortation, Dr. Pond does not touch. He takes it for granted, however, that this will occur, and thinks that there should be at least one meeting every week of the social kind.

We have already alluded to the Lectures on Revivals. These are five : including a Lecture on Protracted Meetings, and one on Evangelists. Dr. Pond's heart is evidently very much interested in this subject. We know not whether he meant to make it the great subject of the book : but it certainly occupies a central place, and is discussed with an ability not surpassed in any other part of the volume. Those who have seen Dr. Pond in revivals, know that he is never more at home, and that his preaching and conversation at such seasons have been greatly blessed. Much practical wisdom may of course be expected in his counsels. He does not take the trouble to discuss the propriety of various minor expedients, which a rash zeal has so often employed within the last ten or twelve years. He takes it for granted that they are exploded, at least in the practice of all sensible ministers (if indeed such ministers ever employed them). But he *does* discuss the great leading objects to be aimed at, and the great leading measures to be pursued : and determines them in strict consistency, alike with the directions of the Bible, and

the dictates of a sound philosophy. He makes it very clear that both in order to the commencement of a revival, and its continuance, there is a *human* work to be done; and he explains clearly what that work in its successive stages is.

We are particularly pleased with Dr. Pond's remarks on the importance of conviction of sin, and the methods by which, with the blessing of God, it is to be produced. Nothing can be more evident than that this "law-work," as our fathers called it, is fundamental to genuine conversion. They did well to insist upon it as strongly as they did; and we love to see it insisted upon now. We only wish that instruction upon the point could reach the quarters where it is most needed. We have seen preachers (not of the Congregational or Presbyterian denominations, though we will not undertake to say that none such are to be found) who seemed to have no conception that there was any process appropriately coming in *between* awakening and conversion; and who seemed to think persons "mourners," in the sense of the Beatitudes, and entitled to be "comforted," the moment they were anxious or distressed. We have known protracted meetings, lasting many days, where the word sin was hardly mentioned, and where, certainly, there was little attempt to produce conviction. To our utter surprise, we have seen preachers of considerable intelligence falling in with their more ignorant brethren in this respect, all seeming alike to forget that the work of the Spirit in regard to sinners, as described in John xvi., is not two-fold, but three-fold. Who wonders that, in certain quarters, the doctrine is held of "falling away?" If a man is converted without being convicted, he *must* fall away. And, as a matter of fact, such converts *do* "fall away" in vast numbers. Of a hundred converted in the winter, sometimes not ten, perhaps not five, will "persevere" through the summer. We make these statements—the truth of which hundreds of men all over the country can vouch—in no spirit of unkindness, but rather in that of unfeigned surprise and sorrow, that there should be any evangelical ministers, and especially that there should be so many, making here so fatal a

mistake, and doing their own churches, as well as the cause of religion in general, so much injury. All evangelical ministers, of all denominations, certainly ought to be agreed that conversion is good for nothing, when not based on conviction.

Dr. Pond makes some valuable suggestions in regard to the treatment of young converts. The argument, sometimes derived from the practice of the Apostles, for receiving persons professing to be converted, into the Church at once, we do not remember to have seen any where more briefly and happily refuted than in one of these Lectures. We quote the passage :

"The *difference of circumstances* between ourselves and the Apostles, ought here to be taken into the account. So far as our circumstances and theirs are alike, we are bound to follow their example to the letter. But when there is a wide and manifest difference, as in the case before us, we are to practice, not precisely as the Apostles did, but as we have reason to believe they would, were they in circumstances like our own.

"In the age of the Apostles, there was much less *inducement* to deception, and proportionably less danger of it, than there is at present. Then the instruction imparted was of the best kind ; given under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. And the exposure at that period not only to reproach and shame, but to palpable persecution, was so great, that none would be likely to make a *profession* of their faith in Christ, who were not in possession of the great reality. In the peculiar circumstances of that age, a simple profession on the spot, such as was always made previous to baptism, furnished probably a more decisive evidence of piety, than converts in general can furnish now, after weeks of probation.

"It should be considered, too, that the Apostles were under the immediate direction of the Holy Spirit, which rendered them, if not infallible in the discernment of character, at least much better judges than we can pretend to be. We have evidence of this, in the readiness with which Peter detected the hypocrisy of Ananias and Sapphira, and of Simon the sorcerer. As we have not the power to unmask hypocrisy after this manner, so neither have we the power to decide (as the Apostles did ordinarily on the spot) who are and who are not proper candidates for admission to the Church of Christ. We lay no claim to the supernatural direction of the Holy Spirit in this matter, but are left to the slow processes of probation and inquiry.

"But though we dare not follow the example of the inspired Apos-

cles to the letter, in this thing, we do profess to follow it in *substance* and *spirit*. The Apostles admitted persons to the church so soon as they were *satisfied* of their conversion ; and we are entitled to do the same. The only difference is, they had the means of obtaining satisfaction *sooner*, ordinarily, than we can.

“ I have said that we are entitled to receive professed converts to the church so soon as we can obtain reasonable *satisfaction* on the question of their piety. But this cannot be obtained in one day, or two. It cannot be obtained, as a general thing, in one week, or two. Persons need *time* for reflection and self-examination, after they indulge the hope of being (that they have *been* ?)¹ converted, before it will be prudent for them to offer themselves as candidates for the church. And the church needs *time* in which to judge of their experience, and observe the character and walk of professed converts, before they can be satisfied on the question of their piety, and can prudently receive them to the fellowship of God’s people. *Satisfaction*, I repeat, is what the church wants, and as soon as this can be obtained, and not before, should the candidate for membership be permitted to enroll himself among the professed disciples of Jesus.”

Of the system (if system it may be called) of Evangelism, the Doctor is a firm and strenuous opponent. He believes that the pastor should be his people’s revivalist, and that if he is what he ought to be, they will need no other. The Lecture on this subject has been published as a separate article in the *New-Englander*, and is worthy of the careful attention of ministers and churches. It is not of great length, but disposes of the subject satisfactorily, and is without bitterness or unfairness.

Of protracted meetings, Dr. Pond is an equally firm and strenuous advocate. Whatever his readers may think in regard to the correctness of his views, they will concede that the case is well argued. The lecture constitutes a very good document for any one to refer to, who wishes to make up his mind upon the subject. And it is a subject of no small importance. Special services of *some* kind, we take it, will be known as long as revivals are known. There is a speciality about the whole nature of a revival ; and the means employed to secure

¹ Neither expression is strictly correct, for *hope* cannot be properly applied either to the present or the past—either to that which is or that which has been : and the conversion is here spoken of as existing.—Ed.

and advance a revival must have something of speciality too. A young man begins his ministry, perhaps, strong in the belief that the stated means of grace are not sufficiently valued, and that it is short-sighted policy to employ any others. But before many years have passed away, he finds that there are times when some special means *must* be employed, if he would save the soul of his people. His church, perhaps, are slumbering. He tries to arouse them. He throws the utmost possible earnestness and pungency into his sermons. He makes the most of the regular church-meetings. He endeavors to give as solemn, searching, thrilling a character as possible to the communion seasons. He visits from house to house, "reproving, rebuking, exhorting, with all long-suffering and doctrine." But in vain. The lethargy continues. It has peculiar depth and power. The disease is alarming; and he becomes convinced that some means must be employed, *adapted to his special exigency*. Perhaps he induces the church to appoint, or informally appoints himself, a visiting committee to go about and exhort their brethren. Perhaps he appoints a series of weekly church-fasts;—perhaps a series of evening prayer-meetings. *Something* he will do—he *must* do. So far, we take it, all ministers, who desire and aim at revivals, are agreed. And they are agreed also, that when a revival is in progress, there must ordinarily be some multiplication of religious services. At such seasons, there is a craving for instruction, which no devoted pastor can find it in his heart to deny. The only point of difference is, as to what the special services shall be. Dr. Pond argues in favor of protracted meetings, technically so called:—not simply a multiplication of services, but "a series of meetings continued a portion of the time, more or less, through several successive days." p. 175. The idea would be rather naturally gathered from his lecture, that special efforts to promote a revival should generally take this one form, or at least that this should be prominent among the efforts used. It strikes us that the Doctor would have done better to argue in favor of the *principle* of special services, allowing a little more latitude as to the shape

which they should assume. If we mistake not, he would in this case have done more justice to his real sentiments. For although we believe that he has great faith in the efficacy of the protracted meeting, yet we think he would be as ready as any man to question the expediency of any one unchangeable measure or set of measures, and to acknowledge that different measures answer best at different times.

From the subject of Revivals, Dr. Pond passes to the duty of a pastor as to enlisting the co-operation of his church in his schemes of usefulness. A well-written lecture is devoted to this topic. Another canvasses the pastor's duties toward the youth of his flock. Another discusses his relations to the charitable objects of the day. In this lecture, Dr. Pond takes up the question of agencies, and shows with great clearness and force that they cannot yet be dispensed with. There are, however, one or two statements which we should have been glad to see in a form somewhat more guarded.

"We occasionally," says Dr. Pond, "find a Pastor, who can be his own agent, and who will take efficient care of all charitable objects among his people. Perhaps it would be well if all Pastors were of this stamp. But it cannot be disguised, that this is not the fact; nor is likely to be very soon. Some Pastors are not fitted, *or adapted*, to do the work of agents. They could not well do it, even if they were called to engage in it as an employment. Others, who could do it, are exceedingly averse to it, especially among their own people. They prefer that some one should come and plead the cause of benevolence, rather than undertake the work themselves. Even in the primitive churches, the Pastors needed jogging and helping in the matter of collecting their charitable contributions; and the Apostle Paul and his corps of Evangelists were not unwilling to be employed occasionally, as agents for this important purpose." P. 233.

These statements seem to leave the impression, that it is only few ministers who may hope to present the object of benevolence successfully to their flocks. We venture to suggest, whether it is not rather only a few who may *not* indulge this hope; and whether the many ought not to be urged to qualify themselves, and keep themselves qualified, for the duty. A

mere "aversion" to a duty certainly ought not to be received as an excuse for not performing it; and in this case, as in many others, when the duty is honestly attempted, aversion often gives place to delight. To us it seems evident, that pastors need some impulse of this sort, to induce them to maintain a familiar acquaintance with the benevolent movements of the day; and why may they not keep themselves as familiar, considering all the facilities enjoyed at present, as any agent—except indeed he be one of the secretaries of our benevolent organizations? We confess that there is, in many quarters, a deficiency among pastors on this point. Our only objection to Dr. Pond's views is, that he seems to regard this deficiency as a *necessary* one, and does not address himself, with his usual energy, to having it remedied. It should be remarked, however, in justice to Dr. Pond, that he prescribes no small amount of labor for the pastor, as well as the agent, to perform in regard to those objects—an amount which the pastor hardly can perform without becoming a good agent himself.

Beside the lectures already noticed, there are excellent ones on the Pastor's duty in relation to the induction of others into the ministry—his intercourse with other ministers and churches of his own denomination—his relations to other denominations—the duties which he owes to himself—to his family—his political duties. The lecture on Respect for the Ministry, discussing the questions, Whether this respect is greater or less now than formerly, and How it may be forfeited and how retained, is one of great interest. The lecture on Frequent Dismissions—causes and remedies—is in Dr. Pond's happiest style. That on withdrawing from the Ministry deserves attentive consideration. And the last, on the results of faithful pastoral labor, forms an appropriate close to the series.

On the whole, the book is worthy of its author and worthy of New-England. If it has any faults, they "lean to virtue's side," arising from the ardent and active spirit of the writer; and they are faults of a very trivial character, compared with

the solid and manifest excellences of the book. Dr. Pond will receive the thanks of many "Young Pastors" for this valuable "Guide." Those who formerly listened to these lectures, will rejoice to renew their acquaintance with them, and will perceive that they retain not a little of that earnest and paternal spirit in which they were first delivered. All sincere men in the ministry, or looking forward to it, will be glad to be presented with a comprehensive survey of the field of pastoral duty, and with a high standard of the fidelity which ought to be exhibited. In recent years, much has been said, through the religious newspapers and other channels, in regard to the exorbitant demands made upon ministers at the present period: and to a degree justly. Yet there is danger in remarks of this kind. There is a tendency to narrow down the sphere of ministerial duty, and to relax the force of conscientious impulses in a minister's heart. According to some, a minister need attend no social meetings, need preach no lectures, need make no visits, except to the sick and afflicted. To preach on the Sabbath, to attend funerals, and to solemnize marriages, constitute about the amount of his ordinary duties. Doubtless there are ministers to whom these indulgences are indispensable—whose health and strength would not hold out otherwise. But they are exceptions to a general rule. Most ministers need to be stimulated, rather than held back. They have hearts like those of other men. Give them liberty to do little, and they will do little. They need to be told that there is *much* for them to do, and that they must do it. Neither in the church, nor in the ministry, does the danger at present lie in the direction of *excess* of zeal and purity and devotedness. Alas! it is too evident that vast masses of ministerial energy lie dormant. There are even sad monuments—just now all too conspicuous—of the fact that ministers can, not only neglect their Master's business, but do the Devil's. Nor would it be strange, if in coming years, with the growing prosperity of the country, and the growing temptations as well of ministers as of others, these monuments should multiply. We want not then to be told,

that there is this and that and the other old-fashioned pastoral duty that we may omit. Nor yet is it the main lesson which we have to learn—though a true lesson—that the measure of our literary, our biblical and theological attainments is low, and must be elevated. Say to us, You have a great work to do—in the study and *out* of it. The work has many branches; all of which require skill, patience, love. The work is difficult. When best done, it will be poorly done. Christ has sent you into his vineyard to *labor*. Fulfil your calling. With every breath pray to Him for help. Look for rest hereafter. We love Baxter because he *does* say this, so plainly, so earnestly, so solemnly. Dr. Pond, in a somewhat different way, has said it too. We thank him for painting that panorama of Duty. These are the best of all panoramas to behold, save those of *Truth* and of *Hope*.

ARTICLE III.

LANE'S REFUGE OF LIES AND COVERT FROM THE STORM REVIEWED

By Rev. SAMUEL H. COX, D. D., Brooklyn, N. Y.

The Refuge of Lies, and the Covert from the Storm : being a series of Thirteen Sabbath Evening Lectures on the subject of Future Punishment. By Rev. BENJAMIN I. LANE. Troy, N. Y. 1844.

THE subject of Universalism demands attention, especially on one ground—the damage it does to the souls of men. Some even of the evangelical and orthodox ministry, seem practically to neglect it as not worthy of their notice. Those whose religion is more scientific or scholastic or metaphysical, it may be, than spiritual and practical and scriptural, may think it altogether beneath their care—because it is so scandalously an absurdity, a sophism, a vain theory. Yes, it is

all this ; and were this all it is, the best way of treating it would be with omission and contempt, as a system that is properly no system ; a vile heresy that is too palpably false to deserve refutation ;¹ a fond and foolish view of things that utterly misrepresents them ; a doctrine wholly without evidence and wholly against evidence too.

But there is one other consideration of great moment. It is its practical influence. This is certainly great and as certainly tremendous. Their doctrine is a lie, and its adoption infects the soul. It is received by the spirit of unbelief, as a very necessary solace to its wounds. It blinds, perverts, infatuates the mind. Sin is at once its parent and its offspring ; while it entails the bitter pangs of perdition on its voluntary victim. This we aver as our own solemn and sincere belief. Whatever singular or monstrous things may be charitably hoped or imagined, in the way of exception to all rules, and of which we may have much persuasion and no proof, we hold it certain as the rule, that, whatever else the Universalist may be, he is surely not regenerated, he is truly no Christian according to the oracles of God. We cannot believe that the people of Christ are possibly so characterized by soul-subverting, God-denying, and men-destroying error. The elect of God are not perfect in this world indeed ; but still they are all characterized as lovers of the truth, as genuine self-renounced disciples, as humble and docile and obedient children, learning progressively *the way of the Lord more perfectly*. How all this may consist with the error of Universalism, latent or openly professed, we could never see. Nor knew we ever one of them, among quite a number, who even seemed to us to be truly and spiritually pious. They may be naturally amiable in comparison of others ; they may be honest, and refined, and urbane, in all their social relations ; they may live well, that is, generously and with elegance of manners ; they may keep respectable company and wear clean and fashionable clothes ; they may be orthodox poli-

¹ Tale portentum refutatione indignum est.—CALVIN on 1 John 2 : 2.

ticians—questionably, be wealthy, patriotic of a sort, and largely influential. And what of it all? Such flaring externals may take the million, may seem a very good substitute, or be a very current counterfeit, of true religion. But, how silly to be deceived by them! They no more constitute piety, than they do the starry firmament or the mineral riches of the earth's unexplored interior. Those who choose to be deluded may mistake, if they please, thistles for wheat, or cockles for barley, or rainbows for bread, and *ignes fatui* for palaces of safety. We find in the oracles of God no hope for them, remaining impenitent and *unrenewed in the spirit of their mind*. *They have corrupted themselves; their spot is not the spot of his children; they are a perverse and crooked generation.*

One of the illustrious Fathers, we think it is Calvin, in some of his Commentaries, observes to this effect—that objections to the truth, arguments against it, and errors that deform or subvert it, are not to be contemned by the ministers of religion, in proportion to their intrinsic folly or sophistry or ineptitude. We, who stand with Christ as it were on the mount of transfiguration, and walk with him in the light of *the excellent glory*, may indeed look down on the mists and the darkness of the plains and the vales below us, and for ourselves we may despise their dreams, their delusions, and their sophomorical arrogance—and despise also the terrene stratum of atmosphere in which they walk astray and wander far from God. But, he continues, we may not practically despise them at all—because they have souls, and because their errors uncorrected will be their destruction, and because we are ministers of the word to this very end that we may pity and seek and reclaim them. Here are three reasons well sustaining the pious position, in reference to our duty and our practice. And with this remark we are prepared to introduce to our readers the performance of the Rev. BENJAMIN I. LANE, whose Lectures on future punishment seem to us to have been inspired by sentiments allied to it in form and congenial with it in spirit and character. But before we examine his work

more particularly, we may be indulged in some general reflections, further, on the subject of Universalism.

1. A plain, strong-minded, honest man, reading carefully and devoutly the volume of inspired truth, having no prepossessions to gratify, no prejudices to conquer, and no theories to support, but on the contrary sincerely aiming to know *the truth as it is in Jesus*, and desirous of avoiding all the forms and the sinuosities of error, would never dream or think of such a doctrine as Universalism in connection with its pages.

We mean by this more than to imply that some of the disturbing forces of sin and folly operate the conclusion in every instance of its existence. Whether they are deliberate or latent, known or unknown to their victim, such is palpably the fact. He finds in the Bible a doctrine which the Bible does not contain ; which its total scope repudiates with holy indignation ; and which nullifies the constitution of Christianity, by making the Bible, if it were legitimately deduced from its statements, a volume of baser and more profound duplicity than *the world, the flesh, and the devil*, ever before exemplified or the created universe ever saw ! A book of consummate holiness, offering to sin, to resolute impenitence, to infidelity, profligacy, and all ungodliness, the consolatory unction of life eternal, the unparalleled premium of a necessitated and everlasting salvation—this, for candid and intelligent minds to receive as it were the genuine grand doctrine of their religion ! Its tendency is to pervert all the virtue of society, to teach specious falsehood and systematic deceit, to all men, on the forged basis of the example of God ! We will here quote none of its holy and luminous passages to the reader, but refer him to his own recollections and his own moral consciousness, for the truth of our appeals.

2. A proper estimate of the veracity of God, as identified at once with his essential moral excellence and his declarative glory, would forever prevent the sober reader of his Book from seeing or attributing such a doctrine to its inculcations and its testimonies.

The excellence and worth of the veracity of God, amid

the holy constellation of his moral attributes, is just as great as that of any other of those attributes. It is just as great as his total moral glory. It is so a branch or radiation of his glorious perfections, that without it there would not be one perfection left. What other quality in any moral being, created or uncreated, could avail—if that being were a liar! What is left from the wreck of his glory? Is he any longer just, wise, trustworthy, merciful, holy, or good? Nay, his moral excellence were *clean gone forever*. It is a perfect epitome of the character of the Devil, that he is a liar; or, in the awful words of our Saviour, *He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar, and the father of it.* On the contrary, and by a contrast of extremes the widest in the universe, it is said of God, *His work is perfect, for all his ways are judgment; a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he.* We are assured that *it is impossible for God to lie; that if we deny him, he will also deny us; if we believe not, yet he abideth faithful: he cannot deny himself.*

With these recollections of the moral perfections of God, let us remember the following principles:

1. If Universalism is true, then all men, bad and good, especially the former, are going, each one, though by different roads, circuitous or direct, painful or pleasant, to eternal glory in heaven, their common and blessed home.

2. God knows this perfectly; he never can mistake or forget the fact, so glorious and so necessary to his plans, in one of his dispensations or manifestations toward us.

3. He mediately wrote the Bible, in his wisdom and his veracity, as well as his great goodness, not only in entire and veracious consistency with the fact of universal salvation, but necessarily—as honesty requires—to reveal it to mankind; and from its very nature—being central, characteristic, and cardinal in the system of his works—it must be the most frontal, palpable, and characterizing, in his revelations concerning them.

4. The Bible, however, in the estimate of about ninety and nine hundredths of its most eminent and learned and pious students, in all ages, and in all countries, since the writing of its inspired Books, the bible has been considered and declared to teach, most plainly, the eternal destruction of the wicked—their punishment, retributory and everlasting, in hell!

Nor can any man seriously doubt their sincerity by whom the award is made, in relation to what the Bible teaches. They are the holiest and most learned men that ever lived; of whom it may be said—of each of them,

He loved the world that hated him ; the tear
That dropt upon his Bible was sincere.
And he that forged, and he that threw the dart,
Had each a brother's interest in his heart.

The testimony of God for any thing, is plainly the highest and the best rational evidence in the universe. Of all possible evidence, there is only one kind superior to it, and that is—experimental. The Author of the Bible is determined to convince every man of the reality of *hell-fire*; *where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched*; and if his full and oft-repeated testimony is nullified by their superior wisdom, or in any other way fails to convince them, it is plain that they must have their own experience! They will know what he means by all the doctrines, the comminations, the predictions, and the testimonies of his Word of Truth, by experimental evidence, convincing them forever! The writer having studied the Bible, chiefly in the original, now for nearly one-third of a century, cannot affect ignorance or doubt as to the meaning of the Book of God. He knows of no alternative. If the Bible is the Book of God, Universalism is an impious and impudent lie. Nor is it possible for him, in all charity, to believe that a good motive, truly such, ever made a Universalist, or actuated one in holding or in propagating his doctrine. True, a man may be, in a kind, sincere; but it is plainly a sincerity of a sort fully described,

and as fully condemned, in the oracles of God. It is criminal and inexcusable. It is the sincerity of delusion—with Satan alone to help it. It is often sent on men judicially, for abusing and resisting the light of the Gospel. Hear God himself account for it: *And with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish, BECAUSE they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. And for this cause [διὰ τοῦτο—on account of this] God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, [very sincere] that they all might be damned.* This solemn passage occurs in 2 Thess. 2: 10–12.

Having thus far given a few of our own convictions on the subject, we recur to the volume of Mr. Lane. It is a performance intended for common as well as professional readers, consisting of thirteen “Sabbath evening Lectures,” in the form of familiar sermons “on the doctrine of future punishment.” It is patiently and well reasoned, illustrated, and enforced, in its positions and principles; and as such, adapted to general usefulness in a peculiar and eminent degree. The author shows his heart and soul in all he says, evinces an excellent and practical acquaintance with the subject, and has furnished us with a work of great merit. Instead of philosophizing forever, dealing in learned abstractions and nice distinctions, instead of theorizing mainly, he grapples with the facts and the realities of his awful theme like one in earnest. He seems peculiarly to understand his adversaries, to state and expose their views, their sophisms, their ways of talking, and their modes of delusion. This he does every where in the light of Scripture, knowing the authority of the sacred text, rescuing its passages from perversion, showing the true view and the false view in convincing contrast, and coming down on the moral consciousness of his hearers, often, in the right place, and with the powerful incumbency of one, who speaks the truth of God, knowingly, and with the authority of God. We have perused his work with increasing interest, with cordial approbation, and not without personal benefit and edification. Nor can we withhold

the testimony of sincere gratitude to Mr. Lane. He has done good service to the cause of truth. He has written a work proper to be put into the hands of our youth, and fitted to instruct all readers in the important truth of which it treats. Is it the interest of a man to be deceived?—in the matter of his soul?—and for his everlasting undoing? Is it, we say, his interest? We waive now the question of his duty. We wholly omit all argument of his obligation to God and his fellow creatures. We regard him, as it were, in his own politics alone—as acting for self, for his own interest, for his personal safety, happiness, and ultimate good. And we inquire, Is it his interest to be deceived? Plainly, it is not; unless it be his interest to miss of salvation; to make an irretrievable mistake; to rush precipitately by all the places of mercy and all the opportunities of salvation, and madly to incur, with a bound and a plunge, the unnutterable miseries of damnation!

In the first Lecture, Mr. Lane considers passages of Scripture adduced by Universalists in support of their doctrine; in the second, the same, with remarks on the Greek terms, *thelo* and *boulomai*; in the third, he views the doctrine of endless punishment according to the law and the testimony—remarks on *sheol*, *hades*, *gchenna*; in the fourth, he furnishes direct arguments from Scripture to prove the doctrine of endless punishment; in the fifth, the same; in the sixth, the same; in the seventh, he disproves the position assumed by Universalists, that the wicked receive all their punishment in this life; in the eighth, he considers the moral influence of Universalism; in the ninth, he evinces that the endless punishment of the wicked is not inconsistent with the justice of God; in the tenth, he shows its consistency with the love of God; in the eleventh, he proves that God is glorious in holiness in the endless punishment of the wicked; in the twelfth, he argues from the fact that Universalism is rejected by the pious; and in the thirteenth, he avers the immutability of man's moral character and condition in the future world. These positions are well sustained, and in a common sense

way illustrated, from reason, from Scripture, from the moral consciousness of man, from the absurdities of the contrary, from history and anecdote, from the nature of things, from the nature of virtue, and from many other allied considerations—which a man can resist only as he *hates the light*. Dreadful indeed will be the account of those ministers of Satan who have deceived the impenitent and edified their wickedness in presumption! God will judge them; *because with lies they have made the heart of the righteous sad, whom he has not made sad; and strengthened the hands of the wicked, that he should not return from his wicked way, by promising him life.*

Mr. Lane has managed his work in a happy medium between metaphysical ratiocination, and a popular but loose exhortation, of style and manner. He has lost no time in speculation and hypothesis. His way is that of manly argument and straight-forward application. He gains as he goes, both in the quantum and dependence of his thoughts, and in the profound interest he awakens in the reader and sustains increasingly to the end. Having read his volume of 130 pages through, we are competent thus to speak in its commendation. We are not indeed idolaters, and we ‘have seen an end of what they call perfection here below.’ The book is not a faultless monster, and we are not blindly praising it. But taken as a whole, we welcome its appearance, and dare almost predict for it a prosperous career of usefulness.

We furnish a few specimens of his manner.

“That the wicked will be reclaimed in or after death, supposes that there are means for reclaiming and saving sinners, more powerful and efficacious than those of the gospel. Why are not those means *now* employed? Is it not as easy for God to employ efficient measures at the present time, if there are such, as it ever will be? If the love of God will ever call them into existence, why does it not *now* call them into existence? If it is said that it is the change which death will produce, that will renovate their moral characters, why does not God renovate them now, by producing a change equivalent to death? He can easily do it.” * * * *

“God’s love is impartial. He loves the happiness of all beings according to their worth. He does not love the happiness of an ani-

mal, as well as the happiness of a man or an angel, because it is not worth as much. We cannot suppose that he loves the happiness of an almost idiot, as much as he loves the happiness of a Bacon or a Locke, because his susceptibilities and powers of enjoying and communicating happiness are not so great. Impartial love must love things according to their worth; otherwise it would be a mere irrational affection. God does not love the happiness of a part of mankind, as much as the happiness of the whole; and it is as much a dictate of benevolence to cut off a part from his favor, when that part endangers the happiness of the whole, as to cut off a putrid member from a child to save its life. * * * It is as much the dictate of impartial benevolence to provide a hell for the ungodly, as to provide a heaven for the righteous. If there is a portion of mankind who will not be reclaimed from their sins, and who endanger the happiness and well-being of the universe, it is not inconsistent with the love of God to banish them forever from his presence, and the presence of all holy beings, and leave them to eat the fruit of their own doings forever."

In reference to the great philosophical distinction between the love of benevolence, of which the object is being, and the love of complacency, of which the object is moral excellence, the one desiring the welfare, the other delighting in the character, of its object, respectively, Mr. Lane has well illustrated and sustained the positions of his book, as at one with those of the *Greatest of Books*.

Our author vindicates the justice of God in the punishment of sinners, in a manner clear and convincing. He says that

"God has shown his love of holiness, by making man upright, in his own image, and after his own likeness. Man has lost that image, and given himself up to the love and service of sin. God, in infinite benevolence, has put forth numerous means to reclaim him, and bring him back to the love and service of holiness. He has done all that infinite benevolence can do to make him holy and happy. Many refuse to be reclaimed, spurn at the offers of mercy, and cherish a character at war with God and his government. It is not therefore inconsistent with the infinite love of God to banish such from his presence, and punish them with an everlasting destruction."

As to the final cause of punishment, we concur with Mr. Lane in an obvious position—it is in a way suited to the honors of infinite wisdom and benevolence; it is for the good

of the universe, which wicked sinners are justly sacrificed to subserve ; it is retributively to make them useful—sublime and awful as is the thought—to make them useful in their destruction. If God punishes sinners, it is for some purpose ; and just as certainly is it for an end good and worthy of himself. If he had no end to answer by it, then plainly he would not do it ; for he *takes no pleasure in the death of him that dieth*, and is as perfectly incapable of punishing for the sake of punishing, as he is of showing himself to be, what he is not, infinitely malevolent. He is just as really incapable of delighting in misery—any where, any misery, as he is of delighting in sin. But shall men hence conclude that he will never inflict misery for any cause ? Such an inference were rash, incredible, and plainly false. It is contradictory to facts by thousands, of human experience and constant occurrence. It is inconsistent with the story of Calvary, with the agonies of crucifixion, with the unutterable misery of the dying Redeemer, when *it pleased the Lord to bruise him*. If then he executed such severe misery on his own Son for our sins, how plain is it that he may execute the natural and proper penalty of the law on transgressors, who, refusing such a glorious substitute, must be justly punished for their own sins. *For if they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry ?*

But still the question returns—For what does he punish them, as the final cause ? what end can he answer by it ? why not rather annihilate them ? The answer is—He makes them useful in their punishment. He gains good to the universe by their penal misery, and that in ways innumerable as the relations of moral government. It is a monumental demonstration to all rational creatures, of the law of God—its nature, its use, its equity, its glory, its importance, and the value of those eternal interests which the law represents and guards, and which sin and rebellion and impenitence and unbelief unite to destroy. It may thus prevent sin in others, and be among the necessary moral causes of the everlasting holiness and conservation of the redeemed. It is not necessary, how-

ever, that we should show all the final causes, or amply vindicate them shown, on account of which infinite wisdom and truth punishes the lost. If the fact be revealed that he punishes them, we know it is just, good, benevolent, and wise, and consequently that the ends to be answered by it are, like God, all excellent. Mr. Lane conformably evinces the fact, and mainly assumes in it the perfect wisdom and goodness of Jehovah. He says,

“We have barely hinted at an argument which we might have illustrated, and drawn out to some length—that the future punishment of the wicked will be productive of great good to the universe at large; and that the love of God therefore to the great whole of rational being, after the glorious display which he has made of his perfections to bring them to obedience and happiness, demands their final condemnation.”

In one of his applications to the impenitent, with which we conclude, Mr. Lane thus solemnly deals with their consciences :

“Allow me, my impenitent friends, to call your minds to one serious reflection. If you perish, you perish under a most holy, righteous, and benevolent administration. It will be, because wisdom, and power, and justice, and benevolence, have failed to make you turn from your evil thoughts and ways. We can find something to sustain us under the inflictions of malevolence; but under the angered strokes of love, whither will you turn for consolation? * * Think before you enter on your eternal state, what it will be, to be shut out from his presence, and hope, and happiness, for ever. Do not abuse his love, and trample on his truth, by indulging the delusive hope that you will be saved whether you repent or not. *You cannot be saved in impenitency.*”

ARTICLE IV.

THE TEUTONIC METAPHYSICS, OR MODERN TRANSCENDENTALISM.

By C. E. STOWE, D. D., Professor of Bibl. Lit., Lane Sem., Cincinnati.

FOR more than a quarter of a century past, the attention of the literary world has been turned very strongly toward Germany. The freshness, the boldness, and the exuberance of the German literature ; the copiousness, the strength, and the flexibility of that majestic language ; the literary treasures of the German universities, and the astounding labors of the German professors, have been well calculated to attract general notice. In some branches of literature and science, the Germans certainly have excelled all other nations ; while in others, if I read them aright, they have made very great pretensions with quite mean results. As in sailing along the New England coast, you sometimes seem to approach a magnificent country, variegated with every beauty of mountain and vale, which, as you come nearer, proves to be a pile of illuminated fog ; so many of the products of the German intellect, which, viewed at a distance, show rich and splendid, on closer inspection are found to be poor and commonplace. When set forth in the imposing vocabulary of the German language, they sound wonderfully weighty, but translate them into homely English, and they strike the ear like flat nonsense.

In classical learning, in translations, in all the departments of history, in philology, in some branches of theology, in certain forms of fictions and poetry, in literary criticism, the German writers are unsurpassed, unrivalled—but on some other topics, it seems to me, they have vastly more credit than belongs to them, and that their writings have been admired, praised, and imitated without much discrimination, and to the manifest injury of many young and ardent minds. I propose,

therefore, to devote a little time, in this article, to the examination of the *Teutonic Metaphysics, or the Philosophical Theories of Kant and Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, the four great pillars of the Modern Transcendentalism*. The term *transcendental*, in its strict technical sense, applies only to the philosophy of Kant; but I here take the word according to popular usage, and apply it to the whole range of German intellectual philosophy.

The metaphysics of Locke, under various modifications, have prevailed over English and French mind, the most effective mind in the civilized world, for more than a century; a long period, certainly, in an active and thinking age, for any one system of mental science to maintain its dominion. This style of philosophizing did not long retain its ascendancy among the Germanic nations, but was there entirely overthrown more than sixty years ago: and for about twenty-five years past, there has been a gradual but certain undermining of its influence in France, England, and the United States. Almost all the ardent, youthful, investigating mind in these countries, now feels that the system of Locke, in all its modifications, is meagre, unspiritual, and unsatisfying, and is anxiously looking for something better.

On the continent of Europe the system of Locke is generally known by the name of *sensualism*, while that which supplanted it has usually been called the *critical philosophy*, and the general system *transcendentalism* or *idealism*. This in Europe has exerted so wide-spread an influence, especially on theology, and is so obviously now doing the same in France, England, and the United States, that some account of it, though perhaps a little of the driest, cannot be unacceptable to the readers of the Repository.

All investigation of this Teutonic philosophy is sometimes opposed in the outset by an argument *in terrorem*. "Look (it is said) at the neologism, the unbelief, the irreligion it has produced in Germany." But if this be a good argument against the study of Kant, it is an argument *a fortiori* against the study of Locke; for it is notorious that Locke's philosophy is

the foundation on which the French atheists built their whole structure of extravagance and wickedness—and every one, I suppose, will admit that German rationalism is a far more devout and respectable adversary than French atheism. It is true that Locke was neither an unbeliever nor an atheist; and it is equally true that Kant was neither a theological neologist nor a scoffer at religion. The principles of both these philosophers were seized upon by others, perverted and driven to results which the philosophers themselves never dreamed of, and would not have sanctioned. In this respect certainly there is no very great difference between them.

It is also said “that the philosophy of Locke and his Scotch successors is very plain and simple, while that of Kant and his German followers is very obscure if not wholly unintelligible.” There may be some truth in this, and yet all the praise of simplicity and clearness, and all the blame of obscurity and unintelligibleness may not rest precisely where the objection places it. It is easy to follow a man who walks very slow, and goes but a short distance; but when a man walks very fast, and goes a great way, it is not always so easy to keep in sight of him. The German philosophy professes to do a great deal more than the Scotch, to investigate further, to penetrate much deeper, and of course it ought to require more pains and study to comprehend it. At least, let us not judge without investigation; let us not rashly decide that to be mere senseless jargon in which so many intelligent, able, and most learned men think they discover most important and profound truths.

I cannot pretend, within the limits assigned me, to give even an outline of this philosophy, but only a brief sketch of its history and changes. And I must say further, that these systems of German philosophy are so elaborate, that they go into investigations to which we are so little accustomed, that they imply a process of mental training so entirely unlike ours, and are withal expressed in a language so peculiar, that any attempt to give in English a sketch of them, in a popular form, must, from the very necessity of the case, be imperfect

and unsatisfactory. This, I think, is stating the case as fairly as possible for the Germans, and I am sure I have no disposition to take any unfair advantage.

SYSTEM OF KANT.

All our knowledge (Locke is understood to say) is derived from *sensation* or from *reflection*. By the former we are made conscious of things *external*, by the latter we are made conscious of things *internal*, or of the operation of our own minds ; the amount of which doctrine seems to be, that we can know nothing except that of which we are immediately conscious.

Berkeley, taking for granted the truth of Locke's doctrine, showed that there could be no such thing as matter or the external world, or at least that we can have no evidence of the existence of any such thing. For, by our senses we are made conscious of sensations only, and not of matter itself, and sensations are affections of mind. From Aristotle to Locke, it had been asserted that our sensations are copies of the real objects which produce them. Berkeley proved that a sensation, that is, an affection of mind, can never be a copy of any thing which does not resemble mind, can never be a copy of matter.

Hume probed the point still further. According to him, we are not more conscious of mind in itself than we are of matter in itself. All that we are immediately conscious of is —ideas and impressions ; consequently nothing but ideas and impressions exist, or rather nothing else can be *known* to exist. Following up this train of reasoning, Hume proceeds to inquire, Whence is our notion of cause derived? Is it from sensation? Surely not, for the senses show only that the two events which we call cause and effect, follow each other, and never that they are *necessarily* connected. Is it then from reflection? But we reflect only on our sensations, and as these do not contain the notion of cause, so no reflection can discover it in them. Finding, therefore, that these

sources of our knowledge, which he with Locke believed to be the only ones, afford no clue to that firm belief which mankind have in the notion of cause, he declared it to be a mere idea, a habit of the mind acquired by seeing two events always succeed each other in the same order.

This of course, pushed away all the evidences of religion, natural and revealed. Hume's system was successfully opposed by Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, Dugald Stewart, and others.¹

It was these speculations of Hume, on the origin of our idea of cause, that first started Kant, and set him on those metaphysical inquiries which have produced such a revolution in intellectual philosophy, and given so much celebrity to his own rather odd-sounding name. Before we give an account of his system, we must give a brief history of the man.

IMMANUEL KANT, the son of an honest, intelligent harness-maker, was born in Königsburg, Prussia, in April, 1725, and in this city he lived to be eighty years old, scarcely ever going without its walls, and having never in his life been more than thirty miles distant from his birth-place. His mother was a woman of extraordinary talent and piety. Immanuel, though very poor, contrived with her help to get a university education in his native city, and soon distinguished himself by superior scholarship. He made marked progress in metaphysics, but at that time mathematics and astronomy were his favorite studies. In 1755, when only twenty-one years old, he published an astronomical treatise, in which he clearly pointed out the existence of the planet afterwards called *Georgium Sidus*, the supposed discovery of which has since given such celebrity to the name of Dr. Herschell. This was twenty-seven years before Herschell's discovery, and if the planet ought to bear the name of its first discoverer, it should be called Kant, and not Herschell. This will be done, I suppose, when America is named Columbia. Kant became a professor in the university of Königsburg, and his lectures were much

¹ See For. Quart. Review, vol. i. p. 360-65.

frequented. His metaphysics at first attracted but little attention ; it was six years before his first metaphysical work, the " Critique of Pure Reason," began to sell at all ; and the publisher was on the point of disposing of the sheets to hucksters and confectioners for wrapping paper, when it suddenly became immensely popular, and Kant lived to see his metaphysics supersede all other systems almost throughout continental Europe.

Kant was never married, his whole life was that of a laborious student ; but he usually took his dinner at the table of a large hotel, for the sake of observing the manners and conversation of the company he met there. A contemporary thus describes him: " Leaner, nay, drier than his small body none probably ever existed ; and no sage probably ever passed his life in a more tranquil and self-absorbed manner. A high, serene forehead, a fine nose, and clear, bright eyes, distinguished his face advantageously."—" He loved mirthful company and a good dinner, and was himself an agreeable companion, who never failed to entertain and enliven by his extensive knowledge, and an inexhaustible store of amusing anecdotes, which he used to tell in the driest way, without ever laughing himself." He was always remarkably neat in his person, and strict in his morals.

On reading Hume, Kant felt perfectly satisfied that he had proved that the idea of cause is not derived from experience ; and he was equally well satisfied that it is impossible for the mind to get rid of the idea. Well, what then ? Is it a mere habit of thought ? No, it must be a *necessary truth* ; a truth not derived from experience, but arising with experience—an *idea written, as it were, in the mind with invisible ink, and requiring only the scorch of experience, the contact of the external world, to make it legible.*

This, then, was his starting point—*there are necessary truths, which we do not derive from experience, which come neither from sensation nor reflection, which can neither be proved nor disbelieved.* This is the corner-stone, the fundamental idea of his whole philosophy.

He then began to inquire, How many of these necessary truths are there, and what are they? He ascertained the number, as he supposed, to be twelve, and that they could be arranged in four classes, under the heads of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. These necessary truths he called categories, a name borrowed from the philosophy of Aristotle. He also gave them the name of *transcendental* truths, or ideas, because they *transcend*, go beyond, the bounds of experience. Hence the name *transcendental* philosophy, by which he always distinguished his own theory (though it has since by its advocates unanimously been called the *critical* philosophy); and hence the modern term *transcendentalism*.

Kant introduced several distinctions which are important to his philosophical system. Thus he distinguished between universal or necessary truths, and merely general or contingent truths. For example, that the sun will rise to-morrow, that all substances have weight, are merely general or contingent truths; for the sun *may* never rise again, and there *may be* substances that have no weight. This class of truths we derive from experience, and it is the only class of truths which experience is capable of teaching us. But that "every thing which begins to exist must have a cause," is a universal, a necessary truth; it is not derived from experience, experience can neither add to nor take from the evidence of it. So of all the twelve categories.

The twelve categories are these: Under the head of quantity he has unity, multitude, totality,—under quality, are reality, negation, limitation,—under relation, we have substance and accident, cause and effect, action and reaction,—and under modality, possibility, existence, necessity. The way in which these several terms are applied, and the exact meaning which they have in the system, can be learned only by a perusal of his treatises.

Space and time, he affirms, are not the properties of objects without us, but exist only in the mind itself, being pure intuitions of the internal sense; and they are the universal forms of thought, that is, it is impossible for us to think of any thing as unconnected with time and space.

He also distinguished between thought and knowledge, and especially between the understanding and the reason. According to him, we have three faculties by which we acquire knowledge, namely, sense, understanding, and reason. Sense is a passive or receptive faculty, by which we become acquainted with the external world; understanding is an active or spontaneous faculty, by which we form conceptions; and reason is the highest faculty of intellectual spontaneity, and by it we form ideas.

Kant denies that we are capable of knowing what things are in themselves. For example, we perceive things extended, but space is not a real existence out of the mind, it is merely a mode of the mind itself, so that the mind perceives things extended whether they are so or not, just as the eye, when looking through a green glass, sees things green whether they are so or not. Hence the idealism into which Fichte run the system.

SYSTEM OF FICHTE.

JOHN GOTTLIEB FICHTE was a disciple of Kant. He was born in 1762, and was successively professor in the universities of Jena, Erlangen, and Berlin, where he died in 1814. He was a man of noble and excellent private character, and his death was a singular one. It was at the time of the disastrous war with the French, and Berlin was full of sick and wounded soldiers. The wife of Fichte, like many other Berlin ladies in the highest walks of life, went to the hospitals and devoted herself to succoring the sick and wounded. In this benevolent occupation she took the malignant disease known as the jail-fever; and then her husband nursed her with such intense assiduity and unremitting care, that though she recovered, he took the disease and died.

Fichte *out-kanted* Kant as much as Berkeley and Hume *out-locked* Locke. His object is to derive all knowledge, all science, from a single principle. He does not, like Kant, begin with an analysis of the faculties by which we acquire knowledge, nor, like some other philosophers, by assuming a

primitive fact, that of consciousness, but supposes only an original act of a spontaneous agent, which he calls *the Me* (*das Ich* in German, in French *le Moi*), and from this he derives consciousness itself. *The Me* puts forth a spontaneous act, meets an impediment in something which is external to itself, a *not-Me*; reflection and consciousness are the result. With this remark to guide you, endeavor to comprehend the following brief analysis of the system.

First principle, $A=A$. X represents the systematic dependency of the whole. A and X being supposed to exist in the Me, may be signified thus: the Me is the Me. This is the self-evident principle in moral philosophy and knowledge in general. By this principle we form judgments, to judge being an act of the Me. The Me establishes absolutely and independently its own existence, being at once the agent and the result of the action, in which combination consists the essence of consciousness. The first operation of the Me is that of reflection on itself, which is occasioned by an impediment opposed to its hitherto unrestrained energies. The Me places itself in the position of the subject, inasmuch as it opposes itself as subject to the obstacle contemplated.

The second principle is this: the Me is not the not-Me. There is yet a third principle. To exemplify this an action of the Me is required, which may illustrate the opposition of the Me and the not-Me in the Me without destroying the Me.

Reality and negation can be associated only by means of limitation. Limitation, then, is the third principle. Limitation leads to divisibility. Every thing divisible is a quantity. Consequently in the Me there must exist a divisible quantity, and therefore the Me contains something which may be supposed to exist or not to exist without detracting from the real existence of the Me. Hence we arrive at the distinction of a separable and an absolute Me. The Me implies the opposition of a divisible not-Me to the divisible Me. Both of these have their existence in the absolute Me. Hence the two following propositions: 1. The Me implies a limitation of its extent by the not-Me, which circumscribes its absolute and

otherwise unlimited influence. 2. In like manner the Me determines and defines the not-Me. Without the opposition here described there can be no such thing as consciousness, without an object there can be no subject. The Me cannot be said to exist except as modified by the not-Me. Also without a subject there can be no object. The Me must determine the not-Me, the one implying a passion, the other an action of the Me.

Our conception of external objects, as external, is an act of the Me, whereby it transfers to the not-Me a real existence abstracted from itself. By such an operation of the mind the not-Me assumes the character of something real as respects the Me, inasmuch as the Me transfers to it a portion of its own reality.

From what has been stated may be deduced—1. The reciprocity existing between the Me and the not-Me. The action and passion of the Me are one and the same thing as relates to the not-Me. 2. The operations of the Me tend to show that the *ideal* and the *real* principles which have been adopted to explain the connection between mind and external objects are identical. The explanation is in the fact that we contemplate the Me as active and the not-Me as passive, and *vice versa*.

From such principles the transcendental theory infers the following conclusions: 1. Mental perception can take place only in virtue of a reciprocal action between the Me and the not-Me. 2. The influence of the Me on the not-Me is opposed to that of the not-Me on the Me. In such cases the Me balances as it were between two contrary influences. Such hesitation is the effect of the imagination, which equally represents the passive and active operations of the Me, that is, conveys them to the consciousness. 3. Such a state of hesitation implies the act of contemplating, in which it is difficult to separate the contemplating subject from the object contemplated. It is not reflection, the tendency of which is inwards, but activity directed toward external objects—Production. 4. From the faculty of contemplating results contemplation,

properly so called, which is the effect of the absolute spontaneousness of the reason, that is, of the understanding. 5. Judgment, in the next place, weighs the objects presented to it by the understanding, and defines their mutual relations. 6. The contemplation of the absolute spontaneousness of the *Me* affords the apprehension of the reason, and the basis of all science.

This philosophy of Fichte is what the Germans call the *Scientific Theory*.

Thus far in our career, through the first half of our voyage, our course has been tolerably plain ; but in the remaining part of our way, through the mysteries of Schelling and Hegel, I cannot promise myself equal success. I have read some of the modern German metaphysicians with considerable care ; I have conversed with them in their own country, and asked them various questions as to the precise meaning of the terms which they use, without being able after all to satisfy myself that I have gained complete possession of the exact idea intended to be conveyed. There really seems to be in the American mind an inherent inaptness to comprehend the German speculations ; a difficulty of which the Germans themselves sometimes complain both in respect to us and our cousins of the British island. A professor in one of our American theological seminaries was conversing with a finished philosopher of Prussia on the deeper mysteries of the German metaphysics ; and the American insisted on precise and definite explanations of every proposition announced, of every term used. The philosopher explained and defined, and defined and explained ; but every new explanation and definition seemed only to suggest a new difficulty to the acuteness or the obtuseness of the quiet, imperturbable Yankee ; till at length the poor German, almost ready to burst with perplexity and vexation, lifted both hands and eyes to heaven, and exclaimed in a despairing tone, "Mein Gott, forgive Christopher Columbus for ever having discovered America." Poor fellow, it was the first Yankee mind he had ever encountered, and such a Gibraltar against the entrance of any of his *kriegs-*

schiffe of polemic metaphysics he had never before seen. Well might he think the Yankees would be the death of his whole tribe.

SYSTEM OF SCHELLING.

FREDERICK WILLIAM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING was born in 1775. He was a pupil of Fichte's ; he was successively professor at Jena and Munich, from which last place he was in 1840 transferred by the king of Prussia to Berlin, to counteract if possible the too prevalent philosophy of his former pupil and subsequent rival, the all-conquering Hegel. Schelling is still at Berlin, a fine, energetic, hearty old man. For a long time he exerted a wider influence probably than any other literary man in Germany. He has been a voluminous writer ; and most of the best scientific and even theological works which were published in Germany for the space of twenty or thirty years, were moulded on the principles of his philosophy. It was from him immediately that Coleridge drew, and the transcendentalism of this country probably owes its existence to a great extent to the influence of his writings. He is himself much pleased with the exposition which Coleridge has given of the principles of his philosophy, and considers him on the whole the very best of the English representatives of the Teutonic mind.

As to the transcendentalism of Schelling, it transcends the transcendentalism of Fichte as much as the transcendentalism of Fichte transcends the transcendentalism of Kant. It is difficult to find English expressions suited to convey his ideas ; but if I were to attempt to express, in plain, common-sense English, the great result of his whole philosophy, it would be in the words following, to wit :

Every thing is every thing—and

EVERY THING ELSE IS EVERY THING—and

EVERY THING IS EVERY THING ELSE.

Perhaps it will aid you in following the analysis of Schelling's philosophy, if I state to you in the outset that his method seems to be the reverse of Lord Bacon's. Bacon says we

must begin with the examination of phenomena ; Schelling seems to say we must begin with the examination of the thing itself. Bacon supposes that we can know little or nothing of the thing itself, but only of what it does ; but with Schelling, on the contrary, the thing itself, *the absolute*, is the very starting-point of all knowledge. I will illustrate my meaning by a familiar example. The high bluffs of our western waters are frequently composed of a soft, friable earth, in which the swallows make deep, horizontal holes for dwelling places. Lord Bacon tells us we must climb up to the mouths of these holes and look in, if we would ascertain their exact form and dimensions. Schelling thinks this a very imperfect and clumsy method, and he tells us, if we would know not only the exact shape and dimensions of those holes, but also what the very holes are in themselves, we must cut away the whole bank of earth, and leave the holes sticking out, in the abstract, in *puris naturalibus*, and then we shall know.

We now proceed to the proposed analysis.

Fichte, as you have seen, derives all our knowledge from the Me, brought to reflection and consciousness by finding its spontaneous activity limited and resisted by the not-Me. Schelling gets beyond this at once ; he derives our knowledge neither from the Me nor from the Not-me, but from that which is superior to and unites them both, from which they both spring as their source, namely, the Absolute. He affirms, that *to know* and *to be* are one and the same thing. The Absolute is neither infinite nor finite, neither to know nor to be, neither subject nor object ; but that wherein all opposition of subject and object, knowledge and existence, spirit and inert nature, ideal and real—together with all other differences and distinctions—are absorbed and disappear, leaving an indissoluble and equal union of knowledge and existence. This absolute identity of the ideal and the real, and absolute indifference of the differing, of unity and plurality, is the unity which comprehends the universe. Absolute identity exists, and out of its limits nothing really exists, and consequently nothing is finite which exists of itself (*per se*). All

that is, is absolute identity, or a development of its essence. This development takes place in conformity with certain correlative opposition of terms, which are derived from absolute identity, as the poles or sides of the same objects, with a preponderance to the ideal or real, and become identified by the laws of totality; the principle of their development being that of identity in triplicity. Such development is sometimes styled a division of the absolute; sometimes a spontaneous revelation of the same; sometimes a falling off of ideas from the Deity. By such a revelation absolute knowledge is made possible to us, reason itself (so far as it is absolute) being the identification of the ideal and the real. The characteristic form of the absolute is absolute knowledge, in which identity and unity assume the character of duality ($A = A$). The leading propositions of this theory, consequently, are: 1. That there exists but one identical nature; and that merely a quantitative (not a qualitative) exists between objects as to their essence, resulting from the preponderance of the objective or subjective, the ideal or the real. The finite has only an apparent existence, inasmuch as it is the product of merely relative reflection. 2. The one absolute nature reveals itself in the external generation of existing things, which on their part constitute the form of the first. Consequently, each individual being is a revelation of the absolute being in a determinate form. Nothing can exist which does not participate in the divine being. Consequently, the natural world is not dead, but animated and divine no less than the ideal. 3. This revelation of the absolute takes place in conformity with certain correlative oppositions, which characterize different gradations of development with a preponderance of the ideal or real, and which, consequently, are nothing more than so many expressions of absolute identity. Science investigates these oppositions and presents a picture of the universe, by deducing the ideas of objects from the original contemplation of the absolute on the principle of ideality in triplicity, in conformity with the creative process observable in nature itself. This is the process of construction. This ideal construction

is what we call philosophy (the science of ideas), the highest effort of which is, the perception of a relative form amid the multifariousness of external nature, and the recognition, in this relative form, of absolute identity.

The scheme of such construction is this :

I. The Absolute—the Universe in its original form—the Deity manifested in

II. Nature—the Absolute in its secondary form,

Its relative and real,

Its relative and ideal,

According to the following gradations :

Weight—matter—light— motion—organic structure— life.	Truth — science — good- ness- religion—beauty—art.
--	---

Above these gradations, and independent of them, are arranged :

Man as Microcosm,
The System of the World,
or
The external Universe.

The State,

History.

This theory of Schelling is called the *Identity Theory*.

The analysis I have given as it is usually given by the Schellingites. I do not pretend to understand these mysteries, or to be able to explain them. Let us hasten to the fourth and last pillar in this great temple of transcendentalism, to Hegel. I hope you are not yet tired ; or if you are I am sorry for you ; for as Sancho Panza used to tell his master, all that has gone before is but as tarts and cheese-cakes compared with what you are coming to now. And I crave the more indulgence, as in this part of my task I can have no assistance from the labors of those who have gone before me ; for, so far as I know, I am the first who has ventured on the vast enterprise of translating any part of Hegel into English. The inherent difficulties of a first attempt of this kind I hope will be properly appreciated.

SYSTEM OF HEGEL.

GEORGE WILLIAM FREDERIC HEGEL was born 1770. He was at first a disciple and associate of Schelling's, though a few years his senior, but soon got beyond him and set up for himself. He was professor first at Heidelberg, and afterwards at Berlin, at which last place he died of cholera in the autumn of 1831. He is much celebrated in Germany as a writer on the philosophy of law. With him the productiveness of the German mind, in respect to metaphysics, seems to have ceased, or at least to be taking a breathing spell; for though thirteen years have elapsed since his death, as yet no rival system has appeared. It is true that Schelling, by the special request of the King of Prussia, is now attempting something which may serve to supersede Hegel; but the success of the effort remains yet to be tested. Indeed it is affirmed by the Hegelians that no rival system ever can be established, because that of Hegel is already perfect. Says an active Hegelian of Berlin: "The system is perfect. The history of philosophy, and the business of philosophers, hereafter, can be nothing else than to explain, apply, and propagate his (Hegel's) doctrines." He further compares Hegel to Jesus Christ, and as one of his ardent disciples who had long sat at his feet, he cries out to his younger associates: "Go ye into all the world and preach this new Gospel." These extravagances were uttered at his funeral as his body was lowered into the grave. Another of his eulogists on that occasion compared him to Alexander the Great, and said that the kingdom of science would thereafter be divided among his disciples.

In Germany I became acquainted with several Hegelians, some of them of great learning and the highest standing in society; and they all seemed to have the same extravagant estimate of him. This fact, together with the enormous influence he has exerted, has led me to make several attempts to become acquainted with his system; but after many strenuous efforts, I have never been able, I must frankly confess it, to find out what the man means by any thing which he says

in all his writings which I have examined, and they have been not a few. I will give the reader some extracts literally translated into English, and perhaps he will be more fortunate than I have been, and be able to draw meaning from the words. Hegel is very careful, according to the injunction of John Locke, to *define* his terms, and as he has much to say respecting ideas, our first extract shall be his definition of an idea.

“An idea (says Hegel) is the course that the notion as the generalness which is singleness, determines itself to the objectivity and to the opposition against the same ; and this externalness, which has the notion to its substance, through its immanent dialectic, brings back itself in the subjectivity.” ¹—HEGEL’S *Encyclop.* sec. 215. HENGSTENBERG’S *Kirchenseitung*, vol. xxviii., p. 355.

This, however, is an old definition, and when the last edition of Hegel’s *Encyklopädie der philosoph. Wissenschaften*, edited by Leopold von Henning, and published at Berlin in 1842, was received in this country, I immediately examined it to see if any new light had been thrown on the important word *idea*. The result was as follows :

Hegel’s last definition of Idea.

“The idea is the true *in and of itself*—the absolute oneness of the notion and the objectivity. Its ideal contents is no other than the notion in its determination ; its real contents is only its representation which it gives itself in the form of external existence, and this shape enclosed in its ideality, in its power, so preserves itself in it.”

“The idea absolute.”

“The idea as oneness of the subjective and the objective idea, is the notion of the idea, to which the idea as such the subject, to which

¹ We give in the margin the original German of this and the subsequent definitions, that the reader, if he can and will, may make a better translation for himself than we have been able to make for him in the text.

Die idee ist der Verlauf, dass der Begriff als die Allgemeinheit, welche Einzelheit ist, sich zur Objectivität und zum gegensatz gegen dieselbe bestimmt, und diese Aüßerlichkeit, die den Begriff zu ihrer substanz hat durch ihre immanente Dialektic sich in die Subjectivität zurück führt.

it is the object—an object in which all the determinations come together. This oneness is herewith *the absolute and entire truth*, the idea self-thinking itself, and indeed here as thinking, as logical idea.”¹ HEGEL’S *Werke*, Band. VI., S. 385, 408.

Having thus received floods of light on *the notion of an idea*, from the luminous pages of Hegel, let us proceed to enlighten ourselves with one or two more of his instructive definitions. We will select the definitions of those two most important terms in philosophical discussion, to wit, “Something” (*Etwas*) and “Nothing” (*Nichts*).

Hegel’s definition of “Something.”

“The something is the *first negation of the negation*, as simple existing reference to itself. Existence, life, thought, etc., determines itself essentially to *the existing, the living, the thinking* (Me), etc. This determination is of the highest importance, in order not to remain standing by existence, life, thought, etc.—also not by the Deity (instead of God) as generalities. *Something* avails to the representation with right as a *real*.”²

There is very much more of it, but this may suffice as a specimen.

Hegel’s definition of “Nothing.”

“*Nothing, the pure nothing*; it is simple likeness with itself, perfect emptiness, destitution of determination and contents; undistinct-

¹ Die Idee ist das Wahre *an und für sich*, die absolute Einheit des Begriffs und der Objectivität. Ihr ideeller Inhalt ist kein anderer als der Begriff in seinen Bestimmungen; ihr reeller Inhalt ist nur seine Darstellung, die er sich in der Form äußerlichen Daseyns giebt und diese Gestalt in seine Idealität eingeschlossen, in seiner Macht, so sich in ihr erhält.”

Die absolute Idee.

Die Idee als Einheit der subjectiven und der objectiven Idee ist der Begriff der Idee, der die Idee als solche der gegenstand, dem das Object sie ist; ein Object, in welchem alle Bestimmungen zusammengehende sind. Diese Einheit ist hiermit *die absolute und alle Wahrheit*, die sich selbst denkende Idee, und zwar hier als denkende, als *logische Idee*.

² Das Etwas ist die *erste Negation der Negation*, als einfache seyende Beziehung auf sich. Daseyn, Leben, Denken, u. s. f. bestimmt sich wesentlich zum *Daseyende, Lebendigen, Denkenden* (Ich), u. s. f. Diese bestimmung ist von der höchsten Wichtigkeit, um nicht bey dem Daseyn, Leben, Denken, u. s. f. auch nicht bey dem Gottheit (*statt Gottes*) als Allgemeinheiten stehen zu bleiben. *Etwas* gilt der Vorstellung mit Recht als ein *Reelles*.

tiveness in itself." ¹—HEGEL's *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Th. I. S. 120-28. Berlin, 1833.

If a man, after reading these definitions, cannot be said to know *something*, it is very certain that he must have acquired a very graphic idea of *nothing*. It is but a small part of the definitions that we have been able to give; for the definition and description of *something* occupy two and a half closely printed octavo pages; and then as many more pages are occupied on *something and another* (*etwas und ein anderes*); and on *nothing* the distinguished author is almost equally copious.

Having thus examined some of the parts, shall we now endeavor to get a representation of the system as a whole?

In this rather unpromising task we shall avail ourselves, so far as possible, of the assistance of the philosopher himself. In his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, from which we have already quoted, he professes to avoid, as far as possible, abstract terms, and to bring the ideas as near as possible to the common understanding. In the *Conversations-Lexikon der neuesten Zeit und Literatur*, Leipzig, 1833, Th. II., S. 380-83, there is an analysis of the whole system formed from the *Encyclopedia*, from which we shall translate as near as possible *ad verbum*, for as to a translation *ad sensum* we must confess it lies quite beyond our power. The analysis thus formed may safely be taken, if not for the system itself, at least for an accurate likeness of it, yea, a Daguerreotype likeness, though, perhaps, like other Daguerreotypes, the features may not appear very distinct, unless the picture be held in precisely the right light.

Analysis of Hegel's Philosophy.

Philosophy is divided into three parts. 1. Logic, the science of the idea in and of itself (*an und für sich*). 2.

¹ *Nichts*, das reine *Nichts*; es ist einfache Gleichheit mit sich selbst, vollkommene Leerheit, Bestimmungs- und Inhaltslosigkeit; Ununterschiedenheit in ihm selbst.

Natural Philosophy, as the science of the idea in its other-to-be (*ihren Andersseyn*) ; and 3. The philosophy of the spirit (*Geist*), as of the idea which returns back into itself out of its other-to-be. Logic is here enriched with a special fore-notion, which treats of the different positions of the thought to the objectivity. The essence of nature is the idea in the form of the other-to-be, or the outwardness. Thereby the notions-determinate acquire the appearance of an indifferent subsistency and of the individualizing towards each other. Nature shows in its there-to-be (*Daseyn*) no freedom, but necessity and accidentness. Nature indeed in itself, in the idea, is divine ; but as it is, its to-be (*Seyn*) corresponds not to its notion ; it is rather the unexplained contradiction. Man may well admire in it the wisdom of God ; but every conception of the spirit, the simplest of its imaginings, the play of its most accidental humors, every word, is a more excellent knowledge-ground for the existence of God, than any one single nature-subject. And though the spiritual accidentness, the will-choice, goes on even to wickedness, yet this itself is an infinitely higher thing than the regular behaviour of the stars, or than the innocence of the plants. Nature is to be regarded as a system of gradations, of which one necessarily proceeds out of the other, but not so that it is naturally begotten out of it, but in the inner idea making out the ground of the nature. The immediate concrete is a richness of attributes, which are out of each other, and more or less indifferent toward each other, toward which even on that account the simple for itself existing subjectivity is likewise indifferent, and leaves them to external, consequently to accidental determinations. This is the weakness of nature, not to remain true to its notions-determinate, and according to them to determine and preserve its structures (*Gebilde*).

The idea of nature is : I. In the determination of the out-of-each-other (*Aussereinander*), the infinite individualizing, out of which the unity of the form, and therefore as an ideal, is only sought—Mechanics : thereto belong space and time, matter and motion. II. In the determination of the special-

ness, so that the form-determinations are realized, or the reality is set with immanent definiteness and existent difference, or reflections-relation, whose in-itself-to-be (*Insichseyn*) is the individuality—Physics: thereto belong, (a) the free physical bodies, light—the bodies of the opposition, sun, planet, moon, comet. (b) The elements. In these moments (motive-powers) consists the general individuality. The physique of the special individuality embraces weight, cohesion, sound, warmth; and finally the physique of the total individuality contains the form, the specializing of the individual body, and the chemical process. III. In the determination of the subjectivity, in which the real distinctions of the form are brought back even to the ideal oneness, which itself is formed to itself and for itself—Organics: thereto belong, (a) the geological nature; (b) the vegetable nature; (c) the animal organism.

The third part of philosophy is the philosophy of the spirit. The spirit has for us nature for its presupposition, whose truth, and therewith whose absolute First, it is. In this truth nature has disappeared, and the spirit has given itself up as the idea attained to its for-itself-to-be (*Fursichseyn*), whose object even so well as the subject is the notion. The essence of the spirit is on this account formally freedom, according to which it can abstract itself from its own externalness, its thereto-be (*Daseyn*), and generally makes itself to a particular. Therefore its determinateness is manifestation. It sets nature as its world. The absolute is the spirit, this is the highest definition of the absolute. In its development the spirit is: I. Subjective spirit. This is, (A) immediate, soul or nature spirit, the subject of anthropology. Here the talk is of the relation between soul and body, of the natural qualities of the soul, of the temperament-diversities, periods of life, sensibilities, dreaming, and animal magnetism, as also of self-feeling and habit. (B) For itself, yet as identical reflection in itself, consciousness, the subject of phenomenology of the spirit. (C) The spirit determining itself in itself, as subject for itself, the subject of psychology. The forth-stepping of the spirit is development;

and so it is, (*a*) theoretical spirit, that is reason for itself to be, as intelligence to know that it is reason. The so-called powers or faculties of the spirit are mere determinations of reflection, whereby the spirit is made to an aggregate nature, a strong-jointed, mechanical collection. Feeling is the lowest form of the spirit, the merely subjective, the renouncing of the nature and the notion of the thing. From feeling arise the activities of the spirit in the following order: intuition, conception, recollection, imagination, memory, thought. Thought is the thing, simple identity of the subject and object. What is thought, is; and what is, is only in so far as it is thought. Thought as this free generality is understanding, judgment, and reason; and in so far as it is in respect to its contents free, the will. At first this practical spirit shows itself in the feeling of the right, the moral, etc. But the further delivery is the reasonable therein to be comprehended in the form of the reasonableness. The evil which enters in this place is the incommensurateness of the *be* to the *should*. The treating of the desires, inclinations and passions, according to their true moral import, is the doctrine of duties.

II. Objective spirit. This is the oneness of the theoretical and practical, the free-will, which thinks itself, and is intelligence. This reality, as the being of the free-will, is, (A) the right; (B) the morality; (C) the decency. The decency is the perfection of the objective spirit, and the truth of the objective and subjective spirit itself. The free substance has in it as the spirit of a people reality. Thereto belong the family life, civil society, the state, which by its history goes over into the world's history. Hereby the spirit becomes the world-spirit. The spirit of every one single people is destined only to fill out one degree in the development of the same, and to perfect one commission of the whole deed.

III. The absolute spirit. The absolute spirit is the eternally in itself being, and in itself returning and back-turning identity, the one and general substance as spiritual, the knowing of the absolute idea. The development-steps of the same are, (*a*) art; (*b*) revealed religion; (*c*) philosophy. This is the high-

est step of consciousness, which is not merely the oneness of art and religion, but it even elevates them to the self-conscious thought.

The notion of philosophy is the self-thinking idea, the knowing truth, the logical with the signification that it is the generalness, in the concrete contents as in its reality, so that science in this way goes back in its beginning, and the logical is become its result.

Such is the outline of this famous theory as derived from the author himself, and "divested (so it is said) of technical phraseology, and the ideas brought as near as possible to the common understanding." If this be "as near as possible," then certainly "as near as possible" is a long way off. Let no one say I have caricatured the system. I have simply translated the German account of it in the clearest and most definite terms I can find in the English language. These terms probably may have a technical meaning unknown to the uninitiated. In wading through the works of Hegel, (if my recollection serves me there are some twenty-five or thirty octavo volumes of them,) it seems now and then as if I could catch a "bit of a glimmer;" but my most honest and strenuous endeavors have seldom been rewarded with a single definite idea, and I am often inclined to say of his philosophy what a Yankee lawyer once said of the argument of his opponent: *it is all an empty meal-bag; it can't stan' up*. Yet when I see such men as Marheinecke and Goerchel professing to understand and admire and follow it as the only true philosophy, such men as Hengstenberg and Doerner professing to understand and abhor it as the concentration of atheism and falsehood, and even such a man as Tholuck balancing and half inclined to believe and yet doubting whether it be safe; when I consider that it has almost boundless sway over the most intellectual nation in the world, I cannot, without some difficulty, bring myself to believe that it is all unmeaning jargon. It is one of Hegel's maxims, "*was wirklich ist, ist vernünftig*"—*whatever really is, is reasonable*; and on this

principle Hegel's philosophical theory may perhaps be pronounced *a reasonable one*. It is the theory of Strauss and Bruno Bauer and the other most powerful opponents of the Bible and of the very idea of a supernatural revelation ; and it is also the theory of Goerchel, an eminent civilian and warm-hearted Christian, and of Marheinecke, one of the most distinguished of the German theologians and ecclesiastical historians, and a very orthodox Lutheran.

I became personally acquainted with Marheinecke and exceedingly interested in him. He is a fine, stately old gentleman, and in his bearing and manners altogether kingly. He is certainly a man of great talent and varied learning, and capable of thinking and speaking with the utmost clearness and precision. His history of the German Reformation, and his historical development of the Roman Catholic faith in his *Symbolik*, are among the best specimens of a clear historic style that can be found, and remind one, more than almost any other modern works, of the terseness and energy of Tacitus. His sermons, too, many of them, are models of perspicuous, concise, energetic declamation ; and it is eulogy enough to say that he occupies without disadvantage the pulpit which once was Schleiermacher's.

Marheinecke has written a system of theology on the principles of the Hegelian philosophy, and as an illustration of what this philosophy can do for theology, I will cite the definition of *conversion* which is given in the second edition of the work alluded to :

“ In effectual calling the divine and human spirit are still in the abstract distinction ; it is still the one-sided divine activity in distinction from the human, and this is therein so good as not at all fixed. The notion and the necessity of the notion of effectual calling is the truth that the initiative to all following steps and operations of grace is this itself, or that God as spirit is the operating principle itself, the man on his side throughout can contribute nothing thereto. But since this grace itself would not be what it is, if it were altogether without consequences and effects, so it has in this its inward self-determination likewise the necessary movement out of the abstraction into the reality, and is not only the effectual calling, but also the

effecting of that whereto it calls, and as such the divine conversion of the man." Ezek. 18: 23, 28, 33: 11, 14. Mal. 3: 7. 1 Pet. 2: 25.¹— (*Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft. Zweite, voellig neu ausgearbeitete Auflage.* Berlin, 1827. S. 288-9.)

The whole work is equally lucid, and equally well fortified by Scripture authority.

Inasmuch as Bruno Bauer, Strauss, and others, have made use of the Hegelian philosophy to demolish the authority of the Christian revelation, Marheinecke felt himself bound to use the same philosophy to defend it; but after the learned theologian had delivered his lectures on this subject, the king of Prussia, regarding Marheinecke's defence as even more dangerous than Bauer's attack, prohibited their publication. What there was to alarm his Majesty I cannot tell, for I should as soon think of being alarmed at seeing boys blowing smoke at each other through a gun-barrel.

Schelling has the honor of being both the master and the successor of Hegel. While Hegel lived, Schelling saw his own system almost universally superseded by that of his pupil, without offering any resistance; and it was not till Hegel had been three years dead, that Schelling, after twenty-four years' silence, began to write again, and in a new style, in 1834. In 1840 he was called by the king of Prussia from Munich to Berlin, for the express purpose of counteracting the influence of Hegelianism by means of his new system, the

¹ *Von der Bekehrung*—In der Berufung ist der göttliche und menschliche Geist noch im abstracten Unterschiede; sie ist die noch einseitige, göttliche Thatigkeit im Unterschiede von der menschlichen, und diese ist darin so gut, wie noch gar nicht gesetzt. Der Begriff und die Nothwendigkeit des Begriffs der Berufung ist die Wahrheit, dass die Initiative zu allen folgenden Schritten und Wirkungen der Gnade diese selbst oder Gott als Giest das bewirkende Prinzip selber sey, der Mensch dazu von seiner Seite durchaus nichts beitragen könne. Aber indem diese Gnade selber nicht wäre, was sie ist, wenn sie ganz erfolg- und wirkungslos wäre, so hat sie in dieser ihrer innern selbstbestimmung zugleich die nothwendige Bewegung aus der Abstraction in die Wirklichkeit, und ist nicht nur Berufung, sondern auch Bewirkung dessen, wozu sie beruft, und als solche die göttliche Bekehrung des Menschen. Ezek. 18: 23, 28, 33: 11, 14. Mal. 3: 7. 1 Pet. 2: 25.

product of his old age. This new system he calls the "positive philosophy of revelation"—the "historical philosophy"—the "system of freedom," etc. According to Schelling, Hegel's system is: "*Der Immanenz der Dinge in Gott*"—*the inabiding of things in God*, which is pantheism; whilst his own new system is "*Das Werden der Dinge aus Gott*"—*the growing of things out of God*, which is theism, and the Bible doctrine. But as the great master and oracle of both is Spinoza, it is difficult to say which is the most pantheistic. The great problem with them all is the "freedom of the will," or the "moral freedom of man;" and all the light they have thrown upon the subject has thus far, as it seems to me, served only to make the darkness more visible. In this conclusion I am sustained by some of the clearest and most acute minds in Germany itself, as for example by old Dr. Paulus of Heidelberg. In many respects Paulus is among the most remarkable of the literary men of Germany. Some forty or fifty years ago, he was the leading, commanding spirit of German rationalism, and now, though verging toward ninety, (he was born in 1761,) he has fire, spirit, and energy enough to furnish half a dozen ordinary young men. I had a long conversation with him, and never was I more intensely interested. There he was, a little skeleton of an old man, reclining on cushions amid a confused heap of old books and dusty manuscripts, with a tall, black velvet cap, and under it a withered pale face, from the middle of which apparently (such was the height of forehead) sparkled two of the sharpest black eyes, shining like diamonds in the dark; and in the eagerness of conversation he would throw out his long, choppy forefinger, and ever and anon strike it to his head, where it would just bury itself and almost go out of sight among the remarkable phrenological protuberances of his brow. Altogether it was a most exciting scene; and I could not but think that is the way Faust must have appeared in some of his violent theological altercations with Mephistopheles. Paulus has a wonderfully clear, penetrating, driving sort of mind; and his deliberate judgments on such a subject as the Teutonic metaphysics, are as valuable as those of any other man living.

In 1835, the year before I saw him, this clear-headed, sharp-sighted, sarcastic old man published what he called "*Entdeckungen über den Entdeckungen der neuesten Philosophie*"—*Discoveries respecting the discoveries of the most recent philosophy*—in which he affirmed that he had discovered those boasted discoveries to be just nothing at all. Schelling seemed to stand in dread of such attacks as these, and was very careful not to publish any full development of his new views. Paulus, after waiting long in vain for Schelling to come out on his own responsibility, in the winter of 1841–42, sent a student to Berlin to take full notes of Schelling's course of lectures. These he afterwards published, with short biting notes in his own peculiar style, under the title: "*The Revelation-philosophy at length revealed.*" The full German title is so characteristic and instructive, that it is too good to be lost, and we accordingly insert it at length:

"Die endlich offenbar gewordene positive Philosophie der Offenbarung, oder Entstehungs-Geschichte, wörtlicher Text, Beurtheilung und Berichtigung der *von Schellingischen Entdeckungen* über Philosophie überhaupt, Mythologie und Offenbarung des dogmatischen Christenthums in Berliner Winterkursus von 1841–42. Der allgemeine Prüfung vorgelegt von Dr. Heinrich Eberhardt Gottlob Paulus."

With this publication Schelling was most excessively annoyed, and instead of answering it, he prosecuted the author, the publisher, and the student who took the notes; but all his law-suits went against him. In 1801 Schelling had declared that "he saw himself impelled, by the condition of science, to spread before the public the system itself which lies at the foundation of his representations of natural and transcendental philosophy, (and which he, in order always to understand his own position, had hitherto kept to himself alone,) as the philosophy which he had the boldness to affirm to be the only one." Dr. Paulus, it seems, had been waiting forty years for this wonderful philosophy to be ushered into the world by its proper parent; and waiting so long in vain, and becoming almost completely discouraged, in order

that the world might not entirely lose the benefit of so important a scheme, he undertook to smuggle it into the public view in the way which has been already indicated.

It is these speculations, such as they are, which the German philosophy has substituted for the Bible. All authority of revelation being discarded, the human mind there is like a man wandering in a prairie ; there is on every side a boundless prospect ; there is neither pathway nor guide ; there is in every direction the same profusion of plants and flowers, without any diversities sufficient to mark his progress ; and the proud wanderer, disdaining to turn his eyes toward the luminaries of heaven which might direct him, pushes onward and onward with laborious diligence, and applauds himself for his rapid progress, when he is only returning again and again upon his own track without knowing it. Just so it will be here, if the guidance of revelation be abandoned for the brilliant mazes of transcendentalism, to which, it must be confessed, there is now a strong tendency. But some boast of the independence of the human mind, and rejoice in these developments as proofs of its exercising that independence. The human mind is *not* independent, and independent it cannot be. It was created limited, and of course dependent. It feels its own dependence in its inmost heart. From the very necessity of its nature, it must have some God to worship, some authority to lean upon. In Germany, where the authority of revelation has been so generally rejected, the mind has no more independence than it has here, where the authority of revelation is still so generally respected. As the ancient Egyptians in their wisdom despised the God of the Hebrews, and worshipped crocodiles and calves, so literary Germany in her pride has despised Jesus Christ, and worshipped her Hegels and her Goethes, both, as the Apostle Paul expresses it, receiving within themselves that recompense of their errors that was meet.

God, who created the soul and knows its wants, has given his holy Word, the Bible, as authority in all questions of re

ligion, and whosoever rejects this authority, wars against his own soul, and sooner or later will be compelled, if he persist in this rejection, to sink down on some other and far inferior authority, from a God to a reptile. Are not the "montes parturientes," and the "ridiculus mus" of the Teutonic Philosophy sufficient to warn us against rejecting the good old Bible of our forefathers, and accepting transcendentalism in its stead?

I believe there are truths in philosophy altogether beyond what Locke or his disciples have developed, and every honest well directed attempt to ascertain these deeper truths I would welcome and honor.

But these depths are not to be discovered and sounded by casting aside the chart and plummet of divine revelation, and trusting the unaided efforts of the human mind. It is to be done only by a deeper study of the Word of God and the Book of Nature, a more laborious comparison of one with the other, a more patient, intense, earnest searching out of the analogies between them; a work only just commenced by Butler, but which no man has since completed or even carried much beyond the rude though noble beginnings, which that master spirit has left behind him.

Think over again the systems of philosophy which have now been exhibited, and which are the foundation of all the unbiblical philosophies of our times, and see whether there really is any thing in them worthy of your confidence; any thing to justify your forsaking the Bible and going after them. Are they adapted to the wants of human nature? Are they fitted to exert an influence for good over man? Can they control the wicked? Can they comfort the sad? Oh! this is not forsaking the sun for the flame of a taper, it is rejecting the light of the imperishable heavens for the glow of a rotten tree. It is at best but a magic lantern, either entirely dark or producing only phantasmagoria by its feeble light.

But one extreme usually begets another and its opposite, and the folly of rejecting the authority of Scripture is now equalled by the opposite folly of encumbering this authority

with ecclesiastical traditions, and a pretended inherent church power derived through an external organization, and not at all dependent on or productive of spiritual communion with God, a moral sympathy between the soul and its Maker. Transcendentalism and ecclesiasticism both put man in the place of God, but transcendentalism still has this advantage, that it compels the would-be God-man to prove his divinity by the power of his intellect, by the exertions of his soul ; while ecclesiasticism pretends to give man his divine power, by the performance of certain trivial, external acts, which might just as well be done by a piece of clockwork, or by a steam engine of a one-mouse power, as by a man. We cannot go back to the infancy of the world or to the middle ages to get rid of the evils of the present ; we must go forward. Society will not retrograde, it must advance. What man in his senses will now prefer a pyramid to a railroad, a cathedral to a Croton aqueduct ! Will it be said that the pyramid and the cathedral embody a great idea ? So does also the railroad, and that too a very active and useful idea. *Say not thou what is the cause that the former days were better than these, for thou dost not inquire wisely concerning this.* God is in heaven and man on earth, and the truths of the Bible, believed and obeyed, felt and practised, are the connecting medium between God and man, and *not* the external rite—the visible church organization. These are but the necessities of earthliness—the body and not the soul—which, so far from conferring spiritual good of themselves when the soul has departed, are corrupting, offensive, nauseating ; disgusting to intelligent men, and an abomination in the sight of God.

But the follies of transcendentalism and the fooleries of ecclesiasticism are usually the resort of idle minds, which have nothing else to employ themselves upon ; or of desponding, timid minds, which can trust neither in themselves nor in God.

We in this country have so much to excite us, and so much to do, that we have no right to be either idle or timid, no excuse for becoming either transcendentalists or monks.

Here is an empire to be reared under auspices more favorable than have ever attended the rearing of an empire before ; here the whole commonwealth is free as no commonwealth ever was free before ; here all nations flow together as nations never flowed together before ; here every individual mind has full opportunity for self-development as individual mind has never had opportunity before ; here the religion of the bible has a fair unencumbered field for the full manifestation of its power such as it has never had before. All depends on what is now done. This is the crisis. The prize is put into our hands, and here is employment enough to use up all our superfluous activity, without chasing after the hallucinations of a Hegel or of an Ignatius Loyola, or of any of the brood of *Ignatiuncula*, his feeble imitators, with which even Protestantism now abounds. We have enough to do for a long time to come within the limits of revelation, and where revelation can help us, before we get beyond it into transcendentalism or ecclesiasticism ; and if we are wise men, if we are benevolent men, let us do with our might what our hands find to do, or very soon it will be forever too late.

And what do we want for our country, and especially for the West ? and toward what point should our labors be directed ?

For one who has been brought up amid New England institutions, who has witnessed the influence of these institutions on the great mass of the people, and has contrasted the New Englanders in respect to intelligence, activity, thrift, and prevalent morality, with the inhabitants of other lands, there can be but one answer to this question. We want for the West a more extensive and permanent establishment of New England institutions, a larger infusion of the New England spirit, than is now to be found there ; and toward this point ought the most strenuous efforts of New England men to be directed.

It is a fact universally acknowledged by the political philosophers of the old world, a fact well known among the intelligent statesmen of our own land, that most of that which

is peculiar in our national development, which characterizes our institutions, political, educational, and religious, is mainly of New England origin and growth. The present tendencies of civilization throughout the world, the tendency to the equalization of rights, to the elevation and the comfort of the many, to the annihilation of privileged orders, to universal education, to religious liberty, to a free press and an open Bible, owe, if not their origin, at least their most fresh and healthful growth, to the fathers of New England. These are now the prevailing tendencies of civilization throughout the world ; and in our Western country, had there been no large foreign immigration, this tendency would have been at the present moment the prevailing and unrivalled one. But foreign immigration has brought in the opposite pole of civilization, the civilization of Rome, which is, in all points, the antipode of the civilization of New England. Weakened and discouraged in Europe, it acquires fresh strength and boldness in the new and fertile districts of the Western States ; and the intention of the French government, centuries ago, to command that whole Western valley, by a chain of forts from the Gulf of Mexico to the great lakes, was not a whit more manifest than is the present design of the powers of Rome to command the same region by a chain of ecclesiastical and educational establishments, permanently located, richly endowed, and strongly manned. Very well. We give them full liberty to build their churches and their schools, to preach, and print, and publish, to their heart's content ; and while they use only fair and honorable means we object not to their efforts ; in this, giving a most striking illustration of the difference between their civilization and ours, for, wherever they have the power, they prohibit all rivalry ; a church or a school or book opposed to them is crushed as if it were a poisonous viper in their path ; and good old Pope Gregory, while he avails himself of the universal liberty here enjoyed to plant his religion in every nook and corner of our land, and calls us bigoted because we choose to have our own Bible read by our own children in our own schools, so far from reciprocating our liberality, is beyond

measure indignant, because some American citizens have had the audacity to send a few books and tracts into Italy ; and he sends his bull to tear away every copy of the Bible in *the vulgar tongue* that may be found in the hands of any Catholic in the United States. Behold the difference, and take your choice. If the people of the United States, after so long an experiment, are tired of intellectual, civil, and ecclesiastical freedom, and desire again to put themselves under the control of an absolute and infallible master ; if they grow weary of the civilization of New England, and Scotland, and Northern Europe, and sigh for the beauties of the civilization of Austria and Mexico and Italy, I see not why I am particularly interested to make any strenuous opposition to the change. But if there be any thing valuable in the principles for which our forefathers suffered so much ; if the very idea of individual responsibility in religion and political equality in the state be not the figment of a mischievous imagination ; if it be a privilege to speak and write, to print and read, and have a free intercourse of thought and views ; if all that has been called progress for the last three hundred years be not absolute retrogradation instead of progress ; then must Protestantism be awake, and the Eastern States arouse themselves, or the whole Western country will slip away from their control. And whoever controls the civilization of the Western States, sways the destinies of this country ; and whoever holds the United States, has eventually the controlling influence over the civilized world.

This is not a conflict of physical power, and its resources are not forts and arsenals. It is a conflict of mind, of opinion, and its resources are *permanent* religious and educational institutions. Without these all other efforts are transient and evanescent ; and in such a contest as this we cannot afford to waste our strength.

As Rome makes permanent establishments with regular plan, in reference to an influence over the whole region, so we must do the same ; as Rome throws herself back on the resources of older states, and draws her supplies from Austria

and France, so we must throw ourselves back on the resources of those who sympathize with us, and draw our supplies from New England and the Atlantic States.

The wealth of the Western States is, as yet, mainly prospective, and their literary and religious institutions must, to a great extent, be supplied with men and money from older communities.

Let none be backward to aid where aid is so much needed, where such tremendous consequences are depending. As the East values her own safety, let her take care of the West; for the Roman Catholic Bishop expressed a thrilling truth when he said: "*Give us the West, and we will soon take care of the East.*"

ARTICLE V.

AN EXAMINATION OF JOSHUA 10:12-15.

By Rev. T. M. HOPKINS, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Westfield, N. Y.

IN the Biblical Repository for October, 1833, an article will be found "on the standing still of the Sun and Moon, at the command of Joshua," supposed by the editor to have come from the pen of Prof. Hengstenberg, of Berlin, which takes the ground, that the above passage is only a quotation from a book, or a volume of poems, therein cited; and that consequently the so-called miracle of arresting the sun and moon never took place. The author, whoever he may have been, expresses the wish, at the close of his essay, that what he had done might lead others to a deeper investigation of the subject; and, if his views were wrong, correct them; if right, confirm and develope them. Whether the following article shall do either of these, is left for others to determine. No one, we think, can read that article, which, in a certain sense, originated this, without feeling that it is too short, and

that it leaves in an unfinished state a subject of vast importance, the investigation of which had been happily commenced. This was the feeling in our mind when we read it ten years ago, and it has remained unchanged in this respect ever since.

The ground which we have taken, and that which we shall endeavor to sustain, is, that Joshua 10: 12-15, is an extract, or a quotation, from a work to which it refers; and that, consequently, it forms no part whatever of the Sacred Record. The main point in which we shall differ from the writer referred to above, will be, in supposing that the passage under consideration found its way into the text, at a period much later than that which is fixed upon by the learned Professor, hundreds of years after the occurrence of the events recorded in the context. This, of course, denies that any miracle like that of stopping the sun and moon, as represented in the extract, ever occurred.

The passage reads as follows: "Then spake Joshua to the Lord, in the day when the Lord delivered up the Amorites before the children of Israel, and he said in the sight of Israel, Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon; and thou Moon, in the valley of Ajalon. And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies. Is not this written in the book of Jasher? So the sun stood still in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day. And there was no day like that before it or after it, that the Lord hearkened to the voice of a man. For the Lord fought for Israel. And Joshua returned, and all Israel with him, unto the camp to Gilgal."—Joshua 10: 12-15.

The following, therefore, is the only question with which we are concerned: Is this passage any part of the Sacred Record? Is it written by him who wrote the book of Joshua? Or is it a paragraph introduced by some one who, perhaps, was engaged in transcribing the sacred writings; who, having a copy of the book of Jasher before him, and recollecting the manner in which the writer of that book notices the victories of Joshua, saw fit to insert it in the words of the author, taking

special care to inform the reader where he obtained it, and where it might be found? We think, as we have already intimated, that it is the latter. But if the former—if the passage be truly a part of those writings which compose the book of Joshua, and which record the wonderful success that attended the arms of Israel, when God wrought with them to empty the land of their enemies, and to establish them in it, then do we most cheerfully receive it as the word of God, and verily believe that “the sun and moon stood still at the command of Joshua, and hasted not to go down about a whole day.”

Before we present the argument, however, in favor of our position, we shall take the liberty to introduce some

Preliminary Remarks.

The passage under consideration has evidently been regarded with very great interest, both by the friends and the enemies of revelation. The frequency with which this passage has been brought forward to *disprove* the authenticity of the whole Bible, has led the friends of revelation, perhaps, to be more determined in their defence of it than they otherwise would have been. They have seemed to act under the impression, that to give it up was virtually to surrender the truth of the Scriptures. There can be no doubt, we think, that 1 John 5 : 7, and part of 8, has been defended in this way, until, by the great majority of those who receive the Bible as the word of God, it has come to be regarded as genuine. And yet, the proofs against that passage amount almost to a demonstration. The same may be said of Ecclesiastes 12 : 8-14, and of some others. The object in endeavoring to retain these passages cannot have been exclusively, or even principally, *the doctrines* which they are thought to contain ; for, so far as these passages seem capable of being understood, they declare no other doctrines than those which are abundantly sustained by other passages of Scripture, whose genuineness has never been attacked by any who would not attack the whole Bible.

The doctrine of the Trinity is undeniably in the word of God, whatever becomes of 1 John 5: 7, 8; and that of a future state of retribution can be found there, without a reference to the dubious verses in Ecclesiastes; especially verses 11 and 12, which seem wholly without meaning. It is evident that the cause of truth needs no false supports. We ought, perhaps, to say with Dr. Chalmers, it can have none; for, if we introduce into the foundation of a superstructure any material which is not substantial, any thing which contains in itself the elements of decay, we virtually endanger the whole fabric; because when that which was true and of permanent value comes to receive the additional weight, which for a time rests securely on the false, but which, by reason of the decay, has been thrown upon the good, it is crushed beneath it, as if it were itself spurious like the other, and the fabric perishes. We render, therefore, very dubious service to revelation, when we persist in defending and retaining that which we ought at once to give up. We do ~~not~~ intend to be understood as saying, or even admitting, that we are to surrender a passage *merely* because unbelief or temerity has attacked it; but only that we are not to *depend* on those passages which, to say the least, are somewhat doubtful; since we may thus be understood as risking the defence of our whole cause upon them.

These remarks apply with great force to the passage under consideration. We need it not in support of the doctrine of a particular, overruling, and special Providence. We can show without difficulty, that he sustained the prophets and apostles, by giving them power to perform those works which no other men could; and which were, perhaps, the best credentials that the nature of the case admitted in favor of the truth of their message. There is enough of clear and indisputable Scripture in support of this, without the so-called miracle of arresting the sun and moon.

But it is distinctly admitted, that this consideration should not influence us to reject the passage in Joshua. *It may be true.* The thing which it asserts is not more difficult for a

wonder-working God than any of the well attested miracles that he wrought. The plagues of Egypt, the passage of the Red Sea, the giving of the Law, the supplying of his people with bread from heaven, or any of the miracles recorded in the New Testament, are as marked exhibitions of Divine power, as the stopping of the sun and moon. And even if it were not so; if the miracle we are considering were one that evidently demanded a much *greater* effort, in our estimation, on the part of God, we ought not to be influenced by this consideration, in making up our mind as to whether we should believe or not. How can we determine the comparative degree of power which the Almighty must put forth in any given case? How can men say which is the greater or the less work for Him to perform, "who giveth no account of any of his matters," and "who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will"? No matter how great the miracle, no matter how stupendous the work, if indeed it is what God has wrought, and he has caused a record to be made of it, we are to receive it. But the question before us is, Did he perform it? Did he, in answer to the request of Joshua, cause the sun and moon to stand still, that his people might avenge themselves of their enemies? This is the whole question which concerns us. It will not be regarded, we believe, as irrelevant or improper for us, in this place, to remark, that no one who has attempted to explain this passage, or who has adventured a theory in regard to it, seems satisfied with his own work when executed. He turns away with evident discomfort, as if to say, "There, I have given the best account of it in my power, and I hope you will be satisfied with it." Even the enemies of revelation, as they have attacked it, with a view to destroy the argument from miracles, seem not to regard themselves as having done any thing toward the accomplishment of their object, in destroying the credibility of the Scriptures, when they have swept the passage away.

It may also be well enough, in passing, to advert to the circumstance which first directed our attention to the question

of the genuineness or inspiration of this text, viz., the astounding fact that a miracle of this magnitude was never once referred to in the writings of prophets, apostles, or evangelists, or even in the instructions of Jesus Christ. By no one who preached or prophesied, at a period subsequent to the conquest of Canaan, though he may have mentioned, and repeatedly too, most of the mighty works which were done for Israel, is the stopping of the sun and moon alluded to, even once ! We shall undoubtedly here be told, that the prophet Habakkuk has referred to it. But they who undertake to maintain this will find it quite as difficult a task as to defend the passage in dispute ; all which will be made to appear in its proper place.

We shall now give a few of the principal theories invented to explain the passage :

1. There are those who understand it *literally* ; who suppose that, in obedience to the command of Joshua, the sun and moon stood still in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about the space of a whole day. We speak, of course, the language of every day and of every age, in reference to this matter, without regard to the philosophy of the thing, or the more rigid principles of astronomy ; this is the language used in the text.

They who embrace the literal view, suppose, of course, that the diurnal motion of the earth was arrested for the space of about twelve hours, that the waters of the sea were prevented from rushing out upon the land, by the same Almighty hand which had made all things, and which had been thus stretched out to work this important miracle ; that all things found upon the surface of the earth, which otherwise would have been piled into a mountain of ruins, by the sudden cessation of the earth's motion, were prevented from doing so by the same hand : in short, that every thing took place as here recorded, without figure, metaphor, or poetry, just as it would appear to an intelligent inhabitant of the earth, with all the necessary means before him for measuring time, and with the sun and moon passing through the heavens. And this is the

view to be taken, if it be determined that the passage before us is an inspired portion of the word of God. *The difficulties* we may feel are no greater than those felt in connexion with any well-authenticated miracle recorded in the Scriptures. And we know not that we feel any difficulties whatever in respect to those which are well attested. We suppose that He who has established the laws of nature, has power to alter those laws whenever it shall seem good in his sight ; and that he can arrest or reverse them when he pleases.

The literal interpretation of this passage is found as far back as the days of Jesus Siracides, the author of the book of Ecclesiasticus, about 150 or 160 B. C., and is referred to in Chap. 46, in the following words : " Was not one day as long as two ?" And so late a writer as Budè Guilloumè, (or Buddeus,) born at Paris, 1467, founds an argument against the Copernican philosophy on the literal interpretation of it. Galileo and Columbus met with it in the mouth of the bigoted monk and ignorant priest, who were opposed to their philosophy. In a word, it has been *the general* view taken of it by those who have received the Scriptures as a revelation from God, from the earliest ages of history. This circumstance may have some bearing on determining the true character of the passage.

2. Another opinion is, that the Almighty so far arrested or altered the ordinary course of things, as to cause *an extraordinary refraction of the solar and lunar rays*, without stopping the sun, moon, or earth, in its course ; but only causing things to appear to the inhabitants of the earth just as they would, were the sun and moon to be made to pause in their journey through the heavens. This is the ground taken by Mr. Taylor in his edition of Calnet's Dictionary. It supposes that the event transpired at mid-summer, when the sun was in his highest northern position ; that it was near the full moon, just at the setting of the sun, and of course as the moon was rising. At Gibeon, then, (latitude 35 deg. 30 min.) the longest day is fifteen hours. If, now, we add one hour and a half of twilight, morning and evening, we shall have

eighteen hours of daylight, so that the rays of light have to be bent from their natural direction only long enough to make up the remainder of twenty-four hours, at which time the sun would reappear,—which would fully answer, in his estimation, the purposes of the miracle. And with this view of the subject Professor Stuart seems to accord. In a letter to the writer of this article, he says that “it was only κατ’ ὄψιν,” i. e. according to appearance.

This, it is thought, will obviate all the difficulties which are felt by the advocates of a literal interpretation, will make the Sacred Record consistent with itself, and leave our confidence in it altogether undisturbed. We shall in this way avoid, as it is said, all serious objections against the miracle—such as the following: “It disturbed the whole course of nature; made a double day for our hemisphere, and a double night for the other; made the month on which it occurred longer than any other, and the next shorter; held the tides standing, so that where it was high tide there was an inundation, and where low, the extreme reverse; saved the houses and mountains upon the earth’s surface from being shaken out of their places, and crushed in one common ruin.”

But we have great difficulty in embracing this view of the subject. It proceeds on the ground that the Jewish leader uttered the command about the hour of the rising sun, whereas the passage itself evidently indicates that it was nearer the middle or close of the day; and the circumstances which are hereafter to be considered, will abundantly show that Joshua, and all Israel with him, were at Makkedah somewhere about the hour of three or four in the afternoon. A more serious difficulty, however, is, that it supposes the rays of the setting sun to have been so bent out of their natural course as to have enabled the inhabitants of Judea to see the sun in the west till he should even reappear in the east, *which would give some two days and a half of daylight*; and that is more than we know what to do with!

But these are difficulties to which the attention of the reader will be called more particularly in the subsequent part of the article.

All that we have now said proceeds on the ground that the phenomena of nature are described just as they appear to the eyes of the beholder. This mode of speaking is perfectly correct and proper, and the Scriptures, if they are to be understood at all, must use language in accordance with the common modes of speaking, not regarding philosophic distinctions. Were it otherwise, they would mislead a great majority of their readers, and prove an endless source of confusion, instead of being, as they are now, "a light to our feet, and a lamp to our path."

3. Others have supposed that unusual atmospheric phenomena appeared near the close of the day, which performed the office of the sun and moon, by shedding such a light upon the path, both of the conquered and the conqueror, as to prevent the escape of the one, and inspire with courage the other, and that, in accordance with "poetic license," these phenomena are said to be the sun and moon, pausing at the command of Joshua, when he had asked, in general terms, only for light enough to enable him to complete the work which had been so auspiciously commenced. The great objection to this view is, that it bears a marked family likeness to that kind of exposition of the Sacred Record, or to those rules of exegesis which generally invoke the aid of an earthquake or a thunder-storm, whenever any thing supernatural or above the ordinary course of nature is to be explained. Every miracle on record, no matter how well attested, has by this method been explained away, or worse ; since, to represent men who are divinely inspired, as stating that for truth which is but the result of their own fear, or the creature of a diseased imagination, is infinitely worse than to have no miraculous works whatever to which to appeal. Besides, one man has as good a right to draw upon the resources of imagination as another. The field is illimitable and open to all, and when once entered is rarely left, until the mind is incurably secured to the interests of unbelief.

4. Some there are, who regard the whole as an example of highly-wrought, figurative, poetic description of a most

signal victory, achieved over the enemies of God *in a single day* ; and to be classed with many other descriptions of fact found in the Bible. According to this view, Joshua asks of God time enough to enable him to make an end of the five confederate kings and their forces ; and in answer to his prayer he is so far assisted by the co-operation of God, as to accomplish in one day the work of at least two, when left without these special manifestations of Divine power. Vatablus, Professor at Paris, one of the number that embraces this theory, thus paraphrases it, and virtually makes it a prayer : “ Lord, let not the light of the sun or of the moon fail us, till we have vanquished all these thine enemies. Enable us this day to complete their utter overthrow.”

We have less objection to this view than to any yet considered. No doubt our ignorance of the bold and imaginative language of oriental poetry, together with our prepossession in favor of grave prose, would lead us to reject many things which are indisputably true. Look, for example, at the 18th Psalm, where David is but describing his victory over the enemies of the theocracy. He introduces the tempest and the earthquake, and many other manifestations of Divine power ; so that this signal victory is plainly attributed to these, whilst his own labors and those of his adherents are lost sight of. Compare also the song of the children of Israel, after their passage of the Red Sea, Ex. chap. 15, and the triumphal song of Deborah, Judges chap. 5, in which we have this remarkable declaration, “ The stars in their courses fought against Sisera !” The whole prophecy of Habakkuk may be cited in illustration of the remark we have just made.

But we cannot adopt any of the theories to which we have adverted, for reasons that follow. We cannot receive the third, in any of its modifications ; for, if we assume that the passage in dispute is from the pen of the writer of the *book* of Joshua, we must understand every thing literally, just as it is represented in the text. Though expressed in poetic language, (as we shall hereafter see,) it is nevertheless plain, simple, and perfectly intelligible ; nothing of ornament or

exaggeration in it ; every term used is evidently to be understood in the most common and easy sense. We feel bound, moreover, to reject every theory which is built upon the hypothesis that the author of the book, in this instance, forgot himself, and spoke of an event as having taken place which was only so in appearance, or in imagination. Nor can we admit that, in simply declaring his wonderful success for a day, he has made use of language that few, if any, can understand. We prefer to understand and explain the passage literally ; and, as such, to receive what it declares as truth, unless we show positively, and beyond all doubt, that it is no part whatever of the Sacred Scriptures. We cannot admit that Joshua was so ignorant of natural phenomena as to mistake a halo round the sun, or the lingering fragment of one, for the sun itself. A child would not have been thus deceived.

5. We come, therefore, to the theory or explanation which we suppose to be the correct one. It supposes the passage to be a quotation, or an extract, from a book which was known at the time as "the book of Jasher ;" which was probably a collection of poems, descriptive of some important events, having truth for their basis, but fiction for their dress. Inasmuch, however, as all turns on the single question, whether the passage properly belongs to the Sacred Scriptures or not, we shall proceed to consider the arguments which, to our mind, seem obviously opposed to it. They are arguments, too, of which every reader can judge, both in respect to their pertinence and their weight.

1. Joshua 10 : 12-15, is evidently an interruption of the narrative ; and an interruption which, when considered with reference to its own statement at the close, destroys the credibility of the whole passage. For the sake of perspicuity, we shall divide this argument into two parts ; first considering the evident interruption of the narrative. The reader has only to turn to the chapter itself, and leaving this passage out, read the remainder. He will there find a well-connected account of a series of events, which are in themselves natural, orderly, and perfectly consistent one with another. Joshua

and his army leave Gilgal at nightfall, or soon after, travel all night, and arrive, probably at daybreak, or very early in the morning, before Gibeon, beleagured by the five confederate kings. He routs them with great slaughter, and then pursues them along the way that goeth up to Beth-horon, thence to Azekah, and thence to Makkedah. Here it is told Joshua that the five kings are hid in a cave. He gives orders to secure them by rolling a great stone to the mouth of the cavern, and then to pursue the fugitive enemy in order to follow up the advantages already secured. After accomplishing their utter overthrow, or chasing them till they seek refuge in their fenced cities, the army of Israel returns to Joshua, who, as it seems, is still at Makkedah ; probably to prevent the escape of the five kings. These are then led forth and slain ; and the narrative goes on to inform the reader, that those cities to which the dispersed armies had fled are next attacked and overthrown, and his conquest pushed into the far south ; *after* which, (verse 43,) Joshua returns and all Israel with him unto the camp at Gilgal. Now, this is perfectly natural and consistent with itself ; no interruption of any kind ; the events are recorded just as we should expect they would occur, in connection with the knowledge of the success which had attended the arms of Joshua in the campaign.

But what shall we do with the 15th verse ? A most serious and insurmountable difficulty this, indeed ! “ Joshua returns and all Israel with him unto the camp at Gilgal.” Returns from Makkedah, immediately after the sun and moon had paused in obedience to his command, till the people had avenged themselves on their enemies, returns to Gilgal, distant some thirty-three or thirty-five miles, returns, as it would seem, that night ! “ But these five kings fled, and hid themselves in a cave at Makkedah. And it was told Joshua, saying, The five kings are found hid in a cave at Makkedah. And Joshua said, Roll great stones upon the mouth of the cave, and set men by it to keep them ; and stay ye not, but pursue ye after your enemies, and smite the hindmost of them.” So, then, we perceive that neither Joshua nor Israel has re-

turned to the camp at Gilgal, but all are at Makkedah, whatever becomes of verse 15, or any thing connected with it.

2. The passage under consideration *claims* to be just what we have regarded it—a quotation, or an extract, and nothing more. The question which occurs in the midst of verse 13, “Is not this written in the book of Jasher?” is proof abundant that he who introduced it either intended to inform his readers where he found it, and consequently that he wished to be understood as quoting, and nothing more, or *appealed* to a contemporaneous work, or record, in proof of what he then asserted. For our own part, we consider it of little importance which ground is taken; the one is just about as fatal as the other to the passage. A third supposition is not possible; the question is either a declaration, though indirect, that the author *intends* it as a quotation, or he would support himself in the assertion that the sun and moon stood still in obedience to the command of Joshua, by appealing to another author and another record. We shall consider this last view of it more at large, in a subsequent section of this article. (See 5.)

If, then, the ground be taken that it is a quotation, and that the author, whoever he may have been, paused in the midst of it *in order that he might guard the reader against supposing that he would be understood as declaring that this ever took place*, the point is settled. There seems to be at least an effort on the part of the writer, to prevent misunderstanding. His question is equivalent to this: Do you not find what I am now recording in the book of Jasher? Or perhaps more in accordance with his true meaning, Do you not find the victory that Joshua achieved over the enemies of God, *noticed, or referred to in the book of Jasher, in the words here inserted?* And this, as the reader must carefully remark, is language which might have been used at any age, since the book of Joshua was written.

3. There are some considerations connected with the well-known references to “the book of Jasher,” which seem to bear somewhat heavily on the main question, and which

we may as well notice here as at a subsequent part of the argument. These references are only two: one is under consideration, and the other is found in 2 Sam. 1: 18.

Josephus supposes "the book of Jasher" was composed of certain records, and was kept in a safe place *at the time!* to which these two notices of it refer; and that it contained an account of what happened to the Jews from year to year. So that the book was not ranked among inspired writings, but only regarded as correct; so much so that its author obtained the name of Jasher, or the Just.¹ Bp. Lowth thinks it was a poetical book, or a volume of poems, extant at a period *long before* it is referred to by the author of the book of Joshua and of Samuel! *An uninspired man referring to events that did not take place till long after he wrote!*

Suppose, then, we take the ground that the book of Jasher was extant at the time of the conquest of Canaan: *When could it have been written, in order to have contained a notice of the standing still of the sun and moon?* That is, upon the supposition that Joshua, or the writer of the book of Joshua, made a record of this miracle as soon as it was wrought, when could the book of Jasher have been written, to have contained a notice of an event which must have been recorded immediately after it transpired, to have been *referred to* by this very book, in the record which is therein made of the same event?

It must be carefully borne in mind that, if Joshua is the writer of the book which bears his name, he is the author of Chap. 10: 12, 15, i. e. if the statement here is true: how, then, can we account for this reference to a book which is said to have contained a notice of the same event, when, beyond controversy, Joshua made a record of it as soon as it transpired?

The book of Jasher, then, must have been extant before the conquest of Canaan, and must have referred to an event which did not transpire *till during the wars of this conquest!*

¹ Josephus Antiq. Jud. lib. 5: cap. 2.

or the writer of the book of Joshua must have neglected to notice a most signal event, till Jasher had had time to speak of it in a poem, so that he could cite this poem in confirmation of his own statement ; or the whole of the passage in dispute has been foisted into the text at a period long subsequent to the occurrence of the event which it proposes to record.

But we are met by a more serious difficulty still, in the other notice of this book ; that found in 2 Samuel 1 : 18. David here bemoans the death of Saul and Jonathan in a poem, at the commencement of which there is a reference to the book of Jasher similar to the one before us : " Behold, it is written in the book of Jasher." What is written there ? That poem ? Is this found recorded in the book of Jasher ? If so, we have a difficulty of no ordinary kind to be removed here. The death of Saul and Jonathan took place at least 400 years *after the conquest of Canaan* by Joshua ; Calmet makes it 430. Did Jasher live and write during the whole period of 430 years ? *And if this was so*, when, and how, and where did he get the poem which David had made on the death of his friends, so as to be able to insert it in *his* book, *before* the writer of the book of Samuel had inserted it there ? The author of " the book of Jasher " has the poem which David made, and inserts it in his book before David has made it !! We set up the plea of ignorance here. We know of no means of removing these difficulties, so as to save the disputed passage from the doom that seems to await it. Nor can we give any other explanation of its being found here than that already offered in regard to the passage under discussion in this article.

But further remark seems necessary in respect to the last passage cited. What, then, does the writer say is written in the book of Jasher ? The *poem*, which immediately follows ? Or does he declare, that the circumstance of David's giving command that the children of Judah should be " taught the use of the bow," is there ? We are not unprepared to answer the latter question. The words "*the use of*" are supplied by translators ; remove them, and a serious difficulty in the

way of correctly understanding the passage itself is removed. "Also he [David] bade them teach the children of Judah the bow;" that is, *the poem*, so called by reason of one of its leading terms, or first words. It was then, as at the present day, the practice to designate a piece set to music from some one or more of its first words; e. g. "Lord of all power and might."

Books were so designated by the Hebrews. Thus the book of Genesis was called *Bereshith*, the Beginning; the book of Numbers, *Bemidbar*. Sometimes they introduce a poem with this formula: "az-jasher," i. e. "then sang;" "az-jasher Mosheh," "then sang Moses." Ex. 15: 1. The Samaritan Pentateuch reads, "Jasher vè-jasher Deborah," "Then sang Deborah."

"The book of Jasher," therefore, was probably a collection of sacred songs, composed on various occasions, and thus named because many of its pieces commenced with the above formula: "ve-jasher."¹

One of its pieces undoubtedly was that recorded in 2 Sam. chap. 1, in which David gives vent to the swellings of his heart at the death of Saul and Jonathan. The notice of it which is found in the 18th verse bears evident marks of violence in its introduction. There is nothing natural, easy, or in accordance with the subject matter of the context. What possible harmony between the announcement, that orders had been given to instruct the children of Judah in the use of the bow, and the elegiac strains that follow? Would a poet of such ineffable skill as David possessed, pause at the commencement of a poem, so perfect in all its parts as the one before us, and give command concerning the training of youth in the arts of war and bloodshed? Were the fires of vengeance burning so deep in his soul, that his hand refused to touch the moaning wires, until he had laid the proper plans for avenging himself at some distant period on those that had

¹ Compare Bp. Lowth. *Prael.* pp. 306, 307, notes. And Dr. Gregory, *Translation*, vol. ii. pp. 152, 153, notes.

slain his friends? It is not possible: the whole verse is spurious, beyond a doubt, a bungling interpolation by some one, years after the death of Saul occurred, or after David noticed it in the melancholy strains which he, or some one else duly inspired, has recorded. Remove the interpolation, and the passage reads easily and naturally; retain it, and all is unnatural and contradictory.

4. There are other, and most serious difficulties in the way of receiving the disputed passage as a part of the records of truth. The one which now follows, we regard as of some importance. While all the surrounding text is, for the best of reasons, the gravest prose, *the passage itself is poetry*. It forms three perfect distiches: Thus—

“ Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon,
And thou Moon, in the valley of Ajalon.
And the Sun stood still, and the Moon stayed her course,
Until the people were avenged of their enemies.
And the Sun tarried in the midst of the heavens,
And hastened not to go down in a whole day.”

This, in connection with the beginning of the twelfth verse, we regard as comprising probably the original extract; and the remainder of the passage as having come from the pen of him to whom we are indebted for the interpolation.

But it will perhaps be replied, What if it be poetry? Is there any thing uncommon in a writer's thus breaking off from prose and introducing poetry, with a view to give effect, or force, to a magnificent work which he wished to record? We are disposed to regard it a very uncommon thing. We can see no reason whatever for introducing a few lines of poetry here, in the middle of a narrative, which required only a plain unvarnished statement of the facts just as they occurred. Was not the event in question one which required in the narrator great plainness and precision?

5. The passage itself contains the elements of its own destruction, in respect to several statements which it makes. We are persuaded, no one can read it, with these distinctly

before his mind, without having his confidence in it utterly destroyed.

One of these we have already considered at some length, in our remarks upon verse fifteenth, "Joshua returned and all Israel with him," etc. But we feel inclined to introduce to the reader's notice the views which some others have taken of this passage. Calvin and Massius declare the fifteenth verse spurious. They have no authority, however, for so doing, except that which arises from the character of its own statements; they see the utter impossibility of reconciling these with the well-known and rational averments of the context. It appears to them quite clear, (as, indeed, to whom does it not?) that Joshua and all Israel with him could not have returned to the camp at Gilgal, and at the same time have remained at Makkedah, engaged in the summary process, therein described, of punishing their enemies. The fifteenth verse is omitted in the Septuagint, at least in the older MSS. The Alexandrine and the Vatican also want it; but all this proves only, that the ancient transcriber, like the modern interpreter, met with a difficulty in it which he could in no way surmount, and therefore chose to *cut* the knot which he found himself unable to untie. Others, as Buddeus, have endeavored to obviate the difficulty by slightly varying the translation. Instead of reading as now, "Joshua returned," they propose to read it, "And Joshua *purposed* to return," etc. That is, as they say, he was on the *point* of doing this, but having been informed that the five kings were found secreted in a cave, he changed his purpose, and remained to push his advantages to the end.

But we cannot concur. Such a *purpose* is altogether inadmissible, even if we were fairly over the difficulty arising from the consideration that it is all supposition. Joshua was not the man, by a precipitous retreat, to lose the advantages which he had that day gained over his enemies. Is it likely, that he would thus throw away the fruits of a most signal victory, which God had evidently given him, and let slip an opportunity of completely vanquishing his combined enemies?

And further, what occasion had he for such haste in getting back to his camp? He had nowhere been beaten; nor in all the land was there a Blücher to come pouring his dark masses down upon him just at night-fall, to snatch from his brow the priceless laurels of an unquestionable victory, and utterly extinguish his hope and his fame. No, he had nothing to fear; God had been his defence, and there were not the least signs of his withdrawing this protection.

Besides, it must be borne in mind, that any defence of the 15th verse will ruin the 43d, where the same words are literally repeated, and where they *seem* evidently to be in place. The proposed amendment, therefore, instead of freeing the passage from one embarrassment, actually involves the whole in more.

Another consideration, which seems to subvert all confidence in it, is the astounding assertion that "there was no day like that, before it, or after it:" In what respect? we are here compelled to inquire. Was this said with reference to its *length*, or to something else? Certainly he might have averred that, in respect to every *preceding* day of time, there had been none like it, if it was, as the passage declares, a day wherein they had the light of two: but whether he could have assured the world, that there was never to be another like it in this respect, is somewhat questionable. How could he say whether God would not in the course of his wars with wicked nations, employ another Joshua; and, as he had done in the case before us, (that is, upon the supposition the thing recorded is true,) so do again; give him authority not only over the treasures of hail, but over the sun and moon; nay, over time itself?

But the reader must carefully bear in mind, that the record claims nothing remarkable for the day, *with respect to its LENGTH*. On the contrary, the writer specifies the particular respect in which that day was unlike any one that had been or ever *was* to be: and what was it? Any thing in regard to its length? Certainly not; but it was "*that the Lord hearkened unto the voice of a man!*" Now we respectfully

inquire, if this *was* the first time "that the Lord had hearkened to the voice of a man?" Or was it the last? Did he not hearken to Moses? How many times? Did not the Most High hearken to the voice of a man, when he emptied the treasures of his wrath upon Pharaoh and his land? And how many times did the half-subdued king of Egypt beseech the servant of God to intercede for him, and prevail? How was it at the Red Sea; and at the waters of Meribah; at Rephidim; and at Sinai; and at Jericho? And how has it been since? Has there been no intercourse kept up between heaven and earth, during the last three thousand years? Now, we are assured in the passage before us, that there is to be no day like that to the end of time. If, then, we suppose that day to have been unlike any one that had been, or *was* to be, in this respect, that the Lord heard and answered the prayer of man, what shall we say of the following declaration? "Elias was a man, subject to like passions as we are, and he prayed earnestly that it might not rain; and it rained not on the earth by the space of three years and six months. And he prayed again, and the heaven gave rain, and the earth brought forth her fruit." And was this the *only* instance in which God hearkened to the voice of man?

But it may, perhaps, be said, The meaning of the declaration is, that God had never hearkened to the voice of a man *in this particular sense*, or in so remarkable a manner, and never would again. In reply, we need only say, there is no end to suppositions. If we regard the sense of the passage, as it stands, incomplete, and on that ground proceed to furnish the supplement, we enter an illimitable field, and shall be likely to find, in the end, that every one has the same right to introduce hypotheses as ourselves.

Neither can the ground be taken, that the point, or the particular, in which that day was unlike any that had been or that would be, was, that the Lord fought for Israel: for this would contradict almost the entire history of his dealings with his people. How was it with Rephidim? And did not the Lord fight for Israel, when he overthrew Og, king of Bashan?

And have there been no instances since ? What is the historical part of the Bible, but one continuous record of his marvellous works to maintain and defend his people ? This hypothesis, therefore, must be given up.

Nor should we fail to remark in this place, that to maintain any of the above suppositions surrenders the main point in debate ; for, if the writer of the disputed passage, in his declaration that there had been no day like that, and there would be none like it again, referred either to the circumstance, that the Lord hearkened to the voice of a man, or that he fought for Israel, he did *not* refer to the standing still of the sun and moon, *and this is the point in dispute.*

We can easily conceive that a heathen poet, one who knew little of the wondrous works of God, and who scarcely believed the little he had heard, who allowed himself almost any license in his art, should make the assertion we have been contemplating. But that a man acquainted with the history of Israel, his escape from Egyptian bondage, his passage of the Red Sea, his journey through the wilderness, his overthrow of Jericho, and destruction of Ai, to say nothing of the numerous instances remaining ; that such an one should declare that this was the first and the last time in which God would take it upon himself to defend his people, we cannot believe ; especially when we take into consideration that he was at the same time divinely inspired. We are, therefore, compelled to regard these considerations as the elements of utter destruction to the credibility of the passage which contains them.

6. It seems, moreover, not a little remarkable, that an event of such stupendous grandeur as this which we are contemplating, (the sun and the moon arrested in their journey through the heavens, and compelled to remain stationary about a whole day,) should have perished from the memory of the world. Why do we not find some notice of it in the traditions of other nations ? Would not the world have been likely to remember it, if such an event had ever occurred ? For, to all who should have been then living in that hemisphere

where the event is said to have taken place, there would have been the same or similar phenomena, the day as long again as an ordinary one; and to those who inhabited the other parts of the globe, the *night* would have been equally prolonged. Why do we not find some scrap of history, some vague tradition, to say the least, of such a day and such a night?

The Deluge, confessedly of little if of any more importance, has left its history, not only engraved upon the rocks of our highest mountains and deepest valleys, but also ploughed deep into the mind of every nation and every people on the earth. In fact so strong is the argument drawn from this source, that were we not to find the history of the flood in the Scriptures, we should feel compelled to admit its existence. But why should this event be so carefully registered in the memory of earth's population, and nothing be known of a certain day, some three thousand five hundred years ago, as long as two days? There are many and strong reasons for believing, that the deluge would have been unknown in the traditions and histories of nations, while the miracle in question would have been carefully remembered had it ever taken place. By the flood, the earth was swept of its inhabitants; there were none left, save the family of Noah, to make a record of that catastrophe. But in regard to the matter we are considering, *all* its population remained. They were eye-witnesses, either of an unusual day, or of an exceedingly singular night. Why do they not remember it?

We must notice another circumstance here: the tradition, or other record, would have varied according to the different situation of the nation or people where that tradition was found. The earth was then, as now, a globe; and consequently this circumstance *must have* given a peculiar shape, or character to the tradition. Thus, as we have already intimated, among some, there would have been the recollection of one day as long as two; with others, a night of equal length. With those living in India, China, and Japan, it would have run thus: Thousands of years ago, the sun lodged on some of the western mountains, and remained stationary for about the

space of a whole day." With others, those living far west of the land of Palestine, it would have been, "The sun once found it impossible to ascend the eastern skies, and remained fixed in his chariot some twelve or fourteen hours." We find however, nothing of the kind, not a shred of a record; not the faintest traces of a tradition of any such event: a silence for which we find it difficult to account, except upon the above ground, that no such event ever occurred.

And yet, it will not be denied that our expectation of this tradition is altogether natural and just. What could have been more difficult for the world to forget, than the day of which we speak? Were such an event to occur at the present moment, with what deep interest would earth's population stand and measure the flight of time, and record the growing anxieties which would be uttered in respect to the result! And how many speculations, and how many theories, how many causes would be assigned for the remarkable occurrence! The preachers of a bewildering fanaticism, which marks the present age, might gratify their vanity by recording the conversion of thousands, nay, millions in a day.

But we shall probably be told, that all we are here requiring has really taken place. Herodotus, as Mr. Horne informs us in his "Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures," Herodotus has found among the Egyptians the very tradition in question. In conversation with the priests, he had learned that "in a very remote age the sun had four times departed from his regular course; having twice set where he ought to have risen, and twice risen where he ought to have set!" Mr. Horne admits, however, that the circumstances are not the same in all respects, in the one record, that they are in the other. Yet he seems to think that, since we cannot tell to what *else* the Egyptian tradition referred, it is proper to regard it as referring to the day when "the sun stood still on Gibeon, and the moon in the valley of Ajalon!" Thus, in the first place, assuming the truth of the thing to be proved in order to account for this tradition, and then bringing forward the tradition to prove the

truth of the thing assumed !! A fair example of arguing in a circle.

But, if Mr. Horne has furnished us with the data upon which his mind is made up, we are compelled to say, our faith can never span an arch like this ! And we do most deeply regret that a man so generally correct in his conclusions, as the author in question, should have allowed himself to be influenced in this matter by considerations of no weight whatever, and utterly irrelevant to the matter in hand, even if they lacked not weight. He might, with equal propriety, have selected any thing else as well as this. The famous Zodiac of Dendera, or of Esneh, would have laid the foundation for a much more plausible theory than the record we have found in Herodotus. However, the thing, as it is, is not wholly without its use ; since it evidently shows, in the first place, that the expectation of some tradition, or history of such an event, in case it had ever occurred, is altogether natural and reasonable ; and in the second, that no tradition worthy of a moment's consideration can be found, or it would have been brought forward in place of the one we have been considering. That Mr. Horne should have consented to bring out this, is proof, we think, that he felt the imperious demand for something of the kind ; and also, that he could find no better, or he would have brought it. If so, we are sorry it did not occur to him that the difficulty lay in the thing to be proved ; the event itself had never taken place.

We are disposed, therefore, to move confidently forward in the line of our argument, under the healthful influence of the feeling, that we have judged correctly in supposing that an event like this should have left some traces of its existence in the memory of the world before whose eyes it must have taken place. The period of time is not so far back as to give any one the shadow of a defence on the ground that the tradition had perished. Most of the marvellous works which God performed in connection with his people, when he took them by the hand to lead them out of Egypt, and which were wrought before they were settled in Palestine, are carefully

treasured up in the traditions of those nations which lived in the immediate neighborhood of the localities where these events are said to have taken place. *A place* (whether the true one or not affects not the argument) where Israel passed the Sea is readily pointed out to the modern traveller, as much so as if the event had occurred but yesterday, and with the apparent feeling that the interests of a world are suspended on the truth of the testimony. The rock, out of which Moses is said to have brought water for the thousands of Israel, just as we read in the Scriptures, is shown you with as much precision as if your guide had been present when it was done. We do not, of course, wish to be understood as saying, *that rock is the true one*; but what seems especially worthy of remark is, this tradition is so vivid, and lies so deep in the mind of the people, as to *compel* them to fix upon a certain rock as the identical one referred to in the Bible. They can forget the locality, but not the event.

But, let us suppose that some may be so destitute of foresight as to assign as a reason for this tradition, not the actual occurrence of the thing specified, but the record which is made of them in the Scriptures: Well! is not the passage we are examining found there also? And has it not been there for at least two thousand years, and if true, as long as any part of the Bible? Why has it not given rise to a tradition as well as the other events which have been recorded? Why would not an individual, who should have repaired to the Jewish Scriptures one, two, or three thousand years ago, to read the record of an event there found, that should have given rise to a tradition which was destined to travel down to the present day, why should he not have fixed upon the record made, i. e. Joshua 10 : 12-15, if it had been there? And without controversy it *was* there, as soon as any of the book, on the supposition that such an event took place. Besides, we are disposed to inquire what an argument of this kind would be worth? Let us suppose a tradition of the deluge to exist among the nations of the earth, and it is asserted, that this tradition originated in the record found in Genesis: How,

then, we would ask, can it be a proof of the deluge ? A tradition, in order to be of any weight whatever in proving an event, must have originated in the actual occurrence of the event; and not in the record which had been made of it. It must have had a separate and independent existence, or it is worth nothing as proof.

Moreover, a tradition which should have for its origin a record in the Scriptures, or any where else, must, from the nature of the case, be limited to a portion only of the human family ; whereas, in regard to Joshua 10 : 12-15, we shall feel justified in asking, nay, *demanding* a universal one. *Can it be found ?*

We feel, therefore, justified in declaring that the death-like silence which obtains among the numerous traditions of men, respecting the stopping of the sun and moon, is stubborn proof that no such event ever occurred.

7. We find, also, from a careful examination of the passage in connection with the whole chapter, some serious difficulties arising from *the position* which it assigns to Joshua, considered in relation to the sun and moon ; and also from the position given to several cities and other localities at the time.

Where *is* Joshua, when he issues the command, "Sun, stand thou still on Gibeon," etc. ? Both the true record and that which we regard as false, place him at Makkedah. (See verse 16.) The battle commences at Gibeon, early in the morning : and Joshua, after routing his enemy, pursues them along the way that goeth up to Beth-boron, and smote them to Azekah and unto Maddekah. But, at what *time* in the day is he at Makkedah ?

He leaves his encampment at Gilgal in the evening, (verse 9,) and marches all night. Now, as Gibeon is distant from Gilgal at least twenty-four or twenty-five miles,¹ he could not have reached the former place, where the battle commences, until sunrise, or after, the next morning. Whether the enemy fled at first sight of Joshua, or whether they remained to fight, we are

¹ See Map of Palestine, by Edward Robinson.

not so particularly informed ; but the latter is more probable, since we are told (verse 10) there was a great slaughter of them at Gibeon. On any ground, therefore, it is most certain they could not have arrived at Beth-horon before the middle of the day. Here, as they were passing from the upper to the nether Beth-horon, the Lord attacks them with hail ; and as they are now at least ten miles from Gibeon, where the battle commenced, they have to pass to Azekah and thence to Makkedah, which is the locality of Joshua when he is said to have uttered the command. But, since Makkedah is at least eighteen, if not twenty miles from Gibeon, where the attack commenced, it must have been as late as four o'clock P. M. when they reached the place. Let us now look at the order particularly : "Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon ; and thou Moon, in the valley of Ajalon." But where is Gibeon from Makkedah ? *Nearly due east*, at least eighteen, if not twenty miles. And what is the hour of the day ? At least four P. M. And where would the sun be to a person standing at Makkedah, at four o'clock in the afternoon ? Over Gibeon ? Nay, verily ; the sun could have been over Gibeon only in the morning ; and at that time, Joshua and all Israel with him were *at Gibeon*. Instead, therefore, of lodging upon Gibeon, at that hour of the day, the sun must have been south-southwest from Makkedah ; and the moon, to have been even visible at that hour, must have been just rising in the east instead of being in the valley of Ajalon, which is southeast from Makkedah. Where is there escape from this entanglement but in the supposition, that the passage itself neither belongs here nor any where else in the Bible ? Remove it altogether, and the difficulty vanishes ; the record will then remain free, connected, and natural ; but as it is, we freely confess, there seems to be no defence for it. Especially is this true, when it is considered in connexion with verse 15, to which we propose soon to give further attention.

On the supposition that the record here made is true, and the miraculous event which it records a matter of fact, we cannot understand why it is not once referred to in all the

subsequent Scriptures. It certainly could not have been on account of its comparative unimportance ; it was a miracle, as we have already remarked, which, if true, would fall little short of that stupendous event which destroyed the old world. Why, then, is it nowhere noticed ? Why is it not once alluded to by those who so often and so faithfully reminded Israel of the great and mighty works which God wrought for their deliverance and for their defence ?

Undoubtedly we shall be told that it is referred to in Hab. 3 : 11, “The sun and moon stood still in their habitation.” This, in truth, would *seem* a very clear case. If so, it will undoubtedly *remain* clear after a faithful examination. We shall not quarrel with the translation, nor invoke the aid of an earthquake, in order to explain it away ; but shall cheerfully admit that, after due investigation had, if the passage turn out to be a reference to Joshua 10 : 12–15, we have no further difficulty with it, whatever becomes of the considerations already offered, each of which seems clear and conclusive. A single case of obvious reference to this event, whether by prophet, apostle, evangelist, or any one else, “who spake as he was moved by the Holy Spirit,” will end all debate, by placing it, so far as the writer is concerned, beyond dispute forever. To the investigation, then, let us proceed.

Habakkuk 3 : 11 must certainly be explained by the same general rules which apply to the rest of the chapter. Consequently, if this passage, “The sun and moon stood still in their habitation,” is a reference to an event which at any time literally occurred, we shall demand the same of all the rest. God is therein represented as “coming from Teman, or the South, his glory covering the heavens, his brightness as the light ; with horns coming out of his hands ; as preceded by the pestilence ; walking upon coals of fire ; standing and measuring the earth ; pausing, casting a look upon the nations and driving them asunder ; scattering the mountains, *and causing the perpetual hills to bow.*” When did all these things occur ? And where is the record of them ? Again : “The tents of Cushan are in affliction, the curtains of the land of

Midian tremble.” When was this, and where recorded? The prophet next inquires if the Lord were displeased with the rivers, if the Most High were exercising his wrath against the sea?” To what event are we referred here? And what is meant when God is represented as riding upon his horses and in his chariot of salvation? His bow, we are told, is made quite naked. Then the mountains are said to have seen God, and trembled. The deep utters its voice, and lifts imploring hands on high; the sun and moon stand still in their habitation; next they move forward at the light of God’s arrows, and at the shining of His glittering spear. Jehovah is there represented as moving through the land, and threshing the heathen in his anger, walking through the sea with his horses, etc., etc.

Again we ask, When, where did these things occur? *We shall insist on stretching one and the same line of interpretation on the passage under present examination, that we use for measuring the rest of the chapter.* If we must admit that the 11th verse is a reference to an occurrence which had a literal and matter-of-fact existence, we shall contend, to the end of the chapter, that the remaining assertions are also references to true and real transactions. We demand that it be understood that the God of heaven, in a bodily visible form, at some time previous to the record here made, was seen coming from the south, with horns springing out of his hands, literally bearing a bow and arrow, walking on glowing coals, scattering the mountains, riding on horses, driving his chariot, compelling the sea to lift up its hands and voice for mercy or something else.

But how does it happen that verse 11 should be thought to have had a reference to an event which actually took place, whilst no one supposes for a moment that a single one of the remaining declarations ever referred to a transaction which at any time literally occurred? Why does no one show us when and where “the perpetual hills did bow”? The answer is, undoubtedly, The assertion in verse 11th is nearly if not entirely literal, as a reference to what is recorded in the dis-

puted passage, and what is thought to have occurred. But there is a better reason to be assigned than this. The marked and unquestionable similarity between the two passages (Joshua 10 : 12-15, and Hab. 3 : 11) is proof abundant, that *one* must have originated the other. Either Hab. 3 : 11 is a reference to the one in Joshua, or that is to Habakkuk. Let the ground then be taken, that the author of the book of Jasher, at what time soever he may have written, finds the glowing description in Habakkuk of the conquest of Canaan, and selecting the startling declaration in verse 11, clothes it in his own language, and makes it the theme of a short poem. Afterward, a transcriber of the sacred volume, or of the book of Joshua, when he arrives at the place in the narrative where we find the extract, takes the liberty to introduce the whole passage from the book of Jasher, taking special pains to inform us where he found it. This hypothesis possesses several qualifications which are of great weight. In the first, and least important place, it is a plausible one ; in the next, it fully accounts for the fact, that the event is not once referred to by the writers of the Sacred Scriptures. Neither by prophets, nor by apostles, nor by the Lord Jesus Christ, is there the slightest, the remotest allusion to any thing of the kind, while every considerable, well authenticated miracle is again and again referred to in the most explicit and unequivocal terms. Scarce a page of the Bible do we peruse, without having our mind directed to some one, or more, of those magnificent works which God had wrought in the beginning, and which he continued to work for the defence of his people, and the exhibition of his power in the sight of his enemies. Let the reader compare, at his leisure, Psalms 105, 6, and 7 ; where we have a summary of the mighty works of God, and which are left on record to be made known to the people : yet, a record of the arrest of the sun and moon is not found there ; it is not even alluded to in this "summing up," if we may so speak, of the whole of God's dealings with his people.

And the author of the epistle to the Hebrews, where, in chap. 11, he is almost wholly employed in citing examples

of faith and its mighty works, and where he even notices the case of Rahab, and the conduct of Moses's parents in secret-ing him, and the directions of Jacob respecting his bones, etc., etc., never refers to the standing still of the sun and moon, at the command of Joshua ! And yet, there is not an event referred to, in either of the passages named, which, for grandeur and sublimity, and the manifestation of power from on high, and the still more important exhibition of the power of faith, will compare at all with the so-called miracle whose record we are considering. It is, therefore, impossible for us to believe, without *some evidence*, (and while considerations of undeniable weight are pressing so hard *against* it,) that any event, like that which is recorded in the passage under examination, ever occurred.

9. We shall add only one consideration more. The passage in question, is evidently no part of the word of God, since it leaves, in spite of every effort, a false or wrong impression upon the mind of the reader ; an impression which is directly at war with the connected and true narrative of the campaign. We have already alluded to the fact, that when these verses are wholly omitted, and the record read as if they never had had existence, there is no obscurity, no difficulty, no embarrassment whatever. The mind is not tortured with the assertion in verse 15, " And Joshua returned and all Israel with him unto the camp at Gilgal," followed immediately with this, (verses 16 and 17,) " But these five kings fled and hid themselves in a cave at Makkedah : and it was told Joshua, etc., etc." Why should these five kings have fled in such terrible affright, after their pursuers had " returned to the camp at Gilgal" ? And what additional security could the cave at Makkedah have furnished them, when once their pursuers were all gone ? And how shall we contrive to get Joshua *back*, " and all Israel with him," to Makkedah, *to hear* the intelligence that " these five kings are found hid in a cave," and to give instructions, that great stones should be rolled upon the mouth of the cave, and men stationed to watch, lest these kingly subterranean prisoners should make their escape ?

Mr. Horne¹ proposes here to cut the knot, by rejecting verse 15 altogether, and retaining the rest of the passage. He says, "Verse 15 is apparently contradicted by verse 43." (He might have said, by all the chapter except verse 43. Though *this*, even, would still be a contradiction.) He adds, "In the former place he (Joshua) is said to have returned and all Israel with him unto the camp at Gilgal; which he certainly did not do until the end of the expedition, (verse 43,) where this declaration is properly introduced. It (verse 15) is therefore either an interpolation, or must signify, that Joshua *intended* to return, but changed his mind on hearing that the five kings had hid themselves in a cave at Makkedah."

With respect to this *intending*, or *purposing* to return, we have already said enough under our sixth argument, to which the reader is referred. We wish only a word further, in this place, on the false impression which the passage unavoidably leaves on the mind of the reader. It is, that the whole work of completely vanquishing, or subduing the confederate kings, was accomplished in one day, and at an hour early enough to enable the conqueror and his victorious army to return to their place of general encampment at Gilgal, that night; whereas it is abundantly evident from the whole record, and also from the nature of the case, that the undertaking must have occupied *weeks*. Let us look at this matter. Makkedah, as we have seen, is at least forty if not forty-two miles, in an almost due west direction, from Gilgal. Here we suppose, and the record evidently demands it, that Joshua and all Israel with him, pass the first night of the campaign. The work of leading forth these five kings and slaying them is probably performed in the evening, after the return of those who had pursued the enemy until they had shut themselves up in their "fenced cities." We think no one will contend for a greater day's work, than Joshua and his people must have performed by the time we have supposed; we think no one

¹ See Introduction to Crit. Study of Sac. Scrip. vol. i. p. 643-44, Lond. ed.

will demand that they should have done more, in the course of twenty-four hours, than to travel some forty miles, fifteen or twenty of which must have been passed in hard fighting. And there is a large number of *cities* named in the subsequent part of the record, which were overthrown by Joshua and his army, during this expedition ; for the doing of which we must have some *time*, BEFORE “Joshua returns and all Israel with him unto the camp at Gilgal.”

Joshua passes from Makkedah unto Libnah, which, with its king, is delivered into his hands ; and he does to it as he had done unto Jericho and its king. From Libnah, he passes and all Israel with him unto Lachish, which surrendered to him *on the second day* ; and to which he did as he had done unto Libnah. From Lachish he passes to Eglon, and overthrew that. From Eglon, to Hebron, and conquers that with all its cities. Next he passes to Debir ; and as he had done to Hebron, so he did unto Debir. From this place he makes an excursion into all the hill-country ; thence into the south ; thence into the country of the vale, and of the springs, and destroyed all their kings ; “he left none remaining, but utterly destroyed all that breathed, as the Lord God of Israel commanded.” And, after smiting Kadesh-barnea, even unto Gaza, and all the country of Goshen, even unto Gibeon with all its kings, “he returns and all Israel with him unto the camp at Gilgal.”

Let any one, now, take a map of Palestine, one on which these different cities are laid down, and after examining their relative positions, and determining their proper distances one from another, let him follow Joshua to the end of his expedition, and say if he would regard it as an enterprise of only one day. Let him say, if he thinks any mode of conveyance, known at that time, or any means of travelling employed, even at the present, in that country, would have enabled a man, *without* stopping to demolish cities or behead their kings, to pass over that tract of country and return to Gilgal, I will not say in one day, but in one week. We leave, therefore, these difficulties upon the mind of the reader ; satisfied that he can-

not regard them in any other light than insurmountable, and directly subversive of the passage, which evidently cannot be retained as a part of God's word.

We shall only say in conclusion, whether we have erred or not in the opinion formed of the passage before us, no one will deny, that we have strong reasons for entertaining it. "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind."

ARTICLE VI.

LUTHERANISM AND THE REFORM; THEIR DIVERSITY ESSENTIAL TO THEIR UNITY.

By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNÉ, D. D.

"Each of these religions deems itself the most perfect ; the CALVINISTIC one believes itself most conformed to what Jesus Christ has said, and the LUTHERAN to what the Apostles have done."—MONTESQUIEU, *Esprit des Loix*, liv. XXIV., chap. 5.

[THE following discourse on the unity and diversity of Lutheranism and Calvinism, was delivered by Professor Merle before the Evangelical Society of Geneva, Switzerland, at its last anniversary. It is more of the nature of an essay than of a discourse ; and the author makes the following apology for its appearance :—

"In the first place, it was not written for publication, and is but a series of notes and paragraphs put together. Besides, far from being the exposition of new and peculiar ideas, as some have thought it to be, it is merely the statement of ecclesiastical facts, acknowledged by the highest authorities ; this might easily have been proved, had I not thought it better to be sparing of quotations."

However old and familiar the distinguished Professor may think the facts which he here gives, it is certain that the same talented and powerful mind appears in this discourse, as is displayed in the pages of the "History of the Reformation." It may be necessary, also, to add, that much of what is said of Lutheranism applies especially to the Lutheranism of Europe, and not at all to that of this country.—ED.]

THE times are pressing. It is becoming necessary to aim at the useful, not to be involved in useless discussions,

but to seek, according to the Apostolic precept, that which will truly contribute to the edification of the church. This thought has determined me to lay before you the following question :

What in our Reformed French churches has characterized the past year ?

It is, if I mistake not, a new manifestation of principles which have frequently been designated by the names of parties opposed to us, but which we desire to mention only in terms of kindness ; and for this reason we will call them (using a name dear to us) the principles of Lutheranism.

Lutheranism and the Reform¹ possess distinct characters, but they are not separated so much by errors as by diversities. God has chosen that this diversity should exist, that in the end the Reformation might be complete. Having in the beginning proposed to make immense bodies move around the sun, his powerful hand impressed them with two contrary forces ; the one tending to drive them from the centre, the other to attract them toward it. It is from these apparent contradictions that the motion of the universe and the admirable unity of the heavenly system result. So it was in the days of the Reformation. Opposite tendencies were necessary for this work, and these very tendencies enhance its admirable unity.

“ Dans le jardin de mon maitre
Il est toutes sortes de fleurs.”²

So wrote a Christian author.³ Shall we then look for one blossom only ? Ah ! let us not, like unskilful gardeners, tear up those indigenous plants, the culture of which is suited particularly to our soil and climate, and supply their place

¹ The reader must remember that the author uses the term *Reformation* to designate the grand work of the sixteenth century in general, whilst the word *Reform* is employed when the work of Zwingle and Calvin is specially referred to.—TRANS.

² “ In my master’s garden there are all kinds of flowers.”

³ *Tersteegen*.

with exotics which require other soil, and which would perish in our hands.

Yes, let us understand this well : there is not only friendship and harmony between Lutheranism and the Reform—there is more than this—there is *unity*.

First, they possess that thorough unity which results from the same living faith animating both. They believe alike in man's entire inability to do good ; they believe in God manifest in the flesh, in atonement by His blood, and regeneration by His Spirit, in justification by faith in His name, in charity, and in good works by virtue of their communion with Him. But it is not of this unity of *identity*, respecting which we wish to speak at present. We go much further : we intend to show that Lutheranism and the Reform are one, in their very diversities ; whence we infer that, instead of being effaced, most of these diversities—and especially those relating to the Reform which we have to defend—should be carefully preserved. Such is our position.

And those who, hearing us to-day enumerate the characters, so different in themselves, that distinguish Lutheranism from the Reform, would fall into a grave error, should they exclaim with painful surprise : “Of what importance is it, then, that there should be a few friends the less, or a few enemies the more ?”—The body and the soul differ vastly in their respective attributes, yet they form but one being. Man and woman have very opposite capacities and duties, yet are but one flesh. In Christ, humanity and divinity were certainly distinct, yet they together constitute but one Saviour. So Lutheranism and the Reform, though very different, are yet in unity.

Shall we speak of their strifes ? But is there never any strife between the body and the spirit ? between the husband and wife ? Was there not strife in Christ Himself, between His humanity and divinity ? “My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death. Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me,” cried His humanity, shuddering at the approach of the cross. Strife, indeed, but strife when overcome, far from being opposed to unity, is essential to it, at least on earth.

I believe the time is now near at hand when the struggle shall be over, and the union of Lutheranism and the Reform will be triumphant, if the rash friends of the former do not endeavor to force the latter to submit to its laws. Bear in mind that the Reform, which is essentially the friend of proselytism, does not strive to make proselytes within the pale of Lutheranism ; it loves it ; it venerates it ; it leaves it to its own strength, or rather to that of its God. But, strange to say, Lutheranism, (certainly not that of Germany, nor of Geneva,) Lutheranism, generally passive in its character, advances heedlessly, seemingly desirous of taking from us our patrimony, and substituting itself for the three centuries' work of our Reformers. Is it indeed necessary, in order to effect unity, to destroy one of the two members ? This may be one method, but it is not ours. Lutheranism has important duties to discharge toward the Reform, and too well do we know the noble principles of the excellent men who, in Germany, are its true supporters, not to be convinced that they will perform them well.

If one of two friendly and allied armies has been beaten and dispersed by the common enemy, whilst the other has remained in its camp, marshalled under its leaders and its standards, shall this latter seize that opportunity to assert its supremacy, and impose upon the other its own colors ? Will it not rather generously help them to recover the ancient standards of their fathers ? It is this that we now ask of Lutheranism.

We need not assert that we have no prejudice against Martin Luther. If there exist in the history of the world, a man whom we love above all others, it is he.—We venerate Calvin ; we love Luther. Lutheranism itself is dear to us, and for weighty reasons. There are principles in the Reform, which we would fear if there existed not the counterpoise of Lutheranism ; as there are also in Lutheranism those which would alarm us, were it not for the counterpoise of the Reform. Luther and Lutheranism have not, even in Germany, not even at Wittenberg, more zealous friends and admirers than ourselves.

But, if this question be proposed, Should the Reform in France, in Switzerland, or elsewhere, give way to Lutheranism? We reply, without hesitation, Certainly not !

Now we think this is the question which, during the past year, has been brought before our churches.

Have they at all times answered as they should have done ? We think not. The Reform is misunderstood, even among the Reformed themselves. Two centuries of persecution and humiliation have caused it to lose its finest traditions. Principles opposed to it, find eloquent and pious advocates. Even within its bosom, there are distinguished minds which hesitate, and are irresolute at the moment of revival, and which, mistaking one voice for another, are ready to undergo a most wonderful transformation. One would say, judging from what is passing at the present day, that the Reform may organize societies, may exercise a certain external activity, but with regard to *principles*, Lutheranism alone must establish them, so that it only remains for us to place ourselves under its guardianship. Our standard, which is three centuries old, is called radical, and innovating ; and colors rejected by ten generations begin to be raised up here and there, in this presbytery and in that church. Some communities, even, which are wholly Reformed, are ready to advocate it. There are countries covered with eloquent ruins, and strewn with the sepulchres of the saints, where such things are going on, and where, if they be not stopped, the very stones will cry out.

We firmly believe that the Swiss and French of the Reformed church have no need to ask directions of any foreign church, particularly of one with which, it is true, the same faith and the same charity ought to unite them, but which does not know them, and which, we must say, has, though with many remarkable exceptions, been frequently wanting in justice and impartiality toward them. If the Reform is to live, it must possess a life peculiar to itself. It has in its own traditions an abundance of most sublime inspirations, but unfortunately it does not know how to appreciate them, and instead of exploring the golden mine of its antiquity, doubt-

less with some trouble and by the sweat of its brow, it prefers receiving with eagerness, coin already stamped, but stamped with foreign arms.

In order that the Reformed church should preserve the principles God has intrusted to it, it must know them.—What are they then? It is to such research we appropriate this essay. We shall only lay before you truths acknowledged for three centuries past, but which seem, in our day, to be completely forgotten.

A great mind, the genius of *Montesquieu*, perceived a fundamental difference between Lutheranism and the Reform, when he said in his “*Esprit des Lois* :” “Each of these religions deems itself the most perfect; the Calvinistic deeming itself most conformed to what Jesus Christ has said, and the Lutheran to what the apostles have done.” This language, undoubtedly, implies that the Reform has for its basis the Word of God, while Lutheranism has the acts and usages of the church. This distinction is profound, and generally speaking contains much truth.

But let us examine more minutely these differences, without, however, pretending to enumerate them all. Let us lay aside peculiarities of doctrine, and particularly that of the free and eternal grace of God, which is our most precious jewel. Let us not speak, at present, of the election of the Father, nor of the manner in which humanity and divinity are united in the person of the man-God, nor of the nature of the Lord’s supper, nor of the doctrine of Baptism; these are well known peculiarities from which all others flow. Let us confine ourselves especially to questions relating to the church; which is daily becoming the greatest, and, so to speak, the all-engrossing subject.

I. The Reformed church lays down as the groundwork of Christianity, the *scriptural principle* that the *Word of God is the positive rule, the absolute law, the sole source of faith, and of the Christian life*; whereas Luther lays down as the basis of his Reformation, a principle not less to be venerated,

but entirely different, namely, *faith*, or *justification by faith*.

We think it was well that these two fundamental principles should have been established at the same time. In this particular, the combined action of Lutheranism and the Reform was admirable ; that of Lutheranism especially fills us with the deepest veneration. Not only did Luther and his friends set forth the capital doctrine of justification in a manner still more explicit than did the Reform, but, had they not done so, we boldly assert that there would have been no Reformation. Why was not the great Reformation accomplished by the sects of the middle ages, which originated the principles of the Reform ? For several reasons, undoubtedly, but principally because they were not fully impressed with the importance of this great idea, of which Luther, after St. Paul, was the most faithful promulgator.

The Reformation, and, prior to it, nascent Christianity, had two fundamental principles ; that of the Reform, which was simple, and that of Lutheranism, which was material. The Reform required faith also ; Lutheranism too required the Bible. But each of these principles was distinctively and specially intrusted to a faithful guardian. These were the two forces which were to urge on the new world created in the sixteenth century ; and herein we admire with gratitude the most perfect unity in the diversity of the work of God.

However, we would not justify the consequences to which Luther pushed his principles. Applying them to the Word of God with a boldness which astonishes us, he declares, in the preface of his translation of the New Testament, that the Gospel of St. John, the Epistles of St. Paul, particularly that to the Romans, and the first Epistle of St. Peter, are the true *marrow* of the Scriptures, because they treat especially of faith ; he considers the Gospels inferior to the Epistles ; lightly esteems the Revelation by St. John, and speaks of one of the Epistles (that of St. James) in terms so well known that I need not repeat them here. Rationalism, which shakes or revokes all the canonical writings, has appeared, and as it seems to us, could only appear in the church of Luther.

The Swiss and French Reform could not be reproached with this want of respect. On the contrary, in throwing off the authority of the church, it had recourse to that sovereign authority, which the church itself had always exalted, that of the Holy Scriptures. "Forsaking," says one of its leaders,¹ "the decrees of the Popes and the Fathers of the church, I went to the very fountain head. My soul was there refreshed, and from that time I strongly maintained this principle: The Bible alone should be our guide, and all the additions of men be rejected."

"The church of Christ," said the pastors of Berne in the famous dispute which decided the Reform of that Canton in 1528, "has made neither laws nor commandments in addition to the Word of God. This is the reason why all human traditions, called ecclesiastical, are obligatory only as far as they are contained and commanded in this Holy Word." And in the seventeenth century, Chillingworth, an English Reformer of the Episcopal church, chancellor of the diocese of Salisbury, all of whose opinions we should not uphold, but who, having been a Papist, understood well in what should consist the spirit of the Reform, uttered these sublime words: "The Bible, the whole Bible, nothing but the Bible, is the religion of the Reformed church." Let us here remember, that the church of England is a *reformed* church, and not Lutheran. It is such, not only by the name it bears, but by its admirable articles of faith, and especially by the testimony it therein renders to the Word of God.

This principle of the Reform is of even earlier date than the views of Luther; for it was not only the principle of the primitive church, of Wickliffe, of the Waldenses, and of many other fervent Christians, but it was proclaimed in the very morning of the Reformation, in the year 1518, by Carlstadt, who says in those theses which Dr. Eck so violently attacked: "We prefer the letter of the Bible, not only to one or many doctors of the church, but even to the authority of the whole church itself."

¹ Wolfgang Joner.

Every thing in the Reformed church reveals this grand principle of the exclusive authority of the Word of God. Whilst the Augsburg Confession is silent with regard to the sole authority of the Scriptures, all the Confessions of the Reformed church are unanimous on this subject.¹ Whilst the Lutherans uphold the Apocryphal books, and frequently select from them texts for their sermons, the Reformed distinguish them from the canonical writings with scrupulous care, and, if necessary, contend earnestly for this distinction, as did the British Bible Society, not long since, excited by the example of Scotland, that eminently Reformed country ; and they regard it as a matter of the highest importance, to define exactly the extent of the Word of God, and carefully to exclude all human additions. Whilst the text of the Lutheran Bibles does not distinguish human from divine words, in all our translations of the Bible, on the contrary, the words not found in the original are printed in italics, in order that the reader may, as far as is possible in a translation, discern between the Word of God and the word of man. And it may be remarked that the translation of the New Testament published, a few years since, in Lausanne, which is purely and simply a *fac simile* of the original, has been prompted by the spirit of the Reform. We do not think that such a translation would have appeared among Lutherans.

It is not true, however, as has been recently pretended, that the Reform presents the Bible to us as a book all-sufficient in itself, whatever doctrine may be deduced from it.—“We are persuaded,” says the Helvetic Confession, “that a solid knowledge of true religion depends on the internal enlightening of the Holy Spirit. We only regard as real and orthodox those explanations which are drawn from Scripture itself in conformity with the analogy of faith, and the law of charity.”—Nor is it true, as has been asserted, that the Re-

¹ Gallican Confession, Art. V. ; Confessio Belgica, Art. V. ; Confess. Helv., Art. I., II. ; Conf. Angl., Art. VI. ; Conf. Bohem., Art. I. ; Conf. of Westminster, (of Scotland,) Chap. I.

form possesses no kind of tradition. There is not a century, not a generation, to whose voice the Reform is not ready to listen, and from which it is unwilling to derive instruction. Only it places the great voice above all smaller voices, and, instead of judging of the import of Scripture by tradition, it judges, according to the principles of the Fathers, of the truth of traditions by the Scriptures. Such, then, is our first principle :

The Reform is pre-eminently the confession of *the Bible*.

Never shall such man-worship be found among us, even of the men of God in the church, as has been justly called elsewhere Lutherolatry. Never will there be seen among us such writings as have been published in Germany with these titles : *Luther a Prophet—the second Moses—an Elias—a Star—a Sun*. We have no other Prophet than Jesus Christ, and no other Sun than the Bible. And whilst, for a long space of time, all sorts of relics of Luther were preserved with religious veneration, we hardly know where the great Calvin resided ; there is not even a small stone in our cemetery to mark the place where his ashes repose ; and four venerable trees, which were to be seen, five or six years ago, shading the ground where it is said the mortal remains of this great servant of God were laid, have been hewn down to make room ! . . . This is undoubtedly going too far ; but its import is striking : it reminds us that Calvin forbade that a monument should be erected to his memory, because he desired that the Word of God alone should be honored in his church.

Yes, the Rock of the Word of God is the foundation of the Reform ; we know of none other. Let other churches boast of their ecclesiastical basis, we will boast only of our *Bible*-foundation. And in this, we believe ourselves more truly ecclesiastical than those who mingle with the Divine Rock the quicksands of human tradition. We will not forsake this our foundation for any price, not for the Pope, nor for Luther,—what do I say ? not even for our Reformers themselves. Far distant be the day when the Reformed church shall glory in being called the church of Calvin, or

of Zwingle. The Bible—the Bible—the whole Bible—nothing but the Bible.

We asserted, at the outset, that the principle intrusted to the Lutheran church was, in the days of the Reformation, of at least equal importance with that which God intrusted to the Reformed church. Which of the two is of most importance in our day ?

I dare not decide. But I will say, however, that the principle of the Bible appears to me, at present, at least as important as that of faith. Which are the two powerful adversaries called upon to fight the battle of the nineteenth century ? *Evangelism and Ecclesiasticism*. And by what means shall Ecclesiasticism be silenced, and those clouds of human traditions and human works which envelope it be dispelled ? By the Bible.

If we hesitate on the importance of the principle of the Reform, shall we not be instructed by the cry which is now sounding on all sides : *The church ! The church !* and would put the visible church above the Word of the Lord ? Shall we not, by that proud pontiff who calls us *sectaries of the Bible ?*¹ Shall we not, by “ *that audacious mouth which spake very great things,*” as says Daniel the prophet, which has just uttered a cry from the depths of the magnificent chambers of his Vatican, and which extending its fearful arms in the midst of his Apollos, his Venuses, and all those trophies of Paganism by which he is surrounded, has rung throughout all Christendom that watchword of alarm and terror :—**THE BIBLE ! THE BIBLE !** What, then ! has He, who reveals all secrets, “made known to him, in the silent watches of the night, what shall come to pass hereafter” ? Has He shown him the Bible at the gates of Italy ? Has He shown him already suspended in the air, overhanging Rome, “the stone that was cut out of the mountain without hands,” that is to break in pieces the ancient statue, and lay it low in the dust, amid the ruin and devastation of twenty centuries ?

¹ Circular of the Pope, dated the day after the nones of May, 1844.

Ab ! if there is a time when the Reform should remain faithful to its principles, it is the day in which we now live. To conquer by the Bible, or to perish, is the only alternative before us.

One thing, among others, which alarms us concerning the state of England, is, that recently, (about a month since,) in London, whilst the assemblies belonging to particular churches (Episcopal, or dissenting) crowded the vast extent of Exeter Hall,—for the first time the meeting of the Bible Society had comparatively but few present. It is not our intention to draw too serious consequences from this ; we know it may have arisen from various causes, but we confess that the knowledge of this fact caused us to shudder, and with sadness we recalled to mind these words, “ *Ichabod, Ichabod !*” Hath thy glory indeed departed ?

II. But if the Reformed church places the Word of God so decidedly above any word of man, and gives it pre-eminence even above faith, on the other hand it places faith above the church. One of the oldest doctors, Irenæus of Lyons, has called attention to this great antithesis: *Where the Spirit is, there is the church* ; this is the principle of the Reform ; and *where the church is, there is the Spirit*, is the principle of Rome and Oxford ; and it is also, though in a milder form, that of Lutheranism. A distinguished theologian, Dr. Lange, who occupies in the University of one of our confederate cities the professorship which was intended for Strauss, has recently brought to mind that antithesis, wording it thus: *the church comes of faith*, or *faith comes of the church*. We do not hesitate to say that both these propositions are true in a certain sense, and provided the visible church be not confounded with the invisible ; for there is a marvellous alternative between faith and the church. But observe, whilst Lutheranism places emphasis on the latter, and declares that, since the foundation of the church, God converts men only by means of the church, the Reform on the contrary lays stress on the former, and asserts that faith, that

faith which God implants in the heart, alone begets the church. Hence the Reform does not say : the church (which is the *assembly* of the faithful) exists first, and then follows each individual believer ; but it says : first each believer exists, and then comes the *church*, which is the union of all. Lutheranism says : first the species, then the individual ; the Reform says : first the individual, then the species. We are ready to allow that both are right, but we add, that it should be our especial care to uphold the principle of the Reform.

And why so ? Because if we assert, in an absolute sense, that *faith comes of the church*, we establish at once the principle that leads to the inquisition, and which gave rise to it in times past. Now, at the period of the Reformation, when for centuries all those who did not humbly receive their faith from the visible church had been stretched on the rack, it was necessary that the renewed church should loudly proclaim opposite principles. The Reform is then in direct opposition here to Rome and also to ultra-Lutheranism. By this name we call that extreme Lutheran orthodoxy, which, in the days of Calow and Quenstedt, exaggerating the Lutheran principle, revived the scholastic system, and placed, above all other doctrines, that of the church and the means of salvation.

The Reform, on the contrary, remembering that Christ saves His people soul by soul, gives, has given, and always will give the first place in Christian theology to what concerns the individual work, the regeneration, the justification, and the conversion of the believer.

Thus, what distinguishes Lutheranism is the importance attached to the church, to the church collectively, and particularly to its ministers. In truth it is not very far from that *sacerdotalism* which is the essence of Rome and of Oxford. The Lutherans do not hesitate to give their pastors the name of priests ; and in a celebrated book on *Practical Theology*, written by a German whose memory is very dear to us, Claude Harms, Prevost of Kiel, one of the sections is entitled the *Preacher*, another the *Pastor*, and a third the *PRIEST*.

This too was essential to our unity. The individual

element of the Reform might have brought on dissolution and dispersion of the members of the church, which would have proved fatal to the whole body, had it not been restrained by the ecclesiastical element of Lutheranism. As also the tendency of the latter would have been to languor and certain death, had it not been restrained by the spontaneous and vivifying influence of the Reform. It is the combination of these two forces, the one centripetal, the other centrifugal, which has launched into the universe a new world, and which sustains it.

Shall we abandon, then, the principle of our strength, as we are called upon to do? God preserve us from this invasion on the eternal decrees of his all-wise providence! Let us not look on one side only; let us examine both, and contemplate the magnificent ensemble of the work of the Lord. If a man is Lutheran he is right, quite right; if a man embraces the Lutheran faith he is right still; but if he is Reformed, if he converses with the Reformed, he should neither act nor speak as though he were Lutheran, or as though he were addressing Lutherans, to counteract, impede and destroy the Reformed principle in the bosom of the Reform itself.

We shall not enumerate, here, the numberless evils to which too strict an application of the Lutheran principles has led. From this arose *clerocracy*,¹ or the excessive authority of the pastor, or more properly speaking confessor, (for among the Lutherans each individual has a pastor to whom he gives that name,) so that, in the last century these confessors having become infidels, and the unsuspecting Lutherans continuing to submit to them, infidelity spread throughout their churches with inconceivable facility. It has even been asserted, in Lutheranism, that each individual should cling to his spiritual guide, appointed by the competent ecclesiastical authority, even though that guide were a stranger or entirely opposed to the true faith! The Reformed Christians will never ac-

¹ This word, as well as another here used, (*ecclesiasticism*,) though coined by the author, is none the less significant and appropriate for its novelty.—TRANSL.

knowledge this as their maxim. They will ever rank the Bible above the pastor, and, if there is a decided disagreement between them, rather than allow themselves and their children to be led by them into infidelity, they will forsake their pastor, and take refuge beneath the Word of Christ. In so doing they carry the church with them, leaving to themselves both the sect and the pastor.

It is from this *Ecclesiasticism* that originates the different importance which the Lutherans and the Reformed attach to the confessions of faith of the churches. The Lutherans look upon them as rules of faith—*normæ normatæ* ; and they have even gone so far as to assert that their authors had a kind of inspiration, such inspiration as the Roman Catholics call *deutero-canonical*, when speaking of the Apocryphal books. In the Reform, symbolical writings are, on the contrary, but the expression of the faith of the church. “Our churches do not say to those who desire to occupy our pulpits : *Believe !* but they ask them : *Do you believe ?*” Thus spoke, in the true spirit of the Reform, two men who are dear to us—Cellérier and Gaussen, when, twenty-five years ago, they republished the *Helvetic Confession of Faith* in Geneva. Although this privilege belongs, by right, to another here present, allow me to pay a passing tribute to the memory of this faithful servant of Jesus Christ,¹ who was taken from us a few weeks since, in a good old age, and whose glory it was to have been the first, after a century of infidelity, to raise again in our country the standard of the Gospel and the Reform.

Again I repeat : *The church comes of faith, rather than faith of the church.*

This is our watchword. And who will dare assert that the time is come when we should lower our colors, and meekly march under those which others offer us, and which Papacy itself has shown for so many centuries past ? If any

¹ The author alludes to the recent death of the venerable Cellérier, an illustrious servant of God in Geneva.—TRANS.

of our brethren deem it their duty so to do, we openly declare that we will not; convinced that, in this day, to uphold and vindicate the principles of the Reform is to save the Reformation.

But, it may be said, if the maxim that faith comes of the church, leads to the *Inquisition*, the maxim that the church comes of faith, leads to *separation*.

We do not deny that this is the excess of the principle, nor that this excess is to be seen in our day. But we deny that the abuse of a principle can ever subvert it. No; the principle of the Reform is not essentially a principle of separation; nor does it necessarily flow from that principle, that Christendom should be divided into a thousand sects. Undoubtedly it is a right and a duty of a Christian, as was done in the days of the Reformation and has been repeatedly done since, to separate from a community which no longer confesses Jesus Christ, 'God manifest in the flesh,' the only righteousness of His people. But to make separation a constantly recurring duty, is, according to the Reform, to trample under foot numerous passages of the word of God, it is to invite what the Apostle Paul declares should be rejected, "strife, seditions, and heresies." Gal. 5: 20.

"I assert," says Calvin, "that we should not, for slight dissimilarity of opinion, separate from a church where the fundamental doctrine of salvation is preserved, and where the sacraments are lawfully administered according to the institution of our Lord."¹

However, if choice must be made between uniformity and error on the one side, or diversity and truth on the other, the Reform does not hesitate; it always sides with the truth; truth being always its great aim.

III. But the Reform has always distinguished itself by a liberal spirit of Christian charity; and this third characteristic triumphantly answers the charge of separatism; it has ever held out a brotherly hand to all communions that preserve

¹ Christian Institutes, book iv. chap. i.

pure the doctrines of salvation. So that, whilst a sectarian spirit has animated other confessions in various degrees, the Reform has ever worn on her brow the seal of true catholicity.

We shall not here speak of the sectarian spirit of Rome or of Oxford ; these are well known topics ; but history obliges us to acknowledge this spirit even in Lutheranism. The Lutherans, like the Romanists, have always aimed not at fraternally uniting with the Reform, but at absorbing it.

Exclusiveness is a feature of Lutheranism. Here it will be asked, What becomes of your unity ? This exclusiveness itself was necessary for it. It is one of the wheels which must form part of the admirable machinery which the hand of the Great Architect prepared, three centuries ago. *Exclusiveness* is essential to the church. Who was more exclusive than he who said, “ *No man cometh unto the Father but by me* ” ? and again, “ *Without me ye can do nothing* ” ? The church needs a holy jealousy for the eternal truth of God. Latitudinarianism is fatal to it. The history of all ages has proved this, and none can show it more clearly than that of our own age. It was this *exclusiveness* with which Martin Luther was charged ; and although he was mistaken in carrying out his exclusiveness, not only with regard to the fundamental doctrines, but even respecting the different methods of understanding the same truth ; although it was against our Reform that his darts were hurled, yet we love, we admire Luther, even in his errors ; and we behold in him, not a *furious Orestes*, as he was called by Bucer and Capiton themselves, but a *Prometheus*, who, anxious that man should lift his eyes towards heaven,—

. *erectos ad sidera tollere vultus*,—

and having taken fire from on high to inspire him, was cast down in consequence of his very elevation, and his entrails devoured by ruthless vultures. “ *Let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall !* ” Luther believed that the real presence of Christ was a truth of God, and he went too far to defend it. May God teach us what Luther did not know, to distinguish truth from falsehood, what is essential

from what is secondary ! God grant unto us, what Luther could not do, to teach with mildness those who entertain opposite opinions. But God grant at the same time that, like Luther, we may be inflamed with devotion to truth and filled with zeal for the house of God !

Here again, however, we cannot justify every thing. History is inflexible, and points out sad excesses to us. This is the most painful part of our task, for Luther is our father, (we speak after the manner of men,) a father whom we regard with profound veneration, and tender filial affection. The true Lutherans are our friends ; our beloved brethren ; they are among those whom we hope one day to join in the kingdom of our Lord. If, then, their opposition draws from us a sigh, let it never cause in our hearts the least bitterness of feeling toward them. Be it remembered that the violence of controversy, far from proving us to be declared enemies, is a proof of the closest bonds uniting us to Lutheranism ; for in all times, and in all matters, the more united we are on essential points, the more we are carried away by differences on minor ones.

It was Luther, that great man of God, who in this, as in every thing else, advanced at the head of his church. When in 1527 the Reformed pleaded for brotherly love and Christian concord, he answered : "Be such charity and unity cursed, even to the bottomless depths of hell." He himself relates to one of his friends that, at the conference convoked at Marburgh by the Landgrave of Hesse, to unite the Lutherans and the Reformed, Zwingle, moved to tears, approached him, saying : "There are no men on earth with whom I so much desire to be united as with the Wittenberghers." And Luther repulsed the Zurich reformer, answering : "Your spirit is not our spirit !" and refused to acknowledge Zwingle and the Swiss as *his brethren*.

Since that day a sectarian spirit has always pervaded Lutheranism. When, in 1553, the unhappy reformers were driven from London, by the unfeeling order of bloody Mary, they were cruelly repulsed, in the midst of winter, by the ad-

vice of the Lutheran theologians, from the walls of Copenhagen, of Rostock, of Lubeck and of Hamburg, where they asked for shelter. "Better Papists than Calvinists," said they, "better Mohammedans than Reformed." And on one house in Wittenberg was written: "The words and the writings of Luther are poison to the Pope and to Calvin." The name of Calvin was given to cats and dogs. Books were published with such titles as these: "Proofs that the Calvinists have six hundred and sixty-six errors in common with the Turks,"—"Brief evidence that the present attempt at union (1721) with the self-styled Reformed is in direct opposition to the ten Commandments, to all the articles of the Apostles' Creed, to all the petitions of the Lord's Prayer, to the doctrine of holy Baptism, the power of the Keys, the holy Communion, as well as the whole Catechism." In a Lutheran Catechism, of the beginning of the sixteenth century, this question is asked: "Dost thou believe that instead of honoring and worshipping the true and living God, the Calvinists honor and worship the devil? Answer—I do, from the bottom of my heart." A Lutheran doctor, who is still living, and is remarkable for his piety and zeal, applies the following passage from St. Paul to the Reformed: "Be ye not yoked with unbelievers." It is well known that the Lutheran Missionary Societies have recently dissolved their connection with that of the city of Basle, which, however, comes nearer Lutheranism than any of the Reformed churches.

What shall we say concerning these excesses? We will say with St. Paul, "they have zeal without knowledge;" and we will add with a smile the well known words of Jerome of Prague, when he saw a peasant approach with a load of wood to deposit on his stake: *SANCTA SIMPLICITAS!* and then we will repeat that the Lutherans are our brethren, our well beloved brethren!

A spirit of conciliation, of union and fraternity, has pervaded our church in all ages, and is perhaps its most beautiful ornament. Zwingle, Oecolampadius, Calvin, and Farel, always extended a brotherly hand to Luther and his friends.

Calvin even does not hesitate to assert, that in his sight Luther is far superior to Zwingli: "For if these two are compared, you are aware how much Luther surpasses him."¹ And he writes thus to Bullinger on the 25th Nov. 1544: "I hear that Luther is lavishing the most cruel invectives upon you and all of us. I scarcely dare ask of you to be silent. But I earnestly entreat you at least to remember how great a man Luther is; what admirable qualities distinguish him, what courage, what faithfulness, what skill, what power of doctrine he possesses to bring down the reign of Antichrist, and to propagate the knowledge of salvation. I say, and have frequently repeated, that even though he should call me *Satan*, I would not cease to honor him and acknowledge him to be an illustrious servant of God." These are sublime words; let the Reform never forget them! And, observe, they come from Calvin, that man who is represented to us as so irritable and so proud.

At different times, proposals for peace and projects of union were offered by the Reform. The Reformed of French-Switzerland particularly showed, on this score, the most unshaken perseverance. At the period when the ultra-Lutherans, Westphal, Timann, Vort Eitzen, and many others had discharged their heavy artillery upon the Reform, Calvin and his friends appeared on the field of battle, with the olive branch in their hands. This same year, (1557,) when Theodore Beza and Farel travelled throughout all the cities of Switzerland, to excite the public sympathy in favor of the Waldenses, who had been cruelly massacred in the valley of Angrogne, they also visited Germany, where they presented a confession of faith of the churches of Switzerland and Savoy, designing to unite all the Reformation, by convincing the Lutheran churches that they also were brethren and fellow soldiers in the war against Antichrist. In 1631 the general synod of Charenton, near Paris, took the lead, accomplished this union, and passed a resolution which declared that "the

¹ Nam si inter se comparantur, scis ipse quanto intervallo Lutherus excedat.

churches of the confession of Augsburg agreeing with them in all the articles essential to true religion, the members of these churches may be allowed to present themselves at the holy table without any previous abjuration." In our days it is from the Reformed that propositions and efforts to re-establish true union in the church, have always proceeded.

And wherefore this difference between Lutheranism and the Reform? Undoubtedly it proceeds in great part, as far as Luther and the Lutherans are concerned, from the importance they attach to the real presence of Christ in the Lord's supper, from that unshaken attachment to what they believe to be the truth, which we sincerely respect ; but we must say that it also results from that difference which we have already designated. The *Biblical* tendency of the Reform must lead all the Reformed to attach slight importance to *Ecclesiastical differences* and much to *Bible truth* ; consequently to endeavor to extend a brotherly hand to all churches, and all individuals who possess the *Bible*. It is thus from sound principles that beneficial consequences always flow. Let us remain faithful to this spirit of true catholicity. Let us not forget these memorable words of the Apostle : "One God, one Lord, one body, and one spirit." To uphold these is the special mission of the Reform.

IV. But if the Reform possesses great liberality, it is none the less distinguished for a genuine profoundness. It is not merely a reformation of faith, as is Lutheranism, but a reformation of life ; and for this reason it is more universally Christian. Undoubtedly Antinomianism is foreign to Lutheranism ; Luther himself opposed it. Still, there is great difference in the manner in which Lutheranism and the Reform view the law. A singular feature and characteristic points out one of the principal differences. In the Lutheran Catechism, the ten commandments are placed before faith, before dogmas. Their use is to convince man of sin, and bring him to Christ. On the contrary, in the Reformed Catechism, the law is placed after faith, and after the doctrine of salvation, as an expression of the gratitude of the child of God for his redemption

through Christ. The law, according to Luther, is for the unconverted only. According to Calvin, it is also addressed to believers.

Luther did not accomplish a reformation of morals, nor did he even attempt it. This was not, undoubtedly, because he did not think it of the highest importance. "How," as he wrote to the brethren of Bohemia, who desired him to establish such discipline, "how can we, who live in the midst of Sodom, of Gomorrah, and of Babylon, bring about order, discipline, and exemplary life?" Luther thought that the reformation of morals should proceed simply and naturally from the influence of sound doctrine.

Let us here observe, again, how necessary the diversity of Lutheranism and the Reform is for the unity and even the existence of the Reformation. Who does not discern a profound Christian truth in the doctrine that faith leads to sound morals? Was it not necessary, after centuries in which the discipline of the church had caused innumerable troubles, and still greater superstitions, that there should be a protestation against these fatal errors? Was it not necessary that, beside the strength of the Reform, which has a sectarian tendency, there should be another force in the renewed church that should tend to enlarge the views of the faithful? Was it not necessary that, above all that men could do, above all their efforts to rebuke the disorderly and to watch over the Lord's inheritance, there should be a finger to point to heaven, and that a loud voice should pronounce this oracle: "The good shepherd goeth before his sheep, and his sheep follow him, for they know his voice"? But if one of these was necessary, the other was not less so. The work of Christian vigilance and pastoral guardianship was intrusted to the Reform; and we are reformed.

Zwingle started from this principle: "A universal renovation of life and morals is as requisite as a renovation of faith." Immediately after the Reformation, in Zurich, Berne, and Basle, ordinances for the promotion of good morals were published, prostitution was abolished, pensions and enlist-

ments in foreign service were suppressed ; and when afterwards the Pope, according to his ancient custom, required troops from Zurich, the citizens offered him instead two thousand monks and priests whom they could spare. Would to God that in our day we sent not Swiss soldiers to Rome. The morals of ministers were particularly insisted on : “ As the Word of truth is solemn, the life of its servant ought also to be grave,” said the ordinance of 1532.

But it was especially in Geneva that this principle was fully carried out. Calvin, with the zeal of a prophet and the resignation of a martyr who submits himself unreservedly to the severe Word of God, exacted of the church under his care *absolute obedience*. He struggled hard with the party of the Libertines, and by the grace of God he overcame. Geneva, which was so corrupt before, was regenerated, and evinced a purity of morals and a Christian simplicity so remarkable, that it drew from Farel, (after an absence of fifteen years,) an expression of admiration, in these memorable words : “ I had rather be the last in Geneva than the first elsewhere.”

And fifty years after the death of Calvin, a fervent Lutheran, John Valentine Andreae, having passed some time within our walls, said on his return, “ What I have seen there I shall never forget. The most beautiful ornament of that republic is its tribunal of morals, which every week inquires into the disorders of the citizens. Games of cards and chance, swearing and blasphemy, impurity, quarrelling, hatred, deceitfulness, infidelity, drunkenness, and other vices, are repressed. Oh ! how beautiful an ornament to Christianity is this purity. We Lutherans cannot too deeply deplore its absence from us. If the difference of doctrine did not separate me from Geneva, the harmony of its morals could have induced me to remain there for ever.”

This moral character was not confined to Switzerland and Geneva alone ; it spread through France, Holland, Scotland, and wherever the Reform made its way. It has in a measure remained in some of those countries to the present day. A German author, Mr. Goëbel, having related that a

traveller, also a German, was unable to find in the churches of Scotland which he visited, a single instance of adultery and divorce, and very little impurity, exclaims : " Let the frightful immorality of Germany be contrasted with this ; in the country as well as in the city let only the pastors be interrogated, and one will be filled with astonishment and terror." Alas ! we cannot pride ourselves on such a state of things at present. These morals are no more. We do not pretend to say that there was nothing in this discipline adapted to hasten its fall ; on the contrary, we think that the part the state took in these matters must inevitably have destroyed it. We reject all Christian discipline exercised by constables and soldiers ; but we think we can lay aside all public force, retaining the power of vigilance, of charity, and of the word of God.

This was not done, and what is the result ? Senebier said, " The prosperity of Geneva was long the fruit of Calvin's wise laws. In the purity of our ancient morals consisted our glory. We can prove that one of the causes of our misfortunes is the diminution of their influence. Thus Rome was lost, when its censors could not make themselves heard any more, and Sparta fell with the credit of those whose charge was to cause virtue to be respected." If Senebier spoke thus in 1786, what shall we now say ?

Ah ! who could fail to understand what Montesquieu said, that the Genevese ought to bless and celebrate the day of Calvin's birth, and that of his arrival in their midst ? But what the most profound politician of the eighteenth century clearly saw, the Genevese have not comprehended. Instead of celebrating the birthday of the Reformer, they and their children celebrate that of a noted sophist, a man of ardent soul, of unsurpassed talent, but who sent to the hospital the sad results of his libertinism ! They have erected a magnificent statue to the memory of Rousseau, and they have erected none to Calvin ! " We will do it at Edinburgh," said a Scotch divine to me last year. " Edinburgh," added he " is now the metropolis of the Reform."

The revival of faith and sound morals among the Reformed,

is the statue which Calvin, that great but unassuming man, would have desired. Shall we not erect it? And, if now, as in Saxony in the days of Luther, a too rigid law is inapplicable, shall we not at least remember, that whoever asks for a reformation of morals possesses the spirit of the Reform, and that it is the most sacred duty, not only of ministers, but of all reformed Christians, to cause all those who invoke the name of the Saviour to be "*blameless and harmless, the sons of God without rebuke in the midst of a perverse nation.*"

V. This leads us to a fifth consideration. The Reform has both in its principles and its progress something more decided than Lutheranism. The principle of Lutheranism was, *to preserve in the church all that is not condemned by the word of God* ; whilst that of the Reform was, *to abolish in the church all that is not prescribed by the word of God*. Lutheranism is a reformation of the church ; the Reform, its renovation ; or, to express this distinction by the different pronunciations of the same word, Lutheranism is a *reformation*, the Reform a *re-formation*. Lutheranism took the church, such as it was, contenting itself with effacing its stains. The Reform took the church at its origin, and erected its edifice on the living Rock of the Apostles.—Whilst Luther, hearing what Carlstadt was doing, writes, "we must remain in the middle path," and opposes those who cast down the images, Carlstadt, the first Reformed, from the year 1521 boldly reforms the church of Wittenberg, of which he was the Prevost, abolishing the mass, images, and confessions, the fast-days, and all the abuses of papacy. Zwingle, almost at the same time, proceeds in the same manner at Zurich ; and as to what took place in Geneva, we shall merely transcribe here an inscription which, for nearly three centuries, remained on the walls of our City Hall, from 1536 to 1798, and which expresses, better than we could do, the uncompromising character of the Reform. At the time of the Jubilee of 1835, it was to have been placed in the church of St. Peter, but it has not yet been done.

“In the year 1535, the tyranny of Roman Antichrist having been overthrown, and its superstitions abolished, the most holy religion of Jesus Christ was established here in its purity, and the church better organized, by an extraordinary blessing of God. And at the same time, this city itself having repulsed its enemies, and put them to flight, was again set free, but not without a remarkable miracle. The Council and the people of Geneva have here erected this monument to perpetuate its memory, so that the testimony of their gratitude toward God should descend to their posterity.”

What has resulted from this difference between Lutheranism and the Reform?

Two very distinct courses, each of which has its favorable aspect. The course of Lutheranism is defensive, successive; that of the Reform is offensive, acquisitive. To Lutheranism belongs the principle of resistance and *passivity*; to the Reform, that of activity and life.

Is it necessary to recall to your mind that these two tendencies are important to the prosperity of the church?—Must we insist that in a well-organized community immobility of principle should be joined to mobility of life?

There is not even a family where two opposite tendencies are not to be found. To counterbalance the decisive and imposing authority of the father, the conciliating and indulgent tenderness of the mother is requisite. Thus, in a political state, the conservative and the liberal elements should be constantly combined. An exclusive immobility leads to violence, hatred, and revolution. Had we not an example of this during the reign of Charles X? An excess of mobility leads to levity, superficiality, agitation, and pride. Do not nations furnish us with a demonstration of this? These two elements are so indispensably necessary to the life of the whole body, that, if by some means you could annihilate one of the two, it would soon re-appear. In France, in 1830, the ancient *conservators* being excluded, those who, for fifteen years, had played the part of *liberals*, became themselves conservators.

And what is necessary in the state, and even in each family, would you exclude from the church? Would you by some revolution drive away one of these two elements? Impotent conspirators! Could you succeed in destroying the element of the Reform, you would be compelled to become Reformed yourselves!

But undoubtedly Lutheranism had much to suffer in the sixteenth century for having carried its principles too far. Halting between the Bible and the church, between that which it should retain and that which it should reject, its progress was in consequence somewhat impeded, its Reformation could not attain the height to which it had before aspired, and] Luther, naturally of a gay character, and joyful temperament, ended his days in sadness and weariness. Whilst the Reform, possessing a visible and unclouded aim, in the Bible, and nothing but the Bible, advanced with power; Calvin, Farel, Knox, and even Zwingli, died joyfully and triumphantly. What a death was Calvin's; how touching his dying words!

Lutheranism, paralyzed from the beginning, witnessed, after the death of Luther, its *conservativeness* turned into *stagnation*.

The Lutheran Princes, unfaithful to the glorious memory of the Diet of Spire, (1529,) opposed every extension of Protestantism, and were but too well seconded by their theologians.

Even now a new Society, which we hail with affection and respect, the Society of *Gustavus Adolphus*, faithful to this Lutheran principle, endeavors, it is true, to support the Protestant churches, which are tottering, yet declares itself opposed to any activity beyond the sphere of acknowledged Protestantism, as well as to all proselytism.

It is not thus with the Reform. It advances, it gains every where. Our Evangelical Societies of Paris and Geneva, with their essentially proselyting characteristics, all our Missionary Societies, are the fruits of the Reformed spirit.

But it is principally in the relation between these two

churches and the Papacy that we see the characteristic which distinguishes them. Lutheranism, which took the *offensive* with regard to the Reform, rested on the *defensive* with regard to the Pope; whilst the Reform, holding out the right hand of fellowship to Lutheranism, boldly and courageously took the *offensive* toward Rome. Melancthon, at Augsburg, in 1530, said to the Cardinals, that but a trifle separated him from the Pope; but an immense abyss separated him from Zwingli.¹ Lutheranism, to which the visible church is of so much moment, could capitulate with Rome. The Reform, which will have nothing but the Bible, must fight Rome boldly. Wherever are found superstitious fears of a struggle with Papacy, wherever extreme circumspection is observed, wherever it is supposed, for instance, that prudence should keep Protestants from offering a fraternal hand to priests who reject the Pope, and confess Jesus Christ, there you will perhaps find ultra-Lutheranism; but there most assuredly the spirit of the Reform is not.

Inspired with a holy love for souls, and a deep conviction that Rome leads them to perdition, the Reform seized the sword of the Word three centuries ago, and commenced with the Papal power a war, the issue of which is life or death. Notwithstanding the constant and violent opposition of the most powerful monarchs of Europe, notwithstanding the redoubled efforts of that hierarchy which fettered the whole world, the Reform has advanced like little David against that gigantic Goliath, having nothing in its sling but a few round pebbles of God's Word. And it conquered in the name of the Lord of Hosts.

We certainly acknowledge all that Christian Princes have done, especially the immortal Gustavus Adolphus. But that was the work of a prince, and perhaps was done with political views. With us it is the business of the faith-

¹ Dogma nullum habemus diversum ab ecclesia romana. Parati sumus obedire ecclesiae romanae. (*Legato Pontificio Melancthon.*) Ambeunt (reformati) colloquium cum Philippo; sed hic hactenus recusavit.—BRENTIUS.

ful, and the work of faith. It is the Reform which saved the Reformation in troublous times, and the Reform shall save it yet in our days.

It is true that it saved it at the price of its blood. Whilst the Lutheran church numbers scarcely any martyrs, ours are counted by thousands, and their faithfulness filled the best Lutherans with respect and admiration, such Lutherans as the sympathizing Spener and Zinzendorf. In Switzerland, Scotland, England, and especially in Belgium and France, the Inquisition, the daggers and the scaffolds of Popery have covered with corpses the soil of the Bible. The Reform witnessed it, but it bowed not its head. It saw its children joyfully shed their blood trusting in Jesus Christ, and it continued its onward march.

A circular, written in the name of a priest, who calls himself Count of Lausanne, and Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, (although since the beginning of this century there has existed no Holy Empire,) has dared to say recently in that city : “ Always, and every where, since the time of the Apostles, the church, (of Rome,) its pontiffs and its priests have been persecuted. The holy pontiffs and priests of Jesus Christ, laboring, from the origin of Christianity, for the conversion and sanctification of souls, have never employed other means than those which the Gospel, conscience, and reason approve.”¹

This is really too much, and a sigh escapes us. What ! you dare hold such language in this city, in the midst of a people formed, so to speak, from the fragments that escaped from your wheels, your racks, and your knives ! We are accustomed to the effrontery of Rome, but we never had such a sample of it.

Men of no memory ! to whom belongs the bloody application of these words, *Constrain them to enter* ? By whose commands were shed those torrents of blood of the Waldenses, and the Albigenses, which inundated the middle ages ?

¹ Circular of the Bishop of Lausanne and Geneva, of 17th May, 1844.

Who, if not your Pope, on the night of the 24th August, 1572, amid nuptial festivals, caused the venerable Coligny, on his knees, and sixty thousand Reformed, to be cruelly butchered? Who ordered all the bells in Rome to be rung in merry peals, and the cannon of the Castle of St. Angelo to resound, and medals to be struck? Who, in 1685, razed to the ground more than sixteen hundred churches in France, slaughtered thousands and thousands of Protestants and forced others to flee? In our days, who forbids, in nearly all Romish countries, the preaching of the Gospel? Who compels the poor inhabitants of Zillerthal to leave their father-land? Who makes laws in Austria against conversion to Protestantism? Who condemned to prison that *Maurette* who struggled here last winter with the priests, charged with having merely read *your circular* from the pulpit? Who, two months since, in a village near our frontier, within three miles of this place, caused a poor peasant to be arrested, thrown into a dungeon, and condemned to the galleys, for having committed no other crime than that of reading his Bible? Who, not in the fourteenth or fifteenth century, but only a few weeks since, condemned to death Maria Joaquina for having refused to worship the Virgin, and to believe the doctrine of transubstantiation? And you speak of Rome as a *persecuted church*! And you assert that it has never employed other means than the voice of conscience and of persuasion! . . . Men of no memory! . . . Come, come! when you persecute, you are consistent with yourselves. Persecution ought to be, and is, in fact, a dogma of yours. No one will envy you that opprobrium, no one will rob you of that glory. . . . *Your church* is a church of murderers; our church is a church of martyrs.

VI. We shall select but one more characteristic among all those which yet remain. It is a consequence of that characteristic on which we have just remarked. It is the difference which exists between these two communions, both as to liberty of the church and liberty of the state.

Whatever his enemies may say to the contrary, Luther was an humble and submissive monk ; and however great may have been the power which he acquired by his language, he ever remained within the bounds of the most perfect obedience to his emperor and his prince. And even in 1530, Luther, who in 1522 had written a book entitled, " Against the State, falsely called *spiritual*, of the Pope and the Bishops," appeared, as did Melancthon also, entirely ready to acknowledge the authority of all bishops, provided those bishops would acknowledge the authority of the Gospel. Luther's Reformation was essentially monarchical in its relations to the state, and hierarchical in its relations to the church. The people are never brought forward in it otherwise than as modestly receiving that which is given them by the higher authorities. It is true that Luther at last made quite a proper distinction between the two swords of the church and the state ; but after him, and even in his day, the Lutheran princes, invested with the territorial episcopacy, absorbed all liberties, and all ecclesiastical independence.

Is it necessary to observe that Lutheranism possesses peculiar excellence in this respect ? The vehicle which bore the human mind, was in the sixteenth century at the top of a steep declivity. The Reform boldly seated itself on the coachman's box ; with one hand it seized the reins, and with the other it used the whip ; and away went the coach. What was necessary to prevent a terrible catastrophe at the foot of the mountain ? To use a vulgar comparison the *wheel-lock* must be used ; that lock was Lutheranism. By this means the progress is rapid, though safe ; and if it is true that the dreaded danger has been realized, it is because both Lutheranism and the Reform have lost their essential characteristics, and their intrinsic excellence, during the past century ; it is that the *wheel-lock* has been taken off, and the driver thrown to the ground.

In this, therefore, consists a new difference between the Reform and Lutheranism ; and it was not unaptly that Bossuet said in presence of the court of Louis XIV : *The Calvinists are bolder than the Lutherans.*

The Reform, in its very origin, was essentially democratic. Switzerland, where the Reform is developed, is an assembly of small nations in which the people are the sovereign. There the reformation comes from the people ; and when the councils are opposed to it, (as for instance at Basle,) the people make it prevail. The political rights and liberties, which were trodden underfoot by the Papacy, and which Lutheranism gave up without reluctance, are zealously claimed by the Reform. They advance with it, and are established wherever it goes. The reformation of the Free Cities of Germany, now Lutheran, was the most striking act of their unfettered will ; but in making this supreme effort they lost their energy and their freedom, and from that time they fell under the influence of their formidable neighbors.

But the Reform, on the contrary, wherever it goes, makes sacred the ancient liberties and bears new ones with it. Why is it that the fate of Geneva, a free imperial city, is at present very different from that of Augsburg, Nuremberg, and many other towns, which were once as free and independent as it is ? History will answer. In 1559, when Geneva was in dread of a siege, Calvin himself helped on the work of raising another rampart. To the same spirit which animated Calvin, Geneva owes her capability of maintaining her independence against formidable enemies, for three centuries. Every where is this distinction between Lutheranism and the Reform apparent. In our own days, for instance, when, on the fall of Charles X. in 1830, the Christians of France and some other countries rejoiced, and the Christians of Germany were astounded and scandalized, perhaps the simple reason of this was that the former were Reformed and the latter Lutherans.

This has long furnished the Roman Catholics with a favorite subject for reproachful language toward the Reform. Well, be it so. Only let us remember the continual commotions of Popish countries, of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Belgium, Ireland, France, and (but three days since) the battle of Trient, (Valais.) Let us remember the anxiety, the uneasiness, and

the sad groans of the Lutheran states of Germany. Let us remember the mighty and fruitful liberties which are peaceably enjoyed by the Reformed countries at this time ; by Scotland, Holland, England, America, and by some Swiss cantons. And if, in America, the quiet city of William Penn, once the city of Brotherly Love, is now defiled by bloody riots, whence is it ? We do not say that the Protestants have been in no wise wrong. On the contrary, we grant that in this case probably *the salt hath lost its savor*. But it is perfectly evident that the disaster which has occurred in Philadelphia is an act by which Popery and Ireland signalize their invasion there.

As it regards political freedom, Popery is in a state of revolution, Lutheranism in a state of fermentation, and the Reform in a state of possession.

Let no one say, There are democratic sympathies in the Reform ; it is therefore not suitable for monarchies. This would be a singular anachronism ; it would be reasoning in the style of the age of Louis XIV. Do not the greatest minds of the day acknowledge that democracy, under one form or another, is a future state toward which all nations tend ? Now, if the Reform, as Mr. De Tocqueville himself asserts, possesses the light and the strength necessary to lead and moderate democracy, is it not essential to the future interests of all states ? To reject it now, would be to send off the seamen, to chase away the pilot, to throw overboard the compass and to break the rudder, at the very moment when the ship is about to set sail and go forth into the open sea. " Let us reform the morals of democracy by religion," says De Tocqueville. The Reform is the golden bit, powerful, yet easy, which a Divine hand has prepared for the mouth of liberty. True *pacific democracy* is the Reform. You will find it nowhere else.

But, if the Reformed church gives freedom to the state, it is because it possesses freedom itself. In the Reform, the government of the church does not proceed from certain individuals whose functions place them above all the rest, but from

the church as a body, from the vote of each believer, so that, if any are raised above the rest, it is only as instruments or delegates of the church. All necessary precautions are taken to hinder domination from entering it. "Let the moderator have the presidency," (say the ordinances of Schaffhausen,) "but nothing more, lest a *monarchy* should take the place of *democracy*."

The Reform does not establish a church of the clergy ; it establishes, observe, a church of the people ; not of a worldly people, but of the people of God ; that is to say, a church essentially, though not exclusively, composed of those devout and holy men whose thoughts have been led captive to the obedience of Christ.

Finally, as to the independence of the church,—we do not say entire separation from the state, for we shall not enter upon that subject in this discourse,—as to the independence of the church, that is not less essential in the Reform. Zwingli, to be sure, who never met with any opposition from the state, and who, on the contrary, received all kind of help from it, regarded the church as a society embraced in the state, protected, cared for, and even, in some measure, governed by the state. But had Zwingli been living in a day when the state attacks Christian truth, for the benefit of Popery or Socinianism, do you suppose that he would have given up the church to its rule ? No ! he would have separated from it.

Even before Calvin asserted this, the Synod of Berne, in 1532, declared that the state ought not to interfere with religious matters except in respect to external order. "But as to the work of grace, it is not in the power of man, and is dependent on no magistrate. The state should not meddle with the conscience ; Jesus Christ our Lord is the only Master. If the magistrate meddles with the Gospel, he will only make hypocrites."

But it was especially Calvin, the head of the Reform, who reclaimed the autonomy, autocracy and independence of the church. He was not, like Zwingli, a citizen by birth of a republic, but a subject of a monarchy, and as such he felt,

less than the former, that he was an integral part of the state. The organization of a monarchy, moreover, gave place, much less than that of a republic, to that confusion of church and state which Zwingli realized.

Luther was a German, Zwingli was a Swiss; but nationality found but a secondary place in the great mind of Calvin; Christ and the church were every thing to him. He was neither French, nor Swiss, nor Genevese; he was of the city of God. On leaving France he sacrificed all that was most precious to him; he did not build up new idols to replace his old ones. Doubtless he loved Geneva, it was his adopted country; but the remembrance of his great nationality was above that of all lesser ones. Nothing was so insupportable to him as national egotism. Turning away from these narrow places in which others chose to remain, his eagle eye was continually fixed on the church as a whole. His colleagues in the cantons endeavored to form a Swiss national church; but this scheme seemed too paltry for his lofty genius; and, passing over rivers and mountains, he constantly aspired to the universal church. He knew none other than the holy nation, none other than the ransomed people.

His very principle, which bound him to biblical and apostolical antiquity, led him back to the church of the first three centuries, and made him view the independence of the church as his normal state. And how could Calvin, at the sight of the state united in France to the Romish hierarchy, and roaring like a wild beast at the humble followers of the Man of Galilee, resist the desire of sheltering the church from its attacks? Nor was it merely the oppression of Francis I. or of Henry II. which he rejected, but the protection of Reformed magistrates also gave him much uneasiness. He viewed the relation which existed between the church and the state in Zurich and Berne as something servile, which hindered the free movements of the church, and was encroaching on its holy liberty. "I do not believe that we are so

slavishly fettered," he writes in 1557, to Bullinger,¹ who insisted on the authority of the magistrate.,

Calvin, therefore, entirely rejected the idea of having the state govern the church, even though the state might have become evangelical. He wanted it to form a community *en commun*, of which each member would have a certain share in the government. He made of each church a small democracy, and of the union of these churches a confederation.

Nowhere, perhaps, was the spirit of Calvin so strongly manifested, with regard to the independence of the church, as in the canton of Vaud. The church in that fine country stood between Geneva and Berne as between two conflicting forces. The spirit of independence and liberty seemed wafted to it from the walls of Geneva by the mighty breath of Calvin; whilst the military republic of Berne, desirous of preserving that power of the state, which for several centuries contributed to its greatness, endeavored, with a strong arm, to draw tighter the bonds and forms by which the state was attempting to restrain the church. Berne could not permit any part whatsoever of the public power to be withdrawn from the mighty hands of the state, not even in religious matters. And thus, when the Vaudois² church claimed the free exercise of ecclesiastical discipline, the state feared lest, if this power were granted, its independence might thereby be acknowledged, in some degree. It was willing to allow discipline, but it wanted to exercise it by means of its own officers.³

Nevertheless, Viret, Theodore Beza, and a number of other ministers maintained the principles of independence in the canton of Vaud. The ties uniting it to Berne were daily slackening, and all turned their eyes to Geneva. These two

¹ Non puto tam serviliter nos constrictos teneri.

² *Vaud* is a Swiss canton; the term *Vaudois* must not be confounded here with the French name of the *Waldenses*, which is spelt in the same way. **TRANS.**

³ Ordonnance de réformation des seigneurs de Berne. Voir *Rochat*, 1837, tom. iv., p. 522. *Pièces Justificatives*.

great systems, placed in opposition to each other, rendered a crisis unavoidable. "A rupture was inevitable," says the learned Hundeshagen, (who is now a professor at Berne,) in his history of the struggles of that church. Thus, in the sixteenth century, two hundred and fifty years previous to its emancipation, the independence of the church was probably on the point of giving political independence to the Vaudois people. But the bear¹ was the stronger. It rushed down roaring from its mountain heights ; and Viret, and Beza, and Marlorat, and Merlin, with about forty of their brethren, all friends of the freedom of the church, had to fly from the country where they had preached the Gospel of Christ with so much joy, and went to enrich Geneva and the Reformed churches of France with their piety and their learning. The free church of Scotland was allowed to remain in the very scene of the struggle ; but the *free church* of Vaud, having its strongest limbs broken, and its hands chained together by a powerful republic, was obliged to leave its smiling villages, its valleys, and its mountains ; and the *fettered church* alone remained. The whole classis of pastors was imprisoned for two days in the castle of Lausanne ; and not one was allowed to leave that prison until he had promised to appear at the first summons. At the same time the state withdrew from the church the power of convoking either classes or colloquies² in future. Thus Vaud was the scene of the complete triumph of the state over the church. "*Order reigned in Warsaw.*" That *order*, which followed one of the most memorable struggles of Christianity, has endured for three centuries, and the influence of the Bernese principles has so pervaded that beautiful country, in the course of time, that if the eloquent voices of Viret and Beza are heard here and there amidst the ruins, claiming the rights of the church of Jesus Christ, those sounds which have lasted for three centu-

¹ The bear is the emblem of the Bernese Republic.

² The *Classis* is equivalent to our *Presbytery* ; the *Colloquy* to our *Conference*.—TRANS.

ries are, strangely enough, taken for modern words and theories of the day.

Without doubt, there were relations between church and state in Calvin's system, but they were so little essential, that, two years since, at the time of our revolution, it was enough that a few voices recalled these principles of the Reform, to place these relations in imminent danger of being broken. Let us then mark this, that, although there is now a recrudescence of nationality in some minds, though there are some honorable Christians who preach a blind submission, and who are opposed to allowing citizens and believers to respectfully request in petitions, that the liberty which has been promised them by oath, and has been secured to them by the constitution itself of their country, should be given them—still, let us mark this, that such a mode of acting is an invasion of Lutheranism, of a false Lutheranism, as well as a great deviation from the principles of the Reform.

Freedom in matters of the church, and in those of the state, is our antiquity ; this is our custom ; this is our tradition ; and we are its preservers. It would be a revolutionary deed to take from the Reform that noble love of freedom.

It is time to close.

“The Catholic church,” says Lange, “is the church of Priests ; the Lutheran church is that of Theologians ; the Reformed church is that of the Faithful.” We accept this definition, observing, nevertheless, that Lange's idea is, that the very catholicism of the Reformed church makes it attribute, both to doctors and pastors, the place belonging to them.

Were it necessary to give a motto to the Reform, what ought to be inscribed on its banner ? I would choose this :—

Above, GRACE,
Below, CATHOLICISM AND LIBERTY.

GRACE, for its doctrine. *Grace*, in its fulness and its eternity, from the first movement of the regenerated heart, to the entire accomplishment of its salvation.

CATHOLICISM and LIBERTY for the church.

Catholicism. Assuredly the Reformed church possesses it, for it has never ceased to make the great Christian union one of its most fervent desires, one of its dearest objects. It possesses it in a far higher degree than the self-styled Catholic church, which has ever unhesitatingly cut off from its communion every man who has had any degree of truth and life. It did so to Jansenius, and almost to Fenelon.

But if *Grace* is the sun of the Reform, and if *Catholicism* is one of its poles, *Liberty* is the other pole. Catholicism for that church as a body, and liberty for its individual members. Individuality and catholicism are both equally essential to it; and to rise against either of them is to cease to be Reformed.

Thus, in the day when the Lord will bring his army together in holy solemnity, in the day when the body of Christ will unite its scattered members, the Reformed church will advance, bringing as a gift to the new church these three things which will abide : *Grace, Catholicism, Liberty*. What other church can bring so sublime an offering ?

We say then in conclusion, let us be intelligent, faithful and unchangeable sons of the Reform; let us be such, not only here, in Geneva, but in Lausanne, in Neuchâtel, in all Switzerland, in France, in Holland, in Scotland, in England, in Germany, in America. The fate of the church depends on this.

Shall we forget our fathers, their principles, their struggles, their faithfulness, their blood ? Whilst they took such care to preserve the Reform pure, not only in relation to Popery, but also in all its secondary aspects, shall we lightly forsake the precious principles of their faith ? Shall we walk over their tombs, treading under foot their bones and scattering their ashes to the winds ?

Doubtless, Lutheranism has its work as well as ours. Doubtless Lutheranism and the Reform ought to walk hand in hand beneath the banner of Christ, to the conquest of the world. And, that we should do our ally the service which he has a right to expect of us, *we must be ourselves*. And are we that ?

Ah! He who wrote to the seven churches of Asia those Revival-letters, speaks to us too. Seeing how many there are whose "hands fall down, and whose knees are feeble," he exclaims to the Reform:

"Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown. Keep that which is committed to thy trust by the spirit which dwelleth in thee."

The Reform is the church of the present day; *the Confession of the present*, as a German writer calls it.¹ Its special work, given to it by the Lord, is the bringing together of the nations. Let it then advance with freedom and courage in the world, and let it there accomplish the sacred function which it has received from the Most High, and, as the sixteenth century was the century of a great separation, may the nineteenth become, by the prayers and labors of the Reform, the century of a great union.

"I will make thee a pillar in the temple of my God."

ARTICLE VII.

DOMINICI DIODATI I. C. NEAPOLITANI, DE CHRISTO GRÆCE LOQUENTE EXERCITATIO.

Translated by O. T. DOBSON, LL. D., of Western Independent College, Exeter, England.

Continued from page 476, Vol. XII.

§ 5. *The Jews taught their children the Greek alphabet in their schools.*

To the points already enlarged upon is added another, drawn from the book *De Infantia Domini*, or the Protevangelion of Thomas, lately published by the learned Jöhn

¹ "Die Confession der Gegenwart."—LANGE.

Aloysius Mingarelli, Greek professor in the High School at Bonn.¹ And although I own the tract to be stuffed with fables and lying prodigies of the Saviour, why should I not seek to extract truth from fables, as chemists do the antidote from poison, the more so as the proverb justly says, “The Cretans do not always lie.” We are urged to the attempt by the very remote antiquity of this fabrication, being supposed a production of the Marcosians, or Gnostic heretics of the second century. For not only have Cyril of Jerusalem,² Gelasius,³ the seventh œcumenical council,⁴ and other ancient authorities, mentioned it, but also Irenæus,⁵ who lived in that century, and Origen,⁶ who was nearly as early.

In the sixth chapter of this work, Zacchæus the schoolmaster is introduced teaching the child Jesus the Greek letters:—*Καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ γράμματα, ἀπὸ τοῦ Α ἕως τοῦ Ω, μετὰ πολλῆς ἐξετάσεως ξανῶς· ἐμβλέψας δὲ τῷ καθηγητῇ Ζακ-*

¹ A fragment of the Pseudo-Evangelium of Thomas was first published by Jean Baptiste Cotelier, (1) from a MS. discovered by him in the Bibliothèque Royale in Paris. This was published a second time by Lambecius, with the addition of various readings from a manuscript in the Royal Library, Vienna. (2) It next appeared in John Albert Fabricius's Codex Apocryphus of the New Testament. (3) At length the entire Pseudo-Evangelium appeared under the hands of J. A. Mingarelli, Reg. Canon of St. Saviour's, at Bonn, from a paper MS. of the fifteenth century in the library of that church. But though this copy of Mingarelli appears to be in all essential respects identical with Cotelier's, nevertheless there will be found no slight variations between them upon examination. But whereas the Mingarellian Codex introduces the schoolmaster Zacchæus teaching Jesus the Greek letters, which is Irenæus's reading—and not the Hebrew as in Cotelier—the testimony of that early father confirms the codex of Mingarelli rather than the fragment of Cotelier. For further information, however, in regard to this topic, we must refer to the very learned letter of Mingarelli to Father Ricchini at the end of the Pseudo-Evangel, well deserving the attention of the reader. [See Jones on the Canon, p. 3, c. 23. Ed.]

² Cyrillus Hierosol. Catechesi. 4 et 6.

³ Gelasius in Decreto de libris apocryphis.

⁴ Synodus Actio 2, par. 5, tom. 7, edit. Labbæi.

⁵ Irenæus, Adversus Hæreses, lib. 1, cap. 26.

⁶ Origenes, Homilia 1 in Lucam, tom. 3, p. 933.

(1) Cotelierius in Not. ad Const. Apost. lib. 6, cap. 16.

(2) Lambecius, lib. 7, Comment. p. 270 et seq.

(3) Fabricius, Cod. Apo. N. T. p. 159, secundæ edit.

χαίρ λέγει αὐτῷ, Σὺ τὸ ἄλφα μὴ εἰδὼς κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ βῆτα πῶς ἄλλους διδάσκεις ; ὑποκριτὰ, πρῶτον εἰ δίδαξον τὸ Α· καὶ τότε σοὶ πιστεύσωμεν παρὶ τοῦ Β· “ Et (Zacchæus) dixit ei (id est Jesu) omnes literas ab alpha ad omega, dilucide singulas expendens, atque accurate. Intuens autem magistrum Zacchæum dicit ei Jesus, Tu quum literæ alpha naturam ignores, quomodo alios doces literam beta ? Hypocrita doce prius si nosti literam alpha, et tunc tibi credemus dicenti de litera beta.” And although the Parisian copy here names the Hebrew letters, and the Arabic Pseudo-Evangelium also in its 48th chapter, yet is the Mingarellian reading to be preferred, because it is evidently the oldest ; for thus too reads Irenæus, whose testimony follows :—Ὡς τοῦ Κυρίου παιδὸς ὄντος, καὶ γράμματα μαθηάοντος, καὶ τοῦ διδασκάλου αὐτῷ φήσαντος, καθὼς ἔθος ἐστίν, Εἰπὲ ἄλφα, ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸ ἄλφα· πάλιν τε τὸ βῆτα τοῦ διδασκάλου κελεύσαντος εἰπεῖν, ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν Κύριον. Σὺ μοι πρότερον εἰπὲ τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἄλφα, καὶ τότε σοὶ ἐρῶ τί ἐστὶ τὸ βῆτα. καὶ τοῦτο ἐξηγοῦνται, ὡς αὐτοῦ μόνου τὸ ἄγνωστον ἐπισαμένον, ὃ ἐφανέρωσεν ἐν τῷ τύπῳ τοῦ ἄλφα ; “ Quum Dominus puerili ætate esset, atque elementa disceret, ac ludimagister, ut mos est, ei dixisset, Dic alpha, respondit, alpha : quumque rursus beta dicere jussisset, respondit Dominus, Tu mihi prius dic, quid sit alpha, tumque dicam quid sit beta. Idque ita interpretantur, quasi solus ipse id quod cognitionem superat norit, quod quidem in figura ipsius alpha declaravit.” This reading, then, as that of Irenæus, is obviously the one to be retained. Besides, in the 14th chapter of the Protevangelion it is written :—Ἰδοὺ γὰρ ὁ διδάσκαλος τὴν πείραν τοῦ παιδίου, καὶ ἐφοβήθη αὐτόν· ὅπως γράψας τὸν ἀλφάβητον, ἐπετήχευεν αὐτόν ἐπὶ πολλὴν ὥραν, καὶ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο αὐτῷ· εἶπε δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς· Εἰ ὁντως διδάσκαλος εἶ, καὶ εἰ οἶδας καλῶς τὰ γράμματα, εἰπέ μοι τοῦ ἄλφα τὴν δύναμιν· καὶ γὰρ σοὶ ἐρῶ τὴν τοῦ βῆτα· “ Noverat enim magister peritiam pueri, et timuit eum : et scribens alphabetum, exercuit illum ad longam horam, et non respondit ei. Dixit autem illi Jesus, Si vere magister es, ac si recte literas nosti, dic mihi vim literæ alpha, et ego tibi dicam vim literæ beta.” What then do these passages indicate, if not that in the time of Christ the Greek was vernacular

in Judæa—so prevailing, in fact, that their children learned Greek at school? This apocryphal volume was composed, as we have already said, in the second century after Christ, not long after the subversion of Judæa, and consequently while it was well known what language the Jews spoke at that period. Nor, we must add, is it at all likely that the forger of the narrative, who of course desired to win general credence for his work, would have committed a mistake in a matter in which detection was the easiest thing in the world. Must we not, then, allow the Jews the use of the Greek language, seeing that this production claims it for them so clearly?

§ 6. *The Jews used Greek Bibles.*

Our sixth proof is derived from the use of Greek Bibles by the Jews. In early times, the sacred books only appeared in Hebrew; and although the pure Hebrew was no longer commonly understood by the Jews after the Babylonish captivity, yet on account of their veneration for the sacred tongue, the Hebrew Scriptures continued to be read in their religious assemblies, an interpreter standing by the reader and explaining the text as he proceeded.¹ But about the time of Christ, the Jews, giving up the use of the Hebrew original, adopted the Greek version of the Seventy interpreters, and read it in their synagogues. We assert this on the authority of Justin Martyr, a Samaritan, who lived at the beginning of the second century, and who, treating of this same version, says:—"If any one should now object that these are not our books, but those of the Jews, because up to the present day they are kept in the synagogues," etc., etc.² Tertullian's testimony is the counterpart of this, who says, "The Jews also read in public: the tributary (*vectigalis*) liberty is commonly enjoyed on every Sabbath."³ By the word *vectigalis*, is generally

¹ Maimonides, Hilcoth Tephil. cap. 12, § 10. Mischna in Tract. Megill. cap. 4.

² Justinus Martyr, Cohort. ad Græcos, p. 14, lit. c. ed. Paris.

³ Tertullianus, Apolog. cap. 18, p. 64.

understood the liberty of hearing and reading, which the Jews purchased by the payment of a tax. The Rabbins confirm our view regarding the Septuagint, among whom R. Azarias, for instance, writes :—"The interpretation of the Greeks was confirmed by the whole congregation of Israel." Again he says : "It was confirmed by a decree of the Talmudists, that the law should be written in the Greek characters only, *לא מריירי* : *סיכתבו ספרים בכל לשון מלא ביוניא* : they did not allow the sacred books to be written in any tongue but Greek." All these circumstances clearly prove that the knowledge of the Jews was confined to that language. But we also read, in the Talmud of Jerusalem, of a certain Rabbi Levi, who, hearing the Jews at Cæsarea reading the lesson, "Hear, O Israel," from the 6th of Deuteronomy, in Greek, would have stopped them ; but Rabbi Jose was indignant, and said, Shall not he, who cannot read Hebrew, read at all ? Nay, let him read in any language he understands and knows, for this is enough.¹ An incident of a similar kind happened under Justinian, for during his reign the question was agitated of returning to the use of Hebrew in the synagogue ; but Justinian interfered, and bade the Jews adhere to their vernacular tongue, the Greek, and the traditionary usage of the Septuagint.² Nor were the Greek sacred books only read publicly in the synagogues ; they were also commonly read and quoted by the Jews in private, by Christ, and by the apostles and evangelists, as has been noted over and over again by the learned.³ Of this the clearest proof is furnished in the New Testament, the writers of which, in citing the Old, depart widely from the Hebrew text, and follow closely the Seventy, whether they quote, as the technical phrase is, *κατὰ λέξιν*, or *κατὰ διάνοιαν*. Now this the Jews would never have allowed, had not the prevalence of the Greek among

¹ Talmud. Hierosolym. Sota, cap. 7. Vide Buxtorfium, in *Thesau. Rabbinico*, voce *תרגומא*.

² Justinianus, in *Novella Constitutione* cxlvi.

³ Vide Lud. Capellum, in *Critica Sacra*, p. 62 et alibi.

them sanctioned this departure from the primitive language of holy writ, and the adoption of the Greek translation instead.

§ 7. *That the Jews spoke Greek, is proved by the testimony of Josephus.*

Our next proof is derived from the works of Josephus, who narrates of Titus, that, in his expedition to Judæa, he pitched his camp on one occasion at a place called Acanthon Aulona, that is, the Valley of Thorns; the historian adding that this was the name given in the native tongue of the Jews. The words of Josephus are:—*Καὶ διανύσας ἡμέρας σαθρὸν στρατοπεδεύεται κατὰ τὸν ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων πατρίως· Ἀκανθῶν Ἀὐλῶνα καλούμενον, πρὸς τινὶ κώμῃ Γαβαθσαοῦλῃ καλουμένη· σημαίνει δὲ τοῦτο λόφον Σαούλου· διέχοντα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἱεροσολύμων, ὅσον ἀπὸ τριάκοντα σταδίων·* “And when he had accomplished a day’s march, he encamped at a valley which the Jews in their native tongue call the Valley of Thorns, near a certain village called Gabath-Saoul, which signifies the hill of Saul, being distant from Jerusalem about thirty stadia.”¹ That the name *Ἀκανθῶν Ἀὐλῶνα* is Greek, every tyro in the language must know, *Ἀὐλῶν* being a valley in that language, and *Ἀκανθῶν*, the genitive plural of *ἄκανθα ἡ*, a thorn. None but the Greek, then, was this native language of the Jews. Nor let it be said that Josephus, a correct and elegant writer of Greek, did here, for the sake of his style, translate the native name; for such a practice is opposed to his own usage as well as to that of the Jews. For the Jews, when they wrote in Greek, never changed the names of men or places on that account, but, whatever they might be, and how different soever from the tongue in which they were composing, scrupulously retained them in their native form. The testimony of Josephus, in his Antiquities, bears me out in this assertion:—*Τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα διὰ τὸ τῆς γραφῆς εὐπρεπὲς Ἑλληνισαὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν τῶν ἐντετυξομένων· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιχώριος ἡμῖν ὁ τοιοῦτος αὐτῶν τύπος, ἀλλ’ ἐν τε αὐτῶν σχῆμα καὶ τελευτὴ μία· Νώεος γὰρ τοι Νῶε καλεῖται,*

¹ Joseph. de Bell. lib. 5, cap. 2, § 1, p. 320.

καὶ τοῦτοι τὸν τύπον ἀπὸ παντὸς τῆς οὐκ ὁμοίας· “The names are here Hellenized, that the style may please the readers. But our authors do not employ such forms, but all our proper names have the same form, and one termination. Noëus, for instance, is called with us Noë, and it preserves this form in every case.”¹ To this may be added, that the name Aulon was not new or uncommon in Judæa. It was used all over Palestine, and not confined to a single province. That vast plain which lay between Libanus and Antilibanus was, on the testimony of Theophrastus, called Aulon :—Καὶ μεταξὺ τούτων ἐστὶν, ὃν Αὐλῶνα καλοῦσι πεδῖον πολὺ καὶ καλόν· “And between them lay that large and beautiful plain called Aulon.”² And that plainlike valley or plain near Jericho and the Dead Sea, which the Jordan borders, was also named Aulon, according to Josephus,³ Eusebius,⁴ and especially Jerome, who says in so many words, in his Epistle to Evangelus, “the plain, which the inhabitants of Palestine call nowadays Aulon.”⁵ Thus the name, it is perceived, was not confined to the people of Judæa, but was commonly given to places throughout Palestine. Now, if Aulon be allowed to be Greek as well as Acanthon, then, from the testimony of Josephus, it is clear that the Jews used Greek as their native tongue ; nor is there any necessity to do violence to his plain testimony, to make it apply to all other instances,

§ 8. *The region of Judæa and its cities received Greek names.*

Our eighth argument is supplied us by the territory and towns of Judæa, both of which from the period of the Maccabees dated the era of their Græcity (suam receperunt Græcitatem). This region was then no longer distributed into twelve

¹ Joseph. lib. 1 Antiq. cap. 6, § 1, p. 21 et seq.

² Theophrastus, lib. 9, c. 7, de Hist. Plantar.

³ Joseph. Ant. lib. 16, cap. 5, § 2, p. 798. De Bell. lib. 1, c. 21, § 9.

⁴ Eusebius, in Onomast. voce Αὐλῶν, et alibi.

⁵ Hieronym. ep. 73, tom. 1, p. 444, ed. Vero.

tribes, שבט,¹ as in its early history,² not into two kingdoms, ממלכה, as after Solomon;³ but into tetrarchies, (τετραρχίαι,) both the name and the thing being derived from the Greeks, who also gave the name τετράρχης to the ruler. The towns, also, and the cities recently built, were called only by Grecian names. The castle, for instance, built in the tribe of Ephraim by John Hyrcanus, was called 'Τουρνίον. The castle, too, adjoining the temple, was named by the same Hyrcanus Βάσις, that is, *the Tower*. The castle erected near the Jordan by Alexander Jannæus was in like manner called 'Αλεξάνδρειον. The town built by Herod had the name of 'Ηρώδεια. That beautiful city which stood in the plain of Capharsaba, received the name of Antipatris from Herod, in honor of his father Antipater (nominavit 'Αντιπατρίδα). Herod erected another pleasant and strongly fortified town above Jericho, which he called Κέντρον, after his mother. Near the valley of Jericho, on the north, he constructed another, to which the name Φασάηλον, from his brother, was given. The same name was also borne by a tower which he erected at Jerusalem.⁴ About the same period a city was built between Antipatris and Sebaste, to which the Greek designation Δροῦρον was attached. A city built by Archelaus, the seat of which Peutinger fixes between Jericho and Scythopolis, had in like manner the Greek name 'Αρχελαΐδα;⁵ not to mention others not a few, such as Gadara, Gaza, and Hippos, which Josephus expressly calls Greek cities ('Ελληνίδες πόλεις).

Nor did the new cities alone receive Greek names; the old had their Hebrew or Chaldee appellations changed into Greek. Thus the old שכם, *Sichem*, became Νεάπολις;

¹ The word *tribe* has been set up in a plural form in our edition, for which there is no authority in the Naples edition. Through an oversight this escaped the editor's eye. The original simply reads שבט.—ED. AND TRANS.

² Josue, cap. 13, lib. 3; Regum, cap. 12.

³ Joseph. lib. 16 Antiq. cap. 2, § 1, p. 786.

⁴ Id. ibid. lib. 17, cap. 11, § 4, p. 862.

⁵ Vid. Joseph. lib. 16 Antiq. cap. 5, § 2, p. 793.

⁶ Ibid. lib. 17, cap. 13, § 1, p. 865.

בֵּית־שֵׁן, *Bethshan*, became *Συνθόποις*; עֲמָוִי, *Emmaus*, became *Νικόπολις*; בֵּית־הָרֵן, *Betharan*, became *Λιβίας*; דָּן, *Dan*, became *Πανεάς*; and what was of old שְׁרֵיירָה, became in Greek *Σεβαστή*. Even the metropolis was not allowed to retain its ancient designation; for the name which was in Hebrew יְרוּשָׁלַיִם, *Jerushalaim*, before the captivity, and after that event in Chaldee יְרוּשָׁלַם, *Jerushalem*, the Asmoneans, from whose time the Jews Græcised, (Græcissarunt,) made into the Greek *Hierosolyma*, *Ἱεροσόλυμα*. This accounts for the word *Hierosolymorum* not occurring in the Old Testament, neither in the Hebrew, Greek, nor Latin. It is found, however, in the books of the Maccabees and in the New Testament quite commonly, because these books were written when Greek was vernacular in Judæa.

§ 9. *Greek names were given to feasts, edifices, dignities, ranks, moneys, and other things of recent institution.*

We now approach an argument that has ever proved most satisfactory to my own mind; namely, that furnished by the names given to every thing new since the time of the Maccabees. From that era, the titles of new feasts, buildings, dignities, orders, coins, measures, &c., all were given in the Greek language exclusively. To begin with festivals. The celebration which Judas Maccabeus instituted, to commemorate the consecration of the temple, was called *ἐγκαίνια*, that is, *renewal*.¹ When Antiochus Epiphanes, about the same period, extinguished the fire of the temple, which the law enjoined to be perpetual,² a solemn day was appointed for the Jews to carry supplies of wood into the temple, to which observance the name of *ξύλοφόριον*, or *the wood-bearing*, was given.³ Moreover, the apostles instituted a festival in which commemoration was made of the adoration of the magi in the stable, the miracle of Christ at Cana, and his baptism, and this

¹ Lib. 1 Mach. cap. 4, v. 56 et seq.; Joan. cap. 10, v. 22.

² Levit. cap. 6, v. 12 et 13.

³ Joseph. lib. 2, de Bell. cap. 17, § 6, p. 194.

they called ἐπιφάνειας, *manifestations*, from ἐπιφαίνεσθαι, *to manifest*; because the majesty of Christ appeared in the adoration of the magi, in the voice heard from heaven at his baptism in Jordan, and in his miracle at the marriage in Galilee.

So also of edifices. Even before the time of the Maccabees, the place built by Jason, the pseudo high priest, for wrestling and other exercises, had the Greek name γυμνάσιον given it.¹ The citadel built on the higher part of Jerusalem was called ἄκρα, from its *elevation*. In like manner the open space surrounding the palace of Herod, where the guards were encamped, bore the Greek name στρατόπεδον. In this space, too, was the prison where Peter was confined by order of Agrippa.² The oblong circus on the southern side of the temple built by Herod, had the name ἵππόδρομος, from its *horse-races*.³ There were two other buildings also erected by Herod, at an immense outlay, the one for gladiators and the circensian games, the other for mimes and music, and they bore respectively their appropriate Greek designations, ἀμφιθέατρον and θέατρον.

The public officers exhibit the same Grecian nomenclature. Judas Maccabeus called the tribunes appointed for the public defence, πεντηκονταρχάς, from their commanding fifty soldiers,⁴ the office and name being alike Greek. Those persons in the synagogues who were distinguished by years and wisdom, were styled ἀρχισυνάγωγοι.⁵ He who presided at a banquet, and made provision for the accommodation of the guests, bore the name ἀρχιτερίκλινος.⁶ At the same period were instituted toparchies and tetrarchies, forms of government and names also plainly Greek, as we have shown above.⁷ In

¹ Lib. 1 Mach. cap. 1 v. 15.

² Adrichomius, in Hierusalem, part 4, § 139. [Theatrum Terræ Sanctæ, fol. 1590, Colonizæ.—Ed.] Act. Apostolor. cap. 12, v. 4 et seq.

³ Adrichomius, ibid. § 52, p. 154.

⁴ Lib. 1 Mach. cap. 3, v. 55.

⁵ Marc. Evangelio, cap. 5, v. 22.

⁶ Joan. Evangelio, cap. 2, v. 9.

⁷ Lib. 1 Mach. cap. 11, v. 28. Matth. Evangelio, cap. 14, v. 1.

the times of the apostles, the seven persons ordained to distribute the benefactions of the church to the widows and orphans, were called *διάκονοι*, a Greek appellation.¹ In giving names to bishops and presbyters, also, the apostles employed no other than Greek terms, *ἐπίσκοπος* and *πρεσβύτερος*, *overseer* and *elder*. The new military battalion raised by Alexander Jannæus, had the Greek name *ἐκατοντάμαχον*, that is, *fighting against a hundred*.² Those persons of Gentile extraction who joined the Jewish people, and who embraced their religion, were called *προσήλυτοι*, that is, *converts*.³ Those who worshipped idols were in like manner distinguished by a Greek appellation, heathen (*εὐθριχοῦς* vocabant Judæi).⁴ Those who in the early churches were young converts, were styled *νεόφυτοι*, that is, *lately planted*. Such words as the following also became common in Judæa from that period:—*παράκλητος*, *comforter*; *ἄγγελος*, *messenger*; *δαίμων*, *demon*; *διάβολος*, *calumniator*; *ἀντιχριστός*, *opponent of Christ*; *ἀποστάτης*, *deserter*; *κλήρος*, *the college of the priests*; *λαϊκός*, *a laic*, from the word *λαός*, *people*; *καθολικός*, *universal*; *κατηχούμενοι*, *those instructed in the mysteries of religion*; *παρανύμφη*, *the bridesmaid*; *βίβλια*, *εὐαγγέλιον*, *ἀποκάλυψις*, and countless others, which are obviously Greek.

The same thing may be affirmed of moneys and measures: the names of these, too, are all Greek; for instance, *δηνάριον*, *δραχμή*, *δίδραχμον*, *σατήρ*, *διπόρδιον*, which occur up and down the New Testament, and are mere Greek. To present a few other specimens without selection: the following are of the Greek mint:—*ῥυμιος*, *a hymn*; *ἐπινίκιον*, *a song of victory*; *ἄζυμος*, *azymus*, or *unleavened*; *παρασκευή*, *preparation*; *κατήχησις*, *instruction*; *αἵρεσις*, *a sect*; *παραβολή*, *a comparison*; *περίψημα*, *filth*; *ἀνάθημα*, *devoted to the gods*; *συναγωγή*, *a congregation*; *στάδιον*, *a stadium*; and others which were then in daily use among the Jews.

¹ Act. Apostolorum, cap. 6. Epist. 1 ad Timoth. cap. 3, ver. 8.

² Joseph. lib. 13, cap. 12, § 5, p. 668.

³ Matth. 23, v. 15,

⁴ Ibid. cap. 5, v. 47.

⁵ Lib. 2 Mach. cap. 8, v. 33.

But not alone in the bestowal of names on new objects, but also in changing the names of the old, do we find the Jews habitually Græcizing (*Græcizasse tunc eos animadvertimus*). The feast of tabernacles was once called by its Hebrew name, חג-הסוכות, *chag-hassuchoth*, but afterwards known by the Greek name, σκηνοπηγία. The feast of weeks was called aforetime חג-שבועות, *chag-schivvot*, but afterwards πεντηκοστή, that is, the fiftieth day. The pond in Jerusalem was once called ביה-צדא, *beth-tzada*, afterwards πρεσβυτήρ. The slips of parchment on which they kept the words of the law were formerly תפילין, *tephilin*, but afterwards in Greek φυλακτήριον, *preserver*. The place of judgment was formerly in Chaldee גבבא, *gabbatha*, but afterwards λιθόστρωτος in Greek. The measure once called ב, *bath*, was afterwards μετρητής. In a word, from the time of the Maccabees the old titles of the Old Testament books were exchanged for new : בראשית, *bereshith*, became γενέσις, *the generation* ; ואלה-שמות, *veller-semoth*, ἐξοδος ; ויקרא, *vayikra*, λευιτικόν ; אלה-הדברים, *elle-haddebarim*, δευτερονόμιον, which is *the second law* ; and תורה, *thorah*, πανταρχον, etc., etc.

§ 10. Summary of the chapter.

To bring this part of our essay to a close, we thus sum up the results at which we have arrived. As it is evident, beyond all reasonable doubt, that from the age of the Maccabees the Jews used the Greek language, 1, in the composition of their books, 2, in the inscriptions upon their coins, 3, in edicts and records intended for public perusal, 4, in their own names, 5, in their schools in the instruction of youth, 6, in the public reading of the law, 7, from the testimony of Josephus, a Jew, by which the Jews are incontestably proven to have spoken Greek, 8, from the naming of the divisions of the country and of the new towns that were built, and 9, from the Greek names of the new feasts, magistracies, ranks, moneys, measures, buildings, and many things besides, must be not be absurd (ἄλογος) beyond measure, who does not gather from all this, that from the period specified Hellenism was

naturalized in Judæa? Who but one so destitute of reason could persuade himself, in the presence of this evidence, that the Jews continued to speak Chaldee? I pledge my word that I do not think it probable posterity could muster as many arguments, at a future day, to prove that we men of Italy now speak Italian: for neither is our money struck, nor are our public monuments engraven, nor our sacred books composed, in this tongue, nor even those other works which we throw off from day to day; but to the Jews the reverse of all this accrued. What I have just described as our condition, is equally true of the other nations of modern Europe—the English, the Dutch, the French, the Germans, the Spaniards, etc., etc. From the premises, then, it is evident that the Jews used no other language than Hellenistic; they spake Hellenistic to one another; Hellenistic was the medium of converse with foreigners; their prayers to Deity were offered in Hellenistic; nor did they know any other language than the Greek or Hellenistic.

ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*Anastasis: or the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, rationally and Scripturally considered.* By GEORGE BUSH. New-York and London: Wiley & Putnam. 1845. pp. 396, 12mo.

THIS book has awakened as much interest as any other which has appeared among us for a long time. The subject is, in itself, interesting, and the boldness of the Professor's theory prompts men to desire, at least, to know for themselves, what it is and whereof the author affirms.

We have never been of the number of those who make a man an offender for a word, and would persecute a brother unto death, for writing a book which does not tally precisely with their own sentiments. Nor, on the other hand, do we feel ourselves at liberty to be indifferent as to what is written and circulated through the community. A bad book will do more evil than a bad man; and it, consequently

becomes the duty of those who are watchmen on the walls, to give note of alarm, when danger approaches from this quarter. Yet we would not fix the finger of scorn on a man, by trying his book instead of himself; but when he has manifestly broached dangerous error, we deem it to be the straightforward course, to deal with the author personally, and in the way prescribed by the Book, considering ourselves, lest we also be tempted.

In respect to the case before us, our humble opinion is, that Professor Bush has begun at the wrong end, in his search for truth, and, in consequence of advancing backwards, has fallen into great perplexity before reaching the desired goal.

It seems to us that, on a subject so momentous, one that cannot be apprehended by intuition, nor reasoned out by logic; one that lies beyond human ken, and must be developed by divine intelligence, it were wise not to commence with theorizing, and exalting human reason, but to go and sit, like a little child, looking up into the face of Infinite Wisdom, imploring a revelation of the truth.

The "Argument from Reason" is well conducted, but proves nothing; for to us it seems to amount to no more than conjecture, at best, and not to be a whit more rational than the ordinary understanding of the subject. The analogies are often pressed beyond measure, and sometimes there seems to be the straining out of a gnat and the swallowing of a camel. To our apprehension, it lies as much within the precincts of probability, that departed spirits will all, at once, assume their spiritual bodies, at the consummation of all things, as that each, as it departs from the body, enwraps itself in one evolved from some germ of the *vital principle* caught up from the clayey tenement, as it makes its escape forever.

It is not necessary for us to believe that the identical particles of matter which constituted the body, at death, are re-formed at the resurrection into a spiritual body, but that such a body will then be given to each as to secure personal identity: and to contravene the whole of the author's philosophy and hermeneutics, it seems to us only necessary to adduce one or two testimonies of the word of God—e. g. 1 Cor. 15: 20, 23. On this we have only to remark: (a) An incongruity in Prof. Bush's paraphrase. He interprets v. 23, thus: "Christ the first fruits, not *in the order of time*, but *first in rank*, the author of the resurrection of the saints." Then a few lines further on: "Every man," (of the family of Adam's race,) "is to be quickened 'in his own order,' or, *as he dies*, from Christ down to the last generation." In the latter case, 'every one in his own order' is referred to *time*—'*as he dies*;' but in the former, in respect to Christ, to *rank*. (b) The quickening, or being "made alive at Christ's coming," can only refer to a resuscitation of the body, at that period, for every other quickening has already taken place in respect to 'them that have

fallen asleep.' (c) The common-sense meaning of Christ's resurrection from the dead, here spoken of, is the rising of his body.—John 5: 28, 29—Prof. Bush here feels that he has met a serious difficulty, and labors hard to make the passage conform to his theory, but we must say, we think he fails, and is fanciful in his exposition. "The hour is coming," (yet future,) "in the which all that are in the grave" (all the dead) "shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." Can this, by any possibility, be so interpreted, as to exclude a general rising of the dead, and to signify any thing consistent with only the assumption of a spiritual envelope by each individual at his death?

Our space forbids more at present, but we must add, that we hope our friend, the Professor, will begin the study of the subject anew, as it is revealed in the word of God, independent of any merely philosophical theories, and subject his philosophy to the simplicity of faith. For, be it remembered that, in this case, there is no certain, demonstrated science to conflict with the orthodox view.

2.—*Sermons.* By HUGH BLAIR, D. D., F. R. S. Ed. To which is prefixed the Life and Character of the Author, by JAMES FINLAYSON, D. D. Complete in one volume. From the last London edition. New-York: John S. Taylor & Co. 1844. pp. 622, 8vo.

This is a neat and convenient edition of Dr. Blair's Discourses, compressed into one volume, yet printed in a type sufficiently large for reading. The author, as Professor of Rhetoric in the University of Edinburgh, and Minister of the High Church of that city, paid much attention to style. And, although his sermons want the unction which belongs to the pulpit performances of evangelical preachers of the present day, they are not devoid of interest as specimens of chaste, lucid, and often beautiful composition. And if we regard the times and the seasons in which the author wrote, we shall not be too forward to blame him for his want of what we now denominate revival-preaching. His sermons, in his own day, were highly prized, and he was manifestly among the most popular preachers of the age. Although wanting in the fervor of Dr. Griffin's sermons, this volume of Dr. Blair's deserves a place on the shelf for "Sermons."

3.—*The Philosophy of Rhetoric.* By GEORGE CAMPBELL, D. D., F. R. S., Edin., Principal of the Marischal College, Aberdeen. A new edition, with the author's last additions and corrections. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1844. pp. 435, 12mo.

We are pleased to find the great press of the Harpers bringing out so many valuable standard works at present. It augurs well for the public taste, which, for some years past, has been any thing but ele-

vated and refined. We trust the day is fast passing away, when the community will be content with such miserable trash as has been offered it so abundantly, and which, by too many who should know and do better, has been but too greedily consumed. Let us return to our senses, and hold fast to that which is good, for our children's and our country's sake.

Dr. Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric* is a book which should be read by all scholars, and more especially by those professional men who are expected to write and speak for the public benefit. It is a masterly production, by no means superficial, but, on the contrary, piercing to the dividing asunder of the joints and marrow of the subject. He who would write and speak well, can here learn what he is to be, and what to do, in order to attain this end. We know of few exercises more profitable to the ministry of reconciliation, than occasionally to sit down and ponder the principles and illustrations of such a work as this of Dr. Campbell's.

4.—*Elements of Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, with copious Practical Exercises and Examples. For the use of Common Schools and Academies. Including, also, a History of the English Language, and of British and American Literature, etc.* Compiled and arranged by J. R. BOYD, A. M., Principal of Black River L. & R. Institute. New-York: Harper and Brothers. 1844. pp. 306, 18mo.

We have been very much pleased with a cursory inspection of this little volume. It seems to us to meet a want which has been felt in the common schools and higher schools of both sexes. It is eminently practical in its method, illustrating every principle by an abundance of examples, and taking the juvenile scholar, as soon as he begins to write at all, and teaching him, in the best way, how to think, speak, and compose correctly.

The book is, of course, not a Dr. Campbell's *Treatise on the Philosophy of Rhetoric*; but it is a text-book, "compiled and arranged," by the author, with great judgment and practical tact.

5.—*Sermons, not before published, on various subjects.* By the late EDWARD DORR GRIFFIN, D. D. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1844. pp. 326, 8vo.

This volume contains sixty sermons, including some of the Doctor's Baccalaureate Discourses. They are generally of great practical interest, and in the fervid style of the justly celebrated author. The reasoning, in one or two of the sermons, would probably not be acceded to by all, but the sermons, as a whole, need no other commendation than to say, that they are the production of Dr. Griffin.

6.—*The Reformation in Europe. By the Author of the "Council of Trent." With a Chronology of the Reformation.* Published by the American Tract Society. pp. 432, 18mo.

This little work on the Reformation has been prepared with considerable care, is written in a good historical style, and presents a compendious view of the progress of light and truth through the different countries of Europe. The principal facts are detailed, the great results are briefly exhibited, and the misrepresentations of Romanists and semi-Romanists are triumphantly exposed. Such compendiums as these we shall rejoice to see placed in the hands of thousands of readers throughout the length and breadth of our land. This volume is suitable for Sunday School libraries.

7.—*A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful; with an Introductory Discourse concerning Taste.* By the Right Hon. EDMUND BURKE. Adapted to popular use by ABRAHAM MILLS, A. M., Prof. of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1844. pp. 219, 12mo.

Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste. By ARCHIBALD ALISON, LL. D., F. R. S. With Corrections and Improvements, by ABRAHAM MILLS, A. M., Prof. of Rhetoric, etc. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1844. pp. 461, 12mo.

There is unusual beauty of execution in these school-books; and it is peculiarly fitting in this case. They treat of "taste," and ought certainly themselves to be models of it. The publishers, undoubtedly, intended to awaken in the pupils who should handle them, the emotion of "the beautiful," and they have succeeded; for no one can take them up without feeling that, as school-books, they are truly beautiful.

Of the value of the works themselves, it is too late in the day for much to be necessary. Both have been a long time before the public, and have won laurels for their authors. They belong to the standard works of their day; and, if they are not now the most perfect exhibitions of "Taste," of "the Sublime and Beautiful," they are works to be read and studied by all who cultivate belles lettres.

The editor, Mr. Mills, has adapted them well to the use of schools, by expurgation on the one hand, and addition of "Questions," on the other.

8.—*The Works of the Rev. William Jay, of Argyle Chapel, Bath.* Comprising matter not heretofore presented to the American public. In three volumes. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1844. 3 vols. 8vo.

The Rev. William Jay's Morning and Evening Exercises are already so well known in this country, and have refreshed and instructed so many minds; his character is so highly appreciated by the pious of this land; and the style of his writings so admirably adapted to do

good, that it is only necessary for us to announce that the Harpers have published a complete edition of his works, in three volumes, in order to secure attention to them. These volumes contain, besides his Exercises, many excellent sermons, lectures, memoirs, and miscellaneous articles, not before given to the American public.

We have heretofore expressed our admiration of his devotional writings; and we verily believe the Christian community will be grateful to the publishers for furnishing them more of his wholesome compositions.

9.—*Notes, Critical, Illustrative, and Practical, on the Book of Job; with a New Translation, and an Introductory Dissertation.* By ALBERT BARNES. New-York: Leavitt, Trow, & Co. 1844. 2 vols. 12mo.

We look upon this as decidedly the best commentary Mr. Barnes has published. It is thorough, lucid, based upon genuine principles of science and hermeneutics, and in accordance with the analogy of faith. It sheds light on many an obscure passage of this ancient book, and will probably disclose beauties and truths to the ordinary reader of our common version which were never seen before.

The Introduction occupies 126 pages, and descants learnedly on the questions: Whether Job was a real person—where he lived—when he lived—the author of the book—its character and design—canonical authority and inspiration—the patriarchal religion as developed in it—the state of the arts and sciences in Job's day—exegetical helps to the book. Part of this Introduction was published, some time since, in the Repository, and the whole of it is equally worthy of perusal and study. We notice an incongruity. The first five sections are denoted by the common numerals, the last four by the Roman—thus, § 5, § VI.

The commentary itself, whilst it contains much that will be appreciated only by scholars, and that will place it among the number of learned commentaries, is, at the same time, well adapted to impart needed instruction to the ordinary reader and the Sabbath School teacher. We have no space for further comment at present, but express our hope and belief that the industrious author will be abundantly rewarded in the utility of his labor. Typographical errors, which were to be expected in such a work, can be corrected in the next edition.

10.—*The Reformers before the Reformation. The Fifteenth Century. John Huss and the Council of Constance.* By EMILE BONNECHOSE, Librarian to the King of France. Translated from the French, by CAMPBELL MACKENZIE. Complete in one volume. Price fifty cents. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1844., pp. 200, 8vo.

This is a very fit introduction to the History of the Reformation by Dr. Merle d'Aubigné. It is composed in a truly Christian

spirit, and in a good style. The Preface is strikingly excellent, the Historical Introduction details the schism of the West and division of Europe, and the body of the work presents a full length portrait of John Huss; narrates his doctrines, preaching, doings, sufferings, and death; and then we have portrayed the execution of Jerome, and the martyrdoms of the successors of Huss in Bohemia.

These Reformers before the Reformation are worthy of remembrance; and whilst we laud Luther, and Calvin, and Zwingli, and their coadjutors of the sixteenth century, let us not forget to embalm in our memories the names of such as Huss, who, long before Luther's time, proclaimed the same truths as he did, and for them paid the forfeit of their lives at the stake.

11.—*Persecutions of Popery: Historical Narratives of the most remarkable Persecutions occasioned by the Intolerance of the Church of Rome.* By FREDERIC SHOBERL. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1844. pp. 180, 8vo.

In this volume, suited to the times, we find a graphic delineation of the rise and progress of the spiritual and temporal power of the Papacy; of the persecutions of the Albigenses, the Lollards, the Waldenses; of the Inquisition, the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, etc., etc.

To learn what Romanism has been, and what she is essentially in the nineteenth century, it is only necessary to read this comparatively brief and truthful history.

12.—*Mary Lundie Duncan.—Hervey's Meditations.—Luther and Calvin.* New-York: Robert Carter, 1845. pp. 310, 295, 91.

These are three good volumes, of the former two of which we have before spoken. Hervey's Meditations generally interests young people much, although the style is exuberant and not to be imitated. Mary Lundie Duncan is above all praise. Luther and Calvin highly worthy of attention. A different translation of the same matter will be found in this number of the Repository. We may be partial, but we think we have furnished the better translation of the two.

13.—*The Works of Charlotte Elizabeth; including Floral Biography, Helen Fleetwood, Siege of Derry, Principalities and Powers, Judah's Lion, Personal Recollections, Letters from Ireland, Wrongs of Women, The Rockite.* In 9 volumes, 18mo. New-York: John S. Taylor & Co.

We have already so highly commended these works, as they severally appeared, that it is only necessary now to say, that Mr. Taylor has had these nine volumes uniformly and neatly bound, with embellished backs, so as to make a very pretty and valuable present for the

holidays. They would doubtless be acceptable, as they could not but be interesting and useful to our young friends.

- 14.—*The Deserter*. By CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1845. pp. 239, 18mo.

This will be a captivating present for our juvenile readers. It is a pretty book, and full of interest in its details of O'Brien, the hero of the tale. It is a useful volume too; for it exposes the dangers of those who, like O'Brien, are led away from the counsels of a pious mother, and the security of the home fireside, by the "pomp and circumstance" of some recruiting sergeant and his feathered company. It inculcates also the solemn responsibility of military officers in regard to those under their control. It teaches, in the character of Dale, how such a soldier can be pious and godly among his wicked companions, and illustrates the power of temptation and passions in O'Brien, and the influence of truth early imbibed, in recovering the most profligate from death to life.

- 15.—*The Pulpit Cyclopædia, and Christian Minister's Companion; containing three hundred and sixty Skeletons and Sketches of Sermons, and eighty-two Essays on Biblical Learning, Theological Studies, and the Composition and Delivery of Sermons*. The London edition of four volumes complete in one. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 616, 8vo.

This large volume is attractive in its exterior, as the Appleton publications usually are, and contains an abundance of useful matter within its lids. We do not mean by this, wholly to approve helps to the ministry of this kind; but, independently of the "Skeletons and Sketches," the "Eighty-two Essays" are full of interesting and useful matter, such as it will be well for all who minister at the altar frequently to ponder. As to the Skeletons, for those who like them, there is here a fine collection. For ourselves, we prefer original plans, even if inferior to many of these, because we opine a ministry which does not think for itself, and is not able to construct its own sermons, is not thoroughly furnished, and cannot be apt to teach. There is danger, therefore, in the possession of such a book; although it may be used in such a way as not to be objectionable. Volumes of Sermons are capable of just as great abuse as volumes of Sketches.

- 16.—*The Book of the Indians of North America: illustrating their Manners, Customs, and Present State*. By JOHN FROST, LL. D. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845. pp. 283, 12mo.

This is one of a series of books in course of preparation by Dr. Frost, who in this line is truly prolific. The Book of the Indians is

just such a book as all our young people want to read. The knowledge imparted is worth possessing, it is derived from authentic sources, and communicated in an attractive style. An Old Hunter talks to a circle of youth, and tells them veritable tales of the character and modes of life of our Aborigines. He portrays buffalo hunts, and beaver trappings; describes weapons of war and musical instruments, modes of warfare and measures of peace, wigwams, lodges and encampments, games, mysteries and religion; gives narratives of Black Hawk, Oceola and other warriors, and concludes with interesting notices of Missionary operations and their blessed results.

17.—*The Poor Man's Morning Portion; being a selection of a Verse of Scripture, with Short Observations, for every day in the year; intended for the use of the Poor in Spirit.* By ROBERT HAWKER, D. D., late Vicar of Charles, Plymouth. New-York: Robert Carter. 1845. pp. 315, 12mo.

This is an excellent volume, on the same general plan as Jay's Exercises, providing a verse of Scripture for each day, with brief practical remarks. It is truly a good "Morning Portion" for the poor man, who has comparatively little time in the morning to devote to his spiritual duties. These portions are, therefore, short, and at the same time sweet, and very much in the form of meditations on the truth of the passage selected. To all, who are necessarily hurried away to work early, we especially recommend this spiritual treasury, whilst all can use it with profit.

18.—*Sorrowing yet Rejoicing; or, Narrative of Recent Successive Bereavements in a Minister's Family.* Sixth Edition. New-York: Robert Carter. 1845. pp. 185, 18mo.

This is decidedly one of the most interesting and affecting little volumes we ever perused. We should like to have every body read it, believer and unbeliever. The narrative is given with great simplicity, and his heart is indeed hard who can read the detail of the afflictions of this godly family, and the sweet piety of the youthful sufferers, without shedding tears over the page. Oh, that in all our families we could see such lovely exhibitions of the power of God's grace in the conversion of our children, and in our own cheerful submission to his severest dispensations.

19.—*Sabbath Musings.* By CAROLINE FRY. New-York: Robert Carter. 1845. pp. 248, 18mo.

We have seldom been more interested than in the perusal of some of the "Musings" of this volume, by Caroline Fry. We place her in the triad with Charlotte Elizabeth and Mrs. Ellis. From either

of them we always feel pretty certain of having something readable and profitable. Mrs. Fry is very happy in the choice of the heads for her "Musings," and this is no small excellence: and then the subject matter is choice. Only read the "Retrospect," the "Sleepers," the "Remembrance," the "Look," the "Gates," etc., and be satisfied that we are not mistaken.

20.—*The Centurion; or Scenes in Rome, in the Early Days of Christianity.* By WILLIAM W. TAYLOR. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1845. pp. 108, 18mo.

A pleasant little book, representing the prevalence of Paganism, and the power of Christianity in overcoming it, in the hearts of the Centurion and other citizens of Rome. The tale is, on the whole, well conducted, although some things put into the Apostle's mouth, we think, not exactly probable.

21.—*The Spirit of Popery: an Exposure of its Origin, Character, and Results, in Letters from a Father to his Children.* American Tract Society. pp. 378, 18mo.

This is a fit companion for the preceding volume on the Reformation. If read before that, it will go far toward convincing us of the necessity for such a Reformation as was effected in the sixteenth century. It is an illustrated book, containing some dozen pictorial representations of various proceedings in the Church of Rome, such as Adoration of the Wafer, Mass for the Dead, Blessing the Bell, etc. The young will here find a detailed account of all the rites and ceremonies, of all the paraphernalia and fixtures, which appertain to the "Man of Sin" and his system of delusion. They will here learn much of the Pope, the mass, indulgences, monasteries, relics, etc., etc., of which they are now ignorant. And, at the present day, it behooves our juvenile friends to give up the reading of foolish novels, and store their minds with such *facts* as are related in this little volume. The rising generation must be prepared for the conflict between light and darkness, between false religion and true, formalism and spiritualism; and they cannot meet the foe with any hope of victory, unless they make themselves acquainted with his strongholds, his outposts, and his mode of warfare.

22.—*The Arguments of Romanists, from the Infallibility of the Church and the Testimony of the Fathers, in behalf of the Apocrypha, discussed and refuted.* By JAMES H. THORNWELL, Prof. of Sac. Lit., and Evid. of Christianity in South Carolina College. New-York: Leavitt, Trow & Co. 1844. pp. 407, 12mo.

This is a discussion, at great length, of the question in respect to the canonical authority of the Apocrypha, in reply to Dr. Lynch, a

Roman Catholic Priest of Charleston, who undertook to defend their inspiration. The claim of infallibility is dwelt upon and refuted, and the uncanonical, uninspired character of the Apocrypha clearly proved. This topic, at least, possesses novelty; and as the whole ground of controversy with Rome will have to be travelled over, the volume before us is opportune. It would be well for theological students and others to study this subject thoroughly, and we know of no other work so accessible, and at the same time so full and complete, as the one before us.

- 23.—*Life of Oliver Cromwell.* By ROBERT SOUTHEY, LL. D.
Philip Randolph: a Tale of Virginia. By MARY GERTRUDE.
A History of the French Revolution; its causes and consequences.
 By F. MACLEAN ROWAN.

These are four of the 18mo. volumes of the "Library for my Young Countrymen," in course of publication by D. Appleton & Co. There are five preceding these; the whole set making a very pretty present for the holidays, or for any other time. The *Life of Oliver Cromwell* is well written, but it is questionable whether Dr. Southey was just the man to write it. *Philip Randolph* is an exceedingly interesting tale of early times in our own country, when the whites were few, and exposed to the savage attacks of the aborigines. The story of Philip Randolph, the captive, is absorbing, and will, doubtless, steal away some moments of our juvenile bookworms. The *French Revolution* is of a higher order of writing than the preceding one, but to more advanced youth offers much useful and entertaining information. We think the author has executed his task well, and compressed the great facts and their relations within a suitable compass for a compendious history.

- 24.—*The Complete Works of Mrs. Hemans.* Reprinted from the last English Edition. Edited by her SISTER. In two volumes. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton. 1845.

We, of course, only need, in this case, to speak of the publishers' part. It is too late in the day to write a commendation of the works of Mrs. Hemans. Suffice it, then, to say, that D. Appleton & Co. have got up the volumes in beautiful style, and made them such that any lady would be pleased to accept them as a contribution to her select library.

- 25.—*The Settlers in Canada. Written for Young People.* By CAPTAIN MARRYAT. In two volumes. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845. pp. vol. 1, 170—vol. 2, 179.

Captain Marryat has not been a favorite with us, and some of his books are objectionable on the score of moral influence: but these

volumes are wholly unexceptionable in themselves unless all fiction is to be rejected. The story is well conceived and well told. It is the tale of a family, which experienced great reverses of fortune, and after one of them removed to Canada, and cheerfully submitted to all the inconveniences of a new country and untried scenes. Mrs. Campbell, as here exhibited, is a whole-souled, confiding Christian, a woman of sound sense, great prudence, and uncommon discretion; just such a woman as every one must love; and her family all show the influence of her spirit and teachings. A pure Christianity reigns there, and also pervades the representations of these volumes. If Captain Marryat must write fictions, we could wish they were always as wholesome as this.

26.—*Young's Night Thoughts—Moore's Lalla Rookh—Pollok's Course of Time.* New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton.

We are indebted to these enterprising publishers for these three miniature editions of these popular poems. They are very pretty cabinet or pocket volumes, handsomely bound and with gilt edged leaves.

27.—*A Complete Greek and English Lexicon of the Poems of Homer and the Homerides, composed with constant reference to the illustration of the Domestic, Religious, Political and Military Condition of the Heroic Age; containing also an Explanation of the most difficult passages, and of all Mythological and Geographical Proper Names.* From the German of G. CH. CRUSIUS: translated, with corrections and additions, by HENRY SMITH, Professor of Languages in Marietta College. Hartford: H. Huntington. 1844. pp. 552, 8vo.

This title-page itself tells almost as much of the story as we have room to insert. Indeed to a scholar nothing more is needed. Yet it may not be out of place for us to remark, that Germany feels indebted to Crusius for this very superior Homeric Lexicon; and the United States must be under great obligations to Professor Smith, for making it accessible to English students of Homer in the original. The Lexicon is copious and constructed according to the best model. It contains all the words found in the Iliad, Odyssey, Hymns, and other small poems: it explains difficult passages, and gives all the proper names, with appropriate geographical and mythological illustrations. It is, indeed, a sort of commentary on the text, and furnishes more valuable matter expository of the poems of Homer, than can be found elsewhere, in so compressed a form. The execution of the work will, in all respects, commend itself to the taste of scholars.

ARTICLE IX.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

Letters have been received at Munich, announcing the death of the celebrated traveller, Dr. Koch. After ten years passed in visiting various parts of Egypt, Dr. Koch penetrated into the interior of Africa.

A letter from Munich states that Dr. Schafhautl was, in the beginning of September, preparing to join the commission sent by the King of Bavaria to Pompeii, under the direction of Professor Gartner. The chief objects, to which the attention of this commission is directed, are the study of the Pompeian architecture, and, if possible, the discovery of the method employed by the ancients in their stucco work, for which it would appear they used no other ingredient than chalk.

Gervinus, of Heidelberg, is engaged in writing a critical work on Shakspeare, and has suspended for the present his "History of the Nineteenth Century."

The University of Bonn is now the favorite school for the princes and the high nobility of Germany. Accounts from Dresden mention, that the son of Prince John of Saxony (the future heir to the throne of that kingdom) is about to be sent to Bonn. Professor Dahlmann has signified his intention of remaining at that university, a circumstance which occasions no little regret in Heidelberg.

France.

Letters received in Paris from Constantinople, dated July, contain some interesting information relative to M. Botta's recent discoveries at Khorsabad, near Nineveh. Eugène Flandin, an artist, has been sent out by the French government for the purpose of making drawings of the excavations which are actively going on. Botta has discovered two doors uniformly adorned with bas-reliefs: on one side is represented a colossal bull, with a human head, and on the other a human figure with an eagle's head and wings.

It is proposed to erect a bronze statue of the celebrated mathematician Laplace, at his birth-place, Beaumont en Auge, near Caen.

Recent letters from Algiers mention the discovery of some curious antiquities in the course of some excavations at Orleansville. The principal objects dug up are the following: a marble bust of a proconsul; several Roman weights in copper and bronze.

Italy.

The sculptor, Mathia, of Berlin, who is at present in Rome, is engaged on a work which attracts the admiration of all lovers of art. It is called 'Cupid and the Dog;' and all who have seen it concur in eulogizing the

beauty and the graceful grouping of the figures. The winged god is represented sleeping, his head pillowed on his left arm, which rests on the back of a watch-dog, the emblem of fidelity. The group is executed in Carrara marble of the purest white. It is for the Duchess of Leuchtenburg.

Professor Foggi, of the University of Pisa, is preparing for publication, in Italian, an important work upon the poetry of the Bible, upon which he has been engaged for several years. It presents a complete development of the metrical system of Hebrew poetry, as well as of the poetical nomenclature which was employed by the ancient rhetoricians of the people of Israel.

THE
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY
AND
CLASSICAL REVIEW.

THIRD SERIES, NO. II.—WHOLE NUMBER LVIII.

A P R I L , 1 8 4 5 .

ARTICLE I.

THE LAST DAYS AND DEATH OF LUTHER.

By C. E. Stowe, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature, Lane Seminary, Cincinnati.

LUTHER died on the 18th of February, 1546, at the age of sixty-two. The immense labor he had undergone for thirty years was too much even for his iron constitution; and for more than a year previous to his death, he suffered much from pains in the head, inflammation of one eye and loss of its sight, swelling of the limbs, the agonizing disease of the stone, together with extreme nervous irritability and depression of spirits. His enemies hoped every day he would die, and in the beginning of 1545, a pamphlet was published at Naples to inform the world that Luther was dead, and it professed to give the particulars of his departure. In this veritable publication it was stated that Luther spent his time in gluttony and drunkenness, and blaspheming the Pope; that, perceiving his end to be near, he commanded his attendants to place him upon an altar and worship him as a god; that he received the sacrament and immediately died; but the consecrated wafer leaped out of his stomach and remained suspended in the air, to the astonishment of all beholders; that when he was buried

there was such a frightful storm, with thunder and lightning, that people thought the day of judgment had actually come ; that in the night the storm returned with still greater violence, and the next morning the tomb was found empty, but such an intolerable smell, and such an odor of burning brimstone came from it, that it made every body sick who ventured near it ; whereupon many repented and joined the Catholic church, etc., etc.

The Landgrave of Hesse sent a copy of this pamphlet to Luther, who made himself very merry over it, and published a large edition in Italian and German, adding nothing but the following very characteristic note at the close : “ Now I, Martin Luther, Dr., acknowledge and testify by this present writing, that I received the foregoing angry tale respecting my death, on the 21st of March, and that I have read it with great mirth and jollity, except the blasphemy that such lies should be attributed to the high, divine Majesty. For the rest, it tickles me to my right knee-pan and my left heel, that the devil and his crew, the Pope and the papists, hate me so heartily. May God convert them from the devil. But if it be decreed that my prayer for a sin which is unto death, be not heard—very well—then God grant that they may speedily fill up the measure of their iniquity, and do nothing else for their own comfort and joy than write such books as these.”

Several circumstances tended to embitter the last days of Luther. The sacramentine controversy, which had nearly produced a breach between him and Melanchthon ; the neglect of some congregations to provide suitable support for their ministers ; the low state of discipline in some of the churches ; the consciousness that he had sometimes been too obstinate and violent in his discussions with his brother reformers ; all these things tended to disturb and trouble him. “ I was born (said he) to fight with devils and factions ; and hence it is that my writings are so boisterous and stormy. It is my business to remove obstructions, to cut down thorn trees, to fill up quagmires, to open and make straight paths ; and if

I must have some failing, it is that I speak the truth with too great severity." To his friend Dr. Probst, of Bremen, he writes, under date of January 19, 1546: "I, a worn out, feeble, wearied, spiritless, and now one-eyed old man, write to you, and desire, what seems to me to be very reasonable, that I, now half dead, may have a little rest and quiet, which I long for; and yet I am still overburdened with writing, and preaching, and talking, and working, just as much as if I had never written, or preached, or talked, or worked. I am weary of the world, and the world is weary of me. The parting will be very like that of the guest leaving the inn. I pray only that God may be gracious to me in my last hour, and I shall quit the world without reluctance."

Certain disorders in Wittenberg, which he found himself unable to control, harassed and vexed his soul. Secret promises of marriage between young people, without the consent of parents and guardians, which the Romish church view to be valid, and which the magistrates of Wittenberg refused to declare null, he held to be exceedingly injurious to the parties concerned, and of mischievous tendency in society. He declared that things had come to such a pass, that a father could scarcely send his boy to a neighbor's house of an errand without the risk of having him return a married man. He exhorted, he prayed, he preached, he appealed to the magistrates and to the elector; but such was the power of old prejudice that his labors were all in vain. The familiarity which began to exist between the young ladies of the city and the students of the university, grieved and offended him. He affirmed that some of the young ladies went so far as to visit the students at their rooms, which he considered decidedly improper. Moreover, a fashion was introduced among the ladies of dressing scandalously low in the neck; and he affirmed vehemently that ladies who went to church with such long necks, ought to be subject to church discipline. But Luther found, as many others had found before, and have found since, that it is easier to carry a point against any other earthly power, than against the power of a lady's fashion, especially

if it be an unreasonable and indefensible fashion. He who had resisted and defeated, single-handed, the most tremendous power which ever existed on earth, was utterly unable to persuade or compel the ladies of his own church to cover their bosoms, while it was the fashion to leave them open. He considered the reputation and usefulness of the university and theological seminary to be in imminent danger from these and the like causes ; and, finally, seeing that all his remonstrances were disregarded, he left the city in disgust, with the determination never to return to it. From Leipsic he wrote to his wife to sell what little property they had in Wittenberg, and take her family to the little village of Zulsdorf, where he had a cottage and garden, a gift from the elector of Saxony. This exceedingly characteristic letter may be read in Lomler's *Luther*, Vol. III. p. 340-42.

As soon as this determination of Luther was known, the whole city was in commotion ; the citizens said it would ruin their town for ever ; the magistrates begged ; the students petitioned ; Melanchthon and his colleagues entreated ; the ladies cried and promised better fashions ; and the elector of Saxony implored and even commanded him to return. Luther at length yielded, and resumed his labors in the university and the city church. He felt, however, that he had not long to live, and he had sometime before written his will, which, like every thing else that came from his pen, is full of character. It is given by Lomler, Vol. III., p. 151-155, in the original German, and I have here attempted to translate it into English.

“ I, Martin Luther, Doctor, acknowledge by this my own handwriting, that I have given to my dear and faithful housewife Catharine, for her own, (or whatever the legal phrase may be,) during her life, that she may use it for her own welfare and pleasure ; and by the authority of this present writing, this day, I grant unto her what followeth, namely, first, the little property at Zulsdorf, as I have fitted it up and owned it hitherto ; secondly, the house by the well, for her residence, which I purchased in the name of my servant Wolf ; thirdly,

the gifts, such as cups, jewelry, rings, chains, medals, gold and silver, which, perhaps, in all may be worth something like a thousand gulden.

“ This is all I am worth, and I give it all to my wife, for the following reasons :

“ 1. Because she has always conducted herself toward me lovingly, worthily, and beautifully, like a pious, faithful, and noble wife ; and by the rich blessing of God she has borne and brought up for me five living children, who yet live, and God grant they may long live.

“ 2. Because she will take upon herself and pay the debts which I owe and may not be able to pay during my life ; which, so far as I can estimate, may amount to about 450 florins, or perhaps a little more.

“ 3. But most of all, because I will not have her dependent on the children, but the children on her ; that they may hold her in honor, and submit themselves to her, as God has commanded. For I see well and observe, how the devil, by wicked and envious mouths, heats and excites children, even though they be pious, against this command ; especially when the mothers are widows, and the sons get wives and the daughters get husbands, and again *socrus nurum, nurus socrum*. For I hold that the mother will be the best guardian for her own children, and will use what little property and goods she may have, not for their disadvantage and injury, but for their good and improvement, since they are her own flesh and blood, and she has carried them under her heart.

“ And if, after my death, she should find it necessary or desirable to marry again, (for I cannot pretend to set limits to the will or the providence of God,) yet I trust, and herewith express my confidence, that she will conduct herself toward our mutual children as becometh a mother, and will faithfully impart to them property, and do whatever else is right.

“ And herewith I humbly pray my most gracious lord, his grace, Duke John Frederick, Elector of Saxony, graciously to guard and protect the above named gifts and property.

“ I also entreat all my good friends to be witnesses for my

dear Catey, and help defend her, should any good-for-nothing mouths reprove and slander her, as if she had secretly some personal property, of which she would defraud the poor children. For I testify that there is no personal property except the plate and jewelry enumerated above. And indeed any one publicly can make the calculation, for every body knows how much income I have had from my gracious lord, and besides that I have never had a penny or a pepper-corn from any one except in the way of presents, which are mentioned above among the jewelry, and in part are pledged for debt; and when it is seen how much I have built and bought, and what great expense of housekeeping and charity I have maintained with this income and these gifts, others as well as myself must consider it a special and wonderful blessing that I have been able to get along, and the wonder is, not that there is no more ready money, but that there are so few debts.

“I beg this may be considered, because the devil, when he can no longer plague me, would be glad to plague my Catey in every possible way, for no other reason than because she has been the married housewife of that man Dr. Martin, and is yet, blessed be God.

“Finally, I beg, since in this will or testament I have not used legal forms or words, (and thereto I have my reasons,) that every one will let me be the person that I am in truth, namely, openly, and known both in heaven, on earth, and in hell, and let me have respect and authority enough, so that I may be trusted and believed more than any lawyer. For so God, the Father of all mercies, hath entrusted to me, a poor miserable, condemned sinner, the Gospel of His dear Son, and therein, thus far, I have behaved and conducted myself truly and faithfully, and it has made much progress in the world through me, and I am honored as a teacher of the truth, notwithstanding the curse of the Pope, and the wrath of emperors, kings, princes, priests, and all kinds of devils; much rather, then, let me be believed in this little matter, especially as here is my hand, which is very well known; and I hope it may be enough, when it can be said and proved, that this is

the serious and deliberate desire of Dr. Martin Luther, (who is God's lawyer and witness in his Gospel,) to be proved by his own hand and seal.

“ Done and given in the day of Euphemia, (Sept. 16,) 1542.

“ M. LUTHER.”

Ego Philippus Melanchthon testor, hanc esse et sententiam et voluntatem, et manum Reverendi Domini D. Martini Lutheri Preceptoris et Patris nostri carissimi.

Ego Caspar Cruciger D. testor, hanc esse et sententiam et voluntatem et manum Reverendi D. Domini Martini Lutheri, carissimi Patris nostri. Quare ipse mea manu subscripsi.

Et ego Johannes Bugenhagius, Pomeranus D. idem testor manu mea.

Confirmed by his grace, the Elector and Duke of Saxony, April 11, 1546.

The Council of Trent was now in session, and every effort was made to inveigle the Protestants into some compromise with the Papists. Notwithstanding his growing infirmities, therefore, Luther did not feel that he could relax any of his labors. He still kept up his active correspondence over all Europe, still lectured every day, and preached from four to six times every week, and almost every month published some book, and he wrote large works on the papacy with special reference to the Council of Trent. Two of these works were adorned with plates of the most satirical and biting character against the pope and his council. They were entitled, *Das Pabsthum zu Rom von Teufel gestiftet*, and *Prophetische Abkonterfeigung des Tridentinischen Conziliabuli*. Even the friends of Luther thought these books too sharp and violent.

But the final scene was fast approaching. There had been a difficulty of long standing at Eisleben, Luther's native town, between the count of Mansfeld, his brothers, and the inhabitants, respecting the property in the mines there. The controversy had become exceedingly bitter, and the minds of the parties were very much irritated and alienated. Luther

had once spent several days among them to effect reconciliation, but without success. They now thought, however, that if he would visit them again, they would submit all their differences to his judgment and abide by his decision. The count of Mansfeld, therefore, besought him to come if his health would possibly admit. January 20th, 1546, Luther writes in answer to the count: "I am busy writing against the asses in Paris and Louvain, and for an old man my health is good enough."

On the morning of the 23d he set out for Eisleben, and took with him his two sons Martin and Paul, the eldest of whom was then about twenty. His wife was sick, and on that account obliged to stay at home. There had been a violent storm, the rivers had all overflowed their banks, the bridges were carried away, and travelling was both difficult and dangerous. At eleven o'clock on the morning of the 24th, he arrived in Halle, and in the evening preached in St. Mary's church. He was detained there three days by the state of the river Saale, which was full of floating ice, and running with a furious current. On the 28th he and his two sons, with Dr. Jonas, rowed themselves across the river in a skiff, at the imminent hazard of their lives. While they were struggling with the ice and water, Luther spoke to Dr. Jonas in his dry pleasant way: "Dear Doctor, would it not be fine sport for the devil to drown Dr. Martin Luther and his two sons and Dr. Jonas, all together, here in the river!" They gained the shore in safety, and proceeded on their journey. The count of Mansfeld met them with a company of one hundred and thirteen horses, and escorted them to Eisleben. When they came in sight of the church tower of Eisleben, a rush of tender reminiscences crowded upon the mind of Luther with such overwhelming force that he fainted entirely away. When he recovered, he said: "The devil must needs insult me from the old steeple yonder. But I will give him a pull or two yet before I die." Luther found himself very much exhausted by the fatigues and inconveniences of his journey. He had an issue for the pains in his head. This had been neglected

since he left home, and had become very painful. After a night's rest, however, he entered on business and pursued it with unremitting diligence.

On account of the state of his health and the inclemency of the season, his wife felt unusual anxiety for him, and in her letters to him expressed her solicitude with all a woman's tenderness. He answered affectionately, cheerfully, and jocosely, and endeavored to quiet her apprehensions. The last of his letters to her, written but a few days before his death, we shall here insert, as a specimen of this unique correspondence.

"To the holy, careful lady Catharine Lutheress, the Zulzdorf Doctress at Wittenberg, my gracious dear housewife.

"Grace and peace in Christ, most holy lady Doctress; we thank thee most kindly for thy great care of us, whereby thou canst not sleep; for since the time thou hast taken up the care of us, a fire broke out in our hotel close by our chamber door, and was likely to burn us up; and yesterday, owing no doubt to thy tender care, a great stone came near to falling on my head and squashing me like a mouse in a trap.

"* * * I have to thank your sacred care of me that the dear holy angels have given over taking care of me. I fear me, if thy anxiety cease not, the earth will open and swallow me up, and all the elements persecute me. Dost thou study the *Kategisseman*¹ and the Creed? Go to thy prayers and let God take care of me. It is written, *Cast thy cares on the Lord, who careth for thee*; read the 55th Psalm and many other like passages. Thank God, we are bright and well; but our business plagues us, and Dr. Jones has a lame leg, by reason of his accidentally stumbling into a shop. So great is the envy of people, that he would not let me have a lame leg alone. Herewith I commend thee to God. We will gladly get loose from here and come home so soon as God pleases. Amen, Amen, Amen.

"On the day Scholastica, (Feb. 10,) 1546.

"Your MARTIN LUTHER."

¹ So Catharine, by mistake, had written the German word *Katechismus*, Catechism.

February 14th, he ordained two preachers and received the Lord's Supper for the last time. The next day he preached his last sermon from Matt. 11 : 25-30, which is given in full by Lomler, Vol. III. p. 182-197.

February 16th, at supper Luther spoke with great cheerfulness on the brevity of human life. Among other remarks, he said : " When an infant of a year old dies, he probably has from one thousand to two thousand of the same age to go into eternity with him ; but if I die at the age of sixty-two, I shall scarcely have sixty or a hundred of my age who will die the same day." Being asked if we should know our friends in the other world, he replied : " Adam, when he awoke from his sleep and found Eve by his side, did not gape and stare, and say, Who are you ? Where did you come from ? but knew her at once, and exclaimed, ' Bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh.' Though he had never seen her before, he felt, through marrow and bone, that it must be she and could be no other ; and so shall we feel when we awake in eternity, and see our loved ones standing around us."

His appetite had been very good and his meals remarkably cheerful ; and he observed that, getting back to his native town, his food tasted to him as it did when he was a boy.

On the morning of February 17th, he appeared so unwell that the count of Mansfeld begged him not to attend to business that day, but keep his room. This he consented to do, he saw no company, and his dinner was sent up to his apartment. In the afternoon, however, he said he could not bear to eat his meals alone, it was so gloomy and unsocial, he would go down and take supper with the family. His two sons were with him, his friend Dr. Jonas, and his servant Ambrose. He walked thoughtfully up and down in his chamber, and at length said : " I was born here in Eisleben ; what if I should die here ?" He complained of pressure for breath ; he walked to the window and opened it ; his lips moved and a low murmur was heard, as if he were in earnest prayer. His servant Ambrose, supposing he might want assistance, came softly behind him, and heard him speak to the

following purport: "Lord God, Heavenly Father, I call upon thee in the name of thy dear Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, whom I by thy grace have acknowledged and preached, that thou wouldst, according to thy promise and for the glory of thy name, graciously listen to my prayers at this time. Oh, grant, according to thy great mercy and loving-kindness toward me, that the light of the gospel, which now begins to shine on the earth, may every where take the place of the terrible apostacy and darkness and blindness of the pope, before the great day of judgment, which cannot now be far off, but is at the door: and withal preserve thou the church of my dear fatherland pure unto the end in the steadfast profession of the truths of thy holy word, and graciously keep it, that all the world may know that thou didst send me to do this work. Ah, dear Lord God, Amen, Amen."

Not a word was spoken by any of his attendants. They felt as Jacob did in Bethel, "How dreadful is this place!"

He resumed his seat, and said to Dr. Jonas and his sons: "Oh, I wish this business of the count of Mansfeld's were settled, that I might go home and lay myself down in my coffin to sleep, and give this poor body to the worms!"

Michael Coelius, the minister of Eisleben, came in to see him, and he said to Coelius and Dr. Jonas: "Pray for our dear Lord God, that it may go well with Him and His church, for the Council of Trent is in a great rage." He complained of pain in his breast, and requested them to rub him with warm flannels, which they did. He felt better, and at supper time, went down and ate with the family with a good appetite. Observing the company rather desponding, he began to converse with great liveliness, and by two or three sallies of his ever ready wit, threw them into a hearty laugh.

After supper he again complained of a pain in his breast, and asked to be rubbed with warm flannels. They urged him to send for a physician, but he declined. At nine o'clock he went up stairs, in company with his two sons Martin and Paul, Dr. Jonas, Mr. Coelius, and his servant Ambrose. He lay down on a sofa in a little ante-room adjoining his cham-

ber and slept for about an hour and a half. He then awoke and asked Ambrose to warm the bed in his chamber. He arose from the sofa, took off his clothes without assistance, wrapped himself in a dressing gown, walked to his bed and lay down. Seeing his sons and the other friends standing anxiously around him ; he requested them to retire to bed ; but they earnestly begging permission to sit up with him, he made no further objection, but turned his face toward the wall, and seemed to sleep. His servant Ambrose says he did not really close his eyes, but seemed to be narrowly watching the flickering shadows made upon the wall by the unsteady light of the fire. At half past eleven he told his servant to light a fire in the little room ; and soon after exclaimed, "O Lord God !" in a tone of distress. His friends were immediately around him, and he said to Dr. Jonas : "I have most distressing pain at my heart, I think I must be dying." They rubbed him again with flannels, and the sad news spread through the family and through the city, that Luther was dying. The two principal physicians of the city were soon by his bed-side, the count of Mansfeld came hurrying in with some salts of ammonia, then newly discovered, and was soon followed by his lady the countess, the count John Henry von Schwartzburg and his lady, and Dr. Aurifaber, the particular friend and biographer of Luther.

Luther soon recovered, rose from the bed without assistance, walked once or twice across the chamber, and then went into the little ante-room and lay down again upon the sofa. It was now one o'clock in the morning. Soon after lying down, he said in Latin : "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit : Thou hast redeemed me, O Lord, God of truth." The countess of Mansfeld wished him to take some of the medicines she had brought ; but he said his poor dear Catey, in her abundant anxiety for him, had put up, just before he came away, a little case of refreshments and medicines, and if he took any thing he would rather have some of that. His son went to his trunk, took out the parcel he spoke of, and handed it to him. He took one or two of the things it con-

tained, just put them to his lips, handed them all back to his son, and told him to put them away, and never to forget the kindness of his mother. Soon after, he said : "Dear God, I am in dreadful pain, I must be going." Mr. Coelius said to him : "Venerated father, call upon our dear Lord Jesus Christ, our great high priest, our only mediator ; you have done a great work for Him ; God will be gracious to us ; you will yet recover." "No, (said Luther firmly,) I feel the cold sweat of death—I am breathing my soul out—my distress is increasing." He then prayed in German : "My heavenly Father, eternal, most merciful God, Thou hast revealed to me Thy dear Son, our Lord Jesus Christ ; Him have I professed, Him have I preached, I adore Him as my only Saviour and Redeemer, while the ungodly reproach and revile and persecute Him. O take my poor soul to Thyself." He then said in Latin three times in quick succession : "Into Thy hands I commit my spirit," and added : "God so loved the world that he sent His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him might not perish, but have everlasting life." After a moment's silence, he again spoke in German : "O, heavenly Father, although this body is breaking away from me, and I am departing from this life, yet I certainly know I shall forever be with Thee, for no one can pluck me out of Thy hand." And then subjoined with a cheerful tone in Latin : "Our God is a God of salvation—our Lord delivereth from death."

He appeared to be fast sinking, and the countess of Mansfeld again administered some cordials, and directed him to be bathed with spirits. Then Dr. Jonas said to him : "Most beloved father, do you still hold on to Christ, the Son of God, our Saviour and Redeemer?" His fading countenance once more brightened, his clear blue eye sparkled with intelligence, and he replied, in a distinct and thrilling tone : "O yes." He then folded his hands across his bosom, turned his face a little on one side, and began breathing softly and gently as a sleeping infant. His eyes were becoming fixed in their sockets, the glassy hue of death was fast gathering on them,

when one of the old men in attendance, who had been his companion in childhood, (and who in bad weather had often carried the favorite little Martin to school in his arms,) in that awful moment forgetting entirely the mighty reformer and thinking only of the friend of his heart, knelt down by the sofa, and putting his arm across his bosom and his face to his cheek, exclaimed in the plaintive notes of childhood: "Martin, dear Martin, do speak to me once more!" But there was no reply. The mighty spirit had already gone. Before the words were fully uttered Luther was already with Moses, with Paul, with John, and with Christ; and in the last only did he find a superior. The countess of Mansfeld would not be persuaded that he was dead. Even when she heard the death-rattle in his throat, and after that all was still; when she saw his lips open with a slight and scarcely perceptible gasp, and then move no more; still, with all a woman's perseverance and hopefulness, she stood intently watching his face, and anxiously rubbing now his feet and now his hands, till at last perceiving that they grew ice-cold to her touch, and she could warm them no more, hope was forced from her, and she turned from the couch, threw herself into a chair, and covered her face and wept like one who refuses to be comforted.

Luther died of cancer in the stomach, or, *angina pectoris*,¹ at half past two o'clock on Tuesday morning, February 18th, 1546, at the age of sixty-two years, three months, and ten days. As he seemed to anticipate, his native city, by a singular providence, became also the place of his death.

Luther's death, though peaceful, and full of unwavering confidence in Christ and his gospel, was not so joyous and extatic as that of many a Christian in humble life. For this, two reasons may be assigned:

1. His personal hopes were never of the exhilarating kind. Of himself he was often distrustful; it was only in respect to the cause in which he was engaged that he was always undoubtingly confident.

¹ The authorities differ on that point.

2. He was probably, during the whole time, suffering excruciating bodily pain. Though he said but little about it, it is evident from what he did say that his sufferings were extreme. And it must have been so, for he had a mighty, muscular frame to be shaken down, and such a frame could not, in so short a time, have been brought to dissolution without terrible torture.

On the morning of the 19th of February the body of Luther was enclosed in a leaden coffin, and carried to St. Andrew's church in Eisleben, where Dr. Jonas preached from 1 Thess. 4: 13-18. Ten of the principal citizens watched with the corpse during the night, and early in the morning of the 20th Mr. Coelius preached from Isaiah 57: 1. The body was to be taken to Wittenberg for burial; and as the mournful procession began to move, the whole city and all the surrounding country was emptied of its inhabitants, who crowded after the hearse, and by their tears and sobs and loud weeping testified how deeply they felt their loss. At five in the evening the train arrived before the walls of Halle, and here the crowd became so dense, that they were two hours in forcing the hearse along from the gate to St. Mary's church, a distance of about fifteen or twenty rods. As the hearse was slowly making its way along through the mass of human beings, a voice in the crowd began to sing the first hymn which Luther published:

*Aus tiefer Noth schrei ich zu dir,
Mein Gott, erhöre mein Rufen.*

From deep distress I call to thee,
My God, regard my crying;

and the whole multitude joined in the singing, but could scarcely complete a single line before their voices were choked by their sobs, and they all wept aloud. Then they began to sing again; and thus alternately singing and weeping, they at length deposited the body in St. Mary's church; and even then they could not be persuaded to disperse, but stood around the church the whole night.

At six o'clock in the morning of the 21st, the hearse started again, followed by the same weeping throng, and meeting every where on the way the same demonstrations of grief; and at mid-day on the 22d it arrived before the outer gate at Wittenberg, where it was met with all the honors which could be conferred on a sovereign prince. The mayor's carriage stood just outside of the gate, and in it was the bereaved wife and her younger children, awaiting the arrival of her elder sons with the dead body of their father. There were many affecting scenes connected with Luther's death, but none more thrilling, more heart-rending than the meeting of that mother and her sons.

After some interruption, the procession went on to the Castle church, which was immediately crowded in every part, every door and window was filled, and every street and avenue leading to it was thronged with mourners intently weeping. Bugenhagen and Melanchthon were in the pulpit. The first arose and with tolerable composure pronounced his text 1 Thess. 4: 13, 15; but the moment he attempted to commence his sermon, he broke out into an uncontrollable fit of weeping, in which all the congregation joined, and the infection spreading to the streets and avenues without, the whole city resounded with one loud and bitter wail.

At length they were hushed to silence, and the sermon was resumed. After the sermon by Bugenhagen, Melanchthon addressed the members of the University in Latin, and the coffin was lowered into the vault under the broad aisle not far from the pulpit. The vast assembly broke up, and each man returned to his home, pondering within himself and intently wondering whether it could be really so, that they should never again see Luther's noble form in their streets, and never again hear his thrilling voice in their churches. He had lived and taught and preached in Wittenberg thirty-eight years, and, from the time of his first arrival, had been the central point of interest to all who inhabited or visited the city, and is so to this day.

After the lapse of three centuries, the city of Wittenberg,

though one of the strongest fortresses and most important military stations in Europe, and though it has been the scene of battles and sieges which might have immortalized any other town, is seldom thought of or visited except as the place where Luther labored and where his bones are buried. Even Wallenstein, and Peter of Russia, and the great Frederic, and Napoleon, whose names may now be seen written with their own hands on the walls of Luther's study, were always small men at Wittenberg and objects of subordinate interest; and feeling it to be so, though some of their most important movements were made in and around the city, they seldom staid there long at a time, and generally hastened away as soon as they could.

The grave of Luther is secured by an iron grating and covered with a thick, heavy plate of bronze, on which is the following simple inscription: *Martini Lutheri S. Theologiæ doctoris corpus h. l. s. e. qui anno Christi MDLVI, XII. Cal. Martii Eyslebi in patria S. M. O. C. V. ann. LXIII. MIIDX.*

The emperor Charles V., in his wars with the Protestants, some years after Luther's death, besieged and took Wittenberg. The first place he inquired for was the grave of Luther. He read the inscription, folded his arms across his bosom, and stood looking down, absorbed in thought. An officer stepped up to him and said, "Let me break open the grave and scatter the ashes of the heretic to the winds." Charles's fine eyes and noble features flashed with indignation at the mean proposal. "I have not come to war upon the dead (said he); I have enough to do with the living,"—and he hurried from the spot. Ever after the famous diet at Worms, Charles and Luther had uniformly manifested the most profound respect for each other.

NOTE. The foregoing account of the last days and death of Luther has been collected from a great variety of sources. Some of the most accurate and copious are the following, namely: Seckendorf de Lutherismo—Marheinecke, Geschichte des teutschen Reformation—Lomler, Dr. Martin Lu-

ther's Deutsche Schriften—Andin, Histoire de la Vie, des Ecrits, et de la Doctrine de Mt. Luther—Mathesius, Leben Dr. Martin Luther in siebzehn Predigten.

ARTICLE II.

BUSH ON THE RESURRECTION REVIEWED,

By SAMUEL T. SPEAR, Pastor of the South Presbyterian Church of Brooklyn, N. Y.

Anastasis : or the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, rationally and scripturally considered. By GEORGE BUSH. New-York and London: Wiley & Putnam. 1845. pp. 396, 12mo.

IT is a duty accordant not less with the spirit of religion than of philosophy, to hail with gratitude whatever shall be adapted to increase the sum, either of human knowledge, or human happiness. Truth and virtue should be the ends of all rational inquiry. These are never subserved by a *proscriptive* treatment of him who proposes to make his intellectual faculties the organs of research, however widely he may differ from us in alleged results. The mere fact that he enunciates a *new* opinion, or attacks a *standard* doctrine, is not of itself sufficient *à priori* to secure his condemnation. He may be right, or he may be wrong, or he may present a combination of important truth and serious error. In either case the appropriate method is, to hear him—master his positions—consider the pertinency and weight of his arguments; and then decide upon the merits of his view, according to the evidence which he submits. It is to be regretted that, in this imperfect world, prejudice and the spirit of dogmatism should so often supersede the work of thought, and lead men to seal up their convictions so as to make their minds impervious to the

claims of reason. This is unfavorable to the dignity and prevalence of truth ; paralyzes inquiry ; precludes improvement ; and is dishonorable alike to man and his Maker. Above all, to put down a man by popular appeals to ignorance—to faith rather than reason and the Scriptures ; by the potent agency of the *odium publicum vel theologicum*, by mere epithets ; is unfair, unworthy of a philosopher, be he Christian or Pagan. The fact is, every improved state of opinion in its inchoative stage, is a *novelty* ; and if we adopt the doctrine of rejecting whatever comes under this title, we must stagnate intellectual progress *ab origine* ; we must assume, that man, in the individual and collective sense, is already perfect in knowledge ; or, if not perfect, we proscribe him from making any further attainments. I cannot suppose, that in this age, and especially in this country of free inquiry, it will be necessary to make a formal defence of these announcements. He who should deny them, would himself be a *personified resurrection* of the bigotry, prejudice and blindness of the dark ages ; and would probably find himself a stranger to the spirit and glory of the age. We should all be careful, however, that we do not in *practice* commit ourselves to a course which in *theory* we are ready to condemn. This rule is never more important, never more signally honored by its observance, than when we are exposing what we deem a fundamental error. Our zeal for truth and our hatred toward error, while well in themselves, may undergo transmutations in their progress ; and in proportion as they advance, lose their original spirit, till finally they shall be marked with some of the worst features of proscription and persecution. In the name of humanity and truth, which is its chiefest good, I plead for every man an exemption from this curse. This is the *right* of every one, commissioned to think by the edict of his Maker.

In the following review it will be the earnest effort of the writer to be governed by the views with which he has opened this discussion. The questions agitated by the author of the book placed at the head of this article, are among the

gravest upon which the human mind can fix its thoughts. Our present life is but a vapor ; it soon vanishes away ; and when we cross the tomb, we are met with an immense series of wonders. Future existence is a great problem—the greatest ever addressed to human thought. Our capacity to conceive of it, and make even some limited determination in regard to it, is among the highest attributes of our rational nature. The imperfection of our intellectual achievements upon this field, is a truth which all must concede. What we do know, however, is not the less certain, because we do not know the more ; we need have no solicitude lest the *unknown* may contradict the *known* ; and above all, the known should not be the less powerful in its *motive* character and action upon our hearts. Our knowledge of the future, and our knowledge of the present, seem coincident in one grand particular, viz., in both cases it is a knowledge of *facts* much more extensively than of *modes*. When in regard either to the present or the future we absorb ourselves chiefly in the latter to the exclusion of the former, we shall soon pass beyond the landmarks of science, and alleged discoveries will deserve no higher title than that of mere dreams, or visions. It has cost the philosophical world much thought and many mortifying failures to find out the proper limits for human inquiry. Many splendid minds have been lost to mankind, while inhaling the gases of the veiled and inaccessible region. On every account, therefore, let us be sober ; let us know what we can do, and what we cannot do ; let us approach the theme suggested by our author, desirous of seeing the truth, and willing to yield our powers, and confess their insufficiency, where the theme may transcend their range.

In entering upon the work before us, I desire to submit some *general remarks*, as prefatory to a more detailed investigation. In reference, then, to the *spirit and aim* of the author, so far as revealed in his book, I have been able to discover nothing demanding any special criticism. He professes to yield to no one in a profound regard to the Sacred Oracles ; and it would certainly be unjust to assume, that this is a mere

guise, under which to assail the word of God. I am willing to grant—what I believe to be the truth—that he is actuated by an honest intention to enlarge the boundaries of human knowledge ; that he has a sacred veneration for the Bible, and full confidence in its truths, its promises and its Saviour. This I deem an act of justice to the writer, since this spirit is certainly breathed throughout the entire book. In his preface, he seems to be aware that he is assailing a series of standard opinions, and of his consequent liability to the sudden and vehement charge of skeptical tendencies. Against this he very early puts in his solemn protest ; and in the manly spirit of Christian philosophy and integrity, he implores the reader to spare himself the trouble of such apprehensions and feelings. This prayer seems to me to be one of conscious innocence, intermingled with many fears. He is unquestionably entitled to the full benefit of his own averments on this point, of which he is a better judge than his brethren. He is *morally* answerable to God in the premises, *logically* answerable to the world—to any man who chooses to call his positions in question. This concession, however, should not be construed into any recommendation of his work. The work itself is no better, as an *intellectual* production, for having proceeded from Christian hands. Men may be honest in propagating false sentiments ; they may have sincere intentions, and teach destructive errors ; and there is undoubtedly a point where intellectual obliquity becomes conclusive evidence of a state of heart which no charity can cover, and no Christian fellowship can safely acknowledge. That the author has reached this point, I am not disposed to affirm. Were I empowered with the prerogatives of the Pope, I would not chase him with the thunders of the Vatican. I prefer to regard him as a Christian brother, wishing well to the cause of truth, and to reason with him upon the merits of his views.

It is apparent that the author indirectly sets up a claim to *originality*—that he has leaped from the beaten track of opinion—that he regards himself as proposing *new* views, if not “new truths,” yet “new views of old truths ;” that he is seeking to

introduce a *new dispensation* of opinions in regard to several questions pertaining to the future state. He prepares the reader to accept this announcement in the "Introduction," where he argues at some length, and with much force of thought, the proposition, *that the knowledge of Revelation is to be progressive*. In the general drift of his argument on this point, I see nothing of which to complain. The knowledge of *each* man is progressive—in one stage of being he knows more than he did at a prior stage. The knowledge of the *race* is progressive; that which is obscure in one age, is made plain in another; that which is rejected at one time, is adopted at another, and *vice versa*. These intellectual transitions, are on the whole, progressions—not retrogressions; they result in compassing more truths, and coming nearer to the pure and perfect apprehension of specific truths. This progress is not equally developed in all departments; in some it is not practicable beyond a certain point, which is rapidly attained, since all that is knowable will have been already known; it does not involve as its consequence an incessant and eternal revolution of all opinions. It is where opinions are not correct—where they are not complete—or where there is no opinion—that we find the legitimate province of intellectual progression. Its basis lies in the laws that regulate the rise and advancement of human knowledge, rather than in any intrinsic character pertaining to truth itself. I am able to see no peculiarities in the field of revealed science, that exclude this progression of knowledge, when guarded by the proper limitations. This view, however, should not be confounded with another, which is different. Revelation, during the long age of its developement, was progressive; but it is no longer such. There are no new revelations to be added to the Sacred Oracles, while there may be advances of the human mind in the more perfect knowledge of what God has revealed. I do not understand the author to claim a new revelation and progress in this sense, but a new and more complete view of religious truth. This is no sin, if he be right; but if wrong, it may work much harm—how much,

we have no accurate methods of judging. It is possible, that his book may do some good, if not by direct action, yet by the reaction which it may generate. As to the direct evil tendencies of the work, if such there be, it is perhaps too early a stage of this review to express an opinion.

There is another general remark, to which I wish to call the reader's special attention. I am confident that no injustice is rendered to the author in the following proposition, viz.: *he places reason, not engaged in applying the laws of a sound exegesis to the word of God, and thus ascertaining the mind of the Spirit, but operating by the natural methods of intuition, induction, and deduction, in the very front rank of all his inquiries.* This he does both in the chronological and logical sense. By the simple exercise of reason, acting not in the direction of revelation, but upon the facts of nature, he undertakes to make out what cannot possibly be true, viz., the common doctrine of the resurrection; and then by the same power he seeks to give us what is presumptively, or probably true; as a substitute for the resurrection in the manner ordinarily held. All this is done, before his mind comes at all in contact with the Bible. He has settled to a certainty in his judgment the truth of no resurrection of the body, before he has solicited a verdict from the Book of God. In the course of his argument there are no very obscure intimations of the manner in which he will deal with the Bible, when he brings the question within this sacred enclosure. If there were ever an instance in which "coming events cast their shadows before them," this most certainly is one. This is his ground, viz.: the resurrection cannot be true for philosophical reasons; therefore the Bible must not be so interpreted as to make it true. We are prepared to expect this kind of exegesis in the outset; and when he comes to the biblical department, we are far from being disappointed. The concession is frequently made, that "the *letter* of the inspired record" is at *variance* with the deductions alleged to be those of philosophy on this subject; and, unless I am much mistaken, there is a sort of tremulous anxiety in view of the fact conceded, made

up of a mixed state of conviction and doubt, whether having reference to the opinions of the Christian world, or the word of God, I cannot tell. But that such is the fact, appears evident by the amount of *special pleading* with which the first part of his book abounds.

In the very dawn of his "Scriptural Argument," he sets at rest all our doubts, and tells us *how* this apparent collision between the results of philosophy and the word of God may be reconciled. He gives a rule we had anticipated, without knowing what should be its title, in the following sentence: "And yet it is unquestionable, that in nothing is the divine wisdom more conspicuous than in what we may term the *elasticity of import* in the language of the sacred volume." This is to us an entirely new phrase and a new idea, unknown until we had read the author's book. We ask, therefore, the privilege of a little reflection, before we adopt either the one or the other. What is this "*elasticity of import*?" It must mean, that the words of the sacred text may be contracted or expanded, and thus varied in their import, either within definite limits or without such limits. The reader will perceive that the allegation is not, that *our minds* are elastic, but that the elasticity inheres in the very Word itself. This is not to be put to the account of a *lapsus verborum*, for the author very gravely reasons upon the truth of what he asserts, and thinks it one mark of divine wisdom.

It has occurred to us that, as a *practical* question, men would disagree very much as to the *quantity* of this elasticity. It certainly would furnish a broad shield, under which to cover the grossest error, for every man is to be his own judge how *elastic* the word is. It would be a perfect *testudo*, better than ever the Romans had, to conceal the head of every sophist. No matter how much the error may conflict with the *letter* of the Word, for this has a sovereign "*elasticity of import*," which the advocate of the error is the honored one to perceive. I beg leave therefore to ask for some *rule* of measurement, by which to graduate these strange expansions and contractions. As a Protestant, the author will not tell

us to go to the Pope, and ask him in every case. Neither will he send us to *philosophers*, for they have as little of the infallible unity as the Pope himself. And if we are to take the author himself as the standard, I am afraid that we should go further from shore than would comport with the timid spirit of most men. At any rate, before we set sail upon this ocean of "elasticity," give us a good compass and a skilful pilot; and until these requisitions are met, it will be prudent not to engage our passage.

It is not proposed to tire the reader with a long dissertation upon the true rules of biblical exegesis, or to consider *in extenso* the light shed upon this subject by the progress of natural science; but I protest against any such "elasticity" as will in result make the language of God an uncertain rule of faith and practice. That the minds of men often present an ample surplus of this elasticity, will be readily granted; but until now, we always supposed that the word of God had a definite and fixed import, meaning just so much and no more; that the great duty of exegesis was to find out this import; and never once imagined that there was any *inherent variableness* in the import. Be it remembered, that our failure to discover *all* that the Bible means in any given case, or to place its import within the proper limits, is with *us*, and not with the *Word* of God. The true meaning of the sacred text is that which the Holy Ghost intended; and ours is the duty to ascertain the mind of the Spirit, as revealed in words. When the intention of the Spirit is to describe things *optically*, according to their appearance—or *typically*, by symbols—or *literally*, according to nature and fact,—then we are to take the description according to the optical, the typical, or the literal sense; and this may be determined, if the Book of God admits of any interpretation. This requires no "elasticity of import in the language" of the sacred text, for the optical, the typical, or the literal sense is the sense intended, and there is no other. The author incidentally and in very general terms has referred us to two sciences, illustrating and proving the necessity for this "elasticity of import." These are Geology

and Astronomy. In regard to the *first*, it will be sufficient to remind him that the geological hypotheses are not as well settled as the truth of the Bible ; and if we grant them to be sound inductions, there is no difficulty in reconciling them with the Mosaic narrative, without any “elasticity of import” in that narrative. These geological periods may very easily be placed between the events recorded in the first verse, and those presented in the following verses, of the first chapter of Genesis. All the elasticity we then have, consists in the fact that Moses did not tell *all* that was true ; and if this make language variable, then no sentence ever had a meaning.—The case of Astronomy is also referred to. The Bible speaks of the sun as moving around the earth, and astronomy declares the earth to move around the sun. Now astronomy is unquestionably right, considered as a philosophy, and the Bible equally right in stating the fact according to its *appearance* to every eye, which is all it proposed to state. There is therefore no ground for the necessity of a certain “elasticity of import” in the language of the Bible, any more than in the language of astronomy. Philosophically and optically you have two facts ; one is the *real* motion of the earth around the sun—the other is the *apparent* motion of the sun around the earth. They are equally facts ; Astronomy states one, and the Bible the other. We need not elongate or contract the import of either record, for what each affirms is equally real. This generates no necessity for any *variableness* in the import of the sacred words, in themselves considered, consequent upon the progress of science ; for that which was originally intended by these words, remains true, notwithstanding the progress. The progress in its course touches upon facts, to which it was not the design of the sacred text to advert. What was alleged or implied, with the reason therefor, is never annihilated ; hence the language needs no depletion, correction, nor substitution, by the demands of philosophy. To make the Bible a treatise on astronomy ; to make it contradict the facts of this science, and then rescue it from ruin by the elasticity of its import, is a short way to reach a great conclusion.

The reasoning looks better in the aggregate than in the detail ; and it was perhaps wise in the author to make general allusions, leaving the reader to infer that beyond them there was a storm of logic, which no man may buffet except at his peril.

In addition to the fact of no logical demand for this *new rule* of exegesis, it is to be remarked, that it is an *unsafe* procedure to crowd into a biblical word a philosophical idea, which Heaven never meant to convey by its use ; or to crowd out another idea, which was intended. Let the philosophical idea stand by itself—state it by itself ; let the same be done with the thoughts of which the words of God are the vehicle ; and when the two shall conflict with each other, we will consider two questions, viz. : Is the conflict real ? If so, which has the greater claim to our confidence ? Adopting this course, we shall need no elasticity in the language, either of philosophy or of the Deity, to accommodate the one to the other. If we adopt the course which is suggested by the author, we open the gateway of variableness, flexibility, and uncertainty, which, when once open, no man can close. There is no point, where you can arrest the principle without giving it up ; and there is no error, which you can try and condemn by the Bible. In the hands of a skilful sophist, every thing is set afloat ; he might claim a much greater elasticity than even the respected author would be willing to allow ; he might extend it to more applications than the resurrection of the dead ; and in the fertility of his genius and the profoundness of his philosophy, declare impossible almost every thing which the letter of the divine word affirms, and at the same time insist upon his entire belief of the word. When we enter upon this process of contraction or expansion, it will be difficult to find a safe judge of its true limits ; as difficult to fix the subjects, where it shall be applied : indeed, nothing short of inspiration in interpreting the word of God could make it either a sound rule, or any rule of faith. The principle is attended with insurmountable objections—objections not less formidable than those urged by the author against the resur-

rection of the dead. I confess that as a Christian I am afraid of it—and not less so as a philosopher ; not because it is true, but for a better reason—*because it is not true*. Between a revelation from God, with this peculiarity as its highest mark of wisdom, and no revelation, there is very little ground for a preference. Can it be that Heaven's language is thus to be seared and shorn of its certainty ? Did not God know what He meant to convey ? In its last analysis what is this elasticity, but an elasticity in the intentions of the Eternal Mind ? I would not make the author an offender for a word ; neither would I proscribe him for an inadvertent sentence ; but when the spirit of a sentence is the spirit of a whole book, then I claim the privilege of a kind, but most earnest protest. Let this spirit become dominant in the regions of philology, and the days of revelation are over.

The author holding on to his grand idea of the *chronological and logical supremacy of reason*, occasionally crosses the track of Almighty power ; and while we would not impute to him the least degree of irreverence, he disposes of the point with an ease and facility, that would seem to require a “trans-sepulchral” elevation of human intelligence. So perfectly certain is he of the absolute impossibility of the resurrection as usually held, and that too on the sole authority of reason, that he denies to the believer of the same all the benefits of an appeal to the omnipotence of the Deity. If the Deity cannot raise the bodies of the dead according to the standard views of the resurrection, the fair presumption is, that inspiration has not recorded as a fact what would be an impracticability to Almighty power. He argues against the possibility of establishing any “relation” between the present body and the resurrection body, except that of “priority and posteriority,” by methods to be considered in the sequel. He declares, that, as he apprehends the subject, “the ideas involved in the proposition of the resurrection of the same body are incompatible *per se*.” He then adds : “The real question is, how Omnipotence itself can establish the relation of which we are in quest—how, not as to the *manner*, but

as to the *fact*." He precedes this remark by the intimation that he "would not dare to limit the Holy One of Israel, or to deny that any thing is possible to him which is possible in itself." Taking the qualifying phrase "*which is possible in itself*," in connection with the allegations immediately following, we do not misunderstand the author in charging him with asserting, on philosophical grounds, the total impossibility of the resurrection as usually held, by *any* power. Almighty power cannot establish in any true and proper sense the relation of identity between the body that dies and the one supposed to be raised ! The ideas are "incompatible *per se*." This, for substance, is our author's proposition. Philosophy then has settled what shall not be a doctrine of Revelation. Exegesis must of course bend to the mandates of this sovereign dictum ; and in doing so, it must incorporate into its code "the elasticity of import," so contractile in its power as to crowd the resurrection from the Bible. Philosophy does more ; it prescribes limits to Omnipotence itself. The author understands physiology and ontology so perfectly,—the flux of material particles in the living body, and the destiny of the particles composing the body that dies—as also the nature of the "*psychical*" or spiritual body, that from these materials he has elaborated an impracticability for the Deity. These are his materials ; and the incompatibility of which he speaks, is gathered by *deduction* ; it is not by any means an incompatibility "*per se*," as he styles it. The conclusion, it will be perceived, is a great one ; and its premises ought to be the clearest ever stated to the human mind, and the dependence of ideas as luminous as light itself.

In this connection I venture to express a doubt in regard to this reasoning, on general principles, reserving special remarks for the sequel. When a man affirms *that the thing implied in a proposition is impossible to almighty power*, that proposition must at least be *self-evidently absurd*. Any such allegation by such a creature as man in regard to the Deity trenches hard upon the borders of presumption. It is a kind of diction of which we cannot have too little. When it is a deduction, especially under circumstances that leave

room for great uncertainty, then the mildest epithet we can apply, is to call it an act of presumption. In the present case, I suggest to the author, that he knows very little about the premises, out of which he evolves this conclusion. Of the peculiar constitution of the spiritual or "psychical body," he knows nothing—*just nothing*. In what sense it is spiritual, he does not know. How far it is like or unlike the present body, he has no means of determining. What should be the bond or link of identity between the present body and the one to be raised, if such there be;—what are the ideas which are indispensable, and, when present, sufficient to make out an identity to all intents and purposes;—these are questions, upon which he cannot pronounce with sufficient certainty to fix the limits of almighty power, even by the remotest implication. His physiological arguments in regard to the flux of particles in living bodies, and his ingenious suppositions in respect to the destiny of the particles constituent of the body that dies, and the consequent difficulties of supposing a resurrection, are childish and puerile, when upon them rests so great a conclusion. They seem to me to groan under their weight, and even sigh for deliverance. They must have had more logical force in the view of the author, than, I am persuaded, they will ever have with his readers. Added to this, how exceedingly defective are all our conceptions of almighty power! Who is prepared to tell the world what such power cannot do? Who understands fully its relation to the possible? Who can set in detail the limits beyond which it cannot pass? It is not, I trust, an over-estimate of these thoughts to say, that they are sufficient to neutralize the grand position of the author's philosophy. They are sufficient to infuse at least one element of uncertainty into his reasoning; and if so, he is called upon to review his line of thought, and abate the positiveness of his conclusion, viz., that there can be no resurrection of the dead, when for its author we have such a being as God. This conclusion is repeated with a flourish of allusions to the discoveries of science and the supremacy of reason, which, for one,

I have not been able to see exemplified in the philosophical department of his book.

After this general survey of the prominent position which the author has given to reason in his inquiries ; the early stage in which he announces its supremacy ; the confidence with which he constructs both the negative and positive portions of his theory on the basis of its sole authority ; and the tribute to its unaided inductions and deductions which he demands in the interpretation of the Bible ; after surveying these points, it has occurred to me to suggest the following important distinction, viz., *There is a great difference in the action of reason, considered as proving or disproving the truth of the Bible, and the action of reason upon the Bible after it is proved.* In the former case, reason is of supreme authority ; it has a perfect right to try the claim of the Scriptures by the most rigid rules of evidence ; it is to judge whether they be from God or not. In doing this the Book is to be examined in its contents, and in its external history—in its relations to all the sources of knowledge and criteria of truth which we can command. Its agreement or disagreement with natural science, with the philosophy of the human mind, with the facts of common experience, is a question which belongs to the general one of its truth or falseness. To reason thus *about* the Bible is a fair work ; we do not complain of it ; we would be among the very last persons to reject this right of reason, and “hoodwink” any man’s intelligence. When, however, we have determined that the Bible is the Book of God, then, although we do not surrender our reason, we change its attitude ; we reason *from* it ; it becomes a source of ideas and knowledges ; it has the first place in our beliefs ; its authority is the highest rule of reason. Standing upon this ground we do not first decide philosophically what *must* be true or not true in religious questions—then infer the coincidence of the Bible on the principle of the general harmony of truth—and then bring into requisition such laws of exegesis as will secure this coincidence. *Then* this there is no surer road to error ; it makes the Bible a mere

appendix to philosophy, and always tributary to its claims. Acting upon this principle, we need no Bible, for we assume already to have the truth, before we come to it. Let skeptics, if they choose, insist upon the reconciliation of the Bible with science; but let Christians insist upon the reconciliation of science with the Bible. They cannot do less, and be honest; for certainly it cannot with *them* be a question, whether the revelations of God are of higher authority than the discoveries of science. I do not mean to concede that the two conflict with each other; but when the question is, which shall I assume as the *fixed* point? from which point shall I start? I have no hesitation in saying—the *Bible*; I repeat it—the *Bible*. Science as conducted by men must not dictate to this Book what shall and shall not be true in religion. The moment we allow this, we are on the direct road to skepticism, and give the lie to our own admissions. The postulate, that the Bible is from God, neither requires nor admits any real conflict with true science. But so long as science shall be the work of uninspired men, it will be liable to the errors of fallible men; and hence it is not authorized to come to the Book of God and say, “This thing ought not, cannot, and shall not be true.” Better would it be first to find out whether it is true according to the Bible; if true, then the question of its reconciliation with science comes up in its legitimate place. If we find a satisfactory solution, then all the difficulty vanishes in the case of apparent conflict. If no such solution can be obtained, we may assume its existence, although we cannot perceive it. If in any case we are precluded from this assumption, then we are brought back to this question: Which is supported by the greatest amount of evidence, the fact taught in revelation, or the alleged fact of science? We know very well what will be the answer of the skeptic; we know also what *must* be the answer of the Christian, unless he be a believer merely in name.

There is a tendency, if I mistake not, in some directions in this age, to a sort of *romantic glorification* over the achievements of science and the dignity of reason, as the organ of

truth. The author seems to me to have caught at least a little of this fever. Far be it from me to undervalue the labors of reason ; above all, I would repudiate the doctrine, that we must give up the use of reason when we become Christians, and yield to a blind, stupid, and stagnant faith. It is possible, however, to make our *relative* estimate even of a good thing too high. I love also to think that there is a God in the universe—that he has spoken to men in the Bible—and that I am quite as safe in reposing upon His verdicts, as upon the results of mere human investigation. When the latter prescribes to the former “ *the must be, and the must not be* ” in the province where the Bible is supreme, then science and reason have forgotten the lesson of humility ; and the less we have of this kind of science and reason the better. I admire thought ; but God and His truth more.

In the preceding concessions, remarks, and strictures, it has been the design of the reviewer to bring out the *general philosophical scope* of the book before us. That the author, having committed himself, as we have seen, to a positive denial on the grounds of philosophy, will finally come to the interpretation of the Scriptures with an overwhelming bias in one direction—entirely, though honestly settled in favor of a negative—it needs no prophet’s vision to anticipate. That this is the true order of his mental action, I cannot affirm ; but that it is the order of his argument, his book is sufficient evidence. If, therefore, he has given us his thoughts in the order of their attainment, then his theory of the future state was complete before he came to the teachings of God. I confess, that I should receive the religious philosophy and the Biblical exegesis of such an inquirer with great caution ; I should want to watch him with sleepless care ; I should be fearful, that he might deceive himself as well as those who implicitly trust him. This unfortunate outset explains why he so often and solemnly warns the reader, that, let what will come, he must reconcile the Bible with the conclusions of science. Never once does he tell the philosopher and scholar, that they must take care what theories they adopt in relation to religion. Oh, no ; there

is no danger here ; no Scylla or Charybdis here ; all is terra firma—you are amid the immutable and supreme deductions and inductions of science ! All his counsels and warnings are expended for the benefit of the theologian and Christian ; he tells *them* to beware how they maintain the resurrection of dead bodies, lest they run the Bible aground, or strand it on the shoals of philosophy. Never was there a more perfect monopoly of benefits ; and if the *beneficiaries* shall not profit in the premises, the fault will not be with the author. To do this very thing, however, was in perfect keeping with the scope of his reasoning—with the plan of his argumentation ; and we must, therefore, credit to him the virtue of consistency, that jewel in logic and in morals.

The reader, bearing in mind these general views, will permit me now to introduce him into the very *interior* of the author's philosophical system of the future state. It is contained in the three chapters, which compose Part I. It has *positive* and *negative* features. He presents the negative first ; but it will involve no injustice to his views, if we reverse the order, and give the positive branch in the first place. To this work then let us proceed.

I.—THE POSITIVE DEPARTMENT.

What, then, are the allegations of the author in regard to the future life ? What on this subject of high import does he assert as true in his opinion ? We propose to let him be his own expositor.

“ It would seem, then, on the whole, from a collation of all the grounds on which an opinion is to be formed, that the judgment of reason would be, *that a spiritual body is developed at death*. By *spiritual*, in this connection, we mean refined, subtle, ethereal, sublimated. By the development of a spiritual body, we mean the disengagement, the extrication of that physical part of our nature with which vital and animal functions are, in the present life, intimately connected, and which differs from the pure spirit, the intellectual principle, as

the Greek *Psyche*, or *sensitive principle* differs from *Nous*, the *self-conscious intelligence*. It is a *tertium quid*—an intermediate something between the cogitative faculty and the gross body. It is indeed invisible ; but so are many of the mightiest agents in nature, and so are many of the noblest entities in the ranks of created beings.”—P. 78. Again, “This existence will indeed be in a *body*, but it will be a *spiritual body*—i. e. some exceedingly refined and ethereal substance, with which the *vital principle* is connected, but of the nature of which we are ignorant, and which we denominate *body*, from the inadequacy of language to afford any more fitting term.”—P. 145. No explanatory remarks can make more lucid the author’s own statement. These passages give the full outline of his theory.

What then is the train of thought, by which he introduces, developes, and defends the above view ? It is due to all parties that this should be known. With a view to show the nature of the difficulties attending the common theory of the resurrection, and come “nearer to a conception of the true theory of the future life,” he compares the succession of particles in the human body “to the successive members of a corporate society, formed under a charter,” and selects the “English East India Company” for his illustration. He supposes the Company to become extinct before the term of the charter expires ; that afterwards it is resuscitated, not by the reviviscence of its extinct members, but of course by the introduction of new ones ; and that the identity of the Company is secured by the “revival of the inherent formative or organic power of the charter.” He then proceeds to the thing to be illustrated. “Now it is obvious, in the application of this to the subject before us, that if we could find in the human being something analogous to the charter in the Company—something which continues to live in spite of the constant process of decay and dissolution—something of which we could predicate an immovable identity in the midst of perpetual transition—should we not feel that we had obtained a clew to the true resurrection-body ?” In almost the very next sentence he passes beyond the “clew” to the very thing itself. “Such,

we cannot help believing, is the true view of the subject. The resurrection-body is that part of our present being to which the *essential life* of the man pertains." "It constitutes the inner essential vitality of our present bodies, and it lives again in another state, *because it never dies.*" To the question, whether this view does not amount to the simple doctrine of immortality, and "virtually abolish the distinction, *as usually conceived*, between soul and body in the future life," he hypothetically pleads guilty, and abides by the result, because he supposes it to be the truth. In the course of his reasoning under this head, he informs us, that it is erroneous to suppose, "that at death the soul goes forth from the body, as a *bare power of thought*—bodiless and formless *mens.*" Granting "that the power of thought does not pertain to the gross physical fabric" which remains after death, he gives us his impression, "that it does inhere in *something*, which goes forth at the same time with the vital principle, and that *something* we believe to be the *Psyche*, which is the seat and subject of nervous sensibility." Tracing some analogies between the facts of galvanic or electrical action and those of the nervous system; then reminding the reader of the "close relation between the *nervous system* and the *mind*," he finally suggests that, from the action of these active energies, (*viz.*, galvanic or electrical,) "a spiritual body may be developed by established laws, as soon as the present tenement is forsaken of its informing principle." Here he adds a note, stating that on account of "the intimate connection between electrical phenomena and light," it is probable "that the spiritual body will be essentially *luminous*"—which idea, he thinks, accords well with Scriptural language. With some degree of caution he suggests, that the future developments of "mesmerism," and "the physico-psychical system of Swedenborg," may yet throw light "on some of the profoundest mysteries of our physical and intellectual being;" and tells us, that his views of the resurrection accord with those of Swedenborg, "though arrived at by an independent process." The next thing we meet in the way of alleged argument, is drawn from

“the analogy of insect transformations,” which he states with some beauty of diction, but on which he does not propose strenuously to rely, since he does not think it best to press it very far. He finally comes in contact with this question, “What proof is there of its truth, and, if true, how is it to be reconciled with what are regarded as the express averments of Holy Writ?” His reply is, “We have already admitted, that the solution propounded cannot be *demonstrated* to be true, although we doubt not there is constantly accumulating evidence that it is true; and if it be, it follows of course that the Scriptures must be interpreted so as to agree with it, as otherwise we should have acknowledged truths at war with each other.” Thus, in the most condensed form which I have been able to adopt without injustice to the author, we have his theory and its defence. Some of the impression which his diction is adapted to produce, may have been lost by the condensation; but this I could not avoid without transcribing the chapter entire. I am not aware of having omitted any material idea, either in the statement or proof of the theory. It will now be my object to submit a series of suggestions in regard to this hypothesis.

I. In the first place the attitude of the author’s mind, as developed in this chapter, is quite as remarkable as his theory. At one time he says, “We cannot say, indeed, that the evidence of this induction is *demonstrative*; it is at best perhaps but *presumptive*,” “that the solution propounded cannot be demonstrated to be true.” What is this but a concession, that he has given us an hypothesis which is not supported by evidence? And it strikes us with surprise to hear the word “*induction*,” either as descriptive of a process or a result, incorporated into the language of such a concession. As logicians we protest against such a degradation of this royal title. At another time he tells us positively and categorically “that the judgment of reason would be, that a spiritual body is developed at death.” “Such, we cannot help believing, is the true view of the subject. The resurrection-body is that part of our present being to which the essential life of the man pertains.” “We doubt

not there is constantly accumulating evidence that it *is* true." He cannot help believing it—the judgment of reason is, that it is true—the evidence is accumulating, (what evidence he has not told us,) and yet, after all, it is a mere presumption! What a conjunction of incongruities in one chapter! Which of these asseverations shall we take for the standard? It is plain, that when the author made these different statements he must have been looking in different directions. They cannot be reconciled with a direct, continuous, and logical view of the same point. If I might venture a suggestion, not unjustified by the book, I would say, that sometimes the author's logical sense prevailed over his imagination, and at other times his imagination was too much for his logic, and saw realities in the region of spectres. When the one triumphs, we find him on earth among sensible men; when the other usurps the ascendancy, he is lost in the clouds, and we need a telescope of full power to trace his flight. A mind so self-contradictory in its own attitude is operating safely, neither for itself nor others. When the author settles the question with himself, we shall be better prepared to appreciate the amount of our intellectual obligation in the premises.

II. In the second place he does not propose, so far as I can perceive, to rest the defence of his hypothesis upon Biblical evidence. He seems to be fully aware, that he is at war with the *apparent* teachings of the Bible; and his grand effort is to relieve this *exterior* collision by a species of exegetical *clairvoyance* into the *interior*. He seeks to show, that the passages which are supposed to prove a resurrection according to the common theory, prove no such thing, but assert something else. This something else is not the hypothesis of the author—but a something else, which may be reconciled with it, by not contradicting it. The Bible is to be exegetically expurgated, to allow the possibility of his view. This is of course a concession, that the resurrection passages, as usually interpreted, are fatal to that view. Giving them a new interpretation, but not such an one as makes them direct and positive evidences of his own hypothesis, he has left in his favor the

possibility of its truth, and nothing more. He occasionally discovers some shadowings forth of his system in certain Biblical terms; but, so far as we can learn from his book, he does not rest upon these for its main defence. Had he supposed his view to be a doctrine of the Bible, his zeal in its behalf and his reverence for the Sacred Scriptures would surely have saved him from the concession, that the evidence "is at best perhaps but *presumptive*." The grand sense in which it is a doctrine of the Bible according to the general course of his argument is this: viz., *it may be harmonized with the Bible*. The fact that Brutus killed Cæsar, is a doctrine of the Bible in the same sense.

Now I submit to the author this question; viz., Is it not a remarkable enterprise of philosophy and exegesis—as dangerous as remarkable—to frame a theory, whose uncertainty he confesses, in proof of which his evidence does not come within a rayless distance, and then on the principle of the general harmony of truth demand that the Bible shall not contradict his theory, either directly or by asserting what would be incompatible with it? After telling us, that the evidence is accumulating, which proves the truth of his hypothesis, he adds, "if it be, it follows of course, that the Scriptures must be interpreted so as to agree with it, as otherwise we should have acknowledged truths at war with each other." Suppose we grant the soundness of this canon, we then ask, What is the *proper stage* in the history of investigation to apply it? When the hypothesis is a bare presumption; when it is not demonstrated? Or when it is proved to be true by evidence, which no mind can rationally resist? There certainly can be no disagreement in the answer of these questions; and yet the author has sharpened up his *exegetical scythe* to make a passage through the Bible, not for a *known* truth, but for a mere *conjecture* by his own concession, and not less so by the character of his evidence. What he makes *hypothetical* in the announcement of his canon, he makes *categorical* and *positive* in its application. He has antedated the era of discovery, and prepared the Bible for the same. How unfortunate for his

exegesis, if philosophy should disappoint his hopes, and fail to put the top-stone upon the building which he thinks she is rearing! Then, alas, all this exegetical labor will have been lost! In a world where life is so short, and economy of time and labor is so large a part of the true wisdom of living, it would seem at least to be prudent to wait till the king is born before we prepare his crown; it would be safe to wait till a theory is established before we provide for its subsistence, especially so, if we must lay waste a continent in doing it. It will be no rejoinder to these thoughts to say, what the author substantially says, "*I have done as well as I can; if you think you can do better, try it.*" The fact is, I do not choose to try it at all. I have never learnt to swim in these *galvanico-transcendental* waters; the element is too thin, and my framework far too gross for this kind of locomotion. I propose to myself no journey over this *terra incognita* beyond that of logical companionship, and this mainly to relieve the solitude of the author. It will not be at all surprising, if we should frequently meet *curious* questions springing up in these fertile regions of thin air of "sublimated" levity. There will, of course, be no impertinence in entertaining them and seeking the response of some *great oracle*.

III. In the third place, unless I have failed correctly to apprehend the language of the author, he approximates very nearly to a *self-contradiction*.—After objecting to the idea of a "bodiless and formless *mens*" going into eternity alone, in the solitude of its own immaterial being, he gives us this sentence: "While our reason assures us, that the power of thought does not pertain to the gross physical fabric, which remains when the inhabiting spirit has taken its flight, we are still unable to resist the impression, that it does inhere in *something* which goes forth at the same time with the vital principle, and that *something* we believe to be the *Psyche*, which is the seat and subject of nervous sensibility." Let us make ourselves certain of the author's meaning. "The power of thought" does not pertain to the physical fabric; but it, i. e. "the power of thought," does pertain to or "inhere in *some-*

thing.” What is this something? “The *Psyche*, which is the seat and subject of nervous sensibility.” The reader will please to fasten these positions in his mind. Now what views does he give of this “*Psyche*” in other passages? Let us hear him. “By the development of a spiritual body, we mean the disengagement, the extrication of the *psychical* part of our nature with which vital and animal functions are, in the present life, intimately connected, and which differs from the pure spirit, the intellectual principle, as the Greek *Psyche*, or *sensitive principle*, differs from *Nous*, the *self-conscious intelligence*. It is a *tertium quid*, an intermediate something between the cogitative faculty and the gross body.” “The resurrection-body is that part of our present being to which the *essential life* of man pertains.” “It constitutes the inner essential vitality of our present bodies, and lives again in another state, *because it never dies.*” What are the conceptions in these passages? The “*Psyche*,” which is to be the resurrection-body, in which our present vitality inheres, “differs from the pure spirit, the intellectual principle.” In what respect? “As the Greek *Psyche*, or *sensitive principle*, differs from *Nous*, the *self-conscious intelligence.*” What then is this difference? The *Psyche* is “the *animating* or *animal* principle of man,” and the Greek *Nous* is the mind itself, the pure spirit.

The reviewer is far from being influenced by a hypercritical spirit in saying, that to his understanding these two classes of passages give very different and contradictory views of the *metaphysics* of human nature. In the first class he denies that the power of thought, the cogitative faculties, pertain to gross matter, and asserts that they pertain to *something* that goes forth at death; this something is the *Psyche*—the physical part of our constitution, the seat and essence of the mind—the *mind itself*. In the second class, this *Psyche* is the seat and source of the vital functions, differs from the intellectual principle, as *Psyche* does from the Greek *Nous*, or the pure spirit; it is the resurrection-body, that which constitutes the present vitality of the physical fabric—a *tertium quid*—neither the mind nor the gross body—a fine, ethereal, sublimated something.

According to the first view of the *Psyche*, there is no resurrection-body of any kind, that accompanies the pure spirit into eternity ; the soul goes as soul, with its powers and its essence, which is the *Psyche*—the very “something” in which the power of thought inheres. According to the second, there is an interior, refined, and sublimated vitality, which escaping at death becomes the resurrection-body. According to one, the power of thought inheres in the *Psyche* ; according to the other, it inheres in the *Nous* of the Greeks, which is not the *Psyche*. We do not wish to make unreasonable requisitions ; but since our author understands what is *presumptively* true, beyond the utmost gaze of common reason, we venture to ask, What is true ? We wish to know whether this inner *lamina* of life, this *vitalizing* *Psyche*, shall go with us at death, or, whether we shall pass away from time in the loneliness and solitude of the *Nous*—the pure and simple *mentality*. We have been accustomed to the crude and common notions of the resurrection as usually held ; and if new light is to be shed upon us, we hope for greater accuracy. As the doctrine is now stated, we know not what to believe ; and shall therefore wait in suspended opinion for further light. Possibly the truth may be, that the *Psyche* contains the *Nous*, and the *Nous* contains the cogitative faculties, and therefore the *Psyche* contains them all. The cogitative faculties would then inhere *metaphysically* in the *Nous*, and be *mechanically* suspended in the *Psyche*. This however is but a floating conjecture, for we do not profess to speak *ex cathedra* on the point.

IV. In the fourth place, I am not able to see why the theory of the author does not give a resurrection-body to *animals* as truly as to men. The resemblance between the ascertained laws and facts of vitality, as developed in animals and men, is very perfect. The assimilating organs are very much alike ; the same is true of the functions performed by those organs ; the ultimate elements into which chemistry may resolve them, are very similar ; there is a great similarity in the causes which produce death in the two. On the ground of this similarity, many skeptical physiologists have insisted that

man was nothing but an animal of the highest grade. For the same reason, experiments are made in Comparative Physiology; and thence deductions are drawn in regard to men. On the whole, physiology has long since rested in the conclusion, that whatever is the organic and vitalizing principle or process in man, is also the same in animals. If then it be true, that "the resurrection-body is that part of our present being to which the *essential life* of man pertains"—that "it constitutes the inner essential vitality of our present bodies, and it lives again in another state, *because it never dies*;" if it have in its own nature an "immovable identity," or continuity of being; then I ask the author to accept the same conclusion in regard to animals. What it is he does not know, neither do I; but the evidence that it belongs to animals, is as complete as that which assigns it to man. Perhaps he will be ready to adopt the conclusion; logical consistency most certainly requires it. If he shall adopt it, we then ask for another philosophical system, which shall go to elucidate the future history of the resurrection-bodies of all the animals that have lived and died. If he reject it, I then call for the evidence which establishes the existence of such a body in man; and by the same evidence I pledge myself to prove, at least to *his* satisfaction, its existence in animals.

V. In the last place, the author's theory of the resurrection-body is manifestly, in all its particulars, an entire assumption, not proved by one solitary fact. I say this without any intended disparagement to his intelligence, as a writer or a logician; but because it is a stern demand of truth. What is life, the vital principle, ultimately and analytically considered? This is a question that has never been answered; it never can be. Whether it depend on mechanical, or chemical, or electrical agency, or some other agency, we know not; whether it be some essence superadded to, but distinct from, the body, or be the result of the properties of matter, developed in the process of organization; these are secrets which physiology, having learnt her proper field of inquiry, has left untouched. When physiologists supposed themselves equal to this great

question, they always had the mortification of leaving it just where they found it. Growing wise by experience, they have concluded to enter upon the legitimate labor of describing and arranging the facts of life ; and to consign its *inner* philosophy to the Great First Cause. If proof of these views be needed, I refer the reader to any standard work on physiology. If this shall not satisfy him, I would then say, let him try the subject for himself.

Now does the author suppose, that any man in his senses, especially any physiologist, will be prepared to consider as proved, or any thing like being proved, the *reality* of his ethereal, sublimated, and invisible something, which death extricates from the gross body, and which then becomes the resurrection-body ? I confess that, after straining my logical eyes to the utmost, I have not seen the shadow of a shade of evidence in support of his position. So confident am I on this point, that I would ask him to re-read his own book, if not re-write it ; and, before he talks of "development" or "extrication," give us the *thing* to be extricated ; prove that there is any thing there which can be extricated. He has not seen it ; the mere facts of vitality, by the concession of all physiologists of modern times, do not prove it. His theory, therefore, has no claim to be considered *philosophical* in any sense at its very starting point ; he is no sooner in motion than he loses sight of all the appropriate boundaries of inquiry. A wild and rampant *guessing* is not philosophy, and not always poetry. A man in logic has no right to give a hazardous *perhaps*, and then build a system upon it.

• Again, suppose we take the first leap from the goal of this philosophy, and shut our eyes so severely, that darkness itself becomes light ; suppose we grant the "*tertium quid*," the ethereal something sublimated to invisibility ; suppose we pass this point, fearless of the frowns of science : what then is the evidence of the development or extrication and accompaniment of the soul at death, of which he speaks ? It will not do to say, that it must be so, because the soul cannot go without it. How does he know this ? How does he know that the mind cannot leave the body and subsist in the spirit-

ual world without any *galvanic pellicle* or corporeity to cover it? To say that this must be supposed, to give the mind some relation to *space*, is an argument from our ignorance, and therefore proves nothing. If the mind may have relation to the body, so as to be with it in this place and not in that, why may it not be in this place and not in that, without a body? I can as readily conceive of the one as of the other. Corporeity is not necessary to give all the *locality* to mind, which it is ever capable of having: for if it be, then mind can acquire no relation to the body. Neither is the supposition necessary to bring the mind into communication with the objects which meet it in the spiritual world. No man knows enough of future scenes to make any such affirmation. There are, then, no demands of philosophy, which require us to admit this development or extrication. Is there any *experience* which proves it? Has the author any such experience to present? He has not said so; and we presume, he will not say so. Does he know of any one, who can attest the truth of this extrication by experience? The only witnesses, who could give testimony, are in the other world. Is there any process by which we can bring them to earth to aid in the settlement of this question, or transport our perceptions into eternity? None that I know of, unless "Mesmerism" in its future evolutions shall very much enlarge the boundaries of knowledge, and lift the veil which hides eternal things. How then stands the point, as a sober, common sense question? *It does not stand at all*, and for the simple reason that there is nothing to stand upon. It needs expatriation to some world, where logical gravity turns the other way.

These are the suggestions which the reviewer would submit in respect to the positive department of the author's philosophical system. He is not aware of having been influenced by any disrespect to the philosopher; but the philosophy is childish and whimsical in the extreme. It would be very well, if it were proved, as any thing else would be. But how the author could express himself with so much apparent sincerity, gravity, confidence, and philosophical flourish, as if lift-

ing the *arcana* of nature from their deepest bed, I am at a loss to conceive. It is as great a *non plus*, as the resurrection itself. I have heard of men being confident just in proportion to the desperateness of their cause : this may make a hero ; it never made a logician ; it is a poor recommendation in philosophy.

II. THE NEGATIVE DEPARTMENT.

The negative department consists in what the author denies, with the reasons for the same. It is mainly developed in Part I, Chapter I, entitled, "The Argument from Reason." His grand effort here is, to disprove the resurrection on the philosophical ground of its absolute impossibility. It is evident, even in this early stage, that he has his eye upon the exegesis of the Bible to be developed in Part II. In repeated instances he indicates to the reader, that the Bible must be made to agree in its teachings with those of science. The practical design of this is to forewarn him, that, after philosophy has shown us that there can be no resurrection, we must not expect to find such a doctrine in the Bible ; even if it *appear* to be there, we may be sure that it is not there, *since philosophy says so*. This *appearance* of the doctrine which he grants, must be dissipated by not laying too great a stress upon the *letter* of the sacred text, and holding it under obligation to bow to the behests and corrections of science.

The philosophical arguments employed against the resurrection, as held and supposed to be taught in the Scriptures, are those which for a different purpose have been urged by skeptics, and answered by Christian writers, before either the reviewer or author was born. They appear to be stated in their full strength, and unquestionably make the negative as plausible as it can be made. It is due to the reader, that I should give him the case as our author presents it ; not in the exact order, but for substance.

The *generic* objection, which is the nucleus of the whole argument, is announced in the following question : "What is

meant by the resurrection of the dead, and what the *relation* which the body that dies bears to the body that is raised?" This objection is placed in the categorical form in the following sentence: "Our grand objection, then, to the common theory of the resurrection, is founded upon the lack of any conceivable *relation* between the former and latter body." This is his generic difficulty; he admits it to be such; all the arguments he urges bear upon this point, and no other. All the relation which it is possible for him to conceive between the two bodies, is "that of *priority and posteriority of time*." By the word *relation* between the body that dies and the one that is raised, we suppose him to mean the *identity* of the two bodies. And by *identity* he means that the two bodies should be composed of the same constituent elementary particles of matter. The relation between the two in this sense is what he cannot possibly conceive as true, since philosophy does not allow its possibility. This is the *vertebral* column of his argument; the formidable engine, before which every thing must give way, even Omnipotence itself. It will be seen at a glance, that the whole force of this "grand objection" lies in the sense of the word *relation* or identity, which he assumes; but of this the reader may expect to hear in the sequel.

What, then, is the reasoning by which he establishes the impossibility of the *relation* between the two bodies, assumed to be the one asserted in the doctrine of the resurrection? His argument touches upon three points, which I shall explain sufficiently to give the reader its full import. (1) After stating that the elementary particles of the living body are supposed to undergo a complete change once in every seven years, he asks, "What body is to be raised? A person, who dies at seventy has had ten different bodies. Which of these is to be the body of the resurrection? Is it the body of infancy, of childhood, of youth, of manhood, or of old age? Or is it the aggregate of all these?" To say that *a* body is raised is not enough; this leaves him quite as much in the darkness as he was before; he wishes to know "what body

is meant." This is one ground why he cannot see the *relation* between the present body and the one that is raised. (2) The second ground, which he thinks far more formidable, is drawn from the earthly destiny of the particles composing the body that dies, which he illustrates at some length, but which I shall state briefly without impairing its logical force. The particles of the body extinct enter into new combinations; and in the course of repeated cycles aid in the composition of other human bodies; therefore, on the common theory of the resurrection, where shall these particles go, that have been constituent in the formation of several different bodies? They belong, according to the supposition, to several different bodies as truly as to one; they cannot go equally into the constitution of as many different resurrection-bodies; therefore any relation of identity between the body that dies and the one to be raised in such cases, is an absolute impossibility, since the rightful *ownership* of the particles is a question which can never be adjusted. He adverts to the theory of Augustine, which carries the particles, in the cases creating the difficulty, back to the man in whom they first became human flesh; but this he discards as not being satisfactory. He also alludes to the notion, that *some* of the particles in every case may be kept from entering into these supposed combinations, and may, therefore, be the link of identity between the present and future body; but this does not answer the demands of his philosophy. (3) The third difficulty of conceiving of the *relation* is drawn from the fact, that "the resurrection-body is to be a *spiritual* and not a material body." He does not see how a spiritual body can be constructed by "the reassemblage of material particles." He grants that some understand a *spiritual* body "to denote a body *adapted to spiritual uses*, instead of implying one that is *metaphysically* spiritual in contradistinction from *material*." But he thinks that, in either sense, "the assertion involves contradictory ideas." There can be no *relation* of identity between the present and future body, for the former is *material* and the latter is *spiritual*; the former is "flesh and blood" and it "cannot inherit the kingdom of God."

In the above statement the reader has the whole *negative* argument of the author; in an abridged form, I grant, but with no abatement of its power, since this does not depend upon rhetoric and words, but ideas and relations. This is the reasoning which sets aside the resurrection, and forecloses the biblical question by the power of philosophy. But for the stern demands of this logic, I suppose that he would feel less necessity for any peculiar methods in interpreting the word of God. Yielding, however, to their force, he must make the Bible yield to the same behest. As it is not proposed at once to sound the alarm for a retreat, we shall proceed to submit the following strictures upon the above argument.

I. In the first place, without intending to dodge the question, or "hoodwink" the intelligence of any man, I respectfully suggest whether the almighty power of God be not a fact entitled to some consideration in this issue. It is hoped that the reader will not mistake the object of introducing this thought: it is not to prove the truth of a doctrine, but to reply to an objection alleged against the supposition of its truth. The author will then grant us the privilege of two assumptions, viz.: the existence of a Being possessing infinite intelligence and almighty power, and the reference of the resurrection, as to its accomplishment, to the energies of this Being. Give his argument its greatest force, and it stands thus, viz.: he cannot conceive the *possibility* of the resurrection by such a Being.

One or two passages would lead us to suppose that he could not conceive of the *thing* itself. If he mean to give this impression, it will then be pertinent to ask him, against what he has been directing his own argument. Something which he cannot "understand" or conceive in the terms of its "*statement*," either as a *fact*, or in its *mode*. This would place him in the very singular attitude of hurling the thunders of his logic against that which, relatively to his apprehensions, has no being. It would be equal to the dogma of Papacy, that requires men to believe what, at the very time of believing, is not even an object of thought or apprehension. Better for

the author would it have been to withhold his book from the public eye, until he himself had at least found out what he was denying.

Upon this criticism, however, I shall not insist, since practically he seems to have conceived of the fact alleged, and his main difficulty lies with the question, *how* such a fact can be made a fact, even by divine power. It is not a little surprising that he should find so many difficulties on this point, after the frank admission which he makes of the strength of his conceptive powers in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. He has no trouble in understanding as a fact, "that God is three in one sense, and one in another." He disclaims very properly any knowledge of the *mode* of this fact; yet upon the allegation of Revelation he admits it, while ignorant of the *mode*. After this just and very appropriate act of faith, I submit to him another subject for the exercise of faith:—Man has a body, which dies; all the logical difficulties which encounter the supposition of its resurrection are before the author; they are so great as to preclude the possibility of his conceiving how it can be raised; beyond all these there is a God of infinite power. He certainly will not demur to this statement of the case. Now is there any thing unphilosophical in inerring all these difficulties into the postulate of infinite power, so far as the question of possibility is concerned, and, without any effort to find the *quo modo* of removal, regarding this power as a complete and sufficient answer? May not Infinite Power, when it shall act in the premises, disembarass the subject of all the difficulties which can be created by a being of a ken so limited as man's? It may be said that this is a mere "quietism" of faith—putting out the eyes of logic, and substituting a blind credence. This position I most respectfully deny. Is it a stupid credence to believe in a God of infinite power? We suppose not. Is it a stupid credence to refer to that power the accomplishment of what is revealed, although, in the present state, we may not be able to tell *how* the thing shall be accomplished? The man who answers this question in the affirmative, will make a large portion of our

acts of faith, whether philosophical or religious, acts of stupid credence. He does more ; he assumes a completeness and perfection of knowledge in regard to infinite power, which are more easily assumed than proved. In anticipation of such a reply, the author tells us that "a resort to Omnipotence leaves the difficulty, in our view, just where it was before." The phrase "*in our view*" was very opportune in this connection, as every man has a right to state his own view ; and its reality, as being his, is a mere question of truth and veracity. We grant to the author the inalienable right to his "own view ;" but we confess that *our own* is entirely different. The "resort" in question does not leave the difficulty where it was before. The difficulty is founded upon an alleged impossibility according to the author's statement. *An impossibility to whom ?* To a God of almighty power. Does not this impossibility lose at least a little of its sternness, when over against it we set almighty power and infinite intelligence ? Are not these latter facts worthy of some consideration in solving minor facts ? May we not reason from the *greater* to the *less*, and dissipate the shades which cover the latter, by the complete and perfect splendor which illumines the former ? If not, then we petition for a new book on logic, as soon as intellectual speed and mechanical tactics can give it to the world. It may be well here to suggest a distinction, which the author seems not to have noticed, viz. : *there is a vast difference between not seeing how a thing can be, and seeing absolutely that it cannot be.* Our failures to see lie mainly under the former category ; and in respect to the latter, the existence of such a Being as God should make every man cautious in his statement. Before we finish these strictures, we hope to show that the author has not made out any thing like such a demonstration against the possibility of the resurrection, as will entitle him or any man to affirm its impossibility in the latter sense ; and therefore we do not accept his unsupported allegation, that a resort to Omnipotence is no relief in the case.

Without, then, grappling with the question at all, but leav-

ing the difficulties in all their hugeness and fearfulness, and conceding to the author the exclusive privilege of making the best use he can of them, I confess that I am not yet *frightened* out of my faith. My religion has a philosophy for the whole difficulty, whose index points me to the Throne of God. This is the view upon which multitudes of common Christians must rest, since they can digest but imperfectly the logic, either of the author or the reviewer. For illustration, permit me to state a *common sense* view of this subject, and draw up a declaration of my faith in the following terms, viz.: "I believe in the existence of God, possessing infinite intelligence and almighty power. I believe that He has revealed the future resurrection of the bodies of the dead. I believe that He has revealed it in such a way, and by the use and application of such terms and sentences, as that the most direct, natural, and obvious impression would be, that there is to be an identity of some kind between the body that dies and the one to be raised. As I am a common man, and not qualified either to apprehend or answer very acutely philosophical difficulties, I still further believe that the God I worship is perfectly competent to secure this identity; that He has such a sovereign control over the present destiny of elementary particles and organized masses, that whatever is necessary to be done in the premises to realize the truth of a biblical doctrine, He can and will do." This is my creed as a plain common Christian, compelled to interpret the Bible in its most obvious and natural sense, never having studied Greek or Hebrew; and assuming that the standard English version does not so far differ from the original text, as to create a dense cloud of *appearances*, where there are no *realities*. Has the author any objection to this creed? Does it not involve philosophy enough to meet all the practical demands of a reasonable faith? We wait for an answer.

II. In the second place his argument drawn from the *nature* of the resurrection-body strikes us as being totally inconclusive. It is, that this body is described by Paul as being "*a spiritual body*," and that it cannot, therefore, be constructed of

material particles, especially it cannot be spiritual and material at the same time. But the resurrection implies the re-construction of a material body ; and the doctrine, therefore, cannot be true.

In reply we submit this question, viz. : *In what sense is the resurrection-body spiritual?* There is a sense of the phrase "*spiritual body*," which would make it a self-evident incongruity. We apply the term "body" to the organized living matter, which composes the material framework of man ; and to say, that a body thus defined is "spiritual" in the *metaphysical* and *absolute* sense, is to confound the distinction between matter and mind. The world most certainly is not indebted to the author for this discovery. In this sense of the word "spiritual" his argument holds good, and in no other. Are we shut up to this sense in expounding the word "spiritual" in application to the future body? Has the author a direct and certain knowledge of the constitution of this body, and of the sense in which it is "spiritual," so that his knowledge confines himself and all the world to this view, to the exclusion of every other? If so, then we ask him to accept the consequence, viz. : *that Paul has asserted an incongruity.* If so, we should like at least a "clew" to the methods of this high discovery. Suppose, that we adopt a rule, whose legitimacy he grants in regard to the Trinity, and say, not less for his relief than our own, that there is a *sense* in which the resurrection-body is spiritual ; another and compatible *sense*, in which it is material. Does it then appear that this body cannot be spiritual and material at the same time? We will allow him to catechize us, and put this question, viz. : *In what sense is the body material?* Our reply is, that it is so in the *true* sense—in the sense that it is constructed of matter, not with all the facts and phenomena of our present organization, but not the less matter for this reason. Suppose him to put another question, viz. : *In what sense is this body spiritual?* To this it will be sufficient to reply, that it is spiritual, not in the sense in which it is material, nor in the sense in which the mind is metaphysically spiritual. More might be said ; that it

is spiritual in reference to its perfection and improvement upon the present body, and its consequent adaptations and uses in the heavenly world. We are not sure by experience and positive inspection, that we have given the true answer, or the full answer; neither is it essential to our argument to be sure. The possibility that it may be spiritual in one sense, and material in another, sets our author's logic afloat. Until he can dispose of this thought, it will not do for him to contend against the possibility of the resurrection, because our present body is material, and the future body is spoken of as spiritual. The future body may be material in the same *essential* sense in which the present body is material; and spiritual in a sense in which the present body is not now spiritual.

It is pertinent, as an *argumentum ad hominem*, to remind the author, that his reasoning under this head is as fatal to his own, as to the common theory. What is the resurrection-body, which he gives us? It is a very refined, ethereal, sublimated something—a *tertium quid*—luminous, as he thinks, a corporeity of some kind, enveloping and encasing the pure spirit. Suppose it to be a very delicate pellicle of condensed electro-magnetism, as the author not very obscurely intimates, or any thing else you please to have. Is it not as difficult to apply the word “spiritual,” in the metaphysical sense, to this body as to any other? Is galvanism any nearer being spiritual than a stone? The author may make as many *essences* as he pleases; instead of three he may have a complete *decade*; he may then sublimate them all into perfect tenuity, so that the evidence of their existence shall be in the ratio of their sublimation. So far as the argument is concerned, we ask for no limits to this creative process. When the work is finished, we ask, to how many of these *essences* will the word “spiritual,” in the *absolute and metaphysical* sense, apply? To but one—just one, which is the mind. In order, therefore, to admit the existence of his resurrection-body under the title of “spiritual,” must he not fix on some other sense besides the metaphysical? Alas, for the fate of all verities, when we have an argument which does execution in so many directions. It is a danger-

ous weapon to carry ; much more so, when used. Let him settle the import of this word "spiritual" in consistency with his own theory ; and we promise to make it an ægis to shelter ours from the violence of the storm.

III. In the third place, his argument drawn from the constant flux and change of material particles in our present bodies, strikes us as not possessing much power. The substance of it is, that these particles all leave the body once in every seven years ; that their place is supplied with new ones, more or less in number according to the increase or decrease of the body ; that at every such complete cycle of particles there is absolutely a new body ; that hence a man living seventy years will have had ten different bodies ;—which, therefore, shall be the body of the resurrection, and what is the reason for choosing one rather than any other of the ten ? The author states these ideas with so much seriousness, that I must suppose his own mind to have labored in view of them, and felt embarrassed with the stern requisitions of science, when contemplating the doctrine of the resurrection. I shall, therefore, look seriously at the case as he presents it to us—reminding the reader, by the way, that it is a *new* field of thought, and if, therefore, we should not leave it, laden with its entire treasures, the fact may in part be attributed to the present juvenility of science.

I begin this exploring tour by demanding, in the outset, the *evidence* which has settled this flux and escapement of *all* the particles of the body once in seven years, or seventy years, to so great a *certainty*, that the fact should be made an objection to a doctrine of the Bible. I am not ignorant of the experiments of physiologists on this subject, and of what they have concluded as *probably* true. Their conclusion, however, falls immeasurably short of a demonstration by the rules of natural science. The experiments are necessarily very imperfect, and leave a vast chasm where science must make a *guess*. I suggest this idea, because our author reasons against an *apparently revealed certainty* from a mere scientific *probability*. And if a third edition of his book be published, I

would modestly intimate the need of a more complete array of evidence in support of the fact from which he reasons. I demand that it shall be conclusively proved, when such use is made of it. In order to make out the ten bodies in seventy years, the author assumes that this transition of particles in every seven years is entire ; he sends them *all* off, not leaving *one* behind ; it is a perfect expurgation from head to foot. It has occurred to us that, if any considerable number of these particles, bolder than the rest, more safely lodged, should happen to hold on to their former home beyond the day appointed, then the author would have to re-model his numerical estimate. If, increasing in courage by one victory, they should be emboldened to try another exploit with similar success, it is more than possible that they might conclude to make a *permanent stay*. Being the oldest occupants, and claiming the body by right of possession, they might dictate to every new comer the terms of his admission ; and none would be fairer than that, since he is so transient, he should not participate in the privilege of constituting the *identity* of the body, this being by right vested in the permanent occupants. If the reader shall regard this as a curious suggestion, I will only say, that the occasion which begets it is with the author, and not the reviewer.

There is another thought, which has come over the spirit of our dreams on this subject. What if some of the particles once composing the body and subsequently extricated therefrom, should happen to get back again,—not a very improbable conjecture,—what then ? Would they have lost their own identity by their absence ? The author needs a bond of every particle, that it will so far keep the peace, that, when once away, it will stay away for ever. In his calculations he makes an argumentative issue based upon this very assumption ; and we have a right, therefore, to hold him to all the *preliminaries* of his own ground. Let him, then, publish a physiological decree of perpetual banishment to each particle, as it flies, before he asks us to tell, which body of the ten we mean, or to admit that there have been ten entire and new bodies.

Again, what evidence has our author, that this *psychical part of our nature*, which is extricated at death, and which, being extricated, becomes the resurrection-body, is not also subject to this same flux and constant change?—Not a solitary proof has he given to support the negative, neither can he give such proof. If the affirmative should be true, which, for any thing we can see, may be true, then we return his own question—viz.: *Tell us what body you mean by the resurrection-body.* Which one of these successive psychical natures is it? Or is it all of them put together? This will be a fair question for the author, till he has established the “immovable identity” of this nature; this being done, we release him from all its liabilities.

I now come to the point, where the philosophy of the author is entirely at issue with common sense, with what is appropriate to nature, and descriptive of things as they are. He introduces a fallacy into his own mind by the use of the word *body*, as applied to human beings. The man at seventy has changed the particles of his body ten times, and therefore has had ten different bodies. Suppose we grant the premise; the conclusion does not follow. What do we mean by *body* in this application? We mean the organized and living *whole*, as such. The continuity of a material and vital organization, as a general aggregate—with the same inhabiting spirit—subject to the same laws of life—this is the *common*, as it is the *philosophical*, idea of the present *identity* of the body. We apply the term *body* to the vital aggregate, as such; and if this remain, though the individual particles should change ten thousand times, it is the same body: it is, in the true and proper sense, but one body. If I should lose one of my fingers, will any man in his senses say that I have lost any portion of my identity as a body?—If by the process of phlebotomy I should lose a pint of blood, is my identity as a body impaired?—Not in the slightest degree, unless we are to have a new dispensation of exegesis upon the terms *body* and *identity* in this application. The author’s view, that a change of particles is continually impairing the identity of the body as

an organized aggregate, and giving us new bodies, carries along with it this consequence—viz.: it is as difficult to admit the continuous identity of the present body in any sense, as to admit the identity of the present body and the resurrection body. His argument operates as severely on earth, as it does in eternity. And before we can admit its soundness here, we must have a new dispensation of philosophy and common sense. Let us try it. Suppose, that a man ten years ago had inflicted a blow upon the author, and to-day he describes the fact, saying to the man himself, “You struck me”—“Oh no,” says the man, in the spirit of the author’s philosophy, “neither you nor I have the same bodies we had ten years ago;—there was a collision between two bodies, that were; but they have long since taken a dismissal from the regions of our present identity; please, therefore, to state yourself more accurately, and in accordance with the dicta of physiology.” Unless the author had his philosophy very near at hand, he would either smile, or frown with indignation.

Our spontaneous self-knowledge gives us one and the same body through the whole course of our present being, in the very same sense in which it gives us a body at all. And if we may have the same knowledge in respect to identity between the present and future body, the author may be left to play with the particles at his pleasure. We feel very little practical interest in the question in the present life; and in the life to come, we apprehend that it will be long before we shall come in contact with this grave inquiry. Give us the assurance, that it will create as little difficulty in the future, as it does in the present world;—then leave the author’s pneumatology and physiology on the theatre that gave them birth;—and we venture the presumption, that the interests of humanity will outlive this philosophical ordeal. His oversight of the important and palpable distinction between identity, as a predicate of ultimate and simple particles, and identity, as a predicate of an organized living aggregate, gave him a comfortable consciousness of triumph, which it requires very little ingenuity to turn into defeat. The one is not essential

to the other ; and this disposes of the objection drawn from the supposed multiplicity of bodies. We shall not answer the question, which of the ten bodies is raised : for, instead of being ten, there is but one.

It is very interesting to see how gravely men can reason upon a mere word. The author, in his chapter on the "Distinction of Personal and Bodily Identity," thinks that *personal identity* consists wholly in the mind with the superaddition of "the animal spirit" or psychical part of our nature, which at death furnishes the resurrection-body. If the author choose to confine the words *person*, *personal*, and *identity*, exclusively to the mind, we shall not debate his right to do so. But we think that the language of common life and of sound philosophy is less exclusive. We all agree, that *man* is a *person*—that he has *personality*. What is a *man* in his present constitution ?—He is a compound of a *soul* and a *living body*. What then are the applications of *identity* in reference to a man ? Bodily and mental : *mental* identity is the continuity of the existence of the same mind ;—and the same is true of the body, while the identity lasts. Suppose, upon analysis, it be true that our conceptions of mental identity differ somewhat from those of bodily identity. Do not our conceptions of mind differ somewhat from those of the body ? In the one case we conceive of an immaterial unit ;—and in the other, of a compound living aggregate, in which that unit is seated. When we apply identity to the one, it is to the unit ;—when to the other, it is to the aggregate. Since both exist, and both now make the real man whom God has made, we see no reason for limiting the application of the word *identity* to the one or the other. The nomenclature, which is according to nature and fact, would be this—viz. : *personal identity is generic, resolvable into bodily and mental*. To the author's view (leaving out the animal spirit) we should make no objections among the angels of heaven, who have no bodies so far as we know ;—but in this world, let our speculations and terms be types of the truth as we find it, and not make the truth, simply to perfect the harmony of a philosophical scheme.

IV. In the fourth place, we now enter upon the consideration of an argument, which the author thinks a very *ne plus ultra* on this subject. It is drawn from the numerous future combinations of the particles composing the body that dies, which, in the judgment of the author, make it impossible for any being to settle their future location, upon the hypothesis of a resurrection. If the reader shall have the least difficulty in apprehending his argument, he will refresh his memory by recurring to the exposition previously given. Upon its logical merits, we respectfully submit the following reflections :

It is entirely obvious that the two objections, viz., the present one and the one drawn from the flux and change of particles in the living body, do not possess the *cumulative* property ; they do not operate with *combined* weight against the resurrection of the dead. In order to legitimate the argument now to be examined, he gives up any logical use of the other objection, since he makes the issue turn upon identity between the body *that dies* and the one to be raised, and not upon identity between the *fluctuating* living body and the resurrection-body. This makes an entirely *new* issue—an issue to which the reasoning from the alleged multiplicity of living bodies in the lifetime of a single man will not apply. In this issue he simply contends against identity between the body *that dies* and the one to be raised ; and hence, while occupying this ground, he cannot strengthen his logic by a consideration, which can have force only upon the supposition that he takes a different ground. If he proceed to that different ground, he recedes from this, and loses the benefit of the present argument. We say, therefore, that his reasoning is not *cumulative*—his two objections do not go to strengthen each other.

Again, the objection drawn from the combinations of the particles composing the extinct body, taken in its strongest sense, is good only so far as it will apply, and it will apply no further than these alleged combinations have been a reality. A process of reasoning, which undertakes to demonstrate the

absolute impossibility of the resurrection as usually held, may be lawfully required to conform to the most rigid rules of logic. The author's high regard for the reasoning faculty will not permit him to complain of this principle. There are two rules of logic that are beyond all debate, viz.: one is, that the premises should be true, as facts; the other is, that they should prove the conclusion in the exact sense in which it is stated. There is an axiom also, that deserves to be mentioned, viz.: that the *onus probandi*, in respect both to the truth of the premises and the logical dependence, lies with him who makes use of an argument: it is *his* argument, and he is obligated to make it accurate and conclusive. If, then, we treat the author's reasoning according to these plain and obvious principles, it will appear that his conclusion is vastly too great for his premises. *What are his premises?* That in cases, how numerous he does not know, the particles composing the body that dies, become in their future earthly history constituent of other human bodies, perhaps several of these in succession. And whether this be true of *all* the particles of any one human body he has not informed us—neither can he do it. *What is his conclusion?* That, according to the common theory of the resurrection, there must at least be an eternal war among the particles of *all* the bodies that have lived and died, which Omnipotence itself would not be competent to arbitrate and settle. Without wishing to be more nice than wise, the reviewer would suggest that the conclusion is not justified by the premises furnished. At best, the conclusion can be allowed only in two sets of cases: first, where one or more particles have been constituent of two or more bodies: secondly, where *all* the particles of one or more bodies have been constituent of two or more bodies. The logical difficulty, if such there be, presses in these cases; but by its very terms it does not press any where else. Before, then, the author asserts the *universal* impossibility of the resurrection on the ground in question, we have a *little item* of preliminary work of investigation into facts, to complete which will absorb about the balance of his life. He must show by

actual discovery, that the particles composing one human body at death have aided in the construction of at least one other human body. He asserts an universal negative in the form of an impossibility, and is, therefore, logically bound to prove whatever is essential to the truth of that negative. It is *his* work to prove it, and not *mine* to disprove it. I claim, therefore, the privilege of pausing at this point ; of not rejecting the resurrection as a *total impossibility*, for the reason assigned, until the author shall have *time* to collect his data. He has taken us to Waterloo, and given us in supposition the history of the bodies of the slain on that bloody field ;—also to some eastern nations, where *cremation*, or burning of the bodies of the dead, is common. For the sake of the argument we grant him the benefit of these cases. He is, however, in the mere beginning of his work ;—let him keep on the track of research ;—begin back with Adam ;—follow the enterprise in respect to the body of every human being to the end of time. The task is Herculean, I grant ;—but never mind this, for it is the demand of logic, and requisite to legitimate the author's conclusion on logical grounds. The possibility of an exception in the facts overturns the universal validity of the reasoning. The reader will not regard me as trifling, for such is not the fact ;—all that is ludicrous lies in the subject matter, and for this I am not responsible. The argument to prove the impossibility of the resurrection of *one* man proceeds upon facts applicable to him ; and when it proves this, its logical power dies. If it be applied to *another*, there must be a *new* collection of the same facts—and equally so in every case. The author has committed himself to a denial, which necessitates this very work ;—let him therefore go forth to its performance ;—and when finished, we promise to bow to his reasoning, or give a good *reason* for not doing so. He surely will not complain, that we do not disbelieve on philosophical grounds, any further than he has compelled us to do so on those grounds. So far as we can see, the supposition that the author himself should be an exception to the non-resurrection power of his own argument, is far from an impossibility.

We should be sorry to have the author mistake the proposition for *atomic* research, now submitted to his notice. Therefore, as a sort of *labor-saving machine*, we would furnish him with the following question to be proposed to every particle, viz.: *Have you or have you not been in at least two human bodies at the period of their death?* It will be seen at a glance, that in order to create the difficulty implied in the author's argument, these *humanized* particles of matter must be charged with having aided in the construction of at least two bodies, at the time those bodies died. If a particle belonging to a defunct body should happen to get into a living body, this will create no trouble, providing said particle should also happen to get out again, before the living body itself becomes a defunct body. Hence the necessity for the above exactitude in the question, since every point must be made certain in the proof of a *deductive impossibility*. Should the author decline the proposition to enter upon this *microscopic* tour, or should he try it and not prove successful in the collection of facts, it will be regarded as no disrespect to say that we do not see that the existence of the alleged impossibility is proved.

We are not much inclined to curious suppositions. Two have occurred to us, which, however, we shall state without pronouncing upon their value. God fixes the time of every man's death. Now suppose him to fix the time in every case, when each man's body is composed of particles, that have never been in any other human body at death. What then would become of the author's objection, even by his own showing? And if we were compelled to choose between the admission of the supposition and the denial of the resurrection in the light of the Bible, we should prefer to take the former. A logical impossibility is a perfect *boa-constrictor*;—it can be set aside by no suppositions, that will not involve palpable absurdities. Has the author given us an impossibility from which there is no escape? Far from it. The other supposition is, that *some* of the particles, composing each body at death, may be kept, in the providence of God, from entering into the construction of any other body at death;—and

that these particles may constitute the *atomic identity* between the dying body and the resurrection-body—a theoretical form of the doctrine, as held by some Christians. The author has replied to this supposition by insisting that *all* the particles shall be present in the resurrection-body. This assumes a criterion of bodily identity, which is not true in the present life, and asks more for the life to come on this subject than is real here.

The reader will be particular to observe, that we lay no argumentative stress upon these suppositions; they are mere suggestions, and show what might be done were we driven to great extremities, rather than subject the word of God to an exegetical expurgation. We rest our cause at the tribunal of philosophy upon a different ground, which is, *that the author has not supplied the logical antecedents of his deductive impossibility*. Should he reply, that this is demanding of him what he cannot do, and then refusing to believe because he does not do it; we reply, that this is the very misfortune of his own position, self-assumed, and chosen by himself. We did not put him there: being there, so long as he demands that we shall believe, we ask the privilege and claim the right of keeping him there. In logic, compassion is no duty. Let not a man tell the world that the inhabitants of the moon have three heads and twenty fingers; let him not demand the faith of the world to his position; and then ask to be excused from the proof of the same by saying, “Oh, Sir, the thing cannot be proved.” When, therefore, the author shall make good the preliminary grounds of his asserted impossibility, he “will at least lay one mind under obligations not easily cancelled.”

V. In the last place we come now to the difficult point—the generic form of the argument, to which all the other points are but subsidiary, viz.: *the difficulty of perceiving how the relation of bodily identity shall be established between the body that dies and the one to be raised*. This with the author is the point of logical crucifixion—where reason must be ignored, or a new view given to Scriptural language.

We wish to give the author the benefit of a candid concession in the outset, viz. : *that we do not profess to know, to a certainty, what are all the component ideas of the identity in question, as seen and to be executed by God.* We rest our faith upon the *fact* of identity, because we suppose that God has revealed it in language, which cannot fairly be reconciled with any other supposition ; and are willing to leave the *integrity*, as we must the *execution*, of this fact to God himself. We may, nevertheless, consent to reason upon this question, so far as our limited resources can penetrate its interior, upon two conditions, viz. : that we do not profess to be wise above what is written or known, and that we do not make our speculations the infallible types of truth. If speculation make a difficulty, it is perfectly competent for another speculation to seek its removal.

With these thoughts before us, let us then cautiously pass out upon this field. At our very first step the question announces to us this proposition, viz. : *that the identity or sameness is bodily and not mental identity.* Bodily identity, as we have seen, the identity of body given to us in this world, is an entirely different question from identity, as applied to ultimate atoms. There may be a change of the latter, with no loss of the former, unless we insist upon having a bodily identity in speculation different from the one *in re*. If atomic identity be indispensable to bodily, we would ask, why not carry the principle still further, and insist also upon an identity of *functions* ; and then say, that when a man *runs*, he is not the same man as when sitting ? Is there any magic, or *occult* sense in the word identity, that gives it an exclusive elective affinity for atoms as mere entities ? If there be, the world has failed to perceive it. It is applicable to atoms, but is it not also applicable to organized living compounds ? And when used in the latter application, the elementary notions of the identity are such, as are admissible and real by the nature of those compounds. To insist that, in this application, we shall have the *atomic* identity or none, is a mere play upon a word, not justified by the *usus loquendi*, nor by the fact it describes.

Recollecting, therefore, that the identity is *bodily*, remembering also the *criterion* of such identity, as given to us by our present existence; and leaving the author to make as many speculative schemes of identity as he chooses; we pass on to the question, *What is the sense of the identity between the present and future body?* The term itself, in this application, can create no difficulty independent of its construction. The construction, therefore, is the great question before us.

Is it identity between the two bodies, perfect and entire in all respects? No advocate of the resurrection, so far as I know, entertains this opinion. It is manifestly at war with the Bible. There will doubtless be a great difference in the interior construction, constitution and qualities of the two bodies. The Scriptures tell us that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." Paul indicates this difference, when he applies the epithet "spiritual" to the body of the resurrection, in distinction from the present, which is "natural." His account of the two bodies shows this difference: "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body."—These passages would be very obscure indices to the precise limits of this distinction in all respects; but nothing is plainer than that they imply a distinction, and as plain is it, that they imply an identity of some kind. In his Epistle to the Philippians, the same writer tells us, that the Lord Jesus Christ "shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body." He tells the Corinthians, "We shall not all sleep, but we shall be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed." In common with my brethren, I believe that these passages apply to the resurrection of the dead, and the change of the bodies of those living at this period. In view of them, we do not assert an identity between the two bodies, such as excludes all differences: this is not essential to the reality of the idea. If the author inform

us, that these passages neither prove a resurrection, nor give us any idea of the resurrection-body, we shall not debate this question with him at the present time, since his philosophy is the only branch of our present remarks. He certainly will not object to grant us the benefit of our own statement,—whatever he may think of its reasons—which is, that we do not maintain an identity that excludes all differences.

Taking advantage of this concession, let him be supposed to meet us with this question, viz.: *How can bodily identity consist with admitted differences of any kind?* The answer is, that the identity does not consist in the differences, but in other particulars, with which the differences are not incompatible. We certainly have such a bodily identity in the present world; and if so, why may not the principle of differences harmonize with that of identity, in the future state? Mental identity, that most absolute and perfect form of the idea, observes this law: it is identity with differences of *phenomenal* conditions. If to admit the resurrection, we must be shut up to an identity which excludes all differences, we are then shut up to an identity, which nearly, if not quite, excludes all identity, mental and bodily, here and hereafter. If the author insist upon this *transcendental* identity, I shall have to let him go; reminding him, however, that such is not the identity that the God of Nature has given to things.

Again, is the identity one that consists in the same number of material particles in the two bodies, or in the presence of some, or all of the very same particles in the two bodies? The Scriptures do not decide this question; and an answer, that should possess any certainty, is plainly beyond the reach of philosophical inquiry. Some have supposed that the resurrection-body will be constructed of the identical atoms composing the body that dies; while others think, that not *all* of these atoms will be in the future body, but *some* of them, sufficient to constitute an identity. Not knowing what is true, we shall not venture to affirm. In order, however, not to dodge a question just when it may be supposed to press us most severely, we will give the author the privilege of making

any supposition that suits him best. He may put *all* of the atoms into the resurrection-body, or *some* of them, or he may leave them all out: he may have his own way on this point, so far as the merits of the philosophical question pertaining to bodily identity are really involved. Granting this privilege to him, we ask for ourselves another, the privilege of discussing the following philosophical question, viz.: *Is identity in respect to the same numerical particles essential to the identity of a body, considered as the seat and residence of the soul?* If he shall say that it is not essential, then we may leave to God the question pertaining to particles, and not embarrass our faith with any philosophy on the subject whatever. If he shall say that the one identity is essential to the other, then I meet him with the fact that he has not shown its impossibility by the hand of God: and more than this, with the fact, that he has assumed, as a criterion of identity between the present and future body, what is not true of the present body at different times, by his own admission. He then insists upon a more perfect identity between the dying and resurrection-bodies, than is given to the present body. What is the reason for this claim? Is it that he may thereby disprove the possibility of a resurrection? Since this is the very point in debate, we prefer not to put this weapon into his hands, unless he shall be lawfully entitled to it; and to seize it for this purpose is an illegal possession. Give me an identity between the present and future body for the residence of the soul, as complete, substantial, and real, as that of my present body during successive periods, and I ask no more. And if in the latter case I may have it with an entire change of elementary particles, why may I not equally have it in the former? The truth is, and it cannot be too often repeated, that the identity of the body, considered as the residence of the soul, is an entirely different question from identity in application to elementary particles. The latter question being thrust into the former, without belonging to it, has created *apparent* difficulties, where in *reality* there are none. The moment this course is adopted, the identity of the present body is as difficult

a question, as that between the present and the resurrection-body. The moment you discard this alliance, so untrue to nature, philosophical difficulties vanish equally in both directions. I submit, whether it be best for a man to confound himself for the sake of being confounded—to put out his eyes that he may have the privilege of being blind, when clear vision is so much cheaper. Is it philosophical to make a case difficult *in thesi*, which nature has never made so? I am persuaded, that not even the author will *practically* feel any difficulty about the resurrection, for *reasons* that create just as great a difficulty in respect to his own present bodily identity ;—and if not, the matter is not really worth the seriousness of an argument. If he shall say that he does not admit within the enclosure of his philosophy the existence of any present bodily identity, then his philosophy is not accordant with the realities of nature, nor the conceptions of common sense. That we have a body, let all men, unless Bishop Berkeley and David Hume be exceptions, admit. That all men, the author not excepted, attach the idea of identity to this body, it is impossible to disbelieve. There is an unquestionable *veritableness* in the idea, whose necessary rejection is a poor compliment to any philosophy, that requires it. No man can dispossess himself of the conception as a type of reality, without ever hunting after the physiological dancing of ultimate atoms.

*Finally, is the identity one that has reference mainly to the spontaneous impressions, judgments, or cognitions of the soul to be seated in the body?—*Let me state the view intended by this inquiry. A man lives and dies. After death his spirit goes to the God that gave it, and his body back to the dust. At the resurrection his spirit enters into, and is united with, a spiritual body—material in one respect, but spiritual in another—a body in some respects entirely different from the one he had at death, but in other respects like it. The spontaneous impression and view of the man himself, as of those who know him, are those of *sameness*, both as to body and soul, abating the admitted but consistent difference between the present and future body. His body is the

same, in this sense at least, that it is *known as such*, and is the seat of the same intelligence. Will this not give us an identity of body substantially the very one, which we have in the present life? Our bodily identity here is such mainly in reference to our intelligence, as a continuous seat of the same—such in reference to the spontaneous impressions and judgments of that intelligence—not affected by the flux and change of particles. Which is the identity here, that of atoms with no mental recognition, or that of recognition without reference to atoms?—Now suppose, that the Scriptures teach what we call a resurrection of the body;—that in this new body shall dwell the same intelligence, having the same recognition of identity between the new and old body, which it had, while in the body on earth, does not this give identity in essentially the same sense in which we now have it?—This seems to me to be the *material* part of the matter; and the question, Whence came the particles of the new body? we may safely leave to God; not knowing, it is wise not to affirm or deny.

The author may say, that unless we have identically the very same particles in both bodies, we have no resurrection. This is basing an argument upon a mere word, and amounts to this, viz.: the resurrection being the reassemblage of the identical particles of the body that dies, unless those particles be reassembled, there is no resurrection. It is a mere assumption of knowledge as to the manner, the *interior* philosophy of a process and result, called the resurrection; an assumption no sooner made than converted into evidence against the possibility of the resurrection. Let the author prove that the reassemblage of the identical particles is essential to the resurrection,—such as will give substantially the same bodily identity that we now have.

The reviewer is very ready to confess his want of certain knowledge as to the manner in which the relation of identity or sameness is to be established between the two bodies; as to the extent and limits of this identity. He has entered upon the previous suggestions simply to show, that the au-

thor, in declaring such a relation inconceivable on philosophical grounds, has put forth an assumption, which sober philosophy itself repudiates. He has assumed in his argument a *criterion* of bodily identity, such as philosophy neither admits, nor requires—which indeed cannot be accepted without converting into a *fiction* what God has made a *reality*;—and then by the force of this assumption he has sought to demonstrate the absolute impossibility of the resurrection. The object of the preceding strictures has been to set this matter in its true light so far as philosophy is concerned, by revealing the falseness of his fundamental assumption, as well as the weakness of his several arguments, whose logical force centres at this point. How far success has attended the effort, is a question now submitted to the reader.

It will be perceived, that the biblical question has not been reached in the previous remarks. Whether the resurrection be a doctrine of the Bible or not, is a simple question of exegesis. We have canvassed the author's philosophy, so far as was necessary to show, that for any thing therein contained, it *might* be a doctrine of the Bible. He told us, in substance, that it *could not be*—giving his reasons, upon which we have ventured to join an issue with him. In so doing we have spoken freely and plainly—with none other than the kindest feelings towards the author—but with an unqualified dissent from the general scope of his philosophy, and not less so from the arguments applied to both the positive and negative portions of his system. He neither proves what his system asserts to be true, nor sustains the impossibility which he alleges. He agrees with the skeptic in denying the possibility of the resurrection, but does not agree with him in denying the truth of the Bible. His book, therefore, has presented a fair occasion for weighing the philosophical argument against the resurrection of the dead. This we have endeavored to do, not intending to blink the question in a single particular.

ARTICLE III.

EXPOSITION OF 1 PETER 3: 18-20.

By Rev. JOHN G. HALL, South Egremont, Mass.

“For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit: by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison; which sometime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was preparing, wherein few, that is, eight souls, were saved.”

Of the many disagreeing interpretations of this passage, it is our design to notice only two; two opposing interpretations; for the most part held by two differing classes of professing Christians; and which might be called, for convenience' sake, the extraordinary, and the common.

The *common* interpretation holds the passage in question, as meaning nothing more, than that Christ, by his Spirit, or by the Holy Spirit, in Noah, a preacher of righteousness before the flood, preached salvation ages ago to the disobedient; who, in consequence of their continued and perverse disobedience, are now confined in prison; by *prison* being meant the hell of the lost, where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched.

The antagonist, or *extraordinary* interpretation, supposes that Christ, after the crucifixion, while his body yet lay in the tomb, made his way in spirit to the regions of the departed, and preached the gospel to the imprisoned; since they had died without having heard it: the disobedient in the days of Noah being mentioned on account of the great multitude who shared in that sudden destruction.

To this main idea of the extraordinary theory, are attached many other points of importance; points of implication and consequence, which deserve, by virtue of their enormity, a special notice; and which may be occasionally glanced at in the various remarks which follow.

The strong points of the interpretation extraordinary, seem to be mainly three :

1. That there is strict antithesis in the 18th verse, between *θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί*, “being put to death as to his flesh,” and *ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι*, (not “quickened by the Spirit,” but) “maintained alive as to his spirit;” *in which*, i. e. in which *spiritual state* of existence, he went and preached unto the spirits in prison.

2. That if Christ preached only through *Noah*, the words “*he went*” and preached, are redundant.

3. That this version is sanctioned by numerous passages in the Bible containing allusions to a time when the mediatorial king 'om shall be completed, and all things shall be made new in *restitution*; and when things from all worlds, above and beneath, shall be subdued to righteousness, that God may be “all in all.”

Concerning this last argument, and which is the main pillar indeed of the extraordinary theory, it is sufficient here to say, that it is built on much that is doubtful and beclouded, and even purely imaginative. Its foundations, to say the least, are *uncertain*. Its most prominent points, it plainly assumes. It *assumes* that the final restitution of all things, spoken of in the Scriptures, includes the restoration of all fallen and lost men to the blessings and holiness of “sons of God;” and, of course, the restoration of the cast-out angels also. It *assumes* that God cannot close up the mediatorial reign, cannot subdue all things to himself, and be “all in all,” without opening with the arm of sovereign mercy, and, with the sound of redemption, the gates of the eternal prison. No man may say that these are not points of unequivocal assumption. Have not the majority of the learned and pious world, of all known ages, been against them? Does not the same majority now, while it receives the scriptural intimations that the mediatorial reign is one day to close, at the same time reject the annexed condition of universal and indiscriminate ransom, as a point of mere conjecture or fancy; to say the least, a point of extreme uncertainty? If so, then this argument is of no positive

account at all in support of the alleged truth of the extraordinary exposition of this passage.

Upon the second argument, the alleged redundancy of the phrase, "he went" and preached, it may be simply remarked, that it rests as a mere matter of taste whether this *be* a redundancy or not. Perhaps as many readers would regard Peter as designing to convey nothing special by it, as the contrary. Or, it might have been a mere matter of taste *with the writer*. Another apostle might have left out the words "he went," and simply have said, "by which also *he preached*." And then again, a third might have written with Peter, "by which also *he went and preached*."

But if it be insisted on, that the words are expressive of *motion*, then it may be inquired how it was unnatural in Peter, when speaking of the Lord of glory, whose appropriate residence was in heaven, preaching unto the sons of men who had made themselves vile, and their earth vile, as *going to preach* unto them? How was it improper? It may also be said that such or similar phrases, with reference to the persons of the Godhead, are in common use in the Bible, and in common use among Christians of modern days. "The Lord *came down*," it is said in Genesis, "to see the city and tower which the children of men builded." "The Lord *came down* on Mount Sinai." "He bowed the heavens, and *came down*," etc. And we daily pray to that Spirit, who is every where present and never *afar off*, to *come down*, to *descend*, to *draw near*, and bless. And to the Ephesians, who had never seen Christ in the flesh, Paul says that he "*came and preached peace*" unto them, when they were *afar off*. It is no marvel, then, that Peter should say, concerning the Redeemer, even *before* his incarnation, that by his Spirit he *went* and preached unto the disobedient in the days of Noah.

The remaining argument of the extraordinary theory, is based upon a proposed rendering of the phrase *ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι*; by which it would have these words carry the meaning of *kept alive in spirit*; or the like.

But where can any thing be found to countenance this?

Zωοποιέω is defined, in the lexicons, as meaning to *give life*, to *reanimate*, etc. In various tenses, it is used in the New Testament *twelve* times. *Once* it refers to God, as he who *giveth life* to all creatures; 1 Tim. 6: 13. *Thrice* it refers to the *life-giving* power, spiritually, of the Holy Ghost, or of the doctrines of the Gospel; John 6: 63. 2 Cor. 3: 6. Gal. 3: 21. *Seven* times it is used with direct reference to the *raising of the dead*; John 5: 21. Rom. 4: 17. 8: 11. 1 Cor. 15: 22, 36, 45. The only remaining occurrence of the word, is in the passage before us; the meaning of which we have been in quest of, but which must now be regarded as decided, by the undivided testimony of the New Testament writers, to be *giving life*, physically or morally, and *raising from the dead*. To put upon it, as used in the text, a different meaning from this, *raising from the dead*, is a procedure of mere gratuity; it is pure conjecture; it is making the obvious sense bend to a pre-formed and a favorite theory. The translators were but using a definition which the New Testament penmen themselves had given them, when they wrote, "quickened by the Spirit."

Moreover, if *ζωοποιήσεις* refers not to Christ's rising from the dead, then no mention of this event occurs at all in the passage; which would be so extraordinary, as of itself to refute the disputed supposition. The verses 19, 20, and 21, are without doubt parenthetical; so that the mention of the resurrection of Christ in verse 21, belongs within the parenthesis. Verses 18 and 22 belong consecutively together; and if so, where, on the conjecture above, is mention of Christ's rising from the dead? Peter carries Christ through his sufferings, and through *death in the flesh*, and then to the submundane prison, and then, whither? To heaven. No mention of his victory over death, his conquest over the grave; no mention of that which, if it be not true, "then your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins; then also they that have fallen asleep in Christ have perished." It is enough to ask, if this is the way in which apostles treated the great sealing fact of the gospel, Christ's death. Did Peter thus *forget* the resurrection?

Should it be inquired why the *Spirit* is mentioned, in connection with the resurrection of Him who said, "I lay down my life of myself, and I take it again;" I answer, that it is the testimony of the Scriptures, that he was, at his resurrection, "quickened by the Spirit." Whether it were the eternal essence of his own divine nature, or the third in the Trinity, were there positively no means of determining, it could be of little importance for us to know. The things that are *revealed* belong unto us. It is said, in Heb. 9: 14, that he offered himself for us *through the eternal Spirit*. And in Romans 1: 4, it is said that he was "declared to be the Son of God with power, *according to the Spirit of holiness*. Parallel to these passages, is the expression of Peter, "quickened by the Spirit."

How Christ could have preached *in the days of Noah*, is plain, if the Holy Spirit be the spirit referred to. And not less plain, if his *own* spirit be the spirit. For it is enough that the Son of God was *before* Noah; and that the apostles so received him. *He* was the spiritual rock in the wilderness, from which the godly among the tribes drank. It was *His* Spirit, also, says Peter, 1: 10, which was in the *prophets*; the prophets of old; of whom Enoch certainly (*before* Noah, if not Noah himself) was one. So that it was but in keeping with the idea stated in the 10th verse of his first chapter, to mention, as he has done, in the 19th and 20th verses of his third chapter, that Christ, the very crucified and risen Christ, in the days of God's long-suffering with the antediluvians, preached the gospel of life to those self-same disobedient ones that are now bound fast in the fetters of an eternal prison.

What I have further to offer upon this passage, and upon the extraordinary interpretation of it, will be presented in promiscuous paragraphs.

1. It is admitted by all, that the disobedient antediluvians passed immediately from this life into a state of positive punishment. This would be evident even from the expression "in prison," used by the apostle.

2. How remarkable is it, that this alleged mission of

Christ to the prison-house of the dead, so wonderful in its nature, should not be spoken of by any other of the apostles ; and by this one, hinted at only in such a manner that many cannot tell what he meaneth ! How remarkable, that Paul, in 1 Tim. 3 : 16, detailing minutely the successive steps in the mission, and its results, of descended and veiled Divinity, should, when come to this most amazing of the flights of mercy, pass it in silence ! “ God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on *in the world*, received up into glory.” No mention of the visit to the prison. Did they not “ believe on ” him there ?

3. Right contrary to the supposition of this extraordinary interpretation, are the explicit words of Peter in the 21st verse, the verse immediately following the passage in contemplation. For, what saves men ? And *when* are they saved ? Peter says “ baptism ” saves us ; the token significative of our *reception of Christ by faith* ; our reception of him in *this world*, where baptism is performed ; a reception of him in this world *by faith*, and not a reception of him by *sight*, in the world to come, where “ faith and hope ” and all things pass away, but “ charity.” Surely, Peter must not be made to teach *two* different times and ways of salvation, in one short passage.

4. Peter speaks of the disobedient antediluvians as *still* in prison. He says nothing of their release. He does not mention any *effect* of the visit of the Redeemer. For aught he tells us, the “ disobedient ” prisoners may have turned to the Lord of life and glory a deaf ear ; may, in their fearful abode, have treated him as they did God before the flood, and “ vexed his Holy Spirit ; ” and thus this visit of the Redeemer, so far from having released them, may have heightened their guilt and increased their condemnation a thousand-fold. Concerning a despatch of the divine mercy, so extraordinary in the extreme, if Peter mentioned it at all, would he not have added something more ?

5. There seems no good reason, why these men, of all

others, should be thus singled out and specially blessed or noticed. Why this *partial* regard for the blasphemous and hardened antediluvians? Where in the Scriptures are we taught that *these* should become inheritors of such lenity as this? Advocates of the extraordinary theory, to such questions as these might answer, that this generation of men was particularized, since it was overwhelmed in so extraordinary a destruction; so sudden, and so extensive. But the spoils of that destruction were (to use a homely phrase) only *one* worldful: and have not *thousands* of such worldfuls perished since? True, they were deprived of life, all of them, in a short and sudden moment: but their *spiritual* destruction, which alone is to be considered, was no greater than though they had perished by tens, or by hundreds, or each man singly; nor than though it had required a century, instead of a day, to remove them. There can be brought no satisfactory reason for the limitation, on the supposition of this surprising interference of mercy, of its benefits to the wretched victims of the flood.

6. If argument be built upon the supposition that the *heathen* find mercy in the future world, and therefore, why not the heathen antediluvians, who may be *supposed* to have lost a knowledge of God, it might be answered:

1st. That the *wicked* heathen are positively guilty, and will *not* thus find mercy in the world to come. God has not, in any bosom, left himself without a witness. Paul says that, though without a written law, they are yet a law unto themselves. And in Rom. 1: 20, he expressly declares, that those of human kind who do not see, or who forget, God's "eternal power and Godhead," "*are without excuse.*"

2d. The contemporaries of Noah were *not* thus ignorant of duty. For the space of a hundred and twenty years, they had a "preacher of righteousness," Noah himself, among them. Christ also, as Peter himself expressly says, in chap. 1: 10, was no stranger on the earth before the flood. He spoke of the "prophets," of whom Noah was one, and before him, Enoch. They enjoyed also the presence of God's warning and

converting Spirit ; as God said in express reference to them, "My Spirit shall not always strive with man." They are by no means, then, to be counted as destitute *heathen*.

3d. It cannot be supposed, that the heathen who are finally saved, are such as are at first condemned on account of their ungodliness. Not being judged by the law, nor the gospel, since they live under neither, they will be judged by the light of nature. Those who have lived to the best of their powers, in this twilight of truth, will be accepted by the Majesty on high, and *may* there hear the gospel, and be blessed in it ; while those who cannot safely pass this ordeal, will be lost, and will not be suffered to taste those blessings of the gospel, to which obedience to nature's light might have admitted them. But now do these saved heathen first go to "prison," being thence, after a certain time, redeemed ? Do they find this supposed mercy, after a period of incarceration, which can stand in no other light than that of an atonement, or the payment of a debt ?

But it is not to be admitted that the antediluvians were heathens, at all. They doubtless knew God, and had many manifestations of his will. And if *they* had never heard of the Saviour, how was it that Abel heard, and Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Job ? A sense there is, indeed, in which Eph. 3 : 5 is strictly true, and "the mystery of Christ, in other ages, was not made known unto the sons of men, as it is now revealed unto his holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit." Kings and prophets desired to see Christ's day, and saw it not. But there is another sense in which Christ has been fully and savingly preached in the world ever since the fall ; a sense in which all who like Abraham *would*, like Abraham *did*, see Christ's day and rejoice. Their knowledge was all-sufficient for salvation. The antediluvians, in like manner with us, were to *believe*, to receive the Redeemer by *faith*,—by faith were to be made just. The faith of one thousand years *before* Christ, cannot be shown to be any more praiseworthy than the faith of one a thousand *after* ; and the converse. Was it not just as easy to believe God's

word of promise, at the gate of Eden, or from the mouth of Moses, as it is to believe the word of history from the pen of Matthew or of Luke? If they heard not Noah "and the prophets," would they have believed though they had read the evangelists and the apostles? So that if the case of men *before* Christ demand an exhibition of special clemency, so also does the case of men long *after* Christ. The antediluvians had not "seen the Christ." Neither have we. Not a few among us even discredit his history. So that if Christ preached the gospel to antediluvians in prison, must he not in equity resort there constantly to preach to the lost out of Christian lands? To such visionary results, does the extraordinary interpretation of this passage lead us.

In fact, the character of the antediluvians is clearly seen to be such, as shows them to be precisely the *wrong ones*, to whom, if to any, the gospel should be preached in eternity. Why did not the apostle hit upon the case of men who were heathen indeed; who had never listened to the words of righteousness from the lips of a messenger of God? *These men* had heard preaching before. They had enjoyed the gospel in their lifetime, and despised it. They had possessed no small share of advantages for piety; for God's Spirit had striven with them mightily. Theirs was no common sin. They had abused God's "*long-suffering*." They were not *ignorant*, but, in Peter's own words, they were "*disobedient*." All this phraseology of Peter magnifies exceedingly the wickedness of the antediluvians, and heightens the hopelessness of their case.

7. Hear Peter's own unequivocal opinion of the character and state of the sinful antediluvians, in his 2d Epistle, 2 : 4, 5, 6, 7. He unhesitatingly ranks them with "the angels that sinned," whom God "spared not," but cast down to hell, and delivered over to chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment. He associates them also with the Sodomites, and with the inhabitants of Gomorrah, and calls them "ungodly." In v. 9, he says, "The Lord knoweth how to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished." This was his

doctrine. He was taught it by the Spirit. Or, he derived it from his knowledge of God, taken in connection with three great undisputed events ; viz. : the casting out of the Angels, the conflagration of Sodom, and the destruction of the old world by a flood. The case of the "old world," was one of his *proofs*. And if he could put their case to such an use, could any thing have been further from his thoughts than the publishment of the gospel, "good news," "glad tidings of great things," to them in their prison? And are those who interpret this passage after the extraordinary method, better judges of the character, deserts, state, and prospects of the wicked antediluvians than Peter himself? After the same pattern, also, is our Lord's expressed estimation of them. Every one must see, how directly this forced interpretation is in opposition to the sayings of the very divine preacher before whom the supposition in question opens the doors of the prison. Who, reading Christ's description of these men in Luke 17th, would imagine that he had it in contemplation, within a twelvemonth or so, to visit their prison-house with the words of life and deliverance?

8. If the extraordinary interpretation of this passage be true, then the antediluvians *had two seasons of probation*. But if *they* enjoyed two periods of trial, then in equity did the *Sodomites* ; and, then, why not the fallen angels too? But Peter in his second epistle 2: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, puts them all together in one dark category, saying of them that they are "reserved unto judgment." Further: If the antediluvians had two periods of probation, then in equity also have *all* bad men, of whatever age. All gospel-haters living may live on in sure hopes that, in the clement dealings of the great Father, they shall have like opportunity of repentance in the world of spirits! Eternity is *not* a world of *doom* ; but of *hope* ; of bright hope to the most reckless among men! Let the ministry contend no longer against the strong odds of nature's tendencies, and God's designs! Let us give way at once to the strong love of pleasurable sin, which reigns in the human bosom ; let us no more disturb the little comfort which

men can snatch from life, as they hurry along ; let us leave the pulpit, handle no more the sword of the Spirit, forget the Bible, and, all together, "eat and drink, for to-morrow we die!"

9. If it be asked, why, in case Peter designed no allusion to a mission of Christ to the imprisoned spirits, this digression concerning the years and events of the deluge was introduced ; it might be answered, that an attentive reader would find but little difficulty on this point. The mind of the apostle most naturally lighted upon that most memorable time and event, as aptly illustrating the position and danger of men at the day of his own preaching. The modern world had wandered, as the old world did. God had planned a great redemption, of which the ark built by Noah was a type. While the vast multitudes, Greeks and Jews, to whom Christ was either a "stumbling-block," or else "foolishness," would be destroyed by an overwhelming spiritual destruction, "baptism" (or, what was prefigured by it, Christ's church) would prove an ark of safety to a few. The same Spirit which preached unto the antediluvians, was preaching in the days of Peter. Likewise, "The end was at hand." (1 Pet. 4 : 7.) And while Christians should not hesitate to "suffer" for Christ, in imitation of him, the wicked should make haste to safety : for the Spirit, while it *might* through the "long-suffering of God," "bear long with them," yet as then, so now, it would not *always* strive ; and God's swift vengeance upon the ungodly was at hand, even as in the days of Noah.

Finally. All due account should be made of the benevolence, the "love to being in general," shown by the extraordinary interpreters of this passage. Charity, however, must not shelter perversions. Wherever else in the sacred volume, they fancy their favorite ultimate restitution is to be found, they should not persist in finding it here. They must not wrest, at least, *this* scripture.

There is much that is pleasing to some minds, and perhaps in itself to all, in the thought, that in some fulness of time, all created intelligences are to be brought back into allegiance to the great Supreme, however egregiously they

have sinned, or however extended may have been the time of their punishment. But, in truth, it must be *granted*, that such a theory finds but a scanty support in the Bible. Scripture evidence is *against* it. To arrive at it, we must needs be wise above and beyond what is written. The Bible speaks of but *one* probation ; that is *life*. The Bible speaks of but *two* future states ; those are founded on the pillars of eternity itself. If we travel our moral journey by the *Bible*, we must believe that “after death comes the judgment ;” when the righteous will be publicly acquitted and acknowledged ; and when the wicked, under just condemnation, shall go away into *everlasting* punishment, “where is weeping, and wailing, and gnashing of teeth,” where “their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched.”

ARTICLE IV.

HOME MISSIONS. BY A MISSIONARY.

REV. THOMAS LIPPINCOTT, Marine Settlement, Ill.

THE philosophy of Missions is, we suppose, to some extent understood by the Christian community ; at least by that portion of it which it is the design of this article mainly to address. The command of our Saviour, just on the eve of his ascension : “Go ye into **ALL** the world, and preach the gospel to **EVERY** creature”—or in its more amplified and specific form as given at the close of Matthew’s gospel : “Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost : teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you :” that is—**CHRISTIANIZE—OR CONVERT—AND SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCT EVERY HUMAN BEING**—with the accompanying promise, “Lo I am with you always, even unto the end of the world,” presents at once the duty, the obligation, and the en-

couragement of Christian Missions. But we deem it necessary that another brief passage, containing our Lord's explanation of the command, be attentively considered. "Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day : and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem." Luke 24 : 46, 47.

Here is the whole system of Missions in a nutshell. The mission of Christ to atone for sin, and to conquer death by dying and rising from the dead ; by which life and salvation are procured for dead sinners on their believing in him ; and then the mission to publish the news and the invitation to "every creature" in "all nations—beginning at Jerusalem."

Why begin at Jerusalem ?—Because the first offer was to be made to the descendants of Abraham, who had been the depository of the oracles of truth : because they were, and would be, almost omnipresent throughout the world, and could spread the intelligence far and wide :—and especially because the evidence must be laid before the Jewish people, and confirmed on the spot, before it could be expected to find credence elsewhere. But there was another reason still : a reason which of itself would have justified the order to begin at Jerusalem. They were there.

There is a principle of human action which is well expressed by the apostle in his letter to the Galatians (6 : 9): "As we have therefore OPPORTUNITY, let us do good," etc. Our obligation to do good to our fellow-men is just in proportion to our ability—which includes opportunity as an essential element—and our opportunity is usually in proportion to our nearness to the object.

"God loves from whole to parts : but human soul
Must rise from individual to the whole."

The principle is incontrovertible ; and he who forgets or overlooks the object of compassion at his own door, while he talks and weeps about the miseries of mankind, exhibits a very

questionable kind of philanthropy. Pope was right. "Self-love"—not the narrow, niggardly feeling which begins and *terminates* on self, and would grasp all in its own exclusive arms; but enlightened, enlarged, pure and heavenly self-love, such as is compatible with and essential to the general welfare;—such as angels feel; this

"Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake,
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake;
The centre moved, a circle straight succeeds,
Another still, and still another spreads:
Friend, parent, neighbor, first it will embrace;
His country next, and next all human race."

It is not selfishness then, nor a narrowing down of human sympathies within sectional bounds, but acting according to an eternal principle which *must* govern finite minds, to direct the eye and extend the hand of benevolence *first* to those most immediately within our reach, and most nearly connected with ourselves. The apostle (1 Tim. 5: 8) places the claims of kindred first: deeming it utterly incongruous that the Christian should extend aid to strangers and overlook those related to him by family ties. And just in proportion to the number and strength of the ligaments of interest, love, common security and common hope, which are thrown around us and intertwined by our relations in life, whether domestic, social, political, or human, are the obligations under which we rest, if not stronger or weaker, yet more or less immediately binding.

As it was not deemed by the apostle an improper use of the property of the Christian, which he was urged to hold for the common cause, nor an abstraction of it from that cause, to use what was needful for the support of his own near relatives, but rather, and in fact, the proper use of it; so it is not losing sight of the principle, that "the field is the world" and we are to cultivate it all, when we fix the attention more specifically on our own country as that part of the field which we can cultivate most effectually; especially when, as we know, the efficient cultivation of this will enlarge our resources, and increase our facilities for the residue.

We have not lost sight of the lesson taught by our Saviour in the parable of the good Samaritan, on the question, "Who is my neighbor?" Nor would we forget that there is no geographical, or national, or sectarian limit or designation to the claim. But the very parable strengthens our position. The neighbor of the good Samaritan was not afar off, but in his very pathway. The priest and Levite had to turn out of the way to avoid him. *They*, perhaps, looked further for objects—away across Samaria to Galilee—and thought how much good they would do in the more distant land. *He* felt, as Randolph told the lady who was preparing clothes for the Greeks, when he saw her own naked negroes—"Madam, the Greeks are at your door."

And now, our object is not to insist on the prior claim of Home Missions over Foreign, in any such sense as to weaken the hold of that noble enterprise on the Christian heart. We have no such thought as that too much labor and prayer and money are expended on the publication of the gospel in other lands. So far from this, it is our settled conviction that the amount might be quadrupled, without loss, not only, but with absolute gain to our country ; and the number of missionaries, teachers, and presses increased in an equal proportion without thinning the ranks of our home missionaries or ministry. Nay, the experience of the past would show that our strength at home would increase ; revivals would multiply, new converts be introduced with missionary hearts, and the churches grow :—for it would be as formerly, when the apostles and believers were faithful, "And believers were **THE MORE** added to the Lord, multitudes both of men and women."

But we do fully believe that the importance of the Home field is far from being realized ; even in reference to the foreign effort. As *this* would strengthen the churches at home by a glorious moral reaction, at once the occasion and the result of the Divine blessing, so *the other* would in the same way, and by the increase of power and disposition among our churches to come up to the work, enlarge indefinitely, almost, the resources of our foreign missions.

But without reference to the work abroad, or at least, interference with it, we would *suggest* the question, whether the members of the churches of Christ in the United States, who are favored with the means of doing good, are fully apprised of the importance to the world, to the church, to our country, to themselves, of hastening forward the work of evangelization, until every part of our land is brought under, not the power of pope, or prelate, or presbytery, nor the control of conference or consociation, of association or assembly, but the influence of the religion of Jesus Christ, *of faith in His blood?* And we would *press* the further inquiry, whether they are aware of the ground, the force, and extent of the obligation which rests upon them, individually, in regard to it?

On the first question, much has been written and spoken in public and private; and we shall deem it unnecessary to enlarge. It were idle, indeed, to spread out here the considerations which are so well known. We only present the propositions naked and condensed, "to stir up your pure minds by way of remembrance."

1. The West and the East are one. The question practically is, whether the favored portion shall carry a dead carcass, or at best a sick and impotent body; or by the infusion of moral life and health and vigor, be cheered by a "fellow helper" in the work which the Lord has laid out to be done.

2. That dead or sickly body is becoming every year more enormous and unwieldy, and if it have not life in itself will, *before long*, crush its associate.

3. The only means of restoration or preservation is the spreading of divine truth; and the divinely appointed agency, *to which all other agencies must be auxiliary and subordinate*, is the preaching of the gospel.

4. Those who are blessed with the gospel must carry or send it to those who need it. "How shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent?" There is not ability in the destitute portions of the country, at least among those who feel their value, to sustain the gospel institutions.

These propositions are brief, plain, and self-evident to the Christian. Their language to every follower of Jesus is, if you wish to convert the world, if you desire to save your country, if you would preserve *yourselves* from destruction, bend your energies to the work of evangelizing the new and vast and accumulating communities of the West. Do it now ! Do it soon ; or never !

But that further inquiry demands more particular attention : whether the ground, and force, and extent, of their obligation to supply the land with the gospel is realized by Christians.

We have admitted that the philosophy of missions is understood ; but our admission must be taken with some qualification. The general outline, the fundamental principles, have been brought before the public mind with sufficient clearness and frequency to be clearly apprehended. Can it be said that Christians generally have *studied* the subject until they perfectly apprehend the several points included in this inquiry ? We think not : and wish, therefore, to suggest some thoughts which have been forced upon us, perhaps by our position, but which do not seem to have entered into the theory, or at least the practice, of the church at large.

What, then, is the ground of obligation to supply the destitute with the gospel ?

The ready answer will be, THE COMMAND OF CHRIST. And the reasonableness and propriety of that command are seen in the facts, that no agency can be so appropriate as the agency of those who know by experience the value of the blessing proposed, and can therefore heartily recommend it ; and that none can with equal propriety be expected to engage in the work as those who are indebted to it for their all. "Freely ye have received, freely give."

Have we stated the matter fairly ? If not, we would be glad to be set right. But under the conviction that we are correct, we design to infer a few things, which will bring out at once *the force and the extent* of individual obligation.

1. The obligation does not rest exclusively on ministers of the gospel. The immediate auditors of the Saviour, on some

of the occasions when he uttered or enforced this command, were doubtless those, who were chosen by him to the special office ; but it is equally clear that this was not always the case : and we presume, indeed, that no attempt will be made thus to limit the command or the obligation. Had the apostles, only, received the blessing of salvation ? Had, the seventy the exclusive hope of eternal life ? “Freely ye have received—freely give.” Here is the principle, and it implies that ALL who freely receive should freely give. And be it remarked that this is not addressed to communities in the mass. When the great object was to preserve and transmit to posterity the blessings of religion, the responsibilities and the promises might with propriety be national. But when the work is to diffuse them among contemporaries, the obligation is individualized. When “the Spirit and the *bride* say, Come,” it is added, so that there could be no mistake, no shifting of responsibility from one to all, or from one to another : “And let HIM THAT HEARETH say, Come.” Now we have thought there must be some mistake on this point prevailing in the churches, and wish to set the matter right. It has seemed to us that the opinion prevailed to a considerable extent, that ministers of the gospel, those who had *a call* to preach, and especially *missionaries*, were mainly, if not solely, responsible for the fulfilment of this command. Other Christians might, indeed, out of the “riches of their liberality,” contribute something toward their support, and receive many thanks and abundant praise for it : but that is another thing. We wish to assure our brethren throughout the length and breadth of the land, that we are no exclusives ; but would most cordially and heartily invite them to take part with us in this labor of love : not to do our work, but their own.

2. A futher inference is, that the obligation to spread the gospel does not primarily, or chiefly, or pre-eminently, or peculiarly rest on the missionary, the minister, or the candidate who “is called of God as was Aaron.” This, certainly, if we are to learn the opinions of men from their conduct, is the prevailing doctrine of the churches, even of those who would

shrink from exclusivism. No sooner does a young man come forward to engage in the work of the ministry, and ask the countenance of the brethren by the laying on of hands, than he is supposed to assume obligations from which he was previously free. But is this true? Let us look at the nature of this responsibility.

That there is propriety in setting apart a portion of the church members to the work of teaching—i. e. the ministry—is evident to us from primitive practice, not of the apostles only, but of our Lord, in selecting the twelve and the seventy from the multitude of believers. And that there may and ought to be a selection from the ministry for missionary work, is shown by the same high authority. “Now there were in the church that was at Antioch, certain prophets and teachers.

* * As they ministered to the Lord and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereto I have called them. So they * * departed into Seleucia, etc.”¹ But whether the chief responsibility of carrying the gospel to the destitute is placed on them or assumed by this act; or whether their selection is founded on a previous obligation *peculiar to them* may certainly be questioned. We think the selection was for another reason.

“Ye are not your own, for ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God’s.” Here the claim is established and enforced to the entire being, the entire powers of the believer. The claim is not for a passive surrender, but an active course of effort in glorifying God. Body and spirit, and of course all that pertains to the body and to the spirit, are his by purchase. We had sold ourselves for nought as slaves: He purchased us with a price which is beyond estimation, redeemed us from the curse, reinstated us in the Divine favor, gave us the privileges of children, and the assurances of a heavenly inheritance: and, as our whole being is included in the blessing, so our

¹ See Acts 13 : 1-4.

whole being is included in the claim. *Who* is thus purchased? The missionary, or every Christian? We say it is *equally* true of every Christian. There is no difference in the obligation. All owe all!

In the church of which you are a member, there have been, it may be, a hundred persons besides yourself introduced to the privileges and the hopes of the gospel. You all stood up in the same broad aisle to take the vows of God upon you before the world. Did you promise then to do any thing more than duty? Did your promise originate the duty? Or, did you not then and there feel that your promises were only to do what you were bound to do whether you promised or not? But what did you promise? Was it not to concentrate the *entire energies* of your body and soul to the service of God? to "glorify God in your body and in your spirit?" and was it not because they are His? We stop not here to inquire if you have redeemed your vow: another object is before us. In that company who stood beside you at that solemn consecration, there were ten young men, whose hearts glowed with desire to say, "Come!" to the famishing soul; "Come, take of the water of life freely." And they have, through much difficulty and self-denial, attained to the desired qualifications for publishing the gospel; and are gone forth, some to churches around you, some to distant lands, and some to the prairies of the West; where, in poverty and sickness and anxiety, they are preaching the word to dying sinners. When you stood side by side at the altar, did you feel that they were under higher obligations than you? Was the salvation purchased by the blood of Christ more valuable to their souls than to yours? Did it occur to you then, that they ought to sing "a louder sweeter song" to redeeming love than you? Did their vow include *more* than ALL? or yours *less*? No! you stood on the same platform, acknowledged equal favors, confessed the same obligations, and vowed the same devotion. *Then* you felt that there was, and should be, equality.

But how has it been since? They commenced a course of preparation, and when that was completed, gave them-

selves to the work of publishing the "good tidings of great joy." You entered upon a course of business, giving your time and attention to wordly pursuits, to procure a livelihood. "Was this wrong?" you inquire. "Are all to be employed in preaching? Are secular employments incompatible with the vow of consecration? What then means the direction, 'Separate me Barnabas and Saul?'" We repeat our conviction that to some is "committed the word of reconciliation,"—that "all members have not the same office," but that there is a division of labor in the church "for the edifying of the body of Christ," and that the church will never be built up until the various workmen perform their several parts in the erection of the edifice. But this is the difficulty. Some are left to toil and sweat and faint in the effort, and the work is not finished, because others,—we had almost said,—*"touch not the burdens with one of their fingers."*

We intimated that the ground of separation to the work of the ministry was something else than superior obligation. It is, doubtless, superior adaptedness. The talents, i. e. the trust committed by our Lord is declared by himself to be "to every man according to his several ability." "There are diversities of gifts," and "there are differences of administrations," or services required of course. What we are pleading for is, not that all should engage in the same ~~the~~ of things; but that all are equally responsible for the accomplishment of the work, *in proportion to their ability to push it forward.* The mason, the carpenter, the plaisterer, and the painter are just as much required to *exert themselves* as the hod-man or the cellar-digger; and these precisely as much as *those who contract to furnish materials or provisions for the workmen; and no more!*

But are these obligations equally met? Our appeal is again to the individual Christian.

The merchant, the mechanic, the farmer;—the rich, the poor, all stand together to pledge their all to the Lord. The amount of their promise is to do *all they can* to glorify God. Ten out of the hundred (we have supposed) prepare for the

ministry and engage in it. At the outset, their prospects for this life are as bright as any of the others, should they pursue the same course. But if they enter the ministry, their portion, they *know*, will be comparative, if not positive poverty. Men do not get rich by preaching. They spend their whole time for seven or ten years in study, laboring with their hands meanwhile for a meagre subsistence. At the close of the college term they find themselves standing side by side with others, who are no more than their equals in talents or acquirements, but who in a few years are climbing the road to wealth and preferments. They enter the ministry; "labor night and day with tears" to win souls; are highly respected for learning, piety, zeal, and good intentions;¹ and when their late classmates are enjoying the comforts of wealth and the excitement of ambition; they find themselves with threadbare coats and scanty fare, looking round with no small anxiety to know how the sick wife shall be supplied with ordinary comforts, and the barefoot children obtain the rudiments of education. We do not draw from fancy. "We speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen."

We affirm it again. The men who have engaged in the ministry,—and we speak of missionaries especially,—whether we consider their intellectual qualities, or business qualifications, are not a whit behind the leading men in the various walks of secular life. They would stand beside them at the workbench, or grace with equal dignity the bench of justice. They could make their way as well and with far less laborious preparation, behind the counter, in the counting-room, at the bar, or in the halls of congress. And they had as much confidence, and ground of confidence, in their ability to shine, or at least to succeed, as the most sanguine and the most ambitious. But they chose to forego worldly promotion, because they had consecrated their all to Christ, and to them it ap-

¹ The writer draws with the more freedom here, because he is not one of the group in the picture.

peared that, if they had talents, those talents were His, and could be employed *to the best advantage* in the work of the ministry. They, therefore, voluntarily relinquished their worldly prospects for His sake. Did they sacrifice (O what a perversion of the term!) too much? Who believes it? Did not the Lord know what he required when he called them to this work?

And now the question is not, whether the ninety (of the supposed hundred) who engaged in secular employments did wrong in the selection of their calling; but whether they have devoted themselves *and their calling* as entirely to the work of the Lord as the ten; and if not, whether they had “a dispensation” from it. Their talents may not have been of that class which is appropriate to the minister, but were they not *equally* claimed by the Master as his?—And yet, is it not considered by the mass of Christians a very enlarged liberality on the part of the secular man to bestow one-tenth—not of his earnings, but his spendings—in promoting the cause of Christ; while he is yearly augmenting his capital and amassing wealth for himself and family? And at the same time, when the missionary literally bestows all his living, and his life too, in promoting that same cause, is it not deemed merely his duty?—“O, the missionary ought to be willing to make sacrifices, for the sake of doing good.” We have heard this spoken—aye, spoken without a blush, by Christians who thought it quite benevolent in themselves to send a ham or fifty pounds of flour out of their well-filled pantry, when the missionary was in need. And why ought the missionary to sacrifice all, and the secular Christians nothing? We say nothing; we mean it. The little pittance which is given is no sacrifice: it involves no self-denial. It is merely the surplus, which, if not thus bestowed, would, in all probability, be wasted. And yet the missionary is compelled to hear from the churches language which strongly implies that he ought to feel a deep sense of obligation toward them for his support, consisting of a scant supply of the plainest fare, while he knows that they

are, if not revelling, at least living in what they would call luxury, if they saw him enjoying it.¹

When the missionary leaves his native soil; and while he is laboring to plant the standard of the cross in the wide field—the world—he knows that each member of the church he left, and each member of every church in the land is bound, equally with himself, to “endure hardness as a good soldier of Jesus Christ,” it may be not in the same way, but equally:—and he well knows that he has done *no more* than duty. How then can he look on those, who are not denying themselves a single gratification of any moment for the glory of the Redeemer?

No man is fit for a missionary who is not sensitive. His course of preparation, his peculiar and delicate duties, and the demands of public sentiment are such, that his mind must be more than ordinarily enlightened, and his sensibilities acutely, if not morbidly, quickened. His wife, too, must be intelligent, accomplished, refined, elegant, plain, simple, rustic: she must be qualified to shine in the politest circles, and be at home with the rudest. And their children must be patterns, but not paragons. Now all these qualifications imply not talents only, but tact. The missionaries who can fill the outline,—and we have seen them,—must have what the world calls common sense. The inference is, they have common feelings too: and if so, how often are those feelings wounded by the thoughtless and needless inflictions of those, who are bound by their common faith to sympathize with them, (not as James describes, 3: 16, but) with heartfelt and substantial kindness.

Perhaps there has never been a set of men employed in conducting a great moral enterprise, more happily selected,

¹ We suppose many of our readers would be astonished, if not scandalized, at the proceedings of an ecclesiastical body in which we have participated; grave ministers of the gospel and representatives of the churches, in full session, deliberating on the price of bacon and pickled pork—ascertaining the value of corn and dried apples, and eggs and potatoes! But necessity knows no law. It was the missionary's living.

than those who manage the affairs of Home Missions in our country. Faithful, untiring, judicious, they are also kind and sympathizing in their intercourse with the missionaries, while not a semblance of dictation mingles with their correspondence. But they can do only what the churches enable them to do. They are but the channel through which the streams flow ; and it is the fountains which fail when the channel dries. How must their hearts be pained when, every few months, they are compelled to send quaking through nine hundred hearts by the intimation of danger that the little stipend (which it may be necessity has already appropriated) may possibly fail ! It is not the fault of the secretaries of the society, but the spirit of the system which requires it, that, after the missionary has sought with solicitude and prayer the path of duty ; has chosen a place of labor, not with reference to his preferences, but usefulness ; has spent all, while waiting for his field or removing to it ; has strained the home contribution to the utmost point of tension ; and settled down with the people on an application for the smallest sum on which he can subsist ; his eye must be met and his heart made to ache by such a passage as : “ The committee hesitated to make so large an appropriation for the field, but concluded to venture it *for one year*, in the hope,” etc. : or, “ We feel sorry that the appropriation does not come up to the amount applied for, but the calls on our treasury multiply without a corresponding increase of contributions : ” or, “ We regret to say that the committee cannot feel justified in acceding to the application,” etc. Or something perhaps even harder to bear, for one who has literally spent all his substance in the Lord’s vineyard, relying on the pledge of support afforded by the society. Is it right, is it Christian, that these warm, noble hearts, should be compelled, by the rage of the church for doing much good at little cost, to wound and mortify the feelings of the missionary, torn by anxieties which none but the refined and sensitive poor can know ; by this cheapening of his work, this threatening or making a reduction in his wages, already inadequate to his pressing wants.

The missionary knows and feels that he has a right to a share in all the comforts of the secular members of the church. He knows that they have no right to hoard up their treasures, or expend them in profusion upon themselves while he is on the very point of suffering, if not in actual want of the necessities of life ; and he cannot help feeling that there is more than economy in doling out a mere pittance to each missionary—just as *little* as possible—in order that the sum total of the contributions may be scattered over the widest possible extent of country. This is preaching the gospel not by proxy, but at the expense of the missionary. It is coining his flesh and blood, his intellect and heart, to enhance (or to avoid diminishing) the hoard or the indulgences of Christians ! Little, indeed, does the comfortable man of business realize the difference between himself and the Christian brother with whom he stood up at the altar and united in the pledge of self and all to the work of God ; and who is actually giving time, talents, life itself to the performance of that work, and in want of common comforts ; while himself is indulging in the luxuries of the table and drawing-room, amid the blandishments of polished life. Little does he perceive the force and extent of God's claim and his own solemn promise.

We have spoken plainly, and it may be thought too strongly, on some of the points ; but our object is to place the obligations of secular Christians on the subject of missions, fairly before them ; and we could think of no better way than to bring them to stand side by side with the missionary at the hour of self-dedication, and then, by revealing some facts, show the actual results of the carrying out of the promise by both parties. And we submit the question, whether the myriads of Christians, who of their abundance furnish the means of just not starving to the missionaries, or they who have given up all hope of pecuniary independence, and consented to be half-paid stipendiaries during the vigor of life, to suffer a premature old age of poverty, and leave a helpless family

unprovided for, are doing the missionary work according to the commandment.¹

If, in our eagerness to make these impressions, we have seemed to forget or undervalue the efforts that have been made to supply our country with the gospel, we assure our readers the case is far different. A quarter of a century ago we took our station on the outpost—the “far west”—of the land. We have stood by the banks of the Father of Waters, until from the *ne plus ultra* it has become the nation’s central artery. Then the wide-spread state in which we have resided was physically and morally a wilderness, beautiful indeed as the garden of God, but still a wilderness, without a single minister of our order. We have greeted to this teeming field many a servant of God, whom the dear Christian brethren of the older states sent out to preach the everlasting gospel. We have seen the same state, from being an appendage to an ecclesiastical body in another, grow into three Presbyterian synods and three Congregational associations, besides the various other denominations : and we have known that for this growth, this delightful increase of religious privileges, we are indebted *mainly*, under God, to the kind, and we will say generous, hearts of Christians in New England and some of the neighboring states. And we have felt, too, the blessedness of him that receives, when the wife and little ones of the missionary, as well as himself, have drawn large additions to the family wardrobe, just in time of need, from the package which Christian sympathy had filled beyond the mountains. Nor while we breathe on earth, nor while we sing in heaven, do we expect to lose the grateful and delightful emotions which have swelled our bosom, as we have seen the wilderness bud and *begin* to bloom. And our prayers have gone up, and will yet ascend to the throne of mercy, for

¹ Mrs. H. E. Beecher Stowe has given a sketch, called, we believe, “The Classmates, or which is the Liberal Man?” which has drawn tears not of sympathy merely, but realization, from many a missionary and many a missionary’s wife. The scene of the sick wife, and the husband at her work,—it is all fact, simple fact.

blessings rich and full on the benevolent hearts which have remembered us in our feebleness. But, while the contributions of secular Christians in New England have far exceeded, perhaps, any other portion of the modern church, we are persuaded that a more correct estimate of duty may be formed by comparison with those who, as the sent, are fellow-laborers and copartners with the senders. And in reference to them and their field, we would adopt the language of the apostle: "For I mean not that other men be eased and ye burdened: but by an equality, that now at this time your abundance may be a supply for their want, that their abundance also may be a supply for your want, that there may be equality."

To conclude. When the church of Jesus Christ shall "remember them that are in bonds as bound with them," shall share in the wants as well as sympathise in the sorrows of the missionary, according to the meaning of these words, then the philosophy of missions will be fully understood; and the land—the world—will be converted to God. Amen.

ARTICLE V.

EXPOSITION OF ROMANS 7: 7-24.

Translated from Olshausen's Commentary.

BEFORE we take up in detail this remarkable passage, so important both in a speculative and practical point of view, some general questions demand our consideration, on the answer to which, the meaning given to the whole passage must, in a great measure, depend. *Does Paul here speak in his own person or not?* and is he describing the experience of a regenerate or an unregenerate person?

In regard to the first question, it is evident that Paul could

not possibly have made use of the first person in this description, had there been absolutely *no* analogy between the state he was describing and his own ; had he designed to represent himself as an exception to his remarks. On the other hand, it is equally clear that he cannot intend to speak of himself *only*, since his aim is to instruct his readers relative to their own wants. Rather is it true that in his experiences those of the mass of men are to be found reflected. We must express the matter by saying that Paul does indeed speak of himself ; but only of himself as a sharer in human nature, as a *man* ; not of his individual, personal experience.

Little is gained, however, by this result, unless we can determine to what period of his life the apostle refers. This question falls in with the other highly important one, whether he is describing the state of a renewed or of an unrenewed person. The verses 7-13 relate, according to the opinion of all interpreters, to the period *before* regeneration, as is sufficiently indicated by the use of the aorist. But whether verses 14-24 are likewise to be applied to the state before regeneration, is very doubtful, as Paul here changes to the present ; and the aorist is not resumed until chapter 8: 2. The question is indeed a difficult one, for, in the first place, it relates entirely to internal goings-on, which cannot be rightly understood without analogous experiences, and a clear-sighted consciousness ; and in the second place, the influence of false tendencies in doctrine has confused the inquiry. Pelagian blindness to moral relations, as well as Donatistic rigor, find it easy to assert that there can be no reference to a renewed state, otherwise there would be no mention of sin. Lax moralists or hypocrites, on the other hand, found it convenient to assert that Paul was describing the state of the regenerate ; among whom they, notwithstanding their moral corruption, fondly classed themselves.

Besides these opposite false directions, the most pious and learned members of the church have understood this passage differently, according as they were accustomed to estimate more or less human depravity, and thence to judge differently

of the effects of the new birth. It cannot, therefore, surprise us to find the names of Origen, Chrysostom and Theodoret among those who refer the passage to a state prior to regeneration ; since the oriental church always inclined to Pelagianism. Even Augustine was at first found on this side ; but the further development of his system led him to adopt the opposite view—that, namely, which makes Paul describe the state of the regenerate. He was followed, not merely by the most distinguished theologians of the middle ages, Anselm and Thomas Aquinas, but by the reformers, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, and Beza. Only since Spener, Francke, Bengel, Gottfried Arnold, and Zinzendorf, has there been a return to the interpretation which makes Paul speak of the state before regeneration, and this interpretation is adopted by Stier, Tholuck and Ruckert.

These theologians, however, admit, with justice, that there is an element of truth in the Augustinian view. For there are moments in the life of the believer in which he must adopt the language here used by Paul. Moreover, the plastic power of the gospel penetrates only by degrees the different tendencies of the inner life, so that similar developments manifest themselves through the believer's whole course ; and this leads to the thought that both views may find a point of coincidence in one higher than either. And it might safely be presumed that men like Augustine and the Reformers would not go *wholly* astray in the interpretation of so remarkable a passage. A further development of the connection will perhaps enable us to discover how such different interpretations have arisen, as well as to determine what is the element of truth, and what of error, in each.

In the first place, it is obvious that the apostle designs to give a complete picture of the successive steps of development in the Christian life, from its beginning to its perfection. In vs. 7-9, he sets out from a point where man lives wholly without law, and concludes, in the eighth chapter, with the glorification of the body. Here the question arises, How many steps are distinctly marked in this process ? Indisputa-

bly four. *First*, a state without law, in which sin is dead ; *secondly*, a life under the law, in which sin is alive, and reigns ; *thirdly*, a state in which, through the strength of Christ, the spirit rules, and sin is kept under ; and *lastly*, the state of entire freedom from sin, through the glorification of the body. If, therefore, we choose to understand regeneration as including the first motions of grace in the soul, the whole description may be applied to the regenerate ; since even in its earliest stage, the attention is directed to the law, through grace. It is assuredly, however, more correct and consonant with Scripture to call that process only a new birth, in which, after the sense of need has been awakened, spiritual strength is so infused into the soul by Christ, that a new man begins to exist, and henceforth exercises supreme sway in the soul. Consistently with this explanation, the state under the law cannot coexist with the new birth ; and it thence follows that since v. 24 expresses the need of redemption, and v. 25 the experience of it, the whole passage (14-24) refers to a state prior to regeneration, and describes the conflict in the breast of a convicted sinner.

The fact that Paul in this section makes use of the present, while in the preceding and following context he employs the aorist, suggests the thought, that he does not intend to consider this state of conflict, as one quite separate and distinct from that of the new birth. There is likewise in the description itself (14-24) a visible *progress* in the battle with sin ; the better *I* gains the ascendancy, and the delight in God's law gradually increases. In a far higher degree is this the case, as expressed in verse 25, *after* the experience of the redemptive power of Christ ; where the renewed man is described as mostly victorious over sin. But the contest continues even *after* regeneration ; and it is evident from express declarations of Scripture, (compare 1 John 2 : 1,) that the new man does not *always* come off victorious ; that he has seasons of being assaulted and tempted, yea, most bitterly assaulted. The same truth is confirmed by what is revealed respecting the lives of the apostles, and by the experience of

good men in all ages. If we likewise reflect that, in proportion as the life of faith advances, the spiritual vision becomes sharpened to discern the motions of sin, and the conscience is quickened so as to reprove sharply deviations which, at a lower point of spiritual progress, would have been unnoticed ; if we reflect on this fact, we cannot but admit that Augustine and the fathers who followed him were right in asserting, that even a regenerate person could and must employ the language of Paul, vs. 14-24. Perhaps the least exceptionable mode of representing the point is this. Paul in this passage (14-24) has a *primary* reference to the state of the unregenerate, designing to carry on the description connectedly, through all the progressive steps of the Christian life ; but, conscious that similar experiences occur in the history of the regenerate soul, his description applies to that likewise. Equally erroneous then are the two assertions ; on the one hand, that Paul primarily and immediately refers to the renewed soul, and on the other, that nothing can be found in the experience of such a soul answering to this description. The difference between the conflict and defeat of the regenerate, and the conflict and defeat of the unregenerate is so great, objectively, (see vs. 24, 25,) notwithstanding the subjective consciousness of their near relationship, as to take away all just ground of apprehension that the new birth, by the proposed view, will be robbed of its essential characteristics.

If we now return to the first question, viz., at what period of his life Paul could have used this language respecting himself, it is plain that this could not have been subsequent to the Lord's appearance to him at Damascus, but that he speaks of his inward conflicts while under the yoke of the law. At the same time, the change to the present tense indicates that even in his state at the time of writing, he found analogies to the former which recalled it, though in far nicer applications, and finer relations : "What I would, that do I not, and what I would not, that do I.—O wretched man that I am ! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death !" (Compare 2 Cor. 12 : 7.)

PARTICULAR COMMENTARY.

Vs. 7, 8. The first two verses of this passage contain the general ground-thought, briefly expressed, which verse 9 develops more fully. The apostle is describing the relation of sin to the *law*, as the means of bringing sin out into manifestation. It is in human nature, apart from the law ; but only through the law does it manifest itself, and thus become an object of consciousness. It does not, however, thence follow that the law has a sinful character ; on the contrary, it is *holy, just, and good*, as the expression of the holy will of God, of whose eternal, unchangeable nature it partakes. (Ps. 119 : 96.) Its tendency is to *life* only ; sin perverts it to death. (Compare verse 10, with Lev. 18 : 5. Deut. 5 : 16, 38.) What the apostle here asserts is true, then, by no means of the ceremonial law exclusively, but of the *moral law*, universally ; in all the forms of its revelation, to heathens, Jews, and Christians. It is characteristic of this law, taken as a whole, that it offers a barrier against which the tide of sin breaks, and thence rages the more ; it hems in the stream of sensual desire by a positive command, (*ἐντολή*), and thus drives it to overleap the command ; whereby man becomes sensible of his inward condition.

Peculiar in these verses is the relation in which Paul places *ἁμαρτία* and *ἐπιθυμία*. At the first glance it appears as if he regarded *ἐπιθυμία* as the first, *ἁμαρτία* as flowing from it. In the sinful *act* this is the true relation ; the bad desire is the mother of the bad deed. (James 1 : 15.) But *ἁμαρτία* expresses here the sinful state in general, which comes into manifestation only in the concrete ; and here the relation is reversed. From the universally depraved nature of man proceeds the *ἐπιθυμία*, *prava concupiscentia*, as its first manifestation ; and then follows the act. On a more careful examination of the words of the apostle, it becomes evident that this is the relation of *ἁμαρτία* to *ἐπιθυμία* which he wishes to express. From the inner depravity, evil desire in all its forms (*πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν*) flows forth and rises against the law, (*κατ-*

εὐγάσατο ἐν ἐμοί,) and the divine command against such desire, or lust, discloses to man his corruption. Paul is not then speaking of a manifestation of the desire in *action*. *The evil desire* itself is sinful, and is forbidden in the law ; and a man may become conscious of his depravity through the strength of this lust, even if it should never break out into open act ; which, however, is commonly the case. The οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, therefore, is not, as Tholuck interprets, to be understood with an “*et cetera*,” as if Paul selected, by way of example, one command out of many ; but it is to be understood as an epitome of the whole law. All the commandments, in their positive application, may be reduced to one, Love God supremely : negatively they all say, Lust not ; that is, do not place your love on any thing created, not even on yourself ; but only on the Eternal One.¹ For ἐπιθυμία is not desire, in itself, pleasure in this thing or that,—since a perfect man might enjoy the highest and purest pleasure in all the works of God,—but pleasure in separation from God, love estranged from God and fixed on self. The command οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, therefore, means nothing less than that man should surrender himself, with all his selfish desires and joys. But this surrender is impossible without regeneration, whence man can never, as the apostle goes on to show, attain to rest through the law. He needs a Redeemer from himself. (v. 24.) —(In verse 8, διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς should be connected with ἀφορμὴν λαβούσα, rather than with what follows ; in order the more clearly to exhibit the peculiar effect of the law.)

Vs. 9, 10. The apostle here proceeds, after having expressed his main thought in general terms, to trace the steps of progress from the very beginning ; going back to the state

¹ Paul takes no note of the circumstance, as one of rarer occurrence, that likewise the very dread of sin may plunge one into sin, if the shield of faith be wanting. Evil thoughts, which fill the mind with horror, may, by reason of this very horror destroying the self-possession, lead into sin. Criminal histories furnish not unfrequent examples of this. In such cases, however, we may safely presume, perhaps without exception, either a previous state of moral corruption, or a diseased state of mind and body.

in which sin is dead, and man lives *without law*. This unconscious or unreflecting state is broken in upon and destroyed by the law. But it may be asked how such a state, *without law*, is conceivable; since the apostle is not speaking of infants, and there is no stage of human life, except infancy, of which it can be said in a strict sense, that man is therein without law, and sin without activity. In explanation of this difficulty it may be remarked that the apostle, throughout this whole representation, is not thinking of *crimes*, and those open transgressions which fall under the notice of the civil magistrate, and draw down the contempt of men; for such the law is able perfectly to restrain; and man is able to perform the so-called *opera civilia*, or *justitiæ externa* in his own strength. To men, however, who render such an outward obedience to law, all laws and ordinances appear only as political, or at least as merely human regulations, and their obedience is entirely without reference to God. They avoid sin on account of its disagreeable outward consequences, not because God has forbidden it, (and truly, even this is better than that recklessness which does not shun the consequences of sin,) and do not obey the rules of absolute and universal rectitude. Of such persons Paul is not here speaking. He is describing the moment when man first perceives his relation to God, not in an abstract and speculative manner, but in its power and import, and learns to regard all the commands of the law as *divine*; that is, as absolute commands. The whole period antecedent to this point, Paul characterizes as a life without law, in which *sin is dead*.

Thus explained, it is evident that we are not to think of this first limit as one that is over-passed in a moment; and the same remark may be extended to the subsequent steps. It is true that, in most cases, the recognition of the law, as the will of the absolutely holy God, is the act of a moment, and offers a broad line of distinction between the earlier and later life. But the light which has then dawned, diffuses itself gradually through the regions of the soul, and they who have made some progress can yet experience the fact, in regard to certain isolated precepts, that they have been living without

law, since in those particulars they had never become vitally conscious of the necessity that the divine law should be brought home to them. Hence is obvious the meaning we are to attach to the expression, *χωρὶς νόμον ἁμαρτία νεκρά*. By sin being dead is not meant that it is absolutely inactive, for it is a distorted *life*, and as such must manifest itself, even though it should be only negatively, through the absence of fear and love to God. But it is in so far dead without law, that it cannot be known, in its nature and magnitude, without the light of the law to illumine its darkness. Accompanying this disclosure of sin there is, too, an increase of its power; first, because the knowledge of the law calls forth an opposition through which the wild force of the natural life is strengthened, (v. 13;) and, secondly, because sin brought forth into consciousness is like the germ awakened from slumber, which strives to expand itself more and more. The self-will of man rises up against the barrier thus opposed to it; the desire of knowledge perverted into curiosity, burns to taste the forbidden fruit, and thus sin attains its utmost development through the law, in the workings of lust, provided that it does not (as seldom happens) break out into open crimes. (This process is so much a matter of experience, that it is alluded to in the Old Testament, Prov. 9: 17, and even by profane writers. Compare the well-known passage of Ovid, Amor, III. 4, "*nitimur in vetitum semper, cupimusque negata*.)

¹ To this quickening of sin the apostle joins the dying of

¹ I believe it to be the case that, in some men, the contest assumes quite a different form. With some, sin is alive from the beginning, and the better *I* appears to sleep. The process of conversion in such persons is such that the contest first begins when the *I* slumbering within is awakened, and opposes itself to the sinful element which had before reigned unresisted. Paul's description is not, therefore, to be understood as if every conversion must necessarily take place after this model, for experience shows that in the life of some converted persons, e. g. Spener and Zinzendorf, no such dividing point occurred, as Paul describes v. 24. Such instances, however, are probably confined to the church; among Pagans and Jews, of whom the apostle was thinking, conversion must necessarily occur somewhat as Paul has described it, because with them there could be no continuing in the grace bestowed at baptism, [*What is this grace?*

the *I*, the better self, whence it appears as if this better self had been alive, just before the entrance of the law, and had been the governing power. The entrance of the law, then, would appear to occasion a retrogression to the worse, rather than an advance to the better. And in fact this is Paul's meaning, as verse 13 plainly shows ; but the retrogression is only apparent, like the coming out of a hidden disease. As this is the only condition of cure, so the manifestation of sin is necessary to redemption from it. The relatively better condition of freedom from violent passions, accompanied by a certain easy good-nature, exists only in appearance, having no true basis, and disappearing at the approach of temptation. But again, I remark that this manifestation of the sinful nature is not to be understood of those open crimes, which a man, at whatever stage of progress, must and can abstain from by his own efforts ; but of those inward motions and more subtle evidences of sin, which do not fall under human observation. It is, indeed, possible for the grossest sinner, if the law awakes in him, through repentance and faith to secure the blessings of redemption ; but he cannot make use of this passage to justify himself in his crimes. The actual thief or adulterer cannot excuse himself by an appeal to the sinful nature in obedience to which he *was obliged* so to sin, for he might have refrained from the *act*, however impossible it might be to him, in his own strength, to banish the desire. It is of this inward strength of lust that the apostle speaks.

Vs. 11-13. Paul dwells awhile on this thought, and insists on the holiness of the law as an expression of the will of a holy God ; so that the *cause* of its inflaming power over the sinful desires, is sin itself. The law is only the innocent occasion, the *conditio sine qua non* ;—the *causa efficiens* is the sinfulness of man. This appears consequently as something foreign to man, and deceiving him, with reference to the narrative in the third chapter of Genesis. This relation of the

Ed], and consequently with them conversion must manifest itself as the work of a moment, namely, as an entrance into the community of believers.

ἐγὼ to ἁμαρτία is of the highest importance to the understanding of what follows, and of biblical anthropology generally. Sin is not the essence, the substance of human nature ; (for evil universally is nothing substantial, or positive ; it is only the *disharmony*, the confounding of relations originally appointed by God ;) rather has the germ of the divine image remained even in fallen man, and it is this germ which grace, in its beginning, has to work upon. (Comp. Rom. 2 : 14, 15.) This better life-germ, however, appears in man's natural state, when sin is active, as kept under by another force, and its true nature obscured and hidden ; while the efficacy of grace is shown in restoring it to its supremacy. Sin, therefore, is not to be regarded as a series of isolated sinful acts ; nor is goodness a series of isolated good deeds ; but both, good and evil, are *elements of life*. Consequently, when either appears in the life of an individual it is the one or the other element, light or darkness, the Lord of light or the prince of darkness, that is exercising authority. Thus it is said, 1 John 3 : 8, ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστίν.

The dominion of sin is represented as ἀπατή, because the soul, the *I*, hopes to find in sin true joy and lasting peace, but is deceived in the expectation. Sin, as a disharmony, can never satisfy the thirst for eternal joy which is implanted in the soul, for it brings in its train disgust and weariness. The law, therefore, fulfils one of its weightiest aims in unveiling this deception to man's consciousness ; it discloses the hidden nature of sin, (ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία ;) it even stirs it up to more open manifestations, in order more effectually to lead the soul to abhor it, and to turn all its affections and desires toward the good, which, as an inward harmony, satisfies the longing for immortality. The words ἵνα γένηται καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρτωλὸς ἡ ἁμαρτία are not, therefore, to be interpreted as meaning any thing less than the plain sense of the words indicates ; that *the commandment increases the strength of sin*. As a rapid river, so long as no obstacle opposes it, flows quietly on, but foams and rages so soon as it meets with an obstruction, so the sinful element in man flows quietly through

him while he does not attempt to restrain it ; but so soon as he seeks to fulfil the divine law, he begins to feel the might of the element whose sway he had not before suspected. (*Καθ' ὑπερβολήν*, equivalent to *ὑπερβαλλόντως*, is often used by Paul. Comp. 1 Cor. 12: 31. 2 Cor. 1: 8. 4: 17. Gal. 1: 13. The phrase is employed in the same sense by later profane writers. The second *ἵνα* is parallel to the first; it merely renders the latter clause more forcible and emphatic.)

V. 14. Here the purely objective, divine nature of the law (*πνευματικός* expresses that which proceeds from God, from the *πνεῦμα*, John 4: 24) is opposed to the fleshly state of man. The spirit and the flesh lust against each other. (Gal. 5: 7.) Hence there is opposition between the *I* and the law; the *I* wishes to be its own law-maker. There is no break in the chain of thought here, the apostle does not pass over to a new representation; yet the change of tense from the past to the present, which is preserved to the end of the chapter, must by no means be overlooked. This change indicates a generalizing of the relations. In what follows Paul considers man in himself, at every step of progress, a conflict with the law; and in so far as the old man remains, even after regeneration, in so far the description, as above remarked, is true likewise of the regenerate. But here the question presents itself how the word *σάρξ*, and its derivative *σαρκικός*, are to be interpreted. Schleusner reckoned not less than sixteen significations of *σάρξ*; Bretschneider and Wahl reduced the number to seven; but none of their explanations make it evident how one of these meanings is derived from the others. The following may be regarded as a hasty sketch of the progress of development of the different meanings of the word.

Σάρξ, *רֶפֶשׁ*, indicates, primarily, the substance of the flesh, so far as it belongs to the living organization; as dead, it is called *κρέας*. In this sense, as the substance of the *σῶμα*, *flesh* and *bones* are often conjoined, (Luke 24: 39. Eph. 5: 20,) in order strongly to mark the thing spoken of. This nearest sensuous ground-meaning is applied by the Holy

Spirit to spiritual relations in a twofold manner. *First*, the flesh is regarded as the visible covering of the spirit, and in so far, *σάρξ* appears as equivalent to *γράφμα*, the covering of the spirit in the Scripture, or to *φανερών*, in opposition to *κρυπτόν*. (Rom. 2: 28, 29. Col. 2: 1, 5. Heb. 9: 10.) It designates the outward, the outside, the form, in contradistinction from the being, the substance; thus it expresses the perishable and the transient in man, as opposed to the immortal, indestructible spirit which dwells in him. This view is prominent in the phrases *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα*, Matt. 16: 17. 1 Cor. 15: 50. Eph. 6: 12, and *πᾶσα σὰρξ*, Luke 3: 6. John 3: 6. 1 Pet. 1: 24, as expressive of the destructible and temporary in humanity. With the idea of punishableness is associated that of *sinfulness*, for the latter is the cause of the former. With sin, death forced its way into the world, and mortality is only a wide-spread death. Hence *σάρξ* is used, especially in the epistles to the Romans and Galatians, as equivalent to sinfulness, and we meet with the expressions, *ἐπιθυμίαις σαρκός*, Eph. 2: 3. 1 John 2: 18. 2 Pet. 2: 18; *ροῦς σαρκός*, Col. 2: 18; *σῶμα σαρκός*, Col. 2: 11, (compare Sirach, 23: 23,) and many others.

These expressions are not, however, to be so construed as if the writers of Scripture regarded sin as merely grounded in the bodily appetites, as the predominance of sensuality. The *σάρξ* is rather to be understood as *the whole sensitive life*, with all its desires and senses; for without the enlivening *ψυχὴ* (which is to be carefully separated from *πνεῦμα*) the *σάρξ* cannot commit sin. Further, it is quite proper that *σάρξ* should be restricted to the designation of *human* sin, since the sin of the evil spirits has an entirely different character. It is founded in their spiritual nature, and on that very account irremediable; while in the natural man, sin has pervaded only the sensitive and bodily natures; the spirit, enslaved or troubled by sin, may be spotted, but sin is not in its essence. When in the case of any man sin takes possession of the spirit itself, and goes out therefrom, that man is on the road to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence may easily be explained the use of the adjectives *σαρκικός* and *σαρκινός*. The

latter (whose occurrence is indubitable only in one passage, 2 Cor. 3 : 3) answers to the word *fleshy*, (*fleischig*,) the former corresponds to *fleshly*. In later Greek the two forms are used interchangeably, and on this account many variations are found in the readings. In the New Testament, however, with the exception of the one passage above cited, *σαρκικός* may every where be read. This form now indicates as well the merely outward (Rom. 15 : 27. 1 Cor. 9 : 11) as likewise the perishable and thence sinful; the last idea being the prominent one in the passage we are considering. The *ἐγώ*, namely, is called *σαρκικός* in so far as it is under the dominion of sin, not in so far as it has sin in its essence; for in the course of the subsequent representation of the apostle, it appears as again set free from the strange yoke, as before the reviving of sin it had been relatively free. To the same point we are led by the expression *πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, at the ground of which lies the image of a man sold into slavery and desiring freedom. For he only who is *free* can become a slave, and becomes again free when he is released from bondage. Truly he cannot release *himself*, but needs a redeemer, and thereto tends the conclusion of the apostle, v. 24. Consequently, the regenerate man can make use of the expression *σαρκικός εἰμι*, since he, if only for moments, finds himself under the dominion of the *σάρξ*.

(The reading *οἶδαμεν* is unquestionably to be preferred to *οἶδα μὲν*, which has no support from MSS., and has plainly arisen from remarking that elsewhere throughout the passage the singular is employed. But the plural was necessary here, at this turning-point of the whole investigation, because the apostle would indicate that he is describing not merely individual experiences, but those which are universal.)

Vs. 15-20. The thought which the apostle had before expressed in a general form, *σαρκικός εἰμι*, he goes on to expand more experimentally; and describes in a most vivid manner the tossings hither and thither of the thoughts and desires, when the soul is tempted and battling against temptation. The repetition of the same words (in ver. 19 ver. 15 is repeated, and ver. 20 is identical with ver. 16) gives a very strong

impression of the *cheerless monotony* of this inward struggle before a higher, tranquilizing power has revealed itself in the soul. Nor is this repetition to be considered by any means as aimless ; on the contrary it should lead to a growing consciousness of the strength of sin, and thence to a more earnest longing for redemption. In the progress of the contest, the advance is likewise indicated by a more conscious separation of the better *I* from sin ; which advance the apostle shows, not only by the increasing strength of the expressions of joy in the divine law, but also by the sharper distinction between the old man and the new just beginning to be formed, and between the law of sin and the law of the spirit.

For the rest, it must not be overlooked that the apostle is not here speaking of those crimes which are punished by human tribunals ; so that no murderer, nor adulterer, nor other flagrant sinner can say, "I do what I would not, and I cannot help it." To such an one the apostle would answer, "Thou hypocrite ! thou canst well help committing the *deed*, if thou usest only the natural strength which God has given thee." The whole passage relates to the inner man, and to minor transgressions of the law, e. g. through a hasty word. Thence has it its truth for the regenerate, with whom temptations to gross sins do not find entrance. But since in him conscience is more enlightened and severe, a small sin is less excusable in his estimation than a gross one had formerly been : and he stands as much in need of *daily* repentance, and renewed pardon, as does the unregenerate of a *first* repentance.

The passage still demands an explanation of the relation held by the two *I*s, of whom Paul speaks, to the *unity of the personality*. The one *I* wills what is good, approves the law (ver. 16 *σύνεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ*), yea, delights in it, (ver. 22 *συνίδομαι τῷ νόμῳ*) ; the other sins notwithstanding ; that is to say, it nourishes the desire of sin, the unholy lust, even if the other *I* prevents it from breaking out into overt acts.¹ Our Lord

¹ Bengel excellently remarks on this point ; *Assensus hominis legi contra semet ipsum praestitus, illustris character est religionis, magnum testimonium de Deo.*

adopts a similar mode of representation when he speaks (Matt. 10 : 39) of a *double* ψυχή, one of which must die, if the other is to be saved. According to the common representations of the soul, as a something shut up in itself, bringing forth good or evil at pleasure, this mode of expression is difficult to be explained. It becomes quite clear, however, if we conceive of the soul, as a receptive nature, penetrated by the forces of light and of darkness, which strive together for mastery. In the better *I*, light gains the ascendancy, in the sinful, darkness ; and thus man recognizes in the unity of his life the duplicity of the warring elements, which mirror their nature in him. He has not two souls, but the unity becomes duplicity through the forces at work in it. By a total surrender of himself to one or the other, he passes over into its nature. Even before Christ, experience guided to the consciousness of such an inward duplicity. Besides the well-known *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor* of Ovid (Metamor. vii. 19), and besides the remark of Epictetus, ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ὁ μὲν θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ, καὶ ὁ μὴ θέλει ποιεῖ (Enchir. ii. 26), the passage in Xenophon is particularly noteworthy (Cyro. vi. 1. 21), in which two souls are expressly distinguished, with the very just observation that the phenomenon of an inward strife, and an alternate attraction to the right and the wrong, cannot be explained by saying that the same soul inclines now to good and now to evil, for in the *very instant* when one is chosen, there is a drawing toward the other.

Plainly, however, the willing of the good before regeneration, can be regarded only as the gradually unfolding power of the free will, as a *preparation* for true freedom, as simple *velleitas*. For this θέλει can manifest itself only negatively, by hindering, so far as it is able, the outbreak of sin into the overt act ; but so soon as a man has become conscious that the wrong *desire* is sin, he feels that his willing is not strong enough to overcome such desires, any more than it is able to call forth holy emotions and a desire for holiness, in his heart. In ver. 15 the οὐ γινώσκω is not to be rendered, according to Augustine and Grotius, “ I allow it not ;” the meaning which

Reiche likewise defends. In general, it is true, the ideas of *knowing* and of *approving* run into each other; but here the connection forbids the understanding of the latter meaning, because a tautology would result from it, since *θέλει* expresses the same thing. Those who have adopted this interpretation have been led to it by observing that the speaker appears to know well what he does, as it is said in ver. 18: *οἶδα γὰρ, κ. τ. λ.* But they overlook the fact that though the apostle knows the *existence* of the inward struggle, he is ignorant of its *cause*; or at least at the point of inward development which he is describing, represents the person speaking as thus ignorant. So it is said, John 3: 8, of the regenerating Spirit, "Thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence he cometh and whither he goeth." Ver. 16, *σύμφημι* is weaker than the following *συνήδομαι*, which is to be carefully distinguished from *ἐφήδομαι*, expressive of malicious joy. Both words are found here only in the New Testament. In ver. 17, *ννί* is not to be understood of time, as if the present were contrasted with an earlier time, but is to be rendered, *therefore*. * * *

V. 21-23. The duplicity in man's inner being alluded to in the preceding verses is here described more minutely. Paul distinguishes the *ἴσω ἄνθρωπος* (Eph. 3: 16) from the *ἕξω ἄνθρωπος*, (2 Cor. 4: 16). Parallel to the former he uses *νοῦς*, to the latter, *σὰρξ* or *μέλη*. In and for themselves considered, these expressions are *not* synonymous with *καινὸς ἄνθρωπος* (Eph. 2: 15. 4: 10, 23), or *καινὴ κτίσις* (Gal. 6: 15. 2 Cor. 5: 17), and *παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος* (Rom. 6: 6. Eph. 4: 22. Col. 3: 9). For the last three formulas relate exclusively to the begetting of the new man in regeneration (John 1: 13). An inner man, a *πνεῦμα* or *νοῦς*, or as Peter says (1 Peter 3: 4) a *κρυπτὸς ἄνθρωπος τῆς καρδίας*, every man has by nature. In so far, however, as the transformation which takes place at the new birth begins in the *πνεῦμα* or *νοῦς* of the natural man, and the *inner* man is the condition, we might almost say the mother, of the *new* man, in so far the two significations meet. And although in this passage the *primary* reference is not to the state of the regenerate, yet has the

description, with the above-mentioned modifications, its truth likewise for this condition. The relation of πνεῦμα or νοῦς to σὰρξ or μέλη, can however be properly understood, only by the aid of the trichotomy in human nature; the idea of which forms the basis of the apostle's representation. From the sharp contrast in which Paul places the two parts of man mentioned by him, their unity would be wholly destroyed, if we could not from other writers (especially 1 Thess. 5: 23 and Heb. 4: 12) supply the third part, viz., the ψυχή; by means of which man becomes conscious of the νοῦς and the σὰρξ as *his*, and which must therefore be considered as the peculiar centre of the personality. In the πνεῦμα (which is comprehended in the νοῦς as a faculty or power), is represented the connection of the ψυχή with the higher world of spirit; in the σὰρξ its connection with the creature. In the natural man the spiritual potency of the νοῦς is weakened (2 Cor. 7: 1), as even the συνείδησις can be defiled (Titus 1: 15), on which account man needs the πνεῦμα ἅγιον, the absolutely pure and supreme Spirit, in order to make him perfect. Nevertheless, the νοῦς, though darkened, furnishes to the natural man an inward light, which gives him a certain degree of *insight*. A continued striving against this light wholly extinguishes it, and all spiritual strength is lost. (Matth. 6: 23. Jude 19.)

The apostle goes on to speak of a νόμος τοῦ νοός, that is to say, of a law of which man becomes conscious through the νοῦς. This law, the demands of which he is sensible he shall not be able to satisfy, is not one which he gives to himself, as his own law-maker; but God gives it to him *through* the νοῦς, as the receptive organ for the divine workings. It is not needful to separate these two laws, as Tholuck has done; they are throughout identical, and are distinguished from each other only with reference to their nearer or more remote source. In the same manner νόμος τοῦ διαβόλου might be substituted for the νόμος τῆς ἀμαρτίας, or νόμος τῆς σαρκός; since the more remote causes of the manifestations of sin in men, must be thought of as connected with the kingdom of

darkness and the princes thereof. But when a law is ascribed to sin, which is in its nature contrary to law, it is in order to indicate that in the progress of sin, no less than in that of goodness, there is a constant advance, an unceasing pressure forward. We might say that in the region of sin the law is the reverse of that which exists in the good ; for as in the good there is a law of attraction from above, so in the bad there is a constant law of attraction downward. Nothing is more dangerous and erroneous than the opinion that a bad act can exist isolated ; so that a man may commit this or that wrong thing, and then cease. All evil hangs together like the links of a chain, and every sin increases the power of the indwelling corruption in a fearful progression ; until before the man forebodes it, he totters, and is drawn down into the gulf below. Even in like manner grows the good, and every slight victory increases the force of the attraction by which it is drawn upwards.

These two forces, then, wage war in the *ψυχή* as their battle-ground. The *I* has an insight into the better, has also the *θέλω*, a certain *velleitas* to do it, but the *κατεργάζεσθαι* is wanting (ver. 18). Man's inward power to act, which proceeds from the *πνεῦμα*, is lamed ; the *I* becomes a prisoner of sin (ver. 23), a slave in its own house. (No stress is to be laid on the expression *ἡ ἁμαρτία οἰκεῖ, τὸ θέλει παράκειται*, ver. 18, 20, 21, as if *οἰκεῖν* expressed a permanent inherence, *παράκεισθαι* a more remote relation, for in ver. 21 *παράκεισθαι* is used also in speaking of sin. The expression *οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία*, ver. 17, is more precisely marked in ver. 18, by *οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου ἀγαθόν*. The *οὐκ ἀγαθόν* equivalent to *κακόν*, ver. 19, answers to *ἁμαρτία*, conceived of as a state or condition ; but sin is transferred from the nobler, higher faculty in man, the *νοῦς*, to the lower, the *ψυχὴ σαρκική*, or the *σὰρξ ψυχική* (com. ver. 14). The lower faculty pollutes the higher, and restrains its activity, but this higher has no law of disharmony in itself. That is the case of the evil spirits alone, and of men, when by persisting in sin they have killed the spirit itself.—*Καλόν* is used like the Hellenic *καλόν καγαθόν* in

a moral-aesthetic sense. Of similar meaning is $\pi\eta\gamma\eta$ when employed in a moral signification, Ec. 3: 11.—Ver. 21. As to the difficulty in the construction of this verse, none of the many attempts which have been made to solve it, have been perfectly successful; an anakoluthon must be supposed. In the interpretation, we must take the leading idea, $\nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\varsigma$, as a clue. This cannot possibly have a different meaning in ver. 21, from that which it has ver. 22, 23, as the law of God. On this account the accusative, $\tau\acute{o}\nu \nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\nu$, must not be connected with $\epsilon\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\kappa\omega$, as its object, but with $\tau\tilde{\omega} \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\nu\tau\iota \epsilon\mu\acute{o}\iota \pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$. This construction, which is defended by Knapp, appears, it is true, somewhat harsh, with respect to $\tau\acute{o} \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\nu$ ¹ (for which Knapp proposes to read $\tau\acute{o}\nu \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\nu$, a useless change), and to the repeated $\epsilon\mu\acute{o}\iota$. The most simple mode of constructing the sentence would have been, $\epsilon\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\kappa\omega \acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha, \acute{o}\tau\iota \epsilon\mu\acute{o}\iota, \tau\tilde{\omega} \tau\acute{o}\nu \nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\nu \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\nu\tau\iota \pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu, \tau\acute{o} \kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{o}\nu \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\iota$. But having placed the accusative too early in the sentence, the apostle could not regularly construct the remainder. The thought is not, however, materially affected by the different readings.—Ver. 23. $\alpha\acute{\iota}\chi\mu\alpha\lambda\omega\tau\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega$, as $\alpha\acute{\iota}\chi\mu\alpha\lambda\omega\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omega$ (2 Tim. 3: 6), belongs to the later Greek and to the Alexandrian dialect. Com. Phrynicius of Lobeck, p. 442.)

V. 24. Thus has Paul reached the peculiar turning-point in the inner spiritual life, the perfectly developed sense of the need of redemption, the point of separation between the law and the gospel. The law has accomplished its work when it has awakened repentance, and despair of attaining true holiness, internal and external, by personal efforts (Rom. 3: 20); and thus has become $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\acute{o}\varsigma \epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma \chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}\nu$, Gal. 3: 24. All that appears surprising is, that the man, crying out from the deepest longing after redemption, does not desire this redemption from sin, or from the law of sin; but from the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha \tau\omicron\upsilon \theta\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\nu = \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha \theta\nu\eta\tau\acute{o}\nu$.² All explanations of this passage

¹ The $\tau\acute{o} \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\nu$ must be regarded as redundant, unless, with Homberg, we extend the meaning of $\nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\nu$, or with Hemsterhuis, that of $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\nu$; for which there are no critical authorities. Comp. Knapp. scr. v. arg. 437.

² Could a point be shown in the preceding description which might be

which leave out of view the corporeity, must necessarily be false, since they disagree with the plain assertions of the apostle in what has gone before, respecting the *σάρξ* and the *μῆλαί* (com. 6 : 12. 7 : 18, 23, 25). Paul does not, however, as has been already remarked, conceive of the *σάρξ* or the *σῶμα* in a Manichæan mode, as sinful in itself ; but in so far as the *σῶμα* is necessarily connected with the physical life of man, and as a portion of the material world stands exposed to its wild and unruly forces, in so far the apostle says, *ἡ ἁμαρτία οἰκεῖ ἐν τῇ σ'ρχί*. He wishes, therefore, not to be redeemed from the body in itself (rather does he long to be clothed upon with that true, heavenly body, 2 Cor. 5) ; but only from the *mortal* body ; in other words, that body which, by reason of sin, has become the property of corruption ; so that he may become alive through the Spirit. (Comp. on Rom. 8 : 11.)

It is plainly to be seen, moreover, from this passage, that Paul, as we have already remarked, teaches the depravity of human nature, yet recognizes in man the remains of the divine image, to which the renewing grace of the Spirit attaches itself. Man has not become, through hereditary transgression, a *πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον*, like the evil spirits ; but through the disobedient will of the *ψυχῇ*, the corporeal part of man first becomes subjected to the mere life of nature and its rough forces ;¹ this reacting upon the *πνεῦμα*, hinders and troubles

considered as the experience of the redemption of Christ in the spirit, and could this whole passage be primarily explained of the regenerate, then ver. 24 might be interpreted to mean, " Would that, since I am redeemed in spirit, my body might also be glorified ! " But this would represent redemption as perfectly completed in the spirit, and needing to be perfected only for the body ; whereas, according to the Bible, it needs to be constantly renewed, for the spirit as for the whole man.

¹ It is true that the Bible knows nothing of the heathenish notion of the body as the prison of the soul ; rather is it its necessary organ, on which account, at the highest point of perfection, the body reappears, only in a glorified form. Without a body, the state of the soul would be an imperfect one. Comp. on the relation of the body to the soul, Seneca (Epis. 65), who expresses himself thereupon in a manner approaching to the Christian view.

it. The *πνεῦμα*, however, retains a certain degree of light and of beneficial influence, whereof, even in heathendom, relatively noble deeds have been the result. But this natural light, together with the natural strength of will, is not sufficient for the annihilation of sin, and the production of that true inward holiness which is demanded by the divine law. Man, therefore, needs a Redeemer, through whom he may recover the whole fulness of the primal spiritual energies, which being recovered, first purify the *ψυχή*, and at length glorify even the *σῶμα*. As the lusts of the flesh strive from below against the *ψυχή*, so the energy of the spirit purifies it from above, and thence it is necessary that sanctification begin with the crucifixion of the flesh (Gal. 5: 24. 1 Cor. 9: 27), because the spirit begins to reign when the flesh is brought into subjection.

If, however, sin were primarily grounded in the *πνεῦμα* or *νοῦς*, so that Paul could have said, *ἁμαρτία οἰκστὶ ἐν τῇ πνεύματι*, then there could have been as little hope of atonement for man as there is for the evil spirits; for there would have been nothing in man to which grace could fasten itself. But since, even in the regenerate man, the body of death and the old man survive, he has occasion to cry out, *ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος*, though in a more partial sense than it is used here, where it is employed in the widest sense, to denote a deliverance from an earlier state, and a longing after an entirely new life, whose peculiar features are delineated in what follows.

[The expression *ταλαίπωρος*, from *τλάω* to *suffer*, and *πῶρος* a *rock*, a *heavy stone*, is very suitable to denote the heavy pressure under which man suffers while the slave of sin. It occurs also in Rev. 3: 17.—The choice of *ρύομαι*¹ is also very remarkable. It indicates a powerful, forcible deliverance, such as is not expected from a circumstance or event, but only from an all-powerful *Person*; hence *τίς με ρύσεται*. That in this *ρύσεται* is expressed, not only the communication

¹ The whole expression betrays, not merely the thought, who *will* deliver me from this miserable state; but likewise, who *can*? There is a consciousness that no *human* help will avail.

of a new principle of life, but likewise pardon, atonement, is shown by (ch. 8: 1) the phrase *κατάκριμα οὐδὲν τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ*.—In the words *ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*, the pronoun belongs to *σώματος*, being placed last, after the Hebrew *usus loquendi*, when two substantives are connected. So, without doubt, Acts 5: 20. 13: 26. *Reiche* was misled by his false interpretation of *σῶμα* (which he explains as merely a personification of sin) to oppose this view. Should *οὗτος* be connected with *θάνατος*, then death must be understood spiritually, for which there is no warrant in the passage. Besides the active fighting of sin *made alive* (ver. 9) does not agree with the notion of *death*. In the expression *body of death*, death indicates only the highest point of corruption, which has possession of the entire man. Certainly *σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου* cannot mean body, which is the *cause* of death, but, body which bears the *nature* of death in itself; = *σῶμα θνητόν* (8: 10). The signification “sum,” “whole,” after the analogy of *הָאֵל*, is here quite foreign to the purpose.

ARTICLE VI.

THE PRELATICAL PRINCIPLES, ANTI-REPUBLICAN AND UNEVANGELICAL.

By Rev. ANSEL D. EDDY, D. D., Pastor of the First Church of Newark, N. J.

THE subject of Episcopacy has become one of almost engrossing interest, and an importance is now attached to it, which, under ordinary circumstances, it never could have obtained. Religious denominations generally, in this country, have long, by common consent, left each other in the undisturbed enjoyment of their respective and peculiar preferences, as to doctrine and forms. And had the friends and advocates of Episcopacy, been contented to enjoy theirs, within their own communion, without seeking to invalidate the basis of all other churches, and proscribing, as unscriptural and vain, all ministrations

but their own, they no doubt would have been permitted to rest undisturbed.

But advocated, as their principles and policy have been, and obtruded every where as exclusively scriptural and saving, they not only entrench upon the peace and rights of other churches, but they corrupt the truth, and arrest the advance of our common Christianity, and thus make war upon the dearest interests of mankind.

Episcopalians cannot and must not complain, that other denominations are officious in discussing their claims, nor sectarian in opposing them. It is for truth and vital Christianity that we meet and examine their system. "Truth is every man's concernment, every man's right, and every man's most necessary possession." The things of religion belong to the *heart*, whose ceaseless pulsation is the electric life of the world. They relate to man's mind and his eternal interests, and are the common property of man every where and forever.

And if it is true, that "two systems of doctrine are now, and probably for the last time, in conflict,—the Catholic and Genevan," infinitely momentous questions are at issue, and every man is deeply involved in the results. These results are immediate and perpetual. For it is equally true, that a corresponding spirit is abroad in the *world*. Two classes of *civil* institutions are now, if not for the last time, in conflict for the mastery; the free institutions of law and equality, and those of will and arbitrary distinction. And no one can mistake their respective religious affinities, and their influence on the popular mind.

It is in vain we assert, that truth has become established, so far advanced and understood, that little danger is to be apprehended from the efforts of sectarianism and infidelity to corrupt the faith and subvert the religion of the gospel. As much as the principles of Protestant piety and the doctrines of the Reformation commend themselves to the more intelligent classes, and have served to elevate and bless the human family, they are far from having lived through their struggles and being beyond the possibility of corruption. It is still

necessary to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints, in the way of free and fair discussion.

Peculiar necessity is laid upon the friends of evangelical piety, at the present day, from the attitude assumed by the advocates of the prelatical and papal systems, who have united and are making common cause against the principles of the Reformation and the spread of the Christian religion through Protestant agencies. The exclusive rights of Episcopacy, however honored by the antiquated governments of Continental Europe, or sustained by the arm of British power, we regard as harmless and childish. But when it begins anew to nerve the energies of persecution, to wage an exterminating war against the entire brotherhood of the Protestant family, and violently to circumscribe the spread of the Christian religion, even among the heathen, all liberty of inaction and indifference is taken from us, and we are summoned to the high work of personal defence and the salvation of men. The outrages of the Romanists upon the islands of the Pacific are comparatively of trifling importance, for nothing better was to be expected from that quarter. But when men, commissioned directly from the church of England, will openly oppose our missionaries in distant Persia ; and others, educated by our own funds, reared among us, long and affectionately received to our confidence, after an apparently cordial co-operation in missionary labors with our own brethren abroad, are suddenly found strangely changed, and denouncing, in the face of heathen converts, as unauthorized, the ministrations of our churches, and as unscriptural all our ordinances and institutions, we are not at liberty to rest or to remain silent. The most abundant testimony has established the truth of the serious charges brought against Mr. Badger in Persia, and every day is showing more and more clearly the decided hostility and opposition of Mr. Southgate to the labors of the American Missionaries in the Levant. The extraordinary change in his character and conduct, had it taken place on heathen ground, had not so surprised us. But it was immediately succeeding his fraternal interview with the prelates

and brethren of the Episcopal church in his native land, and in connection with the remarkable epistle from the six American prelates to the patriarch of Constantinople and their salutations to their brethren in the East.

From this time every thing is changed, and Episcopalians in almost every part of the world, as by some electro-magnetic influence, are suddenly seized with a holy zeal for their exclusive prerogatives, and all besides are pronounced foreign to the covenant of grace.

However favorable the times might have appeared, and however consonant these assumptions may be with the peculiarities of human nature, their advocates have undoubtedly failed in their calculations. The time had not arrived. The world was not prepared for such an intellectual and moral retrogression. And we trust that this sad experiment will result in the firmer establishment of truth, and a more rapid spread of spiritual religion. And it is for the security of this end, that we feel bound to discuss in every form the character and tendencies of the principles and claims advocated by the friends of the prelacy.

In this discussion we see no reason for the broad distinction so often made between the individual classes of the prelatists or the advocates for the Episcopate. They may differ widely from each other on other questions, and present striking varieties of moral character and doctrinal sentiment, while in the one great and essential question of the prelacy or monarchy in the church, they are one and indivisible. The overshadowing influence of a diocesan, unimpeachable but by his peers, and holding office for life, with every species of patronage in his hands, easily diffuses his own sentiments, and even the shades of his moral character, through the extended circle of his jurisdiction.

While, for more than two centuries, this single question of Episcopacy, in the character of its "priesthood," has been looked upon as of secondary importance, we regard it as lying at the basis of the whole system, and as the source of all our difficulties with its practical tendencies. The tenaciousness

with which Episcopalians have adhered to it ; the immense sacrifices made to sustain it ; the subordinating of every other question, doctrinal and practical, to this ; show that this is to them “ *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ.*”

As long as the evangelical Episcopalian, the spiritual, catholic Episcopalian, adheres to this dogma, and sacrifices his individual rights as a minister of Jesus Christ, we believe him to be in error, and united in upholding a system which sixteen centuries have shown to be unscriptural, and ruinous to the civil and religious interests of mankind.

And we conceive that there is now imperious demand for the renewed consideration of this subject, not only from the facts already alluded to, but also from the existing state of sentiment in the prelatical communion, and from the growing spirit of exclusiveness and assumption which has distinguished it for the last few years. At the time of the Reformation, no such importance was attached to the simple question of Episcopacy as it now assumes. The reformed churches in the Episcopal communion almost universally admitted the ministerial acts of other denominations, and their pulpits were open to the Scotch and Continental reformers, without the requirement of reordination ; and some passed even to the highest honors of the English establishment without the initiatory rites of prelatical prescription. And for generations succeeding, almost to the present century, many have been found to co-operate with other denominations in spreading the gospel, and have extended Christian civilities to the clergy of other communions. But of late all this seems to be dying away, and an iron-hearted rigidity has seized and professedly sanctified the entire body of prelatists ; the terms of their communion have grown exceedingly strait, and the tone of their assumptions utterly exclusive and intolerant.

Not only so, but an unusual effort is seen, every where, to enlist the popular feeling in their behalf, and to urge their doctrines, their dogmas, and their men, into every circle and every plan of civil immunity. The public funds are claimed for their private benefit ; institutions reared and enriched by

the beneficence of other denominations are converted into establishments of exclusively prelatical patronage ; almost every chaplainship in the army and navy is filled by a prelatical ministry, and the public arsenals and ships of war are supplied with Episcopal prayer books and prelatical formulas of devotion, at the public expense.¹ With these facts before us, we say again, we are not at liberty, as descendants of the Reformers and as the children of the Pilgrims, to rest unconcerned and inactive.

We propose, in this article, to consider some of the tendencies of Episcopacy, or its necessary influence upon our civil and religious institutions. In this discussion we shall embrace both the framework of the prelacy, and those doctrines which have generally been embraced by the Episcopal church, as consonant with their system and essential to its very existence. We grant that a respectable portion of the Episcopal church, in the time of the Reformation, were evangelical, and in sentiment sympathized with the Genevan church, and incorporated the very sentiments of Calvin into their standards.

Yet it is obvious that this was the result of circumstances, and shows how far the spirit of republican institutions and a tolerant religion had grown into the church of England, under the influence of the Puritans, and from its associations with Scotland and the Continent of Europe. It was this that led to the separation of the best portion of the church from the hierarchy of England, when all hope of general reformation was gone ; and though, from that time to this, a few men of eminent talents and moral worth have been found cherishing and defending evangelical sentiments in the Episcopal church, they have always found themselves in an uneasy and unnatural position, and subject to distrust and strong opposition from the brethren of their own communion ; and even to the present moment, they present the unhappy spectacle of disunion and open hostility, while felicitating themselves on exemption from the sin of schism.

¹ See Debate in the General Assembly met at Louisville, May, 1844.

The preaching, the discussions, and the invariable policy of the Episcopal denomination as a body, has been to explain away the evangelical and Calvinistic character of their own articles, and to work out of their system and society the leaven of Genevan theology. In this they have been but too successful, and the day seems to be past when the voice of Scott, Newton and Martyn is heard with respect and reverence, to any extent, in the circles of Episcopalians. Even Hannah More and Dr. Whately are too puritanical. The voice of proscription is loudly raised against the venerable arch-bishop of Dublin, and the leading organ of the Episcopal church in America boasts that in all the "meetings of the sectaries" at their late anniversaries in the city of New York, not one Episcopalian was to be seen.

I. The prelatical principles are hostile to republican institutions and equality of rights among men.

This position we believe to be sustained by the nature of Episcopacy itself, and by the uniform operation of its principles as seen in the history of civil governments.

What are the principles of Diocesan Episcopacy? They are, that God has established an order of men, as the ministers of his church, who have exclusive right to all the functions and immunities of that church; who are to perpetuate themselves, and who are arranged in three distinct orders, the supreme power resting in *one man*, who, when once raised to his diocesan prerogatives, becomes invested by a "*divine right*," *for life*, with exclusive powers to create and commission all the ministers of the gospel for the entire geographical circle of his Episcopate. This presents the germ of the powers assumed by this system, the growth or details of which it would be difficult to define, and history itself seems in doubt how to record and where to limit them.

At first there may appear nothing dangerous to a republican government, in the mere fact, that a clergyman is ordained by a diocesan prelate, rather than "by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery," as authorized in the gospel. But when this power is claimed by *one individual*, as concentrat-

ing in his own person by a *divine right*, and when obedience to this power is demanded under the most severe penalties of God's displeasure, it becomes a serious question, what must be the consequences of yielding to such a preposterous claim?

Religious institutions we must have ; the services and ordinances of the gospel are essential to our social, civil and national existence. Hence there must be men set apart for religious purposes, and these men, from their talents and character, from their station and employment, must ever exert a controlling influence over the public mind. They must, to a great extent, form the moral character of the people. But on *prelatical or Episcopal principles*, what *kind* of men are they? Just such as the *diocesan* may please to commission and send among us. He claims to hold, directly from God himself, the only power that is known or can be acknowledged, of commissioning the ministers of Christ for millions of souls. He styles himself, "the Bishop of the State," etc. He allows no one to be recognized, in all the communities around which his geographical Episcopate extends, as authorized to engage in the ministry of reconciliation in any way, or under any ecclesiastical organization, until he shall subscribe the articles of *his* faith, and receive from *his* hands, as the sole delegated agent of God, the right to preach the gospel of his Son! What an unparalleled concentration of power! And unless acknowledged, anathemas in the name of God are issued, even in this free land, which breathe the burning spirit of the Tiber and of Smithfield. "Great is the guilt and imminent the danger," it is declared, "of those who negligently or wilfully continue in a state of separation from the authorized ministrations of the church, and participate of ordinances administered by an irregular and invalid authority" — "wilfully rending the peace and unity of the church by separating from the administrations of its authorized priesthood ; obstinately contemning the means which God has prescribed for their salvation. They are guilty of rebellion against the Almighty Lawgiver and Judge ; they expose themselves to the awful displeasure of that Almighty Jehovah, who

will not suffer his institutions to be contemned or his authority violated with impunity.”¹ “None,” adds the same prelate, “can possess authority to administer the sacraments, but those who have received a commission from the bishops of the church.” “We have yet to learn,” says Ravenscraft, “where a promise to fallen man is to be found that is not *limited* on the previous condition, that he be a member of the visible (Episcopal) church.”

Hence to administer with authority, or to be received with profit, yea, to administer or receive without “incurring the displeasure of Almighty God,” any of the services and ordinances of the gospel, every minister within a territory as large as all New-England, on whose head the hands of an Episcopal prelate have not been laid, must at once leave his people, renounce his parentage and his baptism, repair to the altar of prescription, or never again presume to proclaim the love of God to dying man, as a servant of Christ.

Upon such principles, what man on this continent would possess any thing like the power of an Episcopal prelate? And what so controlling as religious supremacy? What grasp so unyielding as individual authority, made fearless by popular submission, and awful as death by the presumed appointment of God? Such must inevitably be the power of those men who hold the only authority known or believed to exist, of commissioning the ministers of religion for millions of people, of saying who shall and who shall not preach the gospel of Christ.

It is supposed that the influence of Episcopacy becomes necessarily softened in its character and shorn of its power, when transplanted to this republican soil, where it finds no alliance with state authority. But the fact is, the prelacy in this country may become more threatening and unyielding than under the monarchy of England, the whole weight of whose hierarchy has seldom ever been more assuming and controlling than the solitary mandate of an American prelate.

¹ Dr. Henry Hobart.

In England there is left a counteracting influence, a controlling power. The throne may interfere and check the abuse of prelatical authority. In the selection of prelates, the crown may grant a *congè d'elire* or not, as it pleases, and the result is what the monarch wills, and not of necessity what the combined curates of the kingdom may desire. The British sovereign decides who are to be the prelates of the church ; but in this country it is not so. Prelacy here, with all its concentrating power, is independent of any superior jurisdiction. While a *woman* may say to the trembling Archbishop of England, "I made you, and I will unfrock you," the learned jurist must fall before the imperious mandate of a republican prelate, and the voice of an entire convention be hushed to silence in his presence ; sixty ministers of the gospel prostrate on their knees at his feet, implore his benediction, in sanction of his apostolic prerogatives ! Such powers as the prelacy confers under republican institutions, are like the anarchy that a reckless democracy inflicts in its wildest licentiousness.

How shall the people resist the abuse of this power to the worst of purposes ? We have alluded to its influence and assumptions already. We know of literary institutions, where by legacy and contract the instruction to be given in all future time is to be according to the plan prescribed by a single prelate, who long since was called from his labors. We have seen almost the entire Episcopal church kept from co-operation in the diffusion of the Bible by the will of one man, and when a loud appeal was made to every community in this country to aid the oppressed Greeks, the same prelate declared his objections, and every church was shut against the demands of charity. How, we ask, shall the abuse of this power be resisted ? Shall individuals withdraw from the church, like our Puritan fathers, and seek religious liberty under free ecclesiastical institutions ? But this is declared to be "rebellion against the Almighty Lawgiver and Judge," "exposure to the awful displeasure of Jehovah." This is declared to cut off the soul from all covenanted mercies and

the hope of eternal life ! Adopt such principles, and let the people give their enlightened assent, and who among them would be weak enough to sacrifice the salvation of his soul for the poor recompense of maintaining for a day the rights of a freeman ?

Let the principles of Episcopacy be embraced in this country universally, (as they ought to be, if they are correct,) and we have at once an ESTABLISHED HIERARCHY, resting, not on the weak basis of human assumption and enactments, like the English church, founded by Henry VIII. ; but on the immutable command of God himself ! The clergy of this hierarchy, we shall be bound to support. This support must be given, not to such as we may choose, but to such only as the prelate thinks proper to ordain. The people have no option in the case, except, perhaps, to arrange how to support and dispose of, among themselves, such individuals as the diocesan shall designate for the care of their souls.

With these men it lies, to administer or withhold those ordinances, which, in the words of the prelatical historian, “are necessary to salvation.” If this is so, it would be madness to hesitate, for a moment, in yielding implicit obedience to *those*, who have the awful prerogative of granting or withholding a “covenant title” to eternal life, or to array ourselves in “rebellion against (our) Almighty Lawgiver and Judge,” by refusing to receive the rites of his religion, on those conditions which his “regularly ordained clergy” may think proper to prescribe. But what will be the consequence of such power in the clergy ? History every where and in all ages affirms that such power *will* be abused, and that too in a manner totally inconsistent with the rights and privileges of freemen. What but these principles created the court of High Commission and the Star Chamber ? Who advocated the sanguinary measures of the Stuarts ? Who resisted the revolution of 1688 ? Who opposed our own revolution ? The advocates of the prelacy, *the world knows* ; while “on the other hand, in all these instances, low churchmen and dissenters, united heartily and co-operated vigorously.” At this very moment,

ten thousand naturalized American citizens, under the control of the principles before us, cast their votes, or arm themselves and their churches with weapons of death ; remain quietly at home, or rush abroad in hostile crowds at the dictate of a single prelate.¹ One man becomes directly or remotely the governor of thousands, solely in virtue of his prelatical office.

A prelate, in this country, has it in his power, to a great extent, to secure the prevalence and succession of his own sentiments and practices whatever they may be ; for he appoints the clergy of his diocese, and they are such and only such, in sentiment and character, as he pleases to commission ; and they, with the associated members of their own vestries, are to elect a successor to *him* who has created *them*. To recall the power invested in *one man*, by popular consent, is more difficult than to destroy the *hereditary despotism* of ages.

We know the pretension has been set up by the advocates of Episcopacy in this country, that their system harmonizes with our federal government. In what point, it is difficult to perceive. The prelate is elected for life, and who has a veto or check upon his measures ? Yea, he often claims and exercises his absolute control over all the acts of his inferior clergy and lay delegates in convention assembled. His voice settles the question who shall be admitted to seats and vote in convention, and what acts of theirs shall receive his sanction or be for ever rejected. This absolute power has been claimed and exercised by, at least, three prelates in this country already ; and without law or precedent, another has assumed the right to decide what shall or shall not be introduced for consideration before the convention, and has forbid an appeal from his arbitrary decision. The right of petition and review has been denied ; the voice of remonstrance silenced ; all privilege of even protesting refused, and the courtesies of parliamentary proceedings outraged.

¹ See account of the late riots in Philadelphia.

The enactments of the prelacy in this country, for the last few years, present a most singular illustration of its reputed republican character and tendencies. We already begin to see here the natural workings of that system, which has ever warred against free institutions in every part of the world, and in every age of its being. "Religious principle will be felt every where. No circle of private life, no department of government, but must feel it." What, then, must be the effect on freedom of mind, on the exercise of private judgment, and above all, on the rights of conscience, if such a system should ever become predominant in this country? The history of the world gives but one answer.

A most striking instance of the anti-republican, not to say unparliamentary tendency of prelatical principles has been exhibited by Dr. Onderdonk of the diocese of New-York, during the sittings of the last two annual conventions. Custom has made the prelate of that diocese president of the convention, *ex-officio*, without, of course, intending to clothe him while in the chair with any diocesan powers. In 1843, Mr. Duer, a distinguished jurist, and who must be well acquainted with the rules and courtesies of deliberative bodies, rises in his place and respectfully proposes a resolution of very general interest. The president at once pronounces it out of order, admits of no appeal from his decision, and peremptorily orders Mr. Duer to sit down. "Sit down, sir," is his positive command. In 1844, "Judge Oakley offers a resolution to amend the first rule of order, so that the president's power should be such as is usually exercised by the presiding officer of deliberative bodies, and that freedom of debate should be allowed." This resolution, though ably sustained by Judge Duer and others, is pronounced by the presiding prelate to be out of order. And why! "Because, the rules of 1832 contained expressions which proved they were meant for perpetuity"!! An appeal is taken from this decision and allowed to be in order, by way of condescension, when the chair is sustained by an overwhelming majority of the convention, who, by their own votes upon this question, exhibit the views, which the

prelacy has taught them, of republican equality, independence of mind and parliamentary rules. That there was no sacrifice of private judgment to the pleasure, not to say dictation, of prelatical arrogance, we cannot for a moment do these gentlemen the injustice to suppose. A similar occurrence took place in the diocese of New-Jersey, whose prelate travels *pari passu*, in the succession of his more imposing brother. A question was taken touching the prerogatives of the diocesan, in the issue of which one of the oldest of the clerical body said, as follows : "The bishop is all wrong, but we must vote with him, he is the bishop" ! And it would not be at all surprising if more youthful and less resolute minds were as easily swayed by the judgment of their prelate, who made them and can unmake them at pleasure ; and whose frown is as withering to their prosperity and hopes as the chilling frost upon the springing herb of May. If these are not instances of anti-republican arrogance and fearful assumption, there is beyond controversy a most anti-republican and abject shrinking from the manly independence of Christian and evangelical liberty. Men that are prepared thus tamely to resign their religious liberties in open, deliberative assemblies, will not be slow to yield their civil rights to the same or equally usurping authority. If men of the standing and character of Messrs. Duer and Oakley, among the ablest jurists of our country, intimately acquainted with the rights of freemen and of parliamentary usages, will thus tamely submit to diocesan dictation, what can we expect from less informed and less resolute minds ?

While we see nothing hostile to our free institutions in those religious associations, which acknowledge every other evangelical communion to be, equally with themselves, a part of the church of Christ, and have no permanent officers, clothed with peculiar and inalienable prerogatives, we are confident that nothing but a standing miracle can save us from the disastrous consequences of a general prevalence of prelatical principles—such principles as confer upon a few men, chosen for life, the only power known on earth of commissioning ten thou-

sand ministers of the gospel, and investing their clergy with the prerogatives of granting or withholding those sacred ordinances, without which, it is maintained, there is no known covenant of mercy or promise of eternal life. If this is truth, and if these principles shall generally prevail among us, we can only say, that the less must and ought to yield to the greater, *the freedom of our country to the salvation of our souls.*

We cannot turn away from the legitimate and ultimate result of these principles, and the light of past times must guide us. We see clearly the natural sympathies and strong affinities of these principles in the Episcopal church, with that more arrogant and superstitious communion, which has ever warred against all freedom of opinion in religion and all freedom in the walks of civil life, which has alike her inquisition and her fires for the heretic in the church and the rebel in the state.

The friends and advocates of moderate prelacy, of the prelacy as found in the Episcopal communion, granting all they claim as true, must admit that from their own principles grew the arrogance and overshadowing abominations of the papacy; that this is but another grade, or rather carrying out of their own system, giving a completeness to its practical results, which the civil relations of the English church do not at present admit. Make the head of the English church a religious instead of a civil functionary, and what change is required to give to the prelacy of the Episcopal communion, all that was ever claimed or perpetrated by the Roman papacy? Yea, take the church of England in the reign of the Stuarts, when the archbishop of Canterbury was to the British crown what the Roman pontiff was to the Italian states, and wherein does the prelacy of England, either as to its pomp or power, its assumptions and its persecutions, differ from the iron-handed papacy on the banks of the Tiber? We have before us the thirty thousand Protestant Christians slain in France within the space of thirty days, when the papacy on the Continent was in the zenith of its power, and we have eight thousand who died in prison and at the stake in England

alone, together with the multitudes slain in Scotland and other places, for the single offence of refusing submission to the "Acts of conformity." We have the sixty thousand who suffered on account of their religion in England, between the reigns of Charles II. and William; while the Puritans alone were robbed of from fourteen to fifteen millions sterling, to swell the coffers of this persecuting hierarchy. We have before us the exile of our fathers, the enormous wrongs still inflicted upon the advocates of a free religion in England; the prelate revelling in his millions, one of the law-makers of the realm in virtue of his office, while an oppressive taxation pours into his hands untold treasures, not one cent of which has he ever earned. Can there be any thing in all this that harmonizes with the spirit and genius of our free institutions?

The baleful advances of popery, and the more cautious air of the prelacy should awaken our vigilance and regard for our rights as religious citizens and advocates of republican principles. The way is open and easy, the steps are natural and rapid, from the spirit of a corrupted religion to veneration for its empty externals, and fiery zeal for its symbols, till you reach the mandate for entire conformity, or the lighted fagot that shall frighten the heretic or consume the dissenter. As face answereth to face in water, so the heart of man to man. The thing that hath been, is that which shall be, and there is no new thing under the sun. Like causes will invariably produce like effects. Standing as republican citizens, and as men under solemn religious obligations, let us guard against that intellectual debasement and moral corruption, which may soon demand the re-enactment of scenes of terror still fresh and vivid before us. Let the carnage of St. Bartholomew's day in France, the millions of confiscated estates, with the butchered thousands of papal Rome and the English hierarchy, ever admonish us of the legitimate fruits of prelatical principles, of what human nature can be and what human power can perpetrate in the name of religion. We would be jealous of all ecclesiastical usurpation, and refuse

the badges of every *exclusive* order, lest we ere long be required to give the same reason for their rejection, which our fathers gave when dissenting from their church and driven in exile or burnt at the stake.

We agree with the haughty king of England, that there is no harmony between the prelatical principles and the genius of republican institutions ; and if, in the language of Hume, England owes the whole freedom of her constitution to the Puritans, it is by cherishing their principles of civil and religious freedom that we are to preserve our own. One of our former and most distinguished chief magistrates, the elder Adams, says, "Who will believe that the apprehension of Episcopacy contributed fifty years ago, as much as any other cause, to arouse the attention, not only of the inquiring mind, but of the common people, and urge them to close thinking on the constitutional authority of the parliament over the colonies? This nevertheless was a fact as certain as any other in the history of North America. The *office* of a bishop, even that was dreaded."

Our fathers from sad experience knew and felt, that there was close "connection between freedom in sacred things and freedom in civil," and can their descendants for a moment doubt that papal and prelatical principles are at war with their political immunities? What would our fathers have said, could they have foreseen that, in fifty years, any of their sons would rejoice in the principles of Laud, "and that sixty American clergymen, free-born and free-bred, would kneel down in bodily presence at the feet of a prelate," who, in virtue of his mitre, silences the voice of ecclesiastical remonstrance, and denies the expression even of private judgment? Is this republicanism? Is this the liberty wherewith Christ makes free? No. Well did Charles II. say, in view of such principles, that they gave "more efficient support to monarchy than a standing army." And whenever and wherever they have held control, it has required more than a standing army to defend against them the precious rights of civil and religious freedom.

And this is the institution so strongly commended at the present time to our confidence and adoption. An institution that first entrenched upon the simplicity of the gospel ; out of which, by the confession of its advocates, the towering structure of the papacy speedily and naturally emerged. And this is the institution that so long, in unison with the state, tyrannized over the rights, property and persons of our ancestors, and drove them to these shores for a refuge from prison and the flames. It is the same that stood firmly opposed to our revolutionary struggle for freedom and religion, and that still wars in England and every where against popular rights, popular education and religious freedom. Even to this day at Oxford, the seat of boasted learning, with its millions wasted on lordly pride and sectarian domination, there are found no literary privileges for the common people ; not a public library, nor lyceum. And not one of the English universities is open to an Englishman, unless he has some hereditary or conferred honors, or has been born and inducted by prelatical prerogatives to the Episcopal church. And we have yet to learn of a solitary instance where the prelatical government has ever aided or sought to aid the cause of popular education, or to elevate the mass of the people. At the present moment, it is acknowledged that the advocates of prelacy are advancing toward the papacy, while Romanism itself is assuming its old powers and re-establishing even the severities of Jesuitism. Well does an eloquent writer in France say, " If Jesuitism continues to act as it does, France will see a new VOLTAIRE appear."

II. *The unscriptural character and tendencies of prelatical principles, and the sentiments usually inculcated by their advocates.*

Perhaps no man connected with the Episcopal denomination in this country, ever did more to give it consequence and permanence, than Dr. Henry Hobart, formerly prelate of the New York diocese. Indeed it hardly had any distinct and defined character before his day. Its organization was incomplete, and nominal Episcopalians hardly knew what were the

principles of their own communion. Its services, festivals, rubrics and canons were more clearly defined and vindicated by him than by any other man. His industry and energy, the extent of his diocese, and the immense wealth that he controlled, gave him preëminence among his peers. Such confidence was reposed in his judgment and infallibility, that literary and religious institutions were stereotyped upon the plan of his projection, in which Christian theology even, was for ever to be taught according to the plan and system of his devising. Bequests were made and received upon this express condition. The reference recently made to the name of Dr. Hobart by Drs. Smith and Anthon, shows the respect which is still paid to his memory. In endeavoring to embody the sentiments of the advocates for the prelatical principles, and to ascertain the sentiments ordinarily inculcated in connection with them, we may with safety refer to the writings of Dr. Hobart, and conclude that we fairly represent, by him, the true character of the American prelacy.

We barely allude to his "Fasts and Festivals of the Church," and ask any intelligent reader of the Bible whether, from its inspired pages, any one could gather the least authority for such a crowd of unmeaning services, and if the whole scope and design of the gospel is not utterly averse to any such array of formalities. We shall confine ourselves chiefly to his work most approved by his friends, the "Companion for the Altar," and refer also to his sermons published in Europe in two volumes.

How salvation is to be secured, is the great question the gospel is given to settle. This declares that except a man be born of the Spirit he cannot enter the kingdom of God. I, says the Saviour, have chosen you out of the world. He has saved us and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works. Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Ghost. I (Christ) am the way, the truth and the life. There is salvation in none other. It is not of him that willeth, nor of him

that runneth, but of God, that showeth mercy. This is the language of the gospel on the great question of salvation. Dr. Hobart says, "The church considers baptized Christians (i. e. baptized persons) as regenerated, as called into a state of salvation, made members of Christ," etc. "In the sacrament of baptism we are taken from the world," etc. "In this regenerating ordinance, fallen man is born again from a state of condemnation to a state of grace," etc. And again, "The only mode by which we can be admitted into covenant with God; the only mode by which we can obtain a title to those blessings and privileges which Christ has purchased for his mystical body, the church, is the sacrament of baptism."

The Scriptures affirm, that the sole conditions required to obtain salvation are repentance toward God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. Repent, that your sins may be blotted out. The gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every one that *believeth*.

The "Companion for the Altar" says, "Repentance, faith and obedience will not of themselves be effectual to our salvation. We may sincerely repent of our sins, and heartily believe the gospel; we may walk in the paths of holy obedience; but until we enter into covenant with God by baptism, and ratify our vows of duty and allegiance at the holy sacrament of the supper, commemorate the mysterious sacrifice of Christ, we cannot assert any claim to salvation." "In order to be effectual, to be acknowledged by God, etc., they (the sacraments) must be administered by those who have received a commission from him. None can possess authority to administer the sacraments, but those who have received commission from the bishops of the church."

We leave these sentiments of Dr. Hobart and these quotations from the Scriptures side by side. We believe they cannot be reconciled. Their moral tendency cannot be the same. It is and ever has been the tendency of the doctrine of man's sinfulness and of justification by faith in Christ, to humble the pride of man and to drive him from all dependence on human help. It is Job that exclaims, I abhor myself and repent

in dust and ashes. And David, I was shapen in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me. And Paul, I am the chief of sinners.—Oh, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death ! The day of Pentecost, the prison of Philippi, revivals of religion down to the present day, show us the tendency of scriptural views of human depravity, and the way of salvation by Christ alone. The question arises, Is this the tendency of the prelatical sentiments as quoted above, especially when taken in connection with prescribed Episcopal services ? What sinner would come to the conclusion that his heart was deceitful above all things and desperately wicked ; that he was in the gall of bitterness and in the bonds of iniquity, when the whole guilt, corruption, and bondage of sin is removed by the simple ordinance of baptism ? “ By this we are said to be taken from the world, when we had no title to the favor of God, and placed in the Christian church.” “ In this regenerating ordinance fallen man is born again from a state of condemnation into a state of grace.” What, we ask, is the moral tendency of such sentiments ? The deliverance of the sinner from his native pollution, and freedom from the curse of God, are secured by the simple ordinance of baptism, while repentance and faith are summarily set aside, and not one word is said about justification by faith. The uniform tendency of the gospel, of all its preachers and of the Holy Spirit is, to convince men of sin and drive them to Christ, to magnify the grace of God, and render infinite the change from death to life. Here is demanded the mighty power of God that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus Christ. Not one word is said of baptism as preceding regeneration, or as bearing at all upon the subject of justification. But on prelatical principles, that great change in the character and condition of sinners, without which no man shall see the Lord, is effected by baptism alone ! This makes them, in a moment, “ children of God !” It is intellectually impossible. It is morally absurd. It is nowhere asserted in the Bible, and nowhere attested by the fruits of these prelatically administered ordinances. The

very subjects of them are a standing refutation of their unscriptural pretences.

Nor can it be said, that these sentiments are the property of a single prelate, and this pretended virtue of ordinances the sad relic of papal ignorance. The Episcopal prayer book, even in its American edition, speaks as follows, "We yield thee hearty thanks, most merciful Father, that it hath pleased thee to regenerate *this infant*, with thy *Holy Spirit*; to receive him for thy own child by adoption, and to incorporate him into thy holy church." "The minister shall say, 'This child is regenerate and grafted into the body of Christ's church by baptism,' " etc. The Rev. Mr. Melville, of Camden Chapel, says, "We really think no fair, no straightforward dealing can get rid of the conclusion, that the church holds what is called baptismal regeneration," and he adds, "so long as I officiate according to the forms of (the) prayer book, I do not see how I can be commonly honest, and yet deny that every baptized person is, on that account, regenerate." It is this that entitles the body of the adulterer, the thief and the murderer, to be deposited as a brother in the consecrated cemetery, while Bunyan, Baxter and Doddridge are denied the rites of Christian sepulture. It is this that is constantly magnifying the importance of forms and ceremonies at the expense of truth and a spiritual religion, and thus is ever warring against the uniform and direct tendency of the Scriptures. These expressly declare, "Except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish." "He that believeth not shall be damned." "Except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of heaven." But where does the gospel present sacraments and ordinances as conditions of salvation? If these are conditions at all, why did Christ and his apostles invariably preach repentance and faith, as the first duties of man and the sole conditions of pardon? In all the directions given to sinners by the apostles, as recorded in the Acts, baptism is never alluded to but in a single instance, and then as *consequent* upon faith in Jesus Christ for pardon. This outward rite is every where represented as the mere *symbol* of a

spiritual change supposed to have taken place already. "Can any man forbid water, that these should not be baptized?" says Peter. But why baptize these men? To place them in a "state of grace"—"to give them a title to the Holy Spirit"? No, but because "they have (already) received the Holy Ghost as well as we."

Not one word is found in the gospel to show that baptism or any peculiar church relation is essential to salvation, and, as if to silence forever all pretensions of this kind in a single sentence, it is declared, circumcision is nothing and uncircumcision is nothing, but a new creature. Ministers acting on the principles under review, seem to rest more upon what *they do* for the subject of their ministry, than upon what the subject is to do *himself*. They industriously, and we doubt not honestly, apply the forms of "the church," and rest upon its administered ordinances more than upon the repentance and faith of the sinner. It is in connection with these that they look for the saving grace of God. With such views we have seen the prelatical minister direct anxious sinners to the forms and services of "the church" for relief, and his fears soon subsided.

The minister in this connection seems to take upon himself more the office of the sacrificing priest at the Jewish altar, or of the Saviour himself in sovereign priesthood applying grace to the soul, than that of an humble teacher directing the guilty and inquiring sinner to the Lamb of God.

We are aware that it has long been the boast of Episcopalians that their forms and liturgy were an effectual barrier to almost every species of error. At the same time, we are confident there is no one denomination of professed Christians, Unitarians perhaps excepted, who make so little inquiry into the religious belief, either of their clergy or their private members, who are accustomed to come to the Lord's table. We have known a minister of the Episcopal church, to preach for months successively sentiments utterly subversive of the gospel and of the thirty-nine articles, even to the denial of the existence of the devil and all satanic agencies, and of the

eternal punishment of the wicked ; and though these errors were openly advocated and published to the world, their author was permitted to live and die a regular “ priest ” in the Episcopal church. And it is well known that a rigid inquiry into their religious faith and Christian experience forms no part of the examination to which candidates for confirmation are ordinarily subjected. Still more seldom, if ever, have we known any one excluded from the fellowship of this church on charge of errors in doctrine. While we admit the scriptural correctness of the “ articles ” of the Episcopal church, we know that they are no positive proof that the members of that church believe them, in their most obvious and original meaning. Indeed it is a conceded fact, that the acknowledged sentiments of the very men who framed these articles are rejected by the Episcopal church generally, and that volumes have been written to conceal or to explain away their Calvinistic character.

The sentiments to which we have alluded, as generally pervading the prelatical churches of this country and of England, were early regarded as unscriptural and ruinous. Our most distinguished ecclesiastical historian says, that “ Arminianism derived its existence from an excessive propensity to improve the faculty of reason and to follow its dictates and discoveries.”

The same writer adds : “ The Calvinists maintained that the Arminians designed, under these specious and artful declarations, to insinuate the poison of Socinianism and Pelagianism into unwary and uninstructed minds, and if we are allowed to interpret the ‘ five articles ’ according to a sense conformable to what the leading doctors among the Arminians have taught in later times, concerning these points, it would be difficult to show, that the suspicions of the Calvinists were wholly groundless.” “ Many of the Arminians, after the decision of the Synod of Dort, accepted the invitation of Frederick, Duke of Holstein, repaired to his dominions, and built Frederickstadt ; among whom was the famous Vorstius, a champion of Arminianism, who by his religious sentiments,

which differed little from the Socinian system, had rendered the Arminians particularly odious." Returning from this exile, their system was greatly changed and assumed an aspect wholly different from that of other Christian churches. "For they gave a new explication to the *five articles*, which made them almost coincide with the doctrines of those who deny the necessity of divine succors in the work of conversion and in the paths of virtue."

Here we have the rise of that loose Arminianism which has uniformly prevailed in the prelatical denominations, and the relation it was early supposed to hold to other and ruinous errors. The "five articles," which peculiarly characterize the Episcopal church, are such as Socinians embrace and defend. They both reject the distinguishing sentiments of the evangelical system, and embrace such as we conceive to be at war with the nature and design of the atonement, and virtually subversive of the entire system of faith, as found in the word of God, and illustrated and fortified by the perpetual ordinances of the Gospel.

It is not, to any great extent, the speculative question of the Trinity, that makes men Unitarians: but it is their settled dislike of the doctrine of depravity, their need of regeneration and entire dependence upon the grace of God. When these doctrines can be escaped on easier terms, few will become Socinians. And had it not been for the remaining spirit of Puritanism, the decided piety and evangelical spirit of those men that still adhere to the Church of England, and the indomitable spirit of civil liberty, the Arian and Socinian classes of Great Britain would probably have found the "*thirty-nine*" barriers of the establishment less formidable, and her shade more expansive and refreshing: and even now, how many may be found reposing under its august protection and ample patronage, we are not called upon to decide; yet we have our fears, and the sighs and prayers of holy men still in that communion assure us that all is not right.

The tendency of prelatical principles we believe to be unscriptural, as they destroy the broad distinction between sin

and holiness, the righteous and the wicked, which enters so deeply into the present character and future prospects of man.

The advocates of the sentiments under review, usually address their hearers as bearing one common character. "The preachers of this class," says the *Christian Observer*, "address their auditors almost promiscuously, as Christians, because professedly, and by the sacrament of baptism, they are such. Our view on the other hand, is, that a large portion of them are not Christians, except in name, and should therefore be addressed, not merely as needing to be exhorted to higher advances in goodness and virtue, but to become Christians in the spiritual sense of the term." These remarks were demanded by the following sentiment from the late Dr. Hobart: "No limit can be prescribed to all persons, beyond which indulgence in pleasure is sinful. The variety in the constitution of human character, and the difference of strength in the passions of different individuals, places at different degrees, the point where indulgence becomes sinful." Well does the "*Observer*" add: "We are alarmed at the oversight that gave birth to this passage, and the consequence to which it might lead. We see nothing in all the Bible warranting allowance in pleasure, we know not of what kind, according to the strength of character in different individuals."

To what does this want of discrimination in preaching lead? Arising from want of discrimination in regard to truth and religious experience, it must lead to a want of discrimination in respect to Christian character and communion. It is giving to all, the hope of the Christian. Most of the congregation are, at some period of their lives, invited and urged to receive those ordinances, which are said to be the securities of piety. And thus, under fatal delusion, many indulge in habits of life which the Gospel forbids, and in conformity to the world, wholly inconsistent with the piety it enjoins. The preachers of whom we speak, do indeed allude sometimes to a future and endless retribution of misery. But the "heirs of the kingdom of heaven," "the children of God," cannot consider themselves as exposed to such a doom. If

we mistake not, their congregations feel as one family, moving on together under the saving culture of their religious services and the favor of God, with assurance of his everlasting complacency. This we are sure is destroying the very foundation of the Christian system.

A belief in native goodness, together with the supposed efficacy of baptism, leads to an indiscriminate treatment of the mixed assembly, and this, of necessity, destroys the scriptural distinction between the righteous and the wicked; for it will be remembered that most, if not all, have adopted "*the mode*" and "*the only mode*" of securing "*a title* to the blessings and privileges of Christ's purchase." Confidence and hope are thus naturally created, resting not on any distinct sense of union to Christ, not on any feeling of unreserved submission to the law and government of God, against whom the soul has been in rebellion, but upon native goodness and nurtured fitness for the presence of God, which at once sweeps away the fear of eternal wrath from every soul brought under the protection and care of prelatical ministrations.

From these considerations, we regard it reasonable and proper that the claims, as well as the moral and Christian character of the prelatical party, when so confident and assuming themselves, should be severely canvassed. For if they are right, a most fearful responsibility is resting upon all other denominations. If there is more security, better means of moral culture, greater certainty of eternal life, in the Episcopal church than in any other, by all means let it be known, and let us urge all men to its favors. But, believing as we honestly do, the very opposite of this, we are solemnly bound to express the grounds of our dissent from the pretensions of the prelacy, and to warn others against being deceived by its proffers. We are not strangers to this system in its practical workings, nor have we lived remote from the society of its churches and clergy. For some years our associations were chiefly with them, and the friendly relations which we still hold to that denomination, utterly forbid the expression of any but the kindest feelings toward them. But being persuaded

that their system is wrong, and the religious sentiments ordinarily embraced and defended by them unscriptural and destructive to the interests of experimental piety, we feel bound to give the grounds of our belief.

Having alluded to the polity and some of the opinions of the prelatical party, it is proper for us to examine whether the *fruits of an evangelical faith*, devout and pious living, revivals of religion, faithful watch and discipline, enlarged Christian philanthropy, separation from the world and spiritual communion with God, are more discernible in this denomination than in others. Without invidious comparison further than the nature of this discussion demands, we must say, that with very few exceptions, this is not the case, but directly the contrary. Every one who is at all acquainted with the Church of England, knows that many of its clergy and members make no pretension to a renewal of heart and a spiritual life, but that they are grossly corrupt in sentiment and depraved in morals. In this country, it is well known that revivals of religion are not common in the Episcopal congregations; that the clergy are, as a body, opposed to all such excitements, and that their preaching has no tendency to produce them. It is well known that there are no settled and uniform conditions of sacramental communion, and rarely any cases of exclusion from ordinances on the ground of moral character. Any thing like discipline, as existing in most of our evangelical churches, is here not to be found. We say it with deep regret, it does not exist. Nor does either baptism or confirmation necessarily admit any one to the Lord's table, or the want of these rites exclude from participation there. Whether other churches are unnecessarily strict or not we shall not here decide; but it is notorious that no denomination in this country, excepting the Unitarian, is so remiss in discipline and so conformed to the world, as the great body of the Episcopal church. And this is true to an extent that forbids the exercise of that confidence in the saving character of their sentiments and services, which it would be our pleasure to cherish. The theatre, the dance, the gayest as-

semblies, are not inconsistent with a connection and communion here. In our early days, we have taken our seat in the theatre with the candidate for "holy orders," who sought no concealment of his conduct, and saw no impropriety in the indulgence. We never heard of a solitary person being required to relinquish the opera or the dance, on account of their church relation. One of the most judicious and distinguished of the Doctors of Divinity in the Episcopal church once said to us, that he considered the location of their theological seminary in the city of New-York highly favorable, as it gave the students an opportunity of attending the theatre, and such refined amusements as would prevent their seeking more gross indulgences. We charitably felt, that this worthy divine knew but little of the character of our theatres.

Mr. Coleman, in his admirable work on the Primitive Church, after minutely examining the prelatical principles, says, that the Episcopal system makes no adequate provision for the necessary discipline of the Christian family. Whether the tendency of the entire system is to defeat this important gospel provision for the purity of religion, or whether it has been greatly overlooked by those who embrace it, is not important for us to decide. We may affirm, without fear of correction or of misrepresentation, that from the beginning of the prelacy, nothing like salutary Christian discipline has ever been known in its connection ; and also, that but two prominent evils have found the authorities and penalties of the Episcopal hierarchy awake and efficient, viz. schism and non-conformity to its forms. Of these, with the "succession," the prelacy is ever watchful. But the Christian morals and spirituality of the flock are quite different matters, and have but seldom formed the grounds, either of exclusion or inquiry. Membership of the church is secured by baptism alone, and this is ordinarily administered to all, without reference to the moral character either of the subject, the parent, or the "sponsor." The *children of all* indiscriminately are admitted to baptism. We remember in our younger days to have been requested to stand sponsor for a youthful college friend,

while the rite of baptism was administered. Presuming it was all right, and wholly ignorant at the time of what was expected, we complied with the request, though the subject was one of the most dissolute of our number, and his father, at the very time, known by the officiating rector to be living in habits of great domestic irregularity and sin.¹

Indeed, from an acquaintance of many years with the Episcopal church, we are free to say, that we never heard of a person being set aside either from baptism, confirmation or the communion, on account of moral character.

As persons are baptized and confirmed without regard to moral character, and even those of known immorality, so any one is admitted to the Lord's supper without inquiry, or even without ever being the subject of either the rite of baptism or confirmation, and after baptism and confirmation they attend upon the ordinance of the supper or not at discretion. We do not hesitate to affirm, from observation and attendance on Episcopal services regularly for many months, if not years, and from frequent inquiries and conversation with members and ministers of this communion, that all we have stated is literally true, and that what may be called gospel discipline is almost unknown among them.

What is true of private members of this communion is equally true of its officers and ministers. Men of the grossest immoralities, profane and lascivious, are among its vestrymen, and found seated in its conventions. Candidates for the ministry, it is well known, cannot be excluded even on charges of grossest heresy ; and what multitudes are known to be invested

¹ We would here inquire how evangelical Christians should regard such baptism as this? It surely is not the outward symbol of inward grace, for the *subject* does not pretend to any such possession. Nor is it administered on the ground of the parent's faith and church relation, for the parent is notoriously wicked and has neither. In what sense, then, is this Christian baptism? It is obviously a perversion of an important Scripture-ordinance, and how can it be Scripture-baptism, when all that is intended and designed by that ordinance is rejected or denied? And where, in the process of perversion and abuse and corruption of a Scripture-ordinance, must it cease to be regarded as valid or scriptural?

with the sacred office who never made any pretension to spiritual renovation or religious experience. We have known a minister¹ in this connection, before alluded to, preach and publish the grossest error, even to the denial of future and eternal punishment and the existence of Satan or any such diabolical agencies as are presented in the Bible, and yet allowed to remain in one of the first pulpits of the land, long after his publications were known and complained of to his own diocesan. And nothing but other delinquencies and death separated him from his parish and the care of his prelate. We see others, at the present time, charged with delinquencies that utterly forbid their elevation in the scale of preferment, and yet, who are left in good and regular standing, neither condemned on trial nor at all vindicated from the charges preferred against them.

Mr. Southgate, too, is elevated to a Bishopric in the East, and that too while the great body of the low church party, who first sent him to Syria, have condemned his course of conduct and withdrawn their support;² and in the face of the most serious charges publicly made against him, by the Missionaries of the American Board at Constantinople and the Rev. Drs. Hawes and Anderson, after a visit to the very field of his labors; charges, too, deeply affecting his moral character.

What, then, is the discipline of the Episcopal church in these United States? The Episcopal Recorder itself, strongly devoted to the cause of prelacy, in speaking of the resignation of Dr. Onderdonk of Pennsylvania, confesses this most dangerous and anomalous feature of the Episcopal policy: that the canons of the church are so framed, that there is no possibility of bringing a prelate to trial for any alleged offences, whatever may be their nature, without his own consent. "We have looked at the canon ourselves," says the Recorder, "and we believe that a loop-hole has been left in it so wide, that the whole Episcopate, if properly conveyed, could pass through, whatever the nature of their offence had been. In

¹ Rev. Mr. Sellon, formerly of Canandaigua, N. Y.

² This we state upon the declaration of a Western prelate.

the present state of our legislation, the trial of a Bishop, if such should take place, will be found to be an idle mimicry of justice. To try Bishop Onderdonk *under such circumstances would be to acquit him, guilty or not guilty.*"

The decisions of the General Convention of the Episcopal church held recently in Philadelphia, more than confirm the position of the Recorder. The prelate of Pennsylvania is, indeed, contrary to the expectations of the Recorder, degraded and deposed, though without a public trial, for what and by what process is wholly unknown. Secresy and darkness of the inquisition hangs over the doings of the house of prelates. And we regret to add, that even this decision was not until years after the delinquencies demanding it were known and complained of in almost every circle. Nothing but the stern demands of public sentiment secured this result. It was not in the "canons" of the church, as confessed by the Recorder, nor in its disciplinary energy.

The case of the brother of this prelate, Dr. Onderdonk of New-York, is equally painful and as fully confirms our position. The conduct for which he has been suspended from his office, was long known to many of the most influential and worthy men of the Episcopal church and ministry. Their own wives had been grossly insulted, and charges of intemperance and impurity were made against him; and yet, for more than two years, no judicial efforts were made to free the church and the cause of religion from reproach. And such is the prelatical influence within its own jurisdiction, that foreign aid must be volunteered, and then even the charges are preferred not against Dr. Onderdonk as "bishop," but as a professor in the Theological Seminary of the Episcopal church. Thus it would appear that it is almost impossible to exercise Christian discipline under the existing regulations of this communion. The "virtue of the succession," "the unity of the church" are every thing; morality, virtue, and holiness of life quite subordinate. And we look with pain and grief of heart at the vigorous efforts now made to sustain the suspended prelate of New-York against the decision of his peers, which decision is more than confirmed by the sickening details of testimony found in the

published trial of Dr. Onderdonk. We see in all this the most imminent exposure of virtue and practical godliness, a most painful disregard of the proprieties of life and the morality of the gospel. We are forcibly reminded of the remark of Grant, the high church historian, that there is "a charm, a secret virtue, by which, to state an extreme case, a vicious minister of the Church of England can confer something *necessary to salvation*, as a sacrament is, while the same office performed by a pious sectary, who has in his heart devoted himself to God, is an absolute nullity." "Truth," he adds, "is sacred and immutable, and must be received, whatever inconveniences attend its reception." That is, no matter how adulterous the hand and the heart, the disciple must kneel in faith, never doubting the prelatical power to confer salvation! What security is there for purity of morals under principles like these?

For the maintenance of doctrinal purity there is still less provision. After the remonstrance of Drs. Smith and Anthon against Mr. Carey's ordination, the promised impeachment of Dr. Onderdonk by Drs. Chase and McIlvaine, and the industrious efforts of the low church party in the late Convention to bring the subject of the Oxford heresy before that body for condemnation, the Convention gravely resolves, "That the canons of the Church afford ample means of discipline and correction for all who depart from her standards; and further, that the General Convention is not a suitable tribunal for the trial and censure of, and that the Church is not responsible for, the errors of individuals, whether they are members of this church or otherwise." This resolution, extraordinary in itself, and still more so from the circumstance in which it originated, is adopted almost unanimously, three clergymen and four laymen only dissenting.

And what were these circumstances?

Vast and threatening error, or rather a fearful class of errors, had arisen at the very fountain of prelatical influence, and been industriously advocated and spread abroad through England and America; and, as yet, no adequate pro-

vision is found to arrest the evil. It had, indeed, been partially frowned upon at Oxford, and a few of the English prelates had attempted its arrest in their respective provinces. But the evil is unchecked and advancing with fearful rapidity. Though acknowledged and lamented by all the friends of religion and order in the English Episcopal church, they seem to fear the sin of schism or the peril of separation more than the toleration and even the oppressive endurance of the sin and evil of partial, if not actual, Romanism. The following is the boast of the Rev. Mr. Ward, a fellow of Baliol, in his labored defence of the most obnoxious articles of the British Critic. "Three years have passed since I said plainly that, in subscribing the Articles, I RENOUNCED NO ONE ROMAN DOCTRINE ; *yet I retain my fellowship, which I hold on the tenure of subscription, and have received no ecclesiastical censure in any shape.* It may be said, that individual bishops have spoken against those opinions, but where does the institution of our church give individual bishops any power of authoritatively declaring church of England doctrine?"

And equally powerless is the prelatical church in this country to arrest and remove error. Oxfordism has become already ascendant, and the voice of a few, once resolute and determined to be heard, is hushed. Dr. Onderdonk ordained Mr. Carey with full knowledge of his sentiments, even in the face of the remonstrance and protest of his most responsible ministers. Two of his peers, Drs. McIlvaine and Chase, manfully utter their dissent officially, and promise to impeach their distinguished brother at the bar of his peers. The whole subject of heresy in the church, which this case involved, is brought before the Convention, and by the foregoing almost unanimous vote, is dismissed, and we hear no more of the impeachment of the prelate of the diocese of New-York. The act of ordaining Mr. Carey is actually sustained, and the very errors he so openly maintained become virtually sanctioned, in the face of the world, by the highest tribunal of the Episcopal church. Mr. Ward, of Baliol, bids defiance to the authority of the English prelate ; as Mr. Sellon, of Canandaigua,

after publishing six discourses advocating substantially the doctrines of Universalism, went wholly unrebuked and undisciplined, and died a minister in regular standing in the Episcopal church.

We have yet to learn where a minister of this connection has been arrested in his course upon charge of errors in doctrine. Many have gone out from the Episcopal church to the Universalists and other denominations, but we know of no case of exclusion from the ministry in this country upon the ground of false doctrine.

We are forced to the conviction, that no denomination of professed Christians was ever known so utterly regardless of the private and Christian character of its members as that of the Episcopal church, and which tolerates such diversity of sentiments, the grossest errors in doctrine and immoralities of conduct. We deeply regret the conclusion thus forced upon us, but we are fully persuaded of its truth, and we feel compelled to question the rights of any denomination to the confidence and fellowship of the Christian family of believers, while so utterly at variance with the spirit and laws of Christ's kingdom.

We feel constrained to allude to these things, as fully sustaining our position, in relation to the discipline of the prelatical churches, and more especially at this time, when the Episcopal system is so loudly commended as affording the most effectual barrier to error in sentiment, and efficient unity of action in excluding unworthy incumbents from the ministry. The Episcopal Recorder of Philadelphia says, in the case of their deposed prelate, "We see the power of the Episcopal church to open her bosom and free herself from corruption." We see rather, how long corruption may there find a lodgment and be countenanced, and with what extreme difficulty it can be ejected.

We cannot possibly avoid the conviction that the policy and sentiments of the prelatical churches are most unfavorable to purity of doctrine, correct discipline, and evangelical piety among their own members and ministry.

And where are the evidences of a general attention to religion and the extension of godliness through the world?

When a few clergymen in the city and vicinity of New-York, more deeply impressed with the need of increased spirituality, and for the promotion of their personal piety and professional usefulness, held weekly prayer meetings at each other's houses, their diocesan interposed and forbid their continuance as inconsistent with the order of "the church." The duty of "obeying the bishop" was held to be more imperious and sacred than that of thus worshipping God, and these meetings were abandoned. In another diocese, where some special interest on the subject of religion existed, and the small edifice would not accommodate the people, service was held in the open air; but as no prelatical consecration had hallowed the grove, the green earth and the fair sky, this was forbidden as irregular and bordering on fanaticism. And if it is true, by their fruits ye shall know them, what evidence does the existing state of the missionary cause give of the evangelical character of these churches? Take the prelatical instructions given to the domestic missionary, the reports he returns from his field of labor, and we are pained to see how little is said about *religion*, its doctrines, its precepts, its spirit, its conversions and its hopes. Take the commission of the foreign missionary and the congratulatory epistles of the six prelates of this country to "their brethren of the East," and then the account which their missionary returns of his labors and successes, and how does it compare with the journeyings, the prayers, the revivals, the triumphs of apostles and many modern missionaries of the cross? Even the amiable Heber could recommend to the English the building of theatres in which the natives of Judea should be admitted to mingle in the amusements of the European residents; and the more recent doings of Badger and Southgate show vastly more devotion to the order of the prelacy than to the spiritual renovation of the heathen. We cannot, with history and existing facts before us, doubt for a moment, that something is radically wrong in the system and sentiments under review, and that the entire structure of the prelacy must yield to the simple equality of the gospel ministry, and that the sentiments ordinarily attend-

ing it, be exchanged for that evangelical system which the spirit of God will bless to the saving of the world. Till then we cannot expect any permanent reformation in the prelatical family, nor regard with pleasure any accession to their number from evangelical denominations. We believe its structure to be radically wrong, and its tendency, evil continually, warring against the best interests of a republican state, the purity of the Christian ministry and the salvation of men through justification by faith in Jesus Christ.

3. Prelatical principles and the sentiments connected with them seem to us to lead directly to the errors and absurdities of Romanism.

It is well known that the reformation effected but a partial change in the Episcopal church, and that its forms, ceremonies and entire service, as prescribed in its standards, are but a modification of the papal directory. Many in the Episcopal church became Protestant only in form and others from necessity, and hence the entire denomination was strongly bound to the papacy, and subject to a thousand influences, which have checked the growth of evangelism and the Protestant piety of her members. And though the Church of England had utterly renounced every popish error and absurdity, or should she now do it, and still retain her prelatical principles, in our opinion she retains the very germ of the papacy, and sooner or later we should expect to see rising the entire fabric of the Romanists. If we are to credit the advocates of Episcopacy, this is already a matter of history. They confidently assert that diocesan Episcopacy was the order established by Christ and handed down by his apostles. That it continued pure through the earliest centuries, till from the aspirings of human ambition and the growing corruptions of the times, all ecclesiastical power became concentrated in one man, and the attendant evils of the papacy followed in rapid succession. They allow, that thus diocesan Episcopacy became absorbed and the apostolical succession corrupted for ages; until Henry VIII., by virtue of his kingly power and his coerced parliament, evolved pure Episcopacy, and gave back to the world,

the church as it was in the days of the Apostles. They admit that popery sprung from the prelacy as its legitimate offspring, and in this all history agrees. The transition was easy from metropolitan prelate to universal bishop, or pope, to whom all the churches that embraced the prelatical principles soon yielded implicit obedience.

And as to ecclesiastical polity, where is the essential difference between the English prelatical church and Romanism? The head of the one is the young queen of Great Britain, and that of the other an old man on the Tiber; and if the union of church and state should now be severed, it probably would not be long before all the powers now centred in his holiness at Rome, would be found claimed by a divine right for the archbishop of Canterbury.

As a large portion of the English church have ever manifested a strong sympathy for Romanism, the tendency has, at various times, been strong toward a re-union; and even at the present day, there are found those who see no cause for a continued separation, and even deny that the Episcopal church of England ever *was* Protestant. "The churches of Rome, of England and France," they say, "are one and the same, and it is matter of regret that we are separate from Rome." "I utterly reject," says one, "and anathematize or curse the principle of Protestantism, as a heresy, with all its forms, sects and denominations." Even Mr. Melville, while he exposes the errors of the Romish communion, says: "That which made us a part of this church, was the acknowledging the pope as our ecclesiastical head; and that which dissolved our union with this church was the refusing to continue such acknowledgment." And why did they refuse? Only because an absolute monarch claimed for himself what had been given to the pope, and directs every clerical order in England to behold at Westminster, rather than at Rome, the supreme head of the church. How far this changed the nature and tendency of their principles it is easy to see. No further than the separation of the French Church in 1830 from the Roman constituted that a Protestant communion. It left

the English church as much papal as before, except that Henry the king of Great Britain, instead of the Roman pontiff, was its head. The Protestantizing, if we may so speak, of the English church, was entirely another affair from its disruption from Rome; and how far it in reality ever became Protestant, is very difficult to decide. Its strong sympathies for Rome, and its frequent advances toward a re-union, are presumptive proofs, at least, that the leaven of popery was never excluded from the English hierarchy; and we see not how any consistent adherent to the prelacy can do otherwise. Its prided forms, its sounding litany, its baptismal and burial services, are all according to the papal prescription; and we say again, if freed from its state connection, and removed from the strong elements of Puritanism, with which it has so long been surrounded, we see no reason why it should not speedily re-assume every feature of the papal church, as far as its ecclesiastical and clerical polity is concerned.

But a more important question remains to be considered, viz.: the tendencies of Episcopacy to the errors of the papacy in relation to the subject of salvation. The doctrines, forms and services of the prelacy are adapted to produce the same *practical* results as those of the papacy. Indeed, to a great extent they are the same. In the services prescribed and the doctrines usually inculcated by the advocates of the prelacy, salvation is made to depend upon the means of grace and the administering of Episcopal ordinances. This is expressly asserted by the prelates of the Episcopal church. Many unsuspectingly receive these sentiments as true; enter upon a course of religious duty, as they suppose; are early baptized, or made Christians, as it is said; they become habitual attendants upon the services of the church; hold a constituent part in the performance of worship, along with which they are taught that divine grace is in some mysterious way connected; that by it they are cultivating their better natures, and nourishing that grace which is given to every man to profit withal. Ere long they are brought to the rite of confirmation, in which the diocesan is accustomed to main-

tain that the Holy Ghost is imparted as his hands rest upon the head of the kneeling recipient. He is now addressed anew as a child of God and an heir of heaven, having assumed to himself the vows of his sponsors in baptism, and received the last rite from one professedly delegated to open the kingdom of heaven. That this is an unexaggerated description of prelatical usage no one will deny, and that it is not the gospel method of salvation we are abundantly assured.

And what is the necessary influence of this upon the confiding disciple? He imagines himself sure of salvation, not as he repents, believes, and leads a life of holy obedience, for these, he has already been told, "will not of themselves secure salvation," but as he is industrious in the use of prescribed means and the reception of "authorized ministrations." Having been baptized he is told that he is an "heir of the kingdom of heaven." "Confirmed" into this belief rather, we apprehend, than into the favor of God, he views every repeated service as an advancing step in his sanctification. The kneeling, the audible invocation, the responses, the respectful bowings at the name of Christ, rise every Sabbath as additional securities of the divine favor. No one at all accustomed to the influence of these services will question this result. And how does all this differ from the practical influence of popery? There may be no worshipping of the virgin, no supplication of saints, no outward penance, no *formal* indulgences sold as the security of salvation, and yet there may be nurtured all those elementary principles whence sprung the mighty machinery of papal superstition. Both the prelatist and the papist make the "authorized clergy" the *sole* dispensers of divine favor. They both would have us expect salvation, not as we repent and believe in Christ, but as we adopt the "only mode" of salvation, "baptism by valid authority." "Confirmation," "indulgences," and "absolution," all follow alike as the fruits of this one essential rite of baptism.

We may as well commission a Tetzels with "indulgences," as did Leo X., as to send out a Tetzels with "baptism," as the

prelacy would authorize. And we may as well look to the virgin and the saints for salvation, as to the hands of the prelate and the sprinkling of his priests; and as far as securing heaven is concerned, the rosary, the cross and the host are surely as efficacious as the repeating of prayers, the kneelings, and responses of the sanctuary. It is all the same. The substantial characteristics and moral tendencies are the same in each. It is *the church*, the ministry and ordinances in both, and not repentance, faith and obedience; not justification through Jesus Christ. There is no salvation out of the Roman church, is the axiom of the papist; and the prelatist answers, "I have yet to learn where a promise to fallen man is to be found, that is not limited on the previous condition that he is a member of the visible (i. e. Episcopal) church upon earth." "Baptism is the only mode" of salvation, unitedly they respond; while in affectionate assurance it is affirmed, "the churches of Rome, of England and of France are one and the same."

We do not wonder at all that the "veiled daughter" approaches with filial confidence the extended arms of her acknowledged mother; that the cross begins to reappear in the pulpits of the prelacy; flowers to bloom again on their altars; and lights to burn at noon-day in the sanctuary.¹ We are not surprised at the return of the real presence in the eucharist, nor at the invocation of the saints, nor faith in miracles; nor shall we be surprised at the statue of the virgin and image-worship, in the sanctuaries of the prelacy throughout the world, as they have already appeared in many of the Episcopal churches of England.

The priests and the ordinances of the papacy are the only ministers of Christ on earth, and the only religious services, that the prelacy acknowledge to be authorized and valid, and

¹ We have been informed upon good authority that the prelate of one diocese in this country has already caused candles to be kept burning daily in his place of worship, and put on his person and his private dwelling the usual badges of papal designation.

why should they not be one? Well does the prelatist say, "It is a matter of regret that we are separate from Rome." The Episcopal church, as such, never was Protestant in fact, and but for causes already mentioned, a fragment of it only would ever have separated from the Roman See, and that would have abjured the prelacy. And while her diocesan character is retained, we confidently believe she will never be able to resist the advances of her clergy and people toward the more imposing services of the papacy. Already the line of demarkation is indistinct, if not utterly invisible.

We think we have shown what are the natural tendencies of prelatical sentiments and ministrations, and that history, melancholy and abundant, confirms the positions we have advanced.

We regret the necessity that compels us to such discussions. But the time has arrived when all are concerned in questions of this character; and being forced upon us by their advocates, it is not unreasonable for us to stand on the defensive. We have seen the gloomy advance of the papacy, and we hear the predictions of the prelacy. We see the one taking possession of our institutions of learning and offices of emolument under government. The united cry of both is, "*We are the church*;" and now when they are striking hands against the religious economy of every other denomination, and claiming affinity, natural and strong, in all anti-republican institutions, we cannot be silent. We owe it to our common Christianity and our country, to speak in defence of the institutions our fathers gave us, and of the gospel for the hope of which they toiled and bled.

In the foregoing positions we do not find ourselves alone. Many, hoping and praying for a reformation in the Episcopal church, that they may not be compelled to a separation, openly acknowledge and lament these evils; while others, confirmed in the correctness of these views by the uniform history of this denomination, see no prospect of any valuable reformation either in "faith or practice."

Mr. Coleman in his admirable work entitled "*THE PRIM-*

ITIVE CHURCH," after a most rigid examination of the claims of Episcopacy, says, "We object to Episcopacy, 1. As a departure from the order of the apostolical and primitive churches. 2. That it had its origin, not in divine authority, but in human ambition. 3. That it removes the laity from a just participation in the government and discipline of the church. 4. That it creates unjust distinctions among the clergy. 5. That it gives play to the bad passions of men. 6. We object to the exclusive and intolerant spirit of Episcopacy. 7. Episcopacy is monarchical and anti-republican." "It is monarchical in its form, monarchical in spirit, and until transplanted to these States, has been always and every where the handmaid of monarchy. And here it is a mere exotic, our own republican soil being quite uncongenial to all its native instincts." "Episcopacy," says Macaulay, "for more than one hundred and fifty years, was the servile handmaid of monarchy, the steady enemy of public liberty." "We must," says Coleman, "regard Episcopacy as a strange, unseemly anomaly here; a religious government, arbitrary and despotic, in the midst of the highest political freedom: a spiritual despotism in the heart of a free republic." "An irresponsible life-bishopric," says Prof. Parke of Andover, "may be congenial with transatlantic institutions, but it is not with American." With these views the late Dr. Rice of Virginia, and Dr. Woods of Andover, substantially concur. We would also refer to these same distinguished authors for support to our other positions illustrative of the popish and unscriptural tendencies of prelatical institutions. "What shall we say of those Episcopalians," says Dr. Woods, "who maintain that their church is the only true church of Christ, and that their ministers are the only ministers who received the gift of the Holy Spirit to qualify them for their office, and that their ordinances are the only ordinances which are valid, or which can secure the blessing of God, while yet there is seen among them no degree of spiritual health or spiritual activity, above what is seen among those, who, according to their ideas, have no share in those invaluable and indispensable

blessings? I cannot but ask, why we should go over to another denomination to obtain benefits, which, after all, prove to be no benefits?"

We agree, fully with the six American prelates of this country who say, "The Episcopal Church, deriving its episcopal power in regular succession from the holy apostles, through the venerable Church of England," "has no ecclesiastical connection with the followers of Luther and Calvin." We believe more, and what we suppose was intended to be understood by the above declaration, they have no *sympathy* with the followers of these illustrious men. And we regard as wholly unimportant and puerile, the arrogant assumptions of the prelacy to exclusive church prerogatives. It is a matter of trifling importance, whether the numerous and extended denominations of evangelical Christians in this country and in Europe are regarded as churches, and the ministrations of their clergy as valid or not, by the smallest sect among us. But we do regard it as a solemn question for them to ask, whether theirs is a church at all, and whether their ministry is in any sense a ministry of Jesus Christ. It is a serious question for all to examine who are listening to the proffers of this sect, as bestowing undoubted favors of grace, whether the truth that saves is with them, and the Spirit that giveth life. We can find neither the church nor the ministry of Christ, but with those who embrace the truths of the gospel, and unite to carry out the objects for which the gospel was given. Where the truth and the Spirit of God are, there and only there, are to be found the church and ministry of Jesus Christ. The virtue of the truth, and the power of the Holy Ghost that attends it, are the heavenly attestations which we receive as incomparably superior to all the bestowments of men or investitures of hierarchy. These are the only credentials which are infallible, and that God requires us to acknowledge. Where, then, is the truth? where is holiness? where is the Spirit of God? where are revivals of true religion? There is the church; there we would rest; there, and there alone, would we have our children live, as the only sanctuary of the ever-

lasting covenants. The church is nowhere else to be found. The ministry of the gospel is nowhere else to be met.

ARTICLE VII.

DOMINICI DIODATI I. C. NEAPOLITANI, DE CHRISTO GRÆCE LOQUENTE EXERCITATIO.

Translated by Rev. O. T. DOSSIN, LL. D., of Western Independent College, Exeter, England.

Continued from page 181, Vol. I.

CHAPTER II.—*That Christ and the apostles spoke the Hellenistic tongue.*

WHAT we have advanced hitherto, is more than enough to prove that Christ, his mother, and the apostles, must have spoken Greek, from their having been inhabitants of Judæa. Nevertheless, as our title, *De Christo Hellenista*, and our purpose, pledge us to something more precise and definite, we shall devote the present chapter to arguments that bear directly upon the exalted personage just named.

§ 1. *Jesus assumed a Greek surname.*

Our first argument, then, is found in the additional name by which our Lord was distinguished. To his Hebrew name Jesus, he added the Greek cognomen *Χριστός*, meaning *anointed*, as Chrysostom,¹ Theophylact,² Œcumenius,³ and Cyril⁴ of Jerusalem inform us. “He is called Christ, because he was anointed; because, too, he was of flesh: with what oil was he anointed, then? Not with oil, by any means, but with the Spirit.” This unction with the Spirit occurred, according to Chrysostom, when he was baptized in Jordan by John,

¹ Chrysostomus, homil. 1 in Ep. ad Roman. p. 6.

² Theophylactus, cap. 1 ad Math. p. 4.

³ Œcumenius, cap. 1 ad Roman. p. 245.

⁴ Cyrillus Hieros. Catech. 3, Nεφ. p. 202.

and when "the Spirit in the likeness of a dove came down upon him."¹ Then did he receive the name of Christ. It is worthy of observation that the Greek word *Χριστός* means precisely the same as *משיח* *Messiah* in Hebrew, the word employed by the prophets to signify the coming One, and thus most familiar and agreeable to Jewish ears. But if Jesus preferred the Greek appellative *Χριστός* to the Hebrew *משיח* *Messiah*, it follows of course that the Greek was his native tongue. From this circumstance, too, his followers take their designation, not from his Hebrew name Jesus, but are called *Christians*, from the Greek *Χριστός*.

§ 2. *His band of disciples Christ called by a Greek name.*

The election of his disciples furnishes another argument. Out of his seventy-two followers Christ selected twelve to be instructed by him with a greater care, with a view to their future employment as the teachers of the world. To this inner circle he gave the Greek name *ἀποστόλοι*, *apostles*, that is, *legates*, or missionaries. "He called his disciples, and chose twelve out of them, whom he named apostles."² When also he laid the foundations of the church upon Simon, he gave him the Greek surname of *Πέτρος*, *Peter*,³ so that from that time his Hebrew Cephias gave place to his Greek name Peter. These facts all go to show that the Greek language was the vernacular of Christ.

§ 3. *Christ used Greek Bibles.*

The same thing is proved by Christ's only reading and quoting the Scriptures of the Greek version. This might be demonstrated by a thousand instances; but for brevity's sake we limit ourselves to a few. Our first example shall be from Luke 4: 16 sq.: "And Jesus entered in, according to his wont, into the synagogue on the Sabbath day, and stood up

¹ Chrysostomus, in Psal. 45.

² Luc. Evang. cap. 6, v. 13.

³ Marc. cap. 3, v. 16; Math. cap. 16, v. 18.

to read ; and there was delivered unto him the book of Isaiah the Prophet. And when he unrolled the book, he found the place where it was written, 'The Spirit of the Lord,' etc., etc. This passage of the prophet, Christ read in the version of the Seventy, for the reason directly to be given. That the point may be more easily ascertained, we here present the three texts in parallel columns, for the sake of comparison ; first the Hebrew, secondly the reading of Christ, thirdly the Septuagint. It will thus be seen, at a glance, whether our Saviour's lection corresponds more closely with the Hebrew or with the Greek :

HEBREW TEXT.

רוח אדני
יהוה עלי יכון
משח יהוה
אוחי לבשר
ענוים שלחני
לחבש לנשברי
לב לקרא
לשבויים דרור
ולאסורים
פקח קוח
לקרא שנה
רצון ליהוה :

READING OF CHRIST.

*Πνεῦμα Κυρίου ἐπ' ἐμὲ, οὗ ἕνεκεν ἔχρισέ με, εὐαγγελίσασθαι πτωχοῖς ἀπέσταλκέ με, ἰάσασθαι τοῦς συντετριμμένους τὴν καρδίαν, κηρύξαι αἰχμαλώτοις ἄφεσιν, καὶ τυφλοῖς ἀνάβλεψιν (ἀποστεῖλαι τεθραυσμένους ἐν ἀφέσει) κηρύξαι ἐνι-
αυτὸν Κυρίου δεκτόν.*

SEPTUAGINT VERSION.

Πνεῦμα Κυρίου ἐπ' ἐμὲ, οὗ ἕνεκεν ἔχρισέ με, εὐαγγελίσασθαι πτωχοῖς ἀπέσταλκέ με, ἰάσασθαι τοῦς συντετριμμένους τῇ καρδίᾳ, κηρύξαι αἰχμαλώτοις ἄφεσιν, καὶ τυφλοῖς ἀνάβλεψιν, καλέσαι ἐνιαντὸν Κυρίου δεκτόν.

TRANSLATIONS OF THE FOREGOING.

The Spirit of the Lord Jehovah is upon me, because Jehovah hath anointed me to preach good tidings to the meek ; He hath sent me to bind up the broken in heart, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound ; To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord.

The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me ; he hath sent me to preach the gospel to the poor, to heal the contrite in heart, to proclaim liberty to the captives and sight to the blind, to send away the bruised free ;¹ to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord.

The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me ; he hath sent me to preach the gospel to the poor, to heal the contrite in heart, to proclaim liberty to the captives and sight to the blind, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord.

¹ "To send away the bruised free," ἀποστεῖλαι τεθραυσμένους ἐν ἀφέσει. This

From the agreement of the lection of the gospel with the LXX, it is clear that Christ used the Greek version. Christ also used this in his quotations from the Old Testament, for from it are those passages of Deuteronomy taken wherein he defeated the Devil in the wilderness :

HEBREW TEXT.

לא על-חלם
לבדו יהיה
האדם כי על-כל
מיצא פי יהוה
חיה האדם :

WORDS OF CHRIST.

Οὐκ ἐπ' ἄρτι μόνον
ζήσεται ἄνθρωπος,
ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήμα-
τι ἐκπορευμένῳ διὰ
στόματος Θεοῦ.

SEPTUAGINT VERSION.

Οὐκ ἐπ' ἄρτι μόνον
ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρω-
πος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παντὶ
ῥήματι ἐκπορευομέ-
νῳ διὰ στόματος
Θεοῦ.

TRANSLATIONS OF THE FOREGOING.

Not by bread a-
lone shall man live,
but by every utter-
ance of the mouth of
Jehovah shall man
live.

Not by bread a-
lone shall man live,
but by every word
that proceedeth out
of the mouth of God.

Not by bread a-
lone shall man live,
but by every word
that proceedeth out
of the mouth of God.

A little after, he again quotes Deuteronomy in these terms :

HEBREW TEXT.

לא תנסו את
יהוה אלהיכם :

CITATION OF CHRIST.

Οὐκ ἐκπειράσεις
Κύριον τὸν Θεόν
σου.

SEPTUAGINT VERSION.

Οὐκ ἐκπειράσεις
Κύριον τὸν Θεόν
σου.

TRANSLATIONS OF THE FOREGOING.

Ye shall not
tempt Jehovah your
God.

Thou shalt not
tempt the Lord thy
God.

Thou shalt not
tempt the Lord thy
God.

§ 4. *Christ used Greek proverbs.*

Matthew furnishes us with our fourth argument, in the place where he introduces Christ saying, "One iota or one apex shall not pass away from the law until all be fulfilled."¹

clause is superfluous, and is not found in Isaiah in the Hebrew Text, Greek Version, or Chaldee Paraphrase. With justice, therefore, do Erasmus, Beza, Lucas Brugensis, Calmet,* and others conceive these words to have crept in from the margin, where they were written as a gloss upon Isaiah. They do not appear in the Greek MSS., nor do Ambrosius nor Eusebius seem to have read them.

¹ Matth. cap, 5, v. 18.

* In Comment. ad Luc. cap. 4, v. 19.

We may here, by the way, observe, that the Greek *iota*, the Hebrew *yod*, the Chaldee *hik*, and the Syriac *yud*, are all the smallest letters in their respective alphabets, so that the proverb would hold good in any of these languages. But as the speaker used none of these, but only the Greek characters, it is quite certain that it sprang from his speaking Greek. This is further confirmed by the fact that a Greek proverb was commonly current at that day, whereby any thing exceedingly minute was compared to an *iota*.

§ 5. *Christ used the Greek alphabet also.*

Our last argument in regard to Christ is drawn from the title given to Christ in the Apocalypse, where, declaring himself to be the beginning and end of all things, he says, "I am the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end."¹ Again, in the beginning of the same book: "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, saith the Lord."² For as the Alpha is the first letter of the Greek alphabet, and the Omega the last, so is HE alone the beginning from whom all, and the end for whom all things were created, and whom no end can follow, the Everlasting.³

¹ Apocalyp. cap. 21, v. 6. Item *ibid.* cap. 22, v. 13.

² *Ibid.* cap. 1, v. 8.

³ Here Grotius, anticipating the force of our argument, has commented upon the words in John in the following terms: This mode of expression, namely, Alpha and Omega, is borrowed from the Rabbins, who say *מֵאֵלֶּף וְעַד תָּו* *from Aleph to Thau, from the beginning to the end*: thus Jalkuth on 2 Sam., Isaac Ben-arima on Lev. 26. And in the contracted form *תָּו אֵלֶּף* *the beginning and the end*, in the Book Zohar, the gate of light, the gates of justice, Bahir and others. John adapted the phrase to the Greek alphabet, because he was writing in Greek.

But with all respect for the illustrious dead, the argument was unworthy of so great a man. For if Christ really said these words in Chaldee, as Grotius thinks, and not in Greek, John would likewise have expressed them in Chaldee, thus: "I am Olaph and Tau, saith the Lord." Nor does it help his cause to say that John expressed these letters in Greek, because he was writing in Greek, for John himself on other occasions acts otherwise. Thus in chap. 9, v. 11, of the same book, he writes: "The king, the angel of the abyss, whose name is in Hebrew Abaddon, and in Greek Apollyon." So also chap. 16, v. 16, "In the place which is called in Hebrew Armageddon." In the first chapter of the Gospel he

§ 6. *Hellenism was vernacular to the apostles.*

The apostles and evangelists also used the Greek as their native tongue, the proof of which we find in the dialect they used in their writings. This dialect, as has been often observed, consists of Greek words and Hebrew and Chaldee combinations, together with an occasional intermixture of Macedonian, Syrian, and Egyptian idiotisms. So peculiar was this at that period to the sacred writers and the inhabitants of Palestine, that you will not find either any people or author elsewhere employing it. If we look closely into this question, we shall perceive that there are only three causes which can furnish an adequate solution of it: either that the apostles acquired this dialect from the Greeks; or that God taught it them by miracle; or, finally, that it was their native dialect.

As to the first supposition, then, no one can say that the apostles learned this dialect from the Greeks, because, I. Josephus tells us that the Jews abhorred the reading of foreign authors, much more the learning of their language, which they regarded as impiety in a Jew to know too well. II. Be-

pursues the same method, for putting the word *Ῥαββί* in the mouth of the two disciples of the Baptist, who accosted Jesus, he straightway subjoins *ὁ λέγεται ἐρμηνεύμενον διδάσκαλε*. Now, if John did so, although he wrote in Greek, in recording matters of minor moment, how much more would he have done so in regard to the divine words of Christ? But if we examine the words of Grotius, we shall find the expression ambiguous. “*Est locutio Alpha et Omega a Rabbinis desumpta, &c. &c.*” This may either mean that the phrase was borrowed by the Rabbins from John, or by John from the Rabbins. If it be understood in the former sense, that the Rabbins took it from John, that may be correct, because they lived long after that sacred writer. But if Grotius means that John borrowed the expression from the Rabbins, he is utterly mistaken, since the very Rabbins named by him, even if we concede the highest antiquity claimed for them by their friends, are all more modern than John. The book *Zohar*, for instance, was composed by Rabbi Simeon Ben Jochai; and *Bahir*, by Rabbi Nehemiah Ben Achan, who both lived in the second century; *Jalkuth* on 2 Sam. was compiled after this period; as also considerably later the *Porta Lucis*, whose author was R. Joseph Gecatilia, who flourished in the eleventh century after Christ; and the *Porta Justitiæ*, written by R. Karnitol, who lived about A. D. 1500, and R. Benarima. The objection of Grotius, therefore, goes for nothing.

¹ Joseph. in fine lib. Antiq.

cause the apostles were almost totally ignorant of polite learning. There was no object, then, to impel them to the perusal of the Greek writers, which had they done they would certainly have formed a more cultivated style than they now exhibit. Nor must it be said, as some unthinkingly urge, that the sacred writers of the New Testament picked up their Greek from the constant study of the version of the Seventy. For, in the first place, this assertion is made without any authority whatever ; and in the next, there is too great a difference between the Hellenistic of the Septuagint and that of the apostles for us to believe it. The apostles, for instance, strew their Greek with Latinisms, which are entirely wanting in the other ; ample proof that theirs was the vulgar tongue, and daily enlarging by accessions from foreign sources. And, III. Because the apostles, plain and humble men, knew no language but their own. If, then, this Hellenism were really a foreign thing to them, not only were they incapable of forming their style from it, but could not even read or understand it without an interpreter.

Nor, in the second place, can it be said that the apostles were miraculously endowed with a knowledge of Hellenism. For, to omit any other argument, if this language was common, besides the apostles, to other Jewish writers, as we have already shown, to whom no gift of tongues was imparted, there was no need for the special interference of God to bestow it upon them.

It remains, therefore, in the third place, that we confess the apostles to have used this language, because their own vernacular tongue ; which alone can account for their employment of a dialect so remote from pure Greek usage.

§ 7. From the weighty reasons just adduced, it must be evident to all that Hellenism was not only the language of the Jews from the Maccabean age, but also that of Christ and the apostles at a later day, as the vulgar one of the country and times. We may, then, fairly rest in the conclusion that Christ imbibed it with his mother's milk, that he swallowed it

by daily use in conversation and teaching, and that he wrote in it when he stooped toward the ground, and pardoned the adulterous woman. His mother spoke Hellenistic, and the angel Gabriel Hellenistic, when he came to her and announced the incarnation of the divine Word. This same dialect did the apostles use as their native one when they went forth to publish the law of the gospel. Hence, too, came it that the ancient church so long employed the same language in its liturgy and ritual.

ARTICLE VIII.

ON THE CHANGE OF THE SABBATH FROM THE SEVENTH TO THE FIRST DAY OF THE WEEK BY APOSTOLIC EXAMPLE.

By REV. R. WEISER, Pastor of the Ev. Lutheran Church of Bedford, Penn.

1. *An Address to the Baptists of the United States, from the General Conference of the Seventh-Day Baptists.* New-York: 1843.
2. *Sabbath Tracts, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, published by the Seventh-Day Baptist Tract Society.* New-York: 1843.
3. *The Sabbath Vindicator, Nos. 1 and 2.* New-York: 1844.
4. *Seventh-Day Baptist Anniversaries, or an Account of their Religious Conference for 1843.* New-York: 1844.
5. *Plain Questions. A Christian Caveat to the Old and New Sabbatarians (by E. Fisher, Esq., first published in London, 1653), republished by the Sabbath Tract Society.* New-York: 1844.

WE have placed at the head of our article quite a formidable array of pamphlets. We have done this, in order to show those whose views we may feel it our duty to oppose,

that all the arguments and facts which they have been able to compress into some ten or twelve publications, are fully within our reach. That these publications, be they great or small, good or bad, true or false, are the proper and legitimate awards of honest criticism, none can doubt.

The article that stands at the head of the list, is an elaborate and rather spirited appeal to the Baptists in the United States, charging them with a deliberate and habitual violation of the fourth commandment, because they do not keep the seventh day holy. Twenty thousand copies have been ordered for gratuitous distribution ! Tracts, proclaiming the same serious charges, are given to the winds, and scattered broad-cast over the land. Missionaries are sent forth to proclaim to the deluded and wicked members and ministers of the "First Day" churches, that all are sinning most grievously against the Lord of heaven, because they do not sabbatize on the seventh day ! This, to say the least of it, is a begging of the question. What good can such publications be expected to accomplish ? They can only strengthen the hands of infidelity, and remove the restraints of public morality. The great body of the Christian church in this country, of all sects and parties, is now making strong and united efforts to produce a better and more general observance of the Sabbath of the Land, and as they honestly believe, the Sabbath of God. Whilst they are doing all they can to influence mankind to obey the commandments of Jehovah, and especially the fourth command, here we see a body of the professed followers of Jesus Christ putting forth every effort to convince the world that all or nearly all who do now, or have, for the last eighteen hundred years, professed and honored the name and revered the religion of Jesus Christ, have been in error on this subject. They say the law is, "The seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord ;" that neither Jesus Christ nor his apostles ever changed, or had a right to change, the time of keeping the Sabbath ; that the keeping of the seventh day is a part of the moral law ; that the keeping of the first day is anti-Protestant ; that it is one of the signs of the beast ; that it hinders the progress of true

Christianity. The men who utter and propagate such sentiments may be honest in their views, but they are unquestionably doing more harm than good. They may think, like Paul, that they are doing God a service, but, like that once infatuated Jew, they are doing all in their power to injure the cause of religion.

From the Minutes of the last Conference of the Seventh-Day Baptists, held at Hatfield, New Jersey, Sept. 1843, we learn that they have in their connection 59 churches, 49 ministers (ordained), 20 licentiates, in all 69, and 6,077 members in the United States. The preachers of this sect seem, at this very time, to be making more systematic and vigorous efforts for the dissemination of their peculiar notions, than have perhaps ever been made in any age or country. Dogmatism and unfounded assertions are palmed upon the public as unanswerable arguments. These circumstances seem to require an impartial examination into the merits of the case. We design merely to throw out a few hints in relation to the most important features of this controversy. Hence we shall endeavor to show :

I. That the apostles of Jesus Christ did uniformly in their lifetime celebrate the first day of the week as the Sabbath. If we can show that the apostles did celebrate the first day, and not the seventh, and if we believe that they were divinely inspired, then it must follow that the change was made by the sanction of Jesus Christ, either expressed or implied, unless we adopt the absurd position that the inspired messengers of heaven, whose express business it was (Matth. 28: 20) to teach the commandments of Jesus Christ to all nations, could err. If God commanded all men, from the giving of the law downwards, to keep holy the Sabbath, and if the seventh day is the Sabbath, and the apostles did not keep that day holy unto the Lord, (and there is no evidence that they did) then it follows that they (although all orthodox Christians admit their inspiration) lived in the habitual violation of the fourth commandment. This is one of the absurdities into which Sabbatarianism drives us !

The Sabbatarians contend that the fourth commandment, not only in its spirit, but also in its letter, is a part of the moral law, and that it cannot be abrogated, and must therefore be binding on us; that *ἐν μιᾷ τῶν σαββάτων* does not mean "on the first day of the week," but "on one of the sabbaths." Swedenborg also maintains this translation, although a First Day Christian. The main question in this controversy is this, viz., Is the observance of the fourth commandment in all its circumstantial exactitude a part of the moral law, or is it only moral in its spirit, and ceremonial in its letter? Dr. Gill says, "The law of observing the seventh day Sabbath is not of a moral nature, if it were it would be binding upon all mankind, Jews as well as Gentiles, and could not have been dispensed with, nor abolished." In loco. Dr. Gill's distinction is a very nice one, although he gives no proof in its support. The Seventh-day Baptists are not satisfied with mere human opinions, they want proof from God's word. Nor are they satisfied with our translation; they want a fair translation. They shall have it. Let us examine John 20: 19. *Οὐσὺς οὖν ὀψίας τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ τῇ μιᾷ τῶν σαββάτων.* Before attempting a fair translation of these words, we shall furnish the reader with a specimen of Sabbatarian philology, from the Sabbath Vindicator, Vol. I., No. 2, August, 1843. Here it is. "From Acts 20: 7, which in our English version reads thus: 'And upon the first day of the week, when the disciples came together to break bread, Paul preached unto them,' it is inferred, that the first day of the week was the day usually devoted to breaking of bread and preaching. But this translation of the text is not authorized by the literal or intended sense of the original, *ἐν δὲ τῇ μιᾷ τῶν σαββάτων*, to which we object, because its proper and literal signification is, 'and on one of the sabbaths.' " Now to prove that the man who wrote this criticism either did not understand the Greek, or wickedly endeavored to pervert the word of God, we refer to John 20: 1, *τῇ δὲ μιᾷ τῶν σαββάτων*, "but on one of the sabbaths." Would not this be as good a translation as the other? And yet would it not destroy the very sense of the passage? Does not the Evan-

gelist intend to convey the idea that Christ arose on the first day of the week, and not on one of the sabbaths? If the learned philologist who wrote such nonsense will look into any lexicon, he will find that *σαββάτων*, both in the singular and plural, means, not only a sabbath, and the Sabbath, but also a week or a period of seven days. But then this modern Porson goes on and betrays his ignorance of the Greek still more glaringly: "Thus *δὲ* answers to the conjunction, and, *ἐν* to the (not proposition, but) preposition, in, on, or upon; *μιά* is the Greek word for one, in the fem. gen., singular num., dative case, and therefore cannot govern *τῶν σαββάτων*, which is in the gen. plural, neuter gen. Hence the necessity of supplying the word *ἡμέρα*, a day, with which *μιά* agrees; and we should therefore read 'one of the sabbaths.'" This is certainly a new system of philology! We would merely say, "en passant," if those men who are so vigorously pressing the claims of the seventh day upon our attention, wish to make any impression upon us with philological arguments, they must study the Greek Grammar more carefully. But to proceed with a translation of John 20: 19. The following, we contend, is a literal, and the only correct translation which can be made. "Now being late in the evening, that first day of the week," or perhaps thus, "Now the evening being far spent on that first day of the week." That the disciples had met on this occasion for religious worship is admitted on all hands. That they met for the same purpose on the following first day, or eight days afterwards, is evident from verse 26. That they met on the seventh day cannot be substantiated any where. That they did not meet on the seventh day is very probable from a number of circumstances connected with the sacred narrative. It appears from the narrative that Thomas was absent on the meeting of the first evening; when those who were present saw him, they informed him of what had occurred, and he seems to have been deeply interested in the facts stated; when they came together again, Thomas was there also. Now it seems very evident that there was no meeting on the seventh day, preceding the second meeting, for if there had

been, surely Thomas would have been there ! If the disciples did meet on the seventh day, it is very certain that the Saviour was not with them ; but it is positively certain that he honored them with his presence on the first day of the week. Let this fact go for what it is worth. Now the question very naturally occurs, why did the disciples meet on the first day of the week, and not on the seventh ? As Jesus had given his apostles private instructions on many points, may he not have informed them of his will on the subject of the Sabbath ? Who dare affirm that it was the will of Jesus that his disciples should meet for religious worship, and should sabbatize on the seventh day, and that they positively disobeyed him in this respect ? But we are told, “ the moral law is unchangeable, the keeping of the seventh day is a part of the moral law, and therefore it is binding on all men, and must be observed through all coming time.” Let us examine this position. Christ says, Matt. 5 : 17, “ Think not that I am come to destroy the law ; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil,” πληρῶσαι. Ex. πληρόω, to complete, to make perfect, to supply what is wanting, to explain. See Rom. 15 : 19, Col. 1 : 25. That the meaning is to make the moral law better understood, to set it in a clearer light, to give it a larger and more comprehensible and spiritual meaning, is very evident from Matt. 5 : 27 and 28 : “ Thou shalt not commit adultery ; but I say, whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery.” Here we have an instance of Christ’s manner of fulfilling the law : he makes it more general and universal in its application ; he explains it in a wider sense. He does not destroy the law, but fulfils it, in all its extent. Now, as there is nothing in the nature of the seventh day to prevent its being changed to the first, and as the change of the time could not in any way affect (so far as we can see) the great moral and natural question of the Sabbath ; and as there are many strong reasons, aside from the example of the apostles, why the first day of the week should be observed and honored as the Sabbath of the new dispensation ; the great probability is that it was changed by the Saviour himself. This position is very much strengthened by what

Christ says, in Mark 2: 28, "The Son of man is Lord also of the Sabbath." The meaning of this passage is, that Jesus Christ, to whom all power in heaven and on earth was given, had an absolute right to do, on and with the Sabbath, what he pleased. To say, as Seventh Day Baptists do, that Jesus Christ himself had no right to change the time of keeping the Sabbath, is, to say the least of it, a daring attack upon his divinity, it is treading on dangerous ground, it savors of Arianism! We have seen above, that the change from the seventh to the first day was actually made; now whether it was made by an express command of Jesus Christ, or by the united concurrence of his inspired apostles, does not seem to be very material; for the apostles had the promise of the Holy Ghost who should guide them into all truth. But let us see whether they did invariably meet on the first day. We affirm that they did, as Christians, sabbatize on the first day. If they did not hold their religious meetings on the first day, then they had no Sabbath at all, for there is no evidence that they sabbatized on the seventh day. That the Jews, in Judea and in the countries whither they had gone, kept the seventh day, all admit; and that the Jewish converts might have rested on the seventh day in conformity to the usages of their country is very probable. But that the heathen converts ever considered, or were taught to consider the seventh day sacred unto the Lord, either in Jerusalem or out of it, we defy any man to prove. Yet this is the point that must be proved, before we can give up the first-day Sabbath.

In Acts 2: 1, we have another meeting on the first day. That the day of Pentecost was on the first day, or the Christian Sabbath, is proved to demonstration by Dr. Doddridge, (*Expositio in loco.*) Here then we find the apostles of our Lord, in the course of forty-nine days, at three different religious meetings, all on the first day of the week, and no intimation that they met at any time on the seventh day, or that they rested or sabbatized on that day. Does not this seem very remarkable? Why is this? The plain inference is, that the apostles considered resting and attending religious

worship on the first day, equivalent to the full observance of the fourth commandment. And is it safe, is it proper, is it wise, in us, to say they were wrong? Let us examine another strong passage in our favor. Acts 20: 7, ἐν δὲ τῇ μιᾷ τῶν σαββάτων, "upon the first (day) of the week," for we have stated that "σαββάτων" means the hebdomadal week. In Luke 18: 12, we have, Νηστεύω δις τοῦ σαββάτου, "I fast twice in the week. Would it not be nonsense to say, "I fast twice on the Sabbath?" Did not the Saviour know the usus loquendi of σαββάτου? In this passage nothing can be predicated, but the hebdomadal week. In Mark 16: 9, we have πρώτη σαββάτου. This, according to the Sabbatarians, should read, "Now when Jesus was risen on the first day of the Sabbath." Would not such a version destroy the very sense of the passage? The Evangelist was just telling us that Jesus did not arise on the Sabbath, but the Seventh Day Baptist, in order to make out his case, makes the Evangelist swallow his own words, and makes him prove the very thing he is trying to disprove!

We come now to εἷς, μία ἓν. This numeral adjective is one of the strong holds of Sabbatarians. It is used, they say, two hundred and ninety times in the New Testament, and in every case as a cardinal, and is uniformly so translated, only where the attempt is made, to prove the first day of the week the Sabbath of God. That εἷς generally means 'one,' we readily admit, but that it is sometimes used as an ordinal, we will now attempt to prove. Dr. Stockius, one among the most learned lexicographers of the last century, in his "Clavis Linguae N. T.," says, "Εἷς, μία, ἓν, unus, una, unum, primus, a, um, quidam. Pro numerali, ordinali, etiam legitur apud Polybium, p. 1401, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ καὶ εἰκοστῇ βίβλῳ. In primo et vicesimo libro." That by μία τῶν σαββάτων we are to understand the first day of the week, or the Christian Sabbath, seems to be evident. If εἷς, μία, ἓν τῶν σαββάτων does not mean the first day of the week in the New Testament, then there is no evidence in the New Testament that Jesus rose on that day. Now if Jesus did arise on the first day of the week, as all reasonable men, whether Sabbatarians or anti-Sabbatarians, must

admit ; then it follows that the apostles met on the same day for religious worship, and they met eight days afterward—and they met on the day of Pentecost—and they met at Troas (Acts 20 : 7) on the same day. If this is not a chain of evidence, then there is no such thing to be found in the Bible. Nor will it invalidate the force of this reasoning, to say, as the Sabbatarians do, that from the day of Pentecost to the meeting of Troas, twenty-six years had elapsed ; for the length of time between the two points, only shows the uniformity of the practice to greater advantage. Some ten or twelve years after the outpouring of the Spirit at Jerusalem, we are told in Acts 13 : 14, that Paul preached at Antioch in the Jewish synagogue on the Sabbath, i. e. on the seventh day. This was quite natural ; it is hardly to be expected that a congregation of wicked and prejudiced Jews (such as the last part of the chapter shows those of Antioch to have been) would worship on the Christian Sabbath. Paul availed himself of the opportunity afforded by their coming together on the seventh day, to proclaim Jesus to them. But is there any thing said about the breaking of bread at Antioch ? The meeting at Antioch was a Jewish, and not a Christian meeting, and as every rational man would suppose, was held on the Jewish Sabbath. The same may be said of the meeting by the river-side, at Philippi.

Now let us look at 1 Cor. 16 : 2. *Κατὰ μίαν σαββάτων*, Upon the first day of the week, not upon one of the Sabbaths. “That there be no gathering when I come.” The Corinthian Christians were in the habit of meeting on the first day of the week. They were heathen converts, and evidently kept the first day, and they must have done it at the instigation of the apostles, who planted the Christian church among them. Human tradition is here out of the question. If the example and instructions of the inspired apostles are human traditions, then are we guilty of “teaching for doctrines the commandments of men.” Dr. Mosheim, Ch. His., vol. i. p. 45, says : “In the first century all Christians were unanimous in setting apart the first day of the week, on which the Saviour arose from the dead, for the solemn celebration of public worship.

This pious custom, which was derived from the church of Jerusalem, was founded upon the express appointment of the apostles, who themselves consecrated that day to the same sacred purpose, and was observed universally, as appears from the united testimony of the most credible writers. The seventh day was also observed as a festival, not by the Christians in general, but only by such churches as were principally composed of Jewish converts." This quotation proves the very point we have been endeavoring to establish. Dr. G. F. Seiler, one of the most learned and impartial writers of Germany, says in his *Tabellen*, Cent. I., "Yan feyerte den Sabbath fast an den meisten orten nech mit den Juden wenigsten in Palastina bis auf die Zerstorung Jerusalems. An den Tagen des Herrn hielten die Christen aber auch feyerliche Zusammen kunfte." This was no doubt the true state of the case. About twenty years after the destruction of Jerusalem, John, in Rev. 1 : 10, says, "I was in the spirit on the Lord's day." Every Christian in those days knew what day was intended. It was the holy day on which all Christians worshipped God ; it was the day spoken of by David as the "day that God hath blessed ;" it was the day on which the Lord arose from the dead ; the day on which the apostles first met their risen Saviour ; the day on which Thomas had thrust his hand into the wounded side of his Lord and his God ; the day on which the Holy Ghost was poured out upon the infant church ; the day on which the disciples habitually celebrated the Lord's supper ; the day on which the Corinthian church regularly met for divine service.

In the apostolic age, the propriety of celebrating the first day was never called in question. Now as other matters of less importance often caused bitter contentions, such as the eating of meats, circumcision, the keeping of Jewish festivals, (Rom. 14 : 5,) etc., and as no difficulty ever arose about the Sabbath, the strong presumption is, that this matter was settled by the Lord himself, and the apostles had nothing to do but to keep the first day in honor of Christ's resurrection, and teach all that loved the Saviour to do the same. That the

first day was sacredly observed, and observed too as the Sabbath, in the age immediately following that of the apostles, is abundantly proved by the writings of the ancient church Fathers. Thus Ignatius, (Epis. ad Magnes.,) about A. D. 100, just six years after the death of St. John, says: "Let every friend of Christ celebrate the Lord's day." He uses the same expression that John had used, *τῇ κυριακῇ*. This day, i. e. the first day of the week, he calls "the Lord's day—the day consecrated to the resurrection—the queen and prince of days." We quote from Prof. Stuart. Caius Plinius Cæcilius Secundus was born 62, A. D. His letter to Trajan was written 107, from Bithynia, just seven years after Ignatius, and eleven after John was in the spirit on the Lord's day. One of the crimes laid to the charge of the Christians in Bithynia and Pontus was, that they were "*went on a stated day* to meet together before it was light, and to sing a hymn unto Christ, as to God." Now that this stated day was the Lord's day, i. e. the first day of the week, is, we think, conclusively proved above. But it may be asked, what does this prove? Why, it proves that the Christians in Bithynia and Pontus did *not* keep the seventh day. That the Jews, both in Jerusalem and in Pontus, met on the seventh day for divine worship, was well known both to Pliny and Trajan; and if the Christians had met upon the same day, the great probability is that Pliny would have said so. Justin Martyr, who was born about this time in Neapolis, says, "On the Lord's day all Christians in the city and in the country meet together, because that is the day of our Lord's resurrection; then they who are able and willing give what they think proper for the orphans and widows." This quotation is from Calmet, and throws a flood of light on 1 Cor. 16: 2 and Rev. 1: 10. Irenæus, a disciple of Polycarp, 167, says, "On the Lord's day, every one of us Christians keeps the Sabbath." This is a strong testimony in favor of the change of the Sabbath from the seventh to the first day. The fact is, there is no getting over it. Theophilus of Antioch, 162, says, "Both custom and reason challenge from us that we should honor the Lord's day, seeing on that

day it was that our Lord Jesus Christ completed his resurrection from the dead." Dionysius of Corinth, 170, says, "To-day we celebrate the Lord's day." Tertullian, 192, says, "The Lord's day is the holy day of the Christian church."

This is enough. We do not wish to come down to a later period. From these quotations, it appears evident that the Christians in the first and second centuries did invariably observe the first day of the week as the Sabbath. If we, who observe the first day, are wrong, we err in good company. If we are wrong, we have been led into error by the holy apostles and martyrs—by the united testimony of all the best men that ever lived in the Christian church. That we keep the day that meets the approbation of the great Head of the church, may be inferred from the fact that he causes his blessing to rest upon those who most religiously keep it.

These hints are thrown out to induce some of your more learned correspondents to take up the subject, and give it a more thorough examination.

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*Life of Godfrey William Von Leibnitz.* On the basis of the German work of Dr. G. E. Guhrauer. By JOHN M. MACKIE. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1845. pp. 288, 12mo.

THE Lives of eminent men are matters of general interest, and when faithfully recorded, become monuments of the providence of God. Mr. Mackie has done the English public good service, by presenting them with so good a memoir of so celebrated a man. Leibnitz is one of the stars in the galaxy of scientific men, which illumined the close of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries. He was evidently a man of original research and of superior attainments in science. He is probably entitled to wear the palm as the discoverer of the differential calculus, although England claims the honor for her own immortal Newton. If the fluxional calculus be considered essentially the same as the differential, then probably Newton is to

be regarded as the first who sought it out. Yet, so almost simultaneously did these two great men arrive at the same results, that the nations which, respectively, gave them birth, may well be content to divide the honor.

Leibnitz early became a man whose society was sought by the great ones of the earth, and whose opinions on scientific, and even on theological questions, were regarded with interest. Yet he was not without his hobbies : e. g. his universal language of philosophy, and his plans for the union of the Roman and Protestant churches. The former he never developed ; the latter he failed to accomplish. Then he exerted his powers to effect a union of all the Protestant churches in opposition to Rome, but with no better success. This object is becoming one of importance now again, and movements of a similar kind are made on the Continent of Europe. And we think there must be some sort of expressed unity among the different evangelical denominations of Protestants in order to meet the unity of Romanism, and be prepared for the mighty conflict with organized error which is fast approaching. We cannot say much for the piety of Leibnitz, and must close our notice with our thanks to Mr. Newman of this city, for the neat volume which has furnished the occasion for these remarks.

2.—*A Manual of Ancient and Modern History ; comprising, I. Ancient History ; II. Modern History.* By W. C. TAYLOR, LL. D., M. R. A. S., of Trinity College, Dublin. Revised, with a Chapter on the History of the United States. By C. S. HENRY, D. D. New-York : D. Appleton & Co. Phil. : Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 797, 8vo.

A good Manual of History, sufficiently comprehensive, has been, for some time, a desideratum. The volume before us, although not perfect, is in advance of Tytler and the other Compenda, which have been so long in use. We think it is quite minute enough, candid on the whole, historical in the style, and well adapted to use as a text-book in colleges and in our more advanced schools.

In this edition, *revised* by Prof. Henry, the remarks on Calvin and the ecclesiastical government of Geneva, in connection with Servetus, ought to have been qualified and made more conformable to truth. Any representation of that portion of the history of the Reformation, which attributes the death of Servetus directly to Calvin, or to the government on account of his obnoxious views on the doctrine of the Trinity, does injustice to both, and ought to be erased from every history which pretends to any character, and especially from Manuals intended for the hands of the young.

Notwithstanding this passing criticism, we consider it the best text-book of general history yet accessible to us, and cheerfully commend it to the attention of instructors in our academies and colleges.

3.—*The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D. D., Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford.* By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of University College, Oxford. First American from the third English edition. The two volumes complete in one. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Phil.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 516, 12mo.

The publishers have here compressed a very large amount of matter into one volume, enabling them to sell the work at \$1 50. And the matter is worthy the reading of every intelligent person. Dr. Arnold was a very remarkable man, far above the ordinary class of men. For many years the head of Rugby School, he acquired there a character and an influence not often gained by those in the same line of life. As Professor of History at Oxford, he was rising rapidly to the pinnacle of fame: and although permitted, in the providence of God, to occupy the station but a little while, it was long enough to show the world that he was no common man, and that, had he lived, he would soon have ranked among the first historians of the age.

His free and evangelical spirit could not brook the fooleries of Newmanism: and, in consequence of his opposition to the Tractarian views, he suffered not a little persecution from those who would have honored both their intellects and their hearts by a sympathy with his views and sentiments.

Mr. Stanley, his particular friend, has developed his inner life by occupying most of the volume with the correspondence of Dr. Arnold. In this he was wise: for we wish to hear such a man utter, at large, his own opinions and feelings, in his own way. The volume contains 301 of his letters.

He was an Episcopalian, and in so far, we are not one with him; but his Episcopacy was such, and professed in connection with such a life, that we can readily forgive him this one error, for the sake of all the good there was about him.

4.—*Rural Economy, in its Relations with Chemistry, Physics and Meteorology; or Chemistry applied to Agriculture.* By J. B. BOUSSINGAULT, Member of the Institute of France, etc., etc. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by George Law, Agriculturist. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Phil.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 507, 12 mo.

Rural Economy is an important branch of knowledge: and few things are more interesting than the pursuit of scientific agriculture. Great advances have been made in it within a few years, and the day is probably not far distant, when very many educated men will resort to farming and horticulture, both as a means of subsistence and of enjoyment. The professions, except the ministry, will soon be overstocked, and men, with an education qualifying them for entering the legal or medical corps, will find little to hope for but starvation if they.

do; and, consequently, will be induced, in many cases, to try their skill at the plough, the harrow, the hoe, and the spade.

How much land is now wasted and impoverished, because its owners presume themselves to be above all instruction in the art of cultivating the soil, and plod on, as their fathers did, in trying to make a fortune on a farm of three or four hundred acres, when one fourth of the amount, scientifically cultivated, would yield a richer reward, and make room for many pleasant neighbors.

Having said our say on this point, it is time to say a word or two of the book. We think, then, we do not err in saying, that the intelligent author, himself also a practical farmer, has comprised, in this volume, an amount of valuable matter on agriculture scarcely to be found elsewhere within the same compass. He treats of the physical and chemical phenomena of vegetation; of the composition and principles of vegetables; of fermentation; of soils; of manures, organic and mineral; of rotations; of live-stock; of meteorology and climate; of the relations between organized beings and the atmosphere.

5.—*Recent Improvements in Arts, Manufactures and Mines : being a Supplement to his Dictionary.* By ANDREW URE, M. D. Illustrated by 190 Engravings. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Phil.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 304, 8vo.

We have already favorably noticed Mr. Ure's Dictionary, and cheerfully add our testimony to the value of this Supplement. There will be found here much additional information on interesting topics, such as Artesian Wells, Bread, Bakeries, Brick-making, Caoutchouc, Gas-Light, Guano, etc.

6.—*History of France, from the Earliest Period to the Present Time.* By M. MICHELET, Professeur-Suppléant à la Faculté, des Letters, Prof. à l'école normale, chef de la section historique aux archives du royaume. Vol. 1. Translated by G. H. Smith, F. G. S. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Phil.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1845.

This will, undoubtedly, prove to be a valuable history of France: and we, therefore, welcome it to an English dress, although we think it could be better translated. M. Michelet, the author, from the station he holds, is in possession of every facility for the preparation of such a work: and his high reputation authorizes us to presume that he has written a candid and superior history. He is a man of uncommon genius, of extensive scholarship, of deep research, of plodding application, of vivid imagination, yet of philosophic and severe judgment.

Among the illustrious French historians of the present day, Michelet holds a very high, if not the first place. His style is suffi-

ciently philosophical, yet so dramatic as to give living interest to his pages, and lead you on, often, through a series of graphic pictures.

The present issue by D. Appleton & Co. cannot but be acceptable to the reading public, and, by the mode of its publication in numbers, will fall within the means of many, who otherwise must be deprived of the pleasure and profit of its perusal.

7.—*A History of Greece.* By the Right Rev. CONNOP THIRLWALL, Lord Bishop of St. David's. In two volumes. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 1130.

The publishers have here offered to the public a large amount of valuable history in two 8vo vols. Bishop Thirlwall seems to have consulted the sources extensively, judging from the frequent references, although this is not always evidence of the fact: for probably nine out of ten of the histories palmed on the credulity of the public, although they make a large display of learning in quotations and references to authorities, are, at least in the last respect, mere copies of some equally unqualified predecessor. The line of succession here is much more easily proven, than that of the apostolic-Episcopal.

We have no intention, however, to apply these remarks to the case in hand, not doubting that the venerable bishop has personally consulted and verified his authorities. At all events, we take pleasure in commending the work as one relying on the best authorities, and presenting the results of recent investigations into the antiquities and history of Greece. Whilst there are other good histories on particular subjects, this, as a general history of Greece, is perhaps superior to any other in the English language.

8.—*History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic.* By WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT. In three volumes. Tenth edition. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845.

Mr. Prescott has established his reputation as an historian: and in honoring himself by his pen has honored also his country. It can never now be said, "Who reads an American book?" Nor, What American has written a standard work, worthy to go down to posterity? Whilst the English language shall be read, we venture to say, Prescott's Histories will be read. They should adorn the historic shelf of every reading man's library. The publishers, also, have taken pains to execute their part in a style corresponding with the richness and value of the work. We love to see a book like this, in clear, large type and broad margin. Yet, as books must be cheap now-a-days, but few can be printed in this luxurious style.

The work has been so long before the public, in its earlier editions, that nothing more is necessary than this brief notice, to remind those not yet supplied, that a fresh edition is ready.

- 9.—*Principles of Forensic Medicine.* By WILLIAM A. GUY, M. B., Cantab., Professor of Forensic Medicine, King's College, London, etc., etc. First American edition, with Notes and Additions, by CHARLES A. LEE, M. D. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 711, 8vo.

We are neither lawyer nor doctor enough to estimate the *full* value of such a work to those professions: yet we find in it much that is valuable to every man of science. It is a comprehensive epitome of medical jurisprudence, embodying all its important facts and principles, and, from its convenient arrangement, must be peculiarly fitted to be a text-book for students and practitioners. Infanticide, Legitimacy, Unsoundness of Mind, Toxicology, etc., are treated of in a perspicuous and masterly manner. Also Medical Evidence, Personal Identity, Life Assurance, Spontaneous Combustion, and many other subjects of great interest.

- 10.—*A Commentary on the Book of Psalms.* By GEORGE, Lord Bishop of Norwich and President of Magdalen College, Oxford. With an Introductory Essay by the Rev. Edward Irving; and a Memoir of the Author. New-York and Pittsburg: Robert Carter. 1845. pp. 536, 8vo.

Mr. Carter now offers this valuable work at the low price of \$1,50, printed on fair paper and in a good-sized type, thus making it, at the same time, readable and accessible to all. And, although this commentary cannot lay claim to as much critical acumen as some others, and would not be resorted to by the student of the Scriptures for accurate interpretation of the text, yet it is decidedly one of the very best practical commentaries we have. Bishop Horne was eminent in his day, and certainly possessed some excellent qualifications for commenting on this book of devotion. His style is lucid and often terse, his reflections grow naturally out of the sentiments of the passage on which he comments, and there breathes through the whole so much sympathy with the Psalmist in his humble views of himself and his exalted conceptions of Jehovah; there is such a heavenly, sweet frame of mind exhibited, so much spirituality, and such love for the Redeemer, as to render this commentary one of peculiar fitness for family-reading.

The Introductory Essay, too, by Edward Irving, written when he was in his right mind, before his great intellect was left to its vagaries, is deeply interesting. It is, indeed, in the Edward Irving style of inversion, yet abounds in such richness of thought, vividness of description, and lofty imaginings, that we forget the defects of style and follow the writer under the influence of such a mesmeric attraction as to be almost persuaded that even the style is just what the thought demands. At all events, it is pleasant to look back to Irving as he

was and to see him standing at the threshold of the Psalmist's Oratory and beckoning us to enter with him into his devotions there.

- 11.—*Sermons on Important Subjects.* By the Rev. SAMUEL DAVIES, A. M., President of the College of New-Jersey, with an Essay on the Life and Times of the Author, by ALBERT BARNES. Stereotype Edition, containing all the Author's Sermons ever published. In 3 vols. Fourth edition. New-York: Robert Carter. 1845.

This is another of Mr. Carter's good publications, which he offers at so low a price, (\$1 50 for the 3 vols.) as to present quite an inducement to purchase. Those who love to read good sermons, can have no excuse for not indulging that love. Davies' Sermons have been so long known, that it is a work of supererogation to say any thing to recommend them.

The Essay of Mr. Barnes is in his best style, and contains reflections well worthy the consideration of ministers and students of theology.

- 12.—*An Essay towards an Easy, Plain, Practical, and Extensive Explication of the Assembly's Shorter Catechism.* By JOHN BROWN, of Haddington. From the sixth Edinburgh edition. New-York: Robert Carter. 1845. pp. 356, 12 mo.—62½ cents.

The Shorter Catechism is one of the best systems of Divinity, in a condensed form, ever published; and John Brown's Explication of it is "easy, plain, practical and extensive." With only this and the Bible, a minister could discipline and indoctrinate his mind well, and write many good sermons.

- 13.—*Advice to a Young Christian, with an Introductory Essay* by Dr. ALEXANDER.—*A World without Souls.* By J. W. CUNNINGHAM.—*The World's Religion contrasted with Genuine Christianity.* By Lady COLQUHOUN. New-York: Robert Carter. 1845.

Many of our readers, doubtless, perused these small volume when they appeared in their first editions; and many, probably, have not yet. To the rising generation we can safely recommend them. They are of wholesome tendency, and the first and third especially adapted to elevate the standard of piety, and wean the Christian from the vanities of time to the realities of eternity.

The volumes are neatly "got up."

- 14.—*Judæa Capta.* By CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1845. pp. 234, 18mo.

Mr. Dodd keeps reminding us, every now and then, that Charlotte Elizabeth has somewhat more to say to us. Well, we are content: for we know she will say something of interest and utility. The Jews

and the Jews' land, engage much of her attention, for she looks confidently for their restoration to the country of their fathers. In this volume she portrays the siege and taking of Jerusalem in her peculiar style.

- 15.—*Kind Words for the Kitchen, or Illustrations of Humble Life.* By MRS. COPLEY. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1845. pp. 263, 18mo.

This is a truly well-meant, and well-executed attempt to elevate the character and promote the happiness of those in domestic service: and we hope it will not be without its effect.

- 16.—*The Great Secret Discovered. A Tale for Children.* By JOSEPH ALDEN, D. D. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1845. pp. 65, 18mo.

This is a little story by Prof. Alden, intended to impress very young children with the importance of beginning early to overcome selfishness and cultivate kindness toward all, and at the same time to teach parents to look well to the employments of their children. Children will be interested in reading it, and may be prompted to imitate the course of Samuel, and thus to overcome evil as he did, if they should be of the same disposition.

- 17.—*The Church Visible in all Ages.* By CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1845. pp. 121, 18mo.

This is a new volume from Charlotte Elizabeth, issued by the publisher in a very pretty style. The object of the author is to show that the true church has always been visible,—though sometimes a very little flock,—and distinguished from the false church, by Scriptural marks. It contains, in a brief space and in an interesting style, much of the history of the Paulicians, Albigenses, etc., who, in the darkest periods of the church's existence, preserved the faith once delivered to the saints, unshaken by the bitterest persecutions.

- 18.—*Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe, from 1794 to 1805.* Translated by GEORGE H. CALVERT. Vol. I. New-York and London: Wiley & Putnam. 1845.

The correspondence of literary men is always entertaining and often profitable. Two such men as Goethe and Schiller, stars of the first magnitude in the literary firmament of Germany, could not conduct a regular correspondence for a series of years without uttering thoughts which must let us into some of the secrets of their own reflective powers. Of course they pass under review many of the issues from the press of that day, and give us their own views on poetry, literature, philosophy, art, and religion.

This volume contains but half of the correspondence, the remainder to appear in a second, to be published ere long.

The translator seems to have executed his task well: but we cannot approve all he says in his "Preface." He there takes occasion to controvert the remarks on Goethe, which appeared in the Phi Beta Kappa Oration at Cambridge in 1844. In that production Goethe is called "selfish, false," "a bad man," "a synonyme for dissoluteness," etc., etc. These judgments the author pronounces false: and there will always be discordant opinions of the man, depending on the stand-point from which different persons view him.

We cannot think, however, that the translator has uttered more than a *flat denial* of the statements of the oration: for his argument that Goethe could not have been "selfish, false, nor bad," because he wrote an Iphigenia, a Clara, etc.; because a "large composition of mind," a "justness and clear humanity of nature," are apparent in his poetry and letters, we hold to be a perfect *non sequitur*. There is an abundance of facts obliging us to believe that a man may be very far from the possession of whatever is "pure, lovely and of good report" in his private character and personal habits, and yet utter in poetry and in letters the most beautiful and sublime sentiments.

The translator reveals the point of view from which he looks on his idol when he says: "*Goethe is the most complete man of his time—the richest specimen of humanity since Shakspeare.*"

19.—*A Course of English Reading, adapted to every Taste and Capacity; with Anecdotes of Men of Genius.* By the REV. JAMES PYCROFT, B. A. Trinity College, Oxford; with additions by J. G. Cogswell. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1845. pp. 243 12mo.

Such a book as this may be very useful. That will depend on the character of the person into whose hands it shall fall. Too many of the young are, at the present day, so bent on fashion and folly, that no systematic course of reading can ever be expected of them. The very sight of such a book as this would frighten them. "La! me! how could a body ever think of reading all that? It would take two lifetimes." A very comfortable conclusion for the pleasure-loving and lazy. And as it would take so long to read *all*, they deem it the wiser course to read none.

We have been applied to ourselves, as doubtless most educated men have, for courses of reading; and we have marked them out; but, we presume, in very few cases have they ever been pursued faithfully and perseveringly.

Mr. Pycroft has certainly pointed out an effective plan, and put it in the power of the reader to make an admirable selection of works on almost all subjects.

On some topics he has omitted valuable works, perhaps the most valuable; and under the head of "Reading for Controversialists" he has enumerated a formidable array of authors "against Dissenters," but none in their favor.

20.—*Hydropathy, or the Water-Cure: its principles, modes of treatment, etc. Illustrated with many cases, compiled chiefly from the most eminent European authors on the subject.* BY JOEL SHEW, M. D. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. New York: Wiley & Putnam. 1845. pp. 360, 12mo.

New modes and measures are apt to become hobbies: and what has been useful in many cases, is in danger of being cried up as panaceaive.

This book can be read with pleasure and profit, whether we adopt the views of the author or not. As to the efficacy of the application of cold water, internally and externally, we have no doubt: nor any more, that, in a multitude of cases, it is all that is necessary, either for the preservation or restoration of health. The Priessnitz method unquestionably requires caution, sound judgment and experience. It may do to dabble in water, but to mummify ourselves in wet sheets is no child's play.

21.—WILEY AND PUTNAM'S *Library of Choice Reading*.—No. I. *Eöthen, or Traces of Travel brought home from the East.* No. II. *Mary Schweidler, the Amber Witch.* Edited by W. MEINHOLD, D. D. Translated from the German by Lady Duff Gordon.

We perceive that the worthy publishers design to publish, in a library form, a series of works of an interesting description, such as will pass for light reading, and yet be of good moral tendency. We ardently hope they will adhere to their purpose, and that the day is not far distant when the vapid, trashy novel will be no longer in demand.

The first two numbers promise well. *Eöthen* is one of the best, and most popular books of Travels in the entire catalogue; "a neat book—not a sham." The *Amber Witch* has, also, excited universal attention, and called forth general approbation. It was, at first, thought to be fact, but is now known to be fiction, characterized by the excellencies of Robinson Crusoe and the Vicar of Wakefield. The author is the "Editor" of the title-page.

22.—*D'Aubigné's Miscellany. Puseyism examined—A Voice from Antiquity—The Voice of the Church—Confession of the Name of Christ—Faith and Knowledge.* By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D. D. New York: John S. Taylor & Co. 1845. pp. 330, 18mo. Mr. Taylor has here thrown together into one small volume, the

minor Essays of Dr. Merle, before separately published. Every thing from the pen of D'Aubigné is interesting to us, both in style and matter, and, for a very small sum, any one can now possess himself of these smaller productions.

23.—*The Adopted Child, or the necessity of early piety.* By CHARLES BURDETT, Author of "Emma, or the Lost Found." New York: John S. Taylor, & Co. 1845.

The incidents of this story are thrilling: some of them wonderful, indeed, if true; and if not, scarcely justifiable. "Emma, or the Lost Found" was received with great favor, and we presume the reception of this will encourage the author to proceed with the story of Henry Barton, all of which he represents as literally true.

24.—*The Church in all Ages—Conformity—Passing Thoughts—Falsehood and Truth—Judæa Capta—Convent Bell—Osric—Ixram.* By CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH. 1845.

These smaller volumes have been neatly got up by Taylor, and it is only necessary to say that they are from the pen of Charlotte Elizabeth, in order to recommend them to many readers. The last two are poetical, but not equal to her prose writings.

25.—*Etherology; or the Philology of Mesmerism and Phrenology: including a new philosophy of sleep and consciousness, with a review of the pretensions of Neurology and Phrenology.* By J. STANLEY GRIMES. New York: Saxton & Miles. Phil.: James M. Campbell. Boston: Saxton, Pierce, & Co. 1845. pp. 350, 12mo.

The author of this book has evidently made phrenology and mesmerism subjects of no little investigation. And whatever may be thought of his theory, he has certainly furnished one of the most interesting and sensible books yet written on these subjects.

That there are singular phenomena of mind not easily explicable on the ordinary and known laws of mind and matter we are ready to grant; but that these phenomena are attributable to magnetism or etherism we have yet to be convinced. That there are things in heaven and earth which *our* philosophy hath not dreamt of, we do not deny; but that these things are explicable by neurology, or etherology we do not yet confess, because we have not yet seen sufficient evidence.

Mr. Grimes seems to have overthrown all the theories prior to his, including Dr. Buchanan's neurology, and we do certainly think that his own does not rest on a *very firm* basis. He sets out with these fundamental principles—2. "One mind cannot influence another, but through the instrumentality of motion." 3. "No motion can be communicated from one mind to another, unless there is a *material*

connection." How does he know these statements to be true? He does not prove them. They are certainly not axioms. Then he writes: "*Fact*. One mind sometimes influences another independently of ordinary sensation or muscular motion, without contact or perceptible connection." "*Inference*. There is a material substance occupying space, which communicates mental emotion, from one mind to another." "This I denominate Etherism."

Now, granting the two principles or propositions quoted and the *fact*, the inference would seem to follow; but denying the principles two and three, the inference falls, until they are proved. The very foundation, then, needs support.

26.—*White Lies, and False and True—A Tale of Trials told to my Children—The Fashionable Wife and Unfashionable Husband*. BY MRS. OPIE.—*The Royal Sisters; an Historical Romance of the Middle Ages*. BY AGNES STRICKLAND. New York: Saxton & Miles. Boston: Saxton & Kelt. 1845.

These are 18mo. volumes, done up neatly in paper covers. Mrs. Opie and Mrs. Strickland, the authoresses, are well known as good writers: and their works are generally of wholesome tendency. The *White Lies* are worthy the attention of all.

27.—*The Devotional Family Bible, by the REV. ALEXANDER FLETCHER, containing the Old and New Testaments, with Explanatory Notes, Practical Observations, Copious Marginal References, etc. Every part embellished with a highly finished engraving on steel, including views of the principal places mentioned in Scripture, from Drawings taken on the spot*. New York: R. Martin & Co.

A splendid work; issued in parts, at 25 cents each. We have received the first two, embracing the first twenty-one chapters of Genesis: and we have certainly never before seen any thing which approached so near to our *beau idéal* of a Bible. It is in large 4to size. The Scriptural text is in double columns, fine, large, clear type, with the marginal references in two intermediate columns. Immediately beneath are the "Different Readings;" and beneath them the Reflections by Mr. Fletcher, all in good, clear type. The paper is heavy and fair, and the entire typographical arrangement and execution admirable. The Reflections are marked by sound sense and practical piety. Then, as an embellishment, each part is to be beautified by an elegant engraving on steel, chaste and appropriate. Those in the parts already published, and now before us, are certainly superior line engravings. All who can possibly afford it, and would indulge in the luxury of a magnificent Bible, need look no further than Mr. Martin's. When bound in a style correspondent with the execution of the text and the embellishments, it will, indeed, be an attractive object.

ARTICLE X.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

G. A. Meier has published his *Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Trinity*—Neander's *History of the Christian Church*, Vol. X.—Neilson's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, translated from the Danish by A. Michelson.—H. L. Ahrens has completed his work on the *Dialects of the Greek Language*.—Kiepert & Ritter, also, have given us their *Typographico-historical Atlas of Greece and the Hellenic Colonies*—Heinrich Ewald's *Copious Manual of the Hebrew Language*, fifth Edition—J. P. Lange's *Life of Jesus*, intended to counteract the influence of Strauss.—Bancroft's *History of the United States*, is being published in Germany, in the German Language. Crasius has published a complete *Dictionary of Xenophon's Memorabilia*.—The *History of Classical Philology in Antiquity*, by Gräfurtan, has reached the 2d volume, extending to the time of Augustus, among the Romans, and completing the history, in respect to the Greeks.

England.

K. O. Müller's *Introduction to a Scientific System of Mythology* has been translated and published. Also Schmitz's *Translation of B. G. Niebuhr's Lectures on Roman History from the first Punic War to the death of Constantine*. The *Correspondence and Remains of the late John Foster*, is in course of publication in London.

The Boden Professor of Sanscrit, at Oxford, commenced his lectures on the 10th of February, at the Clarendon. The Arabic Professor at Cambridge commences his lectures on the 8th of April, in the Combination-room of St. Catherine's-hall, to be continued every day till the division of the term. Subjects—"The Chrestomathies of Kosegarten and De Sacy, the *Koran* and the *Mahamat* of Hairi." The Arabic Professor also gives notice, that he purposes to deliver a course of Sanscrit lectures in the Easter Term. The early lectures will be elementary, being intended for persons desirous of beginning the study of the Sanscrit language. The subject of the remaining lectures will be, "The Episode of Nala," from the *Mahabharata*.

France.

The *Revue de Paris* announces, that the marriage of the celebrated Arab Chief, Yussuf Bey, Colonel of the Spahis, with Miss Weyer, grand niece of General Guilleminot, was to be celebrated in Paris on the 27th of February. He has abjured Islamism, and embraced the Catholic religion at St. Thomas d' Aquin, in presence of the relative of his wife and of a few friends. Yussuf is Turk by birth, and 36 years of age. After his marriage he is to be promoted

to the rank of Major-General, and invested with the military command of Oran.

United States.

Prof. Stuart's work on the Revelation by St. John has at length appeared, although not yet fallen into our hands. We doubt not it will be worthy of its author, and exceedingly valuable to the critical student of that portion of God's word.

THE
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY
AND
CLASSICAL REVIEW.

THIRD SERIES, NO. III.—WHOLE NUMBER LIX.

JULY, 1845.

ARTICLE I.

THE INFLUENCE OF FAITH UPON INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER.

By Rev. C. B. BORTON, Troy, N. Y.

IN this age, so far removed from the influence of ancient opinions, and among a people so eminently practical as we are, any allusion to a faith which controlled the nations twenty or thirty centuries ago, may appear like the pedantry of a school-boy, or at least, be considered an unwise attempt to draw off the mind from its active duties in the real world, to wander among the visions of one purely ideal.

A belief in the invisible has very little direct influence upon our nation. Indeed, Protestant Christendom yields but slightly to any impressions from the spiritual world.

This is a matter of fact era, and facts, with us, are such truths as can be tested by the senses. Whatever can be touched and seen and *used* moreover, for some profitable purpose, is allowed to have a real being. A railroad, or a steamboat, or a cotton-factory, or a bond and mortgage, or bank notes at par, or coin, they are veritable things. A man may

believe in them and not be called a dreamer, or a fanatic ; but whosoever will not shout, "these are thy gods, O Israel," is stared at as a relic of the stupid past.

If we were called upon to name the one *great fact* of modern times, the truth most interesting to all classes, we should mention "available funds" as decidedly, and without a rival, holding the first place in the human mind, the "*τὸ καλόν*" of these latter days.

Mammon and Philosophy have preached a crusade against all spiritual things, and they have well nigh hunted them from the earth. There are no fairies now to make their homes in the flower cups, to sleep under the shadow of a leaf, or to revel by moonlight on the green sward. The good genii have been banished, the witches have all been exorcised, and the land has rest. It was said of Cervantes, that he "smiled Spain's chivalry away." Thus Mammon and Philosophy have sneered out of existence that unseen world, which once presented so many wonders and beauties to the imagination of man.

Even the nurses have been compelled to invent new stories wherewith to frighten the young. The infant philosopher will smile in contempt at wizards and fairies, and speak of a ghost as an optical illusion.

It will be said, perhaps, this is well: the spirits which flitted in the twilight of paganism must of course be banished by the beams of true religion. It is well ; blessed be our Redeemer for disenchanting the world.

But though we grant this, there still remains a question of deep importance to the present age. Are we not in danger of forgetting that the presence and power of that false system which once ruled the nations, demonstrate the existence of a spiritual world, which is not a falsehood, but a solemn and enduring reality ? The counterfeit is the representative of the genuine coin.

In the eager and praiseworthy attempt to release the mind from the thralldom of the ancient superstition, have we not, in a measure, banished the false and the true together ?

As the fantastic shapes of the Grecian mythology melted away, have we not forgotten the substance of which they were the distorted reflection?

In speaking of the influence of faith upon the intellect, we do not propose to confine our remarks to *evangelical faith*, but shall speak of that general belief, which links the soul to a spiritual world and binds it to an hereafter.

For our first illustration, we turn to that people with whose mental powers, with whose poetry, and eloquence, and excellence in the fine arts, and religious belief and institutions, every scholar is familiar—the Romans and the Greeks.

One of the most significant facts connected with the paganism of Greece and Rome is, that beneath its influence the intellect of man towered upward in more gigantic proportions than it has elsewhere reached on earth, with one single exception. As an intellectual being man was then “soaring in his pride of place.” In whatever depends simply upon the powers of the understanding, the Greek and Roman are accounted giants still.

If we would be charmed with those creations of poetry, which have their birth-place in the highest heaven of invention, we must ascend to those former times when an invocation to Calliope was something more than a classic formula; when the soul of the poet was under the full influence of a spell whose power over the world is gone. If we would be moved by an eloquence which cannot die while human nature endures, we must sit at the feet of those masters who lived before the light of Christianity streamed over the marbles of the Acropolis; before Paul had explained its principles to the Athenian Senate, or preached in the household of Cæsar.

In power and grandeur of thought, the philosophers of paganism have never been surpassed by uninspired men, and modern art has not been able to throw over the sculptured form that matchless grace which floats round even the mutilated fragments which Time has spared from Greece. These are significant facts, and it is certainly worthy of seri-

us inquiry, whether this mental excellence was gained independently of the false religion with which it was contemporary; whether it was reached in spite of the adverse influences of heathenism, or whether there was some element in the pagan system which stimulated into gigantic growth and vigorous exercise the intellect of man.

Is there any thing in Christianity which forbids, or even hinders the widest expansion, the loftiest achievement of the human mind?

We deem these questions of unspeakable importance; for unless it can be shown that Christianity is superior to the ancient religion in its power to develope and strengthen even the intellect, how shall we commend it as a revelation from God, adapted to the *whole nature* of man?

In order that we may more easily form an opinion in regard to these interesting inquiries, we shall call the reader's attention, a moment, to some of the more important features of the religion of Greece and Rome, not with the idea of imparting instruction upon these points, but that all our memories may be refreshed with truths from which we propose hereafter to draw some important conclusions.

Let us, however, examine these systems as they appeared in the earlier, rather than the latter periods of these governments, as they have been represented by their purest and noblest men; nor must we forget that in the later times of luxury and corruption, this religion had very little influence upon the public mind. In fact a majority of at least the higher classes considered the whole as a dream of the poet or a contrivance of the priest. They were infidels in regard to their own pagan system.

In its purest and original form, this religion presented the idea of One Supreme Being, Creator and Governor of all things; a Being of unbending justice, the rewarder of the good, and swift to avenge himself upon the workers of iniquity: one, who watched over and interested himself in the concerns of mortals; the hearer and answerer of prayer.

The immortality of the soul was another article in this

creed. Tartarus burned with *everlasting* fire for the wicked, and for the virtuous it provided an eternity of joy.

We discover also the idea of an universal law, emanating from the Supreme Being, clothed with his authority, and binding every intelligent creature. For every transgression of this law, Justice demanded satisfaction, an *atonement*. In addition to the One Supreme Being, the Greeks and Romans, as all are aware, peopled heaven and earth with a race of spiritual creatures; lesser gods, benevolent and evil. The air, the woods, the waters, were all swarming with these imaginary beings; and if we look at the general theory of this system, rather than its absurd details, we may perhaps discover that modern philosophy has yet to prove that its own teachings approach nearer to the true economy of the spiritual world.

For the sake of an inference to be used hereafter, will the reader dwell, a moment, with us upon the characters of some of the spiritual dwellers in that ancient world?

That was a delicate conception of the gentle hamadryad, born with the opening bud, who had her home for ever among the branches; whose shriek of terror sometimes mingled with the sound of the woodman's axe, and whose harmless life ended with that of the tree over whose destiny it had unceasingly watched. There was the home of a nymph in the shadow of every grot, and by the mosses of every fountain. There were spirits who guided the husbandman in his labors, who protected his flocks, and guarded them from the evil spirit's eye. There were those who watched over the springing grain, to cherish the tender blade, to shield it from mildew and blight, and to make effectual the influence of the dew, the shower, and the sunbeam, in bringing to maturity the ripening ear. The Spirit of the storms was heard abroad upon the mountains, uprooting the forests with his mighty breath, and the song of the sea-nymph floated over the moonlit sea.

Each individual was thought to have a good and evil spirit to attend him through life, and he was fortunate or

otherwise as one or the other, for the time, obtained control over his destiny.

What a beautiful and touching idea was that of the *Larés*, the spirits of departed friends, watching over those whom they loved on earth ; giving full power to the holy and purifying belief, that the departed, the loved, are still lingering by our sides unseen, our spirit-guardians attending with sleepless eye and holy affection all our wandering steps, or watching beside our pillows !

The inhabitants of the unseen world were more numerous than those of the visible ; and every operation of the natural world, from the opening of a flower to the heaving of an earthquake and the rush of the whirlwind, was under their supervision ; and every interest of man, from the protection of the sleeping infant to the planting and uprooting of a kingdom, was in some sort subjected to the ministration of these spirits by the Supreme Governor of all. The Greek knew little of that "philosophical god," the "laws of nature," and therefore he referred to direct spiritual agency the phenomena of earth and sky.

With the fall of paganism, and the introduction of Christianity, these viewless beings were banished, though gradually, from the earth. The nymph lingered long by the secluded fountain, and a dim belief in various spiritual creatures walking the earth and waters, is to be traced through modern Europe. But they are all gone now ; the last gentle spirit has departed, and philosophy has decided that they were all but shadowy creations of the poetic dream, and our faith is narrowed down to the visible, tangible, *profitable* things. The error has been effectually destroyed and abandoned. It remains to be seen whether modern philosophy, in performing this work, has not outrun the commands of the Bible, and lost sight of a most important truth.

Let us first inquire, Whence did the Greek and Roman derive that complicated system of which we have spoken, which overshadowed all society with its influence, and was interwoven alike with life's grandest and minutest concerns ?

Was it wholly an invention of human imagination, or was it a distorted shadow of something real, something purer than itself? The last supposition is undoubtedly the true one. It is wholly inconceivable that the human mind, unaided by revelation, could have formed any such conceptions of a world which in no point comes under the observation of the senses, and in regard to which reason can form no definite conclusions. Imagination has no power equal to the creation of such a world as has been opened to the eye of faith, and we are compelled to search for a religious system embracing three worlds, in other regions than the imagination of man.

We have already spoken of some important doctrines which are discoverable amid the rubbish of the ancient mythology; a belief in One Supreme Being, in the immortality of the soul, in future rewards and punishments; a punishment in fire which was eternal, an everlasting home of happiness for the good; in an all-embracing divine law, and the necessity of a satisfaction, an atonement for transgression. These doctrines, as they were then believed, were so strictly in accordance, in their general features, with the teachings of the Bible, that we cannot resist the idea, that both have been derived from some common origin.

But what was that origin? How shall we trace back the corrupted stream as it flowed through Greece and Rome to the original well-springs whence the truths of the Bible were drawn? Rejecting as improbable the hypothesis that the early Grecian tribes derived it from their intercourse with the Jews, we adopt another.

The religious system of Greece and Rome bears marks of a more venerable antiquity. It seems to date its beginnings further back than the exodus; it appears to strike its roots far upward toward the beginnings of time.

We believe this religious system had its origin in the earliest revelations given by God to man. We refer it to the primitive instruction vouchsafed to Adam, preserved by the teachings of the antediluvian patriarchs, handed across the waters of the deluge by Noah, and again preserved in the far

East, with more or less mingling of idolatrous rites, till the calling of Abraham, and finally lost, among the Jews, in the clearer light of the written word and the Mosaic economy.

As the families of the earth divided after the deluge, and leaving Shinar wandered westward in search of a home, they carried with them this primitive belief, at first a direct revelation from heaven, but gradually corrupted by the wickedness of the natural heart, and obscured from age to age, until it became that foul and abominable thing, which polluted earth and disgraced man at the period of the Saviour's advent.

If, then, we have given a correct idea of the origin of the principal features of doctrine which are half hidden, half revealed amid the rubbish of paganism ; to what source shall we trace a belief in those crowds of spiritual creatures with which the fervid imagination of the Greeks had peopled their beautiful land ? Was this a dream, a mere fiction ; or may we refer this spiritual supervision of earthly things, this mingling of good and evil spirits in human affairs to some source in the region of truth ? Is this simply a corruption of some important doctrine ; some revelation once made by God to man ? We have no doubt that the latter is true, and that in all the lesser deities of the ancient world, in the good and evil spirits that swarmed in air, or walked the earth, we have but a monstrous corruption of an original truth, one of the most beautiful and interesting doctrines of Scripture, the ministration of angels.

“ Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister unto the heirs of salvation ? ” Setting aside the absurdity of the *details* of the ancient system, and looking only at the general theory, we consider its correspondence to the teachings of Scripture remarkable and important. From the views here presented we are, perhaps, better prepared to judge of the influence of such a system upon the intellectual character.

The Greek, and Roman, but more especially the Greek, lived and acted under an all-pervading sense of the reality of a spiritual world. Such was the power of his faith, that the unseen was to him a verity, and his soul necessarily held com-

munion with invisible creatures above and around him. His soul on glowing wings rose upward to the abodes of the gods, and there he held converse with beings of unconquerable might, of majestic form ; of matchless beauty, of indescribable grace of motion ; whose eloquence was irresistible in its power to awe, instruct, or win ; whose music could tame a fury's heart, and hush all heaven with rapture.

These to the Grecian soul were parts of the real creation as much as the visible things. These were the associates of his spirit ; with them he held entrancing communion. By the very necessities of the mental constitution he became assimilated to his celestial companions, in proportion to the power and vividness of his faith. By the power of association he was changed into their image. His actions were moulded by this belief in the invisible, his thoughts were colored with brightness from above. He had standards, models, of thought and action, higher than himself. He lived each day amid the creations of his faith, and heaven came down to him in his dreams. We do not pretend that such a belief could purify the corrupted heart, or open the way of salvation. We speak only of its effect upon the intellect, and we deem it not extravagant to assert that the Greek was intellectually great, because of his strong living faith in the reality of a spiritual world, something more enduring, more excellent than earth. From that source he derived whatever was excellent in his character, whatever was great in his achievements. That faith enabled him to make the marble speak, and the canvass breathe ; and that was the Castalian fount, where his spirit drank the inspiration of poetry.

He saw, it must be admitted, a dim distorted shadow, but it was cast from the true substance ; it was a faint reflection from that light so clearly revealed in the Bible. His faith raised his soul above the carnal and the earthly, and brought it into habitual communion with the spiritual, the invisible, partially revealing the beautiful and the true.

We now return, a moment, to the consideration of our own age and its characteristics. We feel constrained to ex-

press the belief that it is sadly wanting in that most powerful of all the quickeners of the intellect, a strong controlling faith in the realities of the spiritual world. It is an era of physical rather than spiritual life. We hear of an iron age, of a golden age; this age is of the earth, earthy. The fires on our altars burn low, and the vision is dim. In Mammon's "chambers of imagery" the young men and the ancients burn incense and adore. Genius has forgotten his vocation; he has come down from his heavenward soarings, and walks a "merchant upon change." He has grown fat, with aldermen, on turtle soup, and is busy "in the cotton trade and sugar line." Instead of walking with Milton on the "mount of God," he writes sonnets to the swiftest steamboat, and manufactures "to order" villainous rhymes upon political candidates.

Could we suppose a Greek of the olden time, and a modern utilitarian now walking the earth in company, we might perhaps imagine their differing thoughts and feelings. On the banks of some stream where the Greek would recognize the home of some river god, or the haunt of some nymph of the fountains, the modern would simply calculate the value of the water power.

Where the Greek would gaze from some eminence, enraptured with the mingling glories of earth and sky, of ocean, mount and river, the modern would consider the expediency of a railroad, and the possibility of a successful speculation in the lots of a lithographic city. While the Greek would listen for the voice of the hamadryad in the branching oak, the modern would cut it down for a steamboat. While the Greek would seek the forum that he might yield himself to the fascination of eloquence or song, the modern would visit the exchange and start a joint stock corporation for a factory or a bank. The Greek would mark the bounding animal, and study the elegant proportions, and the graces of its attitudes, in order that he might transfer them to the canvass, or reproduce them in the marble; the modern would estimate the value of the skin for leather, the flesh for food, the entrails for musical instruments, the horns and hoofs for buttons and combs.

While the Greek would expatiate upon the "bird of Jove," and the swans of Venus, and Juno's more gorgeous fowl, the modern would shoot them all and stuff them for a museum.

This may seem to partake of the spirit of caricature, and yet it embodies a most important truth. It shows that the prevailing spirit of our times is, to provide for the wants of our physical being, while the spiritual life and the means of promoting it are comparatively overlooked and forgotten. The wants of the body, these are the objects of science; these are the end of improvement. The soul is the body's slave, and its mighty energies are tasked by night and by day to devise means and processes, by which the lordly, lazy body may be swiftly transported, delicately clothed, sumptuously fed. The relation of body and soul in this age might be not unaptly represented by Dives, for the body, faring sumptuously, in fine linen and purple, while the soul should be seen harnessed to his carriage, sawing his wood and cooking his dinner.

But let us look seriously out upon the course and character of modern improvements. Have they awakened the most exalted powers of the human soul? We answer, No! You may build steam engines and cotton factories innumerable, you may unite canals and railroads till they gird the earth, you may make our merchants princes, you may erect banks and brokers' offices on every corner, and prisons and poor-houses in the rear, and when you have accomplished all that modern physical improvement has ever promised or dreamed, you may embrace even a flying machine in the catalogue, and still the most exalted feelings of man's soul will remain dormant, the highest powers even of the intellect will not be called into exercise.

These things are indeed noble achievements, they feed the hungry, clothe the naked; they multiply those physical comforts which must precede cultivation and refinement of mind: but man's choicest powers stoop not to tasks like these. In man's heart of hearts, in the inner chambers of the immortal spirit, there is one celestial harp whose strings give no response to the touch of Mammon's fingers.

Man, through modern science and art, has won full many

splendid triumphs over hitherto intractable matter, and as a crowning effort has made the lightnings his messenger, so that Ariel, who could "put a girdle round the earth in forty minutes," would now be much too slow for business operations; but still the question remains, whether all this is fitted to develop, to the utmost, the stupendous genius of the human soul. Will the race in these things fulfil its highest earthly destiny?

Samson was not useless when grinding in the mills of the Philistines; but that was not surely his true vocation. Better there than in the lap of Delilah, but how much better still if the terrible warrior, with helm, and sword, and spear, had been at his post at the head of Judea's legions. Perhaps it is worthy of inquiry whether modern improvement has not proved a Delilah to the soul, and delivered it to Mammon, who has bound it and put out its eyes, and shorn its wings, and compelled it to labor amid his multifarious machinery.

Our next illustration of the power of faith upon the intellect is derived from the Hebrews. To the Jew, the real economy of the spiritual world was in a measure revealed. Instead of those imaginary beings, who occupied the thought of the Greek, the true inhabitants of the unseen world held visible, almost daily communion with the Hebrew. He was the honored associate of those who sat on thrones above, who were members of the principalities and dominions of heaven. They were ministering spirits attendant upon the heirs of promise. The Greek beheld the dim distorted shadow, the Jew, the glorious reality. The Jew was more completely under the controlling influence of the spiritual world than even the Greek.

If, then, our theory be true, the Hebrews should be intellectually superior to the Greek. Perhaps all will not readily concede the point if we declare our belief that it was so. Nationally and individually, we are much inclined to believe the Jews superior to all of earth beside, and not without substantial reasons the favorites of Heaven.

Greece and Rome, in the day of their pride, were not so stupendous in their greatness as that small Hebrew Common-

wealth. It figures not on the pages of history, because authentic profane history reaches not back to the period of its glory. The military operations of the Jews appear insignificant, only on account of the brevity of the Scriptural narrative, and because of the surpassing grandeur of the connected events. In that majestic solemn drama in which devils and angels and God himself are the actors, the slaying of half a million of men in a single battle is passed lightly over, leaving little impression upon the mind.

Had the rise and fall of the Jewish state been described with that fulness of detail, and with that rich, not to say exaggerated coloring which characterizes profane history, it would have been the most amazing page in all the story of earth. But when we study history in the Bible, our standpoint is in eternity. We look as it were from heaven down on the busy world. We behold the whole broad stream of human life in its solemn flow toward eternity, and in the swift march of a thousand millions, the falling of a few hundred thousand here and there, is comparatively an unimportant affair.

In a literary point of view, it must certainly be admitted that the Hebrew stands without a competitor. True, it may be objected that the Jewish writers were under the immediate direction of the Holy Spirit, and therefore their example is not a case in point. But the intellectual power of these writers was not created by their inspiration. Their individuality remains unchanged by the heavenly afflatus. The Spirit suggested the subject, kept them to the line of truth, and then left the individual mind to its own strong workings. The results are unequalled in grandeur and in beauty.

Homer has been surpassed in his battle scenes by Miriam and Deborah; the Grecian drama rises not to the sublimity of Job; where shall we find aught even in the Orphic hymns to compare with the richness, the sweetness, the grandeur of David? who shall equal Isaiah in his lofty imaginings? who shall sing like Jeremiah the dirge of a fallen nation? who shall tread that burning pathway which is lighted by Ezekiel's genius?

If we mistake not, we may draw another and scarcely less vivid illustration of the influence of faith upon intellectual character, from the example of those who first peopled the shores of New England. We do not feel called upon to pronounce any eulogium upon New England, nor would we make any offensive comparison, between her and other portions of our common country. Her reputation, whatever it may be, has been most dearly earned at the expense of patient toil, of treasure abundantly bestowed, of blood most freely shed.

Far be it from us, to dim one single ray of the truly brilliant qualities of those somewhat earlier settlers, who made their homes in the sunny south ; nor have we forgotten those whose Teutonic blood reached America without passing round through English veins, who are Americans indeed, who have stood from the Revolution to the present hour, to defend with their fortunes and their lives our common liberties in the hour of extremest peril.

We speak of the Pilgrims merely because their history seems to throw light upon a fact connected with the philosophy of mind. It is not necessary for us to spend a moment in an attempt to prove that the Puritans were strongly influenced by a faith which linked them to the invisible. Their very excesses sufficiently demonstrate this. No man could cast his vote for the hanging of a witch, or believe that the red warrior was an incarnation of an evil spirit, who was not living under an all-controlling influence from the spiritual world. Their enterprise was essentially a religious one, and in all the records of man's achievements in the planting of colonies or kingdoms, there is nothing to equal it, saving only the exodus of the Hebrews.

Admitting the early Grecian expeditions to have been what poetry and fable describe ; grant that the colonization of Italy from the wreck of burning Troy was as it is portrayed in " Virgil's lay, and Livy's pictured page," and yet they are unable to chain the mind with a spell of such intensity and power, as that which has been breathed from the story of the settlement of New England.

We have spoken already of the influence of faith upon Grecian and Roman poetry, and of its excellence as the fruit of faith, and if our theory be true, it may be said that the richest strains of poetry should be found among the Puritans. Our readers may smile, perhaps, if we attempt to convince them that the true poetic feeling did exist in the land of blue-laws and bigotry and witchcraft, in a land where the only song was the harsh nasal chanting of some limping version of a psalm.

But as the earth rings and echoes with unwritten music, so is there many a noble strain of unwritten poetry. There is, beyond dispute, a poetry of action, of a sublimer and more spiritual character than that which is expressed in words. As there is an eloquence in the eye which no language can equal, so is there a poetry of action loftier even than the strains of Milton.

Who shall say there was no poetry in the bosoms of those in the *Mayflower's* cabin, when she hovered on that stern coast, like a wounded sea-fowl seeking a place to die, her torn rigging crackling in the December blast ; behind, three thousand miles of water stretching between them and civilization, before them, an unbroken snow-covered forest, where the howl of the wild beast mingled with the wilder war-cry of the savage ; and yet not a regret in man's heart to 'shake his high resolve, and not a tear to dim the lustre of a woman's eye ?

Was there no poetry in the transactions of that first long terrible winter, when disease was laying low the pride of manhood and the loveliness of woman ; when, one by one, in swift succession, the sad, stricken, but still high-souled and trusting band, laid their loved ones in that sloping bank which looks out toward England, and then returned undismayed to the task of unrolling a nation's destiny ? Even omitting all the stormy and romantic incidents of the first half century, and confining ourselves to the pestilence, the famine, the cold, the awful solitude of that first winter, and the patience, the courage, the cheerfulness, the submission, with which they were met, and endured, not only by men, but by high-bred and

delicate women, in sickness and in weakness ; will not every true American poet say, that there was more of the sublime, the heroic poetry of *action*, than has been written since ?

Of the intellectual character of the Puritans, no word need now be spoken. The morning mists of prejudice are dissolving around them ; they are so far revealed that we catch the outlines of their manly proportions. It surely need not be said, that *they* were strong men, who watched and guarded the cradle of liberty. The Puritan character was the result of faith, based on the habitual study of the Bible, a faith which brought them into communion with the unseen.

Why then is it, that we, who claim to live amid the fuller developments of the Christian scheme, when, in addition to all which the Jew possessed, we have that superadded knowledge imparted by him who brought life and immortality to light and poured over the spiritual world the illumination of a new risen sun, why is it that we have fallen behind not the Hebrew only in poetry, but even the pagan, in poetry, eloquence and art ? .

It is because Christendom is not and never has been fully baptized with the spirit of the gospel. It is because the intellect of the nations is moulded by earthly and carnal influences, not by the heavenly and the spiritual ; because the mind of the world holds communion with earth and not with heaven. It grovels where it ought to soar, the fading visible excludes the eternal unseen, the present has banished the future, eternity is merged in time, and Mammon has usurped the throne of God.

With us, the universe was made for use and profit : it is not for us a glorious mirror, in which to behold the perfections of God. With us, a mountain is a pile of building-stone, a river is simply a water power, a tree is nothing but firewood ; heaven's lightnings are for forwarding the particulars of the last duel at Washington. How is it possible, then, that the earth-born, wingless spirit of Christendom, should mount those summits where the glorious old Greek trod in the pride of his might, or dwell in still loftier regions with the Hebrew

seer? It may not be until over even Christian nations is breathed a new afflatus from the spiritual world.

Having thus endeavored to trace the mental greatness of the Roman, the Greek and the Hebrew to the influence of a strong and living faith in the invisible; having expressed the opinion that our own times, because of unbelief, are unfavorable to the production of a similar excellence; we are ready at this point to inquire, whether we have any reason to expect that the human mind will yet awake to a higher life, so that in poetry, eloquence and the fine arts, in all the fruits of the highest intellectual development, we shall not only reach but surpass whatever man has hitherto achieved.

We believe this question should be answered in the affirmative; but we do not anticipate this result as a consequence of that system of improvement and those processes of education, upon which the world seems to be placing its reliance. It certainly is not very apparent why man may not obtain all which natural science and the whole scheme of amelioration and improvement in the social system have power to impart, and yet all the noblest faculties of the heaven-born soul lie unawakened within him.

Within the legitimate scope of all possible improvements in manufactures and the mechanical arts, of every imaginable alteration in whatever relates to man's physical nature, there is no object of sufficient magnitude to form a theme for the sublimest efforts of the poet, the orator, or the philosopher; there is no subject which can inspire the mind until it reproduces the excellence of the ancient artist. There are deep recesses and silent depths in the spirit of man, from which comes no response till you speak of something higher than earth.

Under the influences which now sway the nations, we may expect that natural philosophy will push her investigations to the utmost, and that every new discovery will aid in the amelioration of man's social condition; that agriculture, manufactures and commerce will lay, yearly, new triumphs at the feet of man, that the wave of civilization will advance

with unebbing flow, till idolatry and barbarism shall be swept from the globe ; but a new and different era must succeed all this, before the soul can reach the fullness and maturity even of its earthly stature.

For *that*, we must wait until earth is baptized anew with the spirit of the gospel, and a clear, strong, controlling faith in the unseen shall have full dominion over the soul. That era will surely come. The world-wide fever that causes Christendom to hiss and bubble, will reach at last its crisis. Earth will throw off its delirium, and become calm and convalescent. The millions who have mistaken Mammon for a god, will discover their error and forsake his shrine. Man will abandon his muck-rake gatherings and turn again his eye and thought to heaven.

We believe there is no reason to doubt that an epoch is swiftly approaching which, in true science and literature and art, shall eclipse all preceding eras with a purer splendor, with a richer glory. This new excellence will be the result not of any improvements in civil government, or systems of education, but of the universal prevalence of a true, and controlling religious feeling. It will be when the knowledge of the Lord shall fill the whole earth. Until then it cannot be ; because the fountains at which alone true greatness can be nourished, spring in the spiritual world. The spark which kindles true genius rises not from earth, but descends from heaven.

Again, in that era, nobler and more stirring themes will be the subjects of thought than man has ever known. Prophecy has declared that a period is yet to come, when the affairs of earth shall no longer be separated in men's thoughts from their relations to God and to eternity, when the heavenly shall control the earthly, and all national movements and individual action shall be regulated by faith in the unseen : when religion and the spiritual world shall hold a firmer and more constant control over the mind than of old over the soul of the Greek, and when the structure and economy of the invisible empire of Jehovah shall be revealed far more dis-

tinctly than even to the Hebrew ; and all nations, shaking off the degrading servitude of Mammon, shall awake to a sense of the "only true and the only beautiful," to a perfect consciousness of the amazing realities of that higher life which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

Knowledge, it is said, shall be the stability of those times. Man's soul shall then find food in heavenly things which its celestial nature can assimilate, by which the intellect shall be expanded to its true proportions, and its perfect stature.

To the eye of a living faith, standards of heavenly excellence will be continually present, and men by their contemplation shall be changed into the same image, from glory to glory.

The Roman and the Greek beheld the spiritual world clothed in the false drapery of a corrupt imagination, and yet that communion with something higher and nobler than earth, this gazing upon truth through even the glimmering twilight of paganism, made them giant men—a commonwealth of kings. What then shall man become, when the false shall be stripped away, and in the noonday of Christianity he shall live in the unveiled presence of the sublime, the beautiful, and the true ? Then also shall such themes be presented for poetry and eloquence, such subjects for the historian and the artist, as shall surpass all the former experience of earth.

Between us and that dispensation of the fullness of times, lie all those mighty and thrilling events, which on the prophetic record cluster around earth's closing scenes. The oppressive institutions of this world, the whole vast overshadowing fabric of Satan's dominion, must be overthrown, crushed in sternest conflict, stamped into powder by the hot indignation of infuriate millions, and old things shall pass away.

Who shall tell what convulsions shall attend the death-agonies of old systems, what frantic mirth shall hail the birth-throes of the new era ?

The thrones of despotism will not fall except in the shock of battle, and the phoenix of new political structures can only arise out of the conflagration and ashes of the old. Before

Liberty shall obtain her final triumph, the sun, the moon and stars in the political heavens may be hurled down to be extinguished in blood. Earth seems ripening for disastrous change in all her great divisions.

The Mohammedan crescent appears to be peacefully waning now, but its final setting may yet be amid the flash and roar of universal conflict, when other standards may also be trodden down.

And how is the Romish hierarchy to be peaceably removed? Incapable from its very nature of reformation, it must be torn up and abolished utterly. Twined as its roots are with the very foundations of the social fabric, how can they be wrenched gently away? Yet between us and that brighter era of which we speak, lies the destruction of the "Man of Sin."

Again, the lost and scattered sons of Judah and Israel must also be gathered to their own, before the fullness of the Gentiles can come in, and the purity and the elevation of a Christian civilization prevail over all the earth.

In these spirit-stirring events, these closing scenes of the great drama of six thousand years, the mind will find a stimulus utterly unknown to the age in which we live.

Then, when there shall be one faith and one God over all the earth, when prophecy shall be history, and one song shall employ all nations, shall Greek and Roman fame be eclipsed by the splendors of Christian genius, and all that Christian intellect has yet accomplished be surpassed by those, who shall ascend to loftier elevations, and walk by those fountains which flow from the throne of God and the Lamb. Stimulated by the presence or the memory of those scenes at which we have glanced, and quickened by uninterrupted communion with the Invisible, man shall reach the highest excellence of which an earthly state is capable, and language itself be refined and spiritualized, so as to become the fitting vehicle of the soul's nobler imaginings.

As much as the grandeur, the beauty, and the magnificence of the real spiritual world surpasses the dim shadow

which the ancients beheld, so much shall the efforts of a sanctified genius, enlightened by the teachings of the Infinite One, exceed the sublimest achievement of Grecian or Roman mind. Perhaps, on the very theatre of ancient song, the national mind of Greece and Italy, awakened and baptized by the Spirit of God, shall yet send forth loftier and sweeter strains than ever floated over the Adriatic or breathed among the islands of the Ægean. From Judea's repeopled hills some Miriam may send up songs of deliverance; some Deborah astonish the world with a second battle hymn, and the harps of David and Isaiah be strung again in Zion. Then too, perhaps, in our own Saxon race, poets shall arise with more than a double portion of Milton's spirit, and the world be bound by a more potent and yet a holier spell, than that which Shakespeare wove. When the weak among men shall be as Milton and Homer, and Plato, and Socrates, and Demosthenes, and Tully, and all men become not only pure but intellectually great by association with the Spirit of God.

In what quarter of the earth mind shall then reach its fullest development, is a question which cannot now be accurately solved. From lands now sunk in the depths of heathenism, may spring giant minds that shall contend for superiority in literature and art, with those nations who are now most favored with civilization and religion.

The far East was the land of science and elegant learning when Europe was inhabited by savages, and under the influence of a Christian faith she may regain her ancient supremacy, and the fires of genius burn with purest splendor on the very spot where first they were kindled.

Emancipated Africa may yet cause earth to thrill with an eloquence of which the colder western mind is incapable; she may yet be regarded as the land of poetry and art, and demonstrate the great truth that God has made of one blood all the nations of the earth.

If, however, we are to form our opinions of future results from the character of present events, we should expect that the Anglo-Saxon mind would hold over all the earth a controlling

influence. Its star is now evidently in the ascendant. Its power is a conquering power, and it gives no indications of weakness or decay. It rises over the nations like an unebbing tide, higher, stronger, further on with every heave of the restless wave. If such anticipations are to be realized, then, perhaps, there are other reasons than those which spring from national vanity, which should lead us to look to America as the land where the intellect of man shall reach the culminating point of its greatness. I cannot but believe that we already possess more of those influences which promote the growth of mind than any other people. The vastness and magnificence of the features of our scenery give strength and boldness, and expansion to the soul. The intense activity produced by the genius of our institutions, brings mind everywhere into sharp conflict with mind, producing mutual growth; and small though the influence of faith be upon the national character, there is in the United States more of true spiritual religion than in any other nation on earth.

We only need, then, as it would seem, the intellect of the country to be fully pervaded by the religious sentiment, until the genius of the land shall feel the influence of a heaven-born faith, to cause the American mind to stand forth proudly pre-eminent in science, literature and art. If ever our country obtain on earth an enduring fame as a cultivated nation, that reputation will be based upon a Christian literature, a Christian science, and a political structure drawn from the principles of the Gospel. Thus only shall we become even intellectually great.

The principles which have been stated, by an unavoidable inference, should place the American scholar by the side of the minister of the Gospel. Their task in its general features is the same; to elevate, expand, and refine the national mind by the power of truth; to devote the measureless influences of a cultivated mind to the bringing of his country under the power of a quick, strong faith in the realities of the spiritual world, until this great country, in all its vast concerns, shall live and move under a solemn sense of the presence of the

invisible, of coming retribution, of an overshadowing heaven, from which even now angels come down and sweep past us on their errands of love, ministering to the heirs of salvation, and from which the sleepless eye of God looks down on the children of men.

ARTICLE II.

EXPOSITION OF MATTHEW 16. 18.

By REV. CALEB CLARK, Truxton, N. Y.

Matthew 16: 18. "And I say also unto thee, that thou art Peter; and upon this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

THE first point to be ascertained in the exposition of this passage, is, the import of the phrase "my church." Does it mean the whole company of saints who are, and will be, "redeemed by his blood out of every kindred and tongue, and people and nation," who constitute the "church of the first-born, whose names are written in heaven?" or does it mean "the visible church," the company of professors of Christ's religion on earth, who are entitled to the privilege of being called his church? The latter certainly: for he speaks here of what he was doing and would continue to do on earth. Consequently he does not speak of the redeemed church in heaven, but of his church to be built up on earth, by believing his doctrines, and following his institutes and ordinances.

But the phrase, "I will build my church," demands more particular investigation. *Οἰκοδομήσω*, the word in the original text, translated "I will build," does not necessarily imply that Christ was then about to begin a new building, which before had no existence; but may mean that he would continue to build it in extent on a broader foundation, and to carry it up in height until he should bring forth the top-stone with shout-

ing grace; grace unto it. The advocates of the idea of a new church begun by Christ under the Christian dispensation, place too much dependence for the proof of their doctrine on this word. They seem to suppose that because it is compounded of two words, *οἶκος* and *δομέω*, and literally means to build a house, therefore, when employed figuratively, it must mean to begin to build an edifice, and not to enlarge or complete the building. A careful inspection of such passages as John 2 : 20, Luke 11 : 47 and 48, 1 Peter 2 : 5, in the New Testament, and Ezra 4 : 2, Neh. 2 : 17, 4 : 1, 17, 18, in the LXX, will satisfy every impartial reader that *οἰκοδομέω* does not always necessarily signify to begin a new structure. When, therefore, Christ says in the text, "I will build my church," he must not of necessity be understood to mean that he had destroyed the old one, dug up its foundation, and was about to lay a new one on which he would soon build a new church. Nor is the figurative application of the word to spiritual things more fortunate for those who insist that it must mean in the passage before us the commencement of a new church. Does it signify to begin to build a new church in 1 Cor. 14 : 4, *ὁ δὲ προφητεύων ἐκκλησίαν οἰκοδομεῖ*? Or is the idea of a new church found in the substantive derived from this verb in the fifth verse of the same chapter, *ἵνα ἡ ἐκκλησία οἰκοδομὴν λάβῃ*? In the seventeenth verse it is applied to an individual, *ἀλλ' ὁ ἕτερος οὐκ οἰκοδομεῖται*, and must mean the other is not built up in Christian knowledge and virtue. In 1 Cor. 8 : 10, it is used to signify the effect of one person's conduct upon another, in fortifying him in acting contrary to the dictates of his own conscience. It is translated "emboldened." "For if any man see thee which hast knowledge sit at meat in the idol's temple, shall not the conscience of him that is weak be emboldened (*οἰκοδομηθήσεται*) to eat those things which are offered to idols?" The notion of building a new conscience for him would not be seriously entertained even by those who insist that Christ built a new church. If the doctrine that Christ built a new church is found in other places of the New Testament it will afford some support to such an exposition of

the text in hand ; but if not, it cannot be successfully maintained from the phrase, "I will build my church."

It will be seen from the passages quoted above, that the verb *οἰκοδομέω* translated 'build' in the text, is used in reference to the church in two ways: 1, to signify increase of the number of members, and 2, the increase of Christian knowledge and graces in those who are already in the church. That it means the addition of members to the church, in the text, seems to me to be the most natural conclusion, although it may imply also the increase of knowledge and graces. In Acts 9: 31, we are told, "Then had the churches rest throughout all Judea, and Galilee, and Samaria, and were edified (*οἰκοδομούμεναι*), and walking in the fear of the Lord and in the comfort of the Holy Ghost, were multiplied (*ἐπληθύνοντο*). The rest which these churches enjoyed had a tendency, under apostolic labors, to build them up both by the increase of knowledge and grace, and by large addition of members. So also Peter writes, 1 Epist. 2: 5, "Ye also as lively stones are built up (*οἰκοδομεῖσθε*) a spiritual house." The figure of building the church up like a house on a foundation, seems to imply then the addition of members, like the addition of stones to the edifice as it increases in size. So Paul says, 1 Cor. 3: 9, "Ye are God's building (*οἰκοδομῇ*). And it is recorded in Acts 2: 47, "The Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved."

Let us now descend to the foundation of this building and examine, if we can, the rock on which our blessed Lord declares he will build his church. There are three interpretations of this: 1, it is Christ; 2, it is the confession of Peter, in ver. 16, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God;" and 3, it is Peter. The last I adopt as more tenable than the others. The objection against the first is that there is nothing to point out Christ in the connection of the passage. And to suppose that he pointed to himself when he spake it, is mere hypothesis in the absence of all proof. He was addressing Peter, and apparently assigning a reason for the emphatic mention of his

name, and we discern nothing on the face of the text, that should lead us to suppose that, after saying to him, "Thou art Peter," he should immediately proceed to speak of himself as "this rock." There ought to be better proof than conjecture for the interpretation of such a text as this. The second of the above interpretations is rejected because there is not any sufficient reason for calling Peter's confession that he was the Christ, a rock; and least of all, "this rock," which implies a particular one in distinction from others, or one which had been spoken of before. Moreover, it would destroy the emphasis on Peter (ὁ Πέτρος). Let us substitute Peter's acknowledgment in ver. 16, for "this rock," in the 18th. "And I say also unto thee, that thou art Peter," and upon this confession that I am the Christ, "I will build my church." All allusion to the meaning of the name Peter vanishes at once, and no good reason appears for mentioning it at all, and especially with such an emphatic address.

The third and last interpretation is retained for the following reasons. 1. The verse preceding, and that following the text, are addressed to Peter; and the text begins with the emphatic address, "And I say also unto thee, that thou art Peter;" and then follow the words, "and upon this rock," etc. Now, is another subject introduced here which does not relate to Peter, any more than to any body else who should confess that Jesus was the Christ? 2. The connective particles καὶ-δέ at the commencement of this verse, show also that the words following them are a continuation of the address to Peter, and that they convey a sentiment still more important to him, than what he had already said. "*And I say also to thee,*" etc. 3. That part of the verse which follows the word Peter, appears to be explicative of the significant emphasis placed upon that name, and apparently assigns the reason for the address. "And I say also unto thee, that thou art Peter." And the καὶ following does not militate against this supposition. For in such passages as 1 John 3: 4, καὶ ἡ

ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία, and Rev. 1 : 18, and 1 Cor. 14 : 32, it connects an explicative sentence, which explains the reason of something which precedes, and might with propriety be translated *for*, as it is in 1 John 3 : 4. 4. There is in this passage an evident play upon the similarity of sound between the two words Πέτρος and πέτρα, which the Greeks called *paronomasia*. “And I say also unto thee, that thou art ὁ Πέτρος,” then follows the reason, “and (or for) upon ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ (this rock) I will build my church.” Πέτρος signifies a stone or rock, but generally one which is movable ; and πέτρα has a similar meaning, but is generally used when a mass of rock is spoken of which is not moved, or upon which something rests, like an edifice upon an immovable foundation. Our Saviour gave this name to Simon when he first became his disciple, as we learn from John 1 : 42. “And when Jesus beheld him, he said, Thou art Simon, the son of Jona ; thou shalt be called Cephas, which is by interpretation Πέτρος, a stone.” This word is used for such a stone as belligerents employed in battle, and appears to be a synonym with λίθος. So Xenoph. Anab. iv. 7, 10. And in sec. 12, οὐδεὶς πέτρος ἄνωθεν ἠνέχθη. Also 2 Macc. 1 : 16, and 4 : 41. And in the Book of the Wisdom of Solomon, chap. 11 : 4, this sentence occurs, in which λίθος and πέτρα are used synonymously—Καὶ ἐδόθη αὐτοῖς ἐκ πέτρας ἀκροτόμου ὕδωρ, καὶ ἱαμα δίψης ἐκ λίθου σκληροῦ. See also Is. 8 : 14, Rom. 9 : 33. It does not appear then from this comparison of terms that there is any more difference between πέτρος and πέτρα, than there is between the English *stone* and *rock*. Hence, when an edifice is reared upon such a solid foundation, we say it is built on a *rock*, not on a *stone*. And this corresponds with the Greek usage. See Matt. 7 : 24 and 25. But when a foundation or basement is built of stones, then λίθος is used more commonly. 1 Kings 6 ; 7, and 7 : 9 and 10. But in Is. 28 : 16, we have this peculiar form, “Behold, I lay—λίθον πολυτελῆ, ἐκλεκτὸν, ἀκρογωνιαῖον, ἐντιμον, εἰς τὰ θεμέλια αὐτῆς.” The figure, then, in the text, of the base or beginning of an edifice, made it more proper to use the feminine termination πέτρα, than to repeat the mas-

culine πέτρος; not because the nature of the things signified by the two words differs, but because the one represents a mass proper for a foundation, and the other a smaller mass to which the figure is not adapted. And the application of the demonstrative pronoun ταύτη to the noun πέτρα, I think confirms this conclusion. What rock had he spoken of except ὁ Πέτρος? And what is pointed out by ταύτη? If a rock was in sight to which he was pointing, or any had been spoken of in the conversation, then ταύτη was intended to demonstrate or point it out. It would in that case accord with the form of a passage in Xenoph. Anab. iv. 7, 4. But here there is nothing for ταύτη τῇ πέτρᾳ to point to, unless it be ὁ Πέτρος. Ask the question, Which rock will he build upon? Is there any rock spoken of or any answer to be given but Πέτρος? 5. There is one more reason for the interpretation which has been given; and that is the part which Peter performed among his brethren in the propagation of the Christian religion, after the ascension of his Master to heaven. In Jerusalem, on the day of Pentecost, when three thousand were added to them, it was through the preaching of Peter. Thus with the keys of the kingdom of heaven which Christ gave him, in the verse following the text, he opened the door of faith to the Jews; and afterwards to the Gentiles, at the house of Cornelius. Acts 10. In Acts 3: 4th and 5th chapters, we find Peter the most prominent preacher and agent, while great multitudes believed, so that the number of the *men* was about five thousand. Acts 4: 4. And Paul tells us, Gal. 2: 7, that the gospel of the circumcision was committed unto Peter. Now all this shows that Christ assigned him an important part to act in building up his church. And what could be more natural when likening his church to a building, and considering Peter as a part of it, than to place him in the foundation. He does not say that he was the whole foundation, and that he would build the church on him alone; nor does he say any thing inconsistent with the idea that he him-

self was also the chief foundation of support and hope to his church, and his incarnation and atonement the fundamental truth on which that hope and support must rest. All that I understand to be implied in the text, as addressed to Peter, is, that he would make him the beginning of the enlargement of his church under the new commission he gave the apostles in setting up the kingdom of heaven, for which purpose he gave him the keys, to open it both to the Jews and to the Gentiles. It is not, then, a post of authority over his compeers which he assigns him, but a post of toil, opposition and persecution. He did not crown him a Pope, but gave him many souls as his crown of rejoicing in the day of the Lord. And though it appears evident from the subsequent history of events, that Peter was a prominent man among the apostles as a teacher and minister, yet it is evident also that they were all, when the church was likened to an edifice, viewed as constituting the foundation, with Christ at the chief place of the corner. The reason for this is found in the fact that they were the little company with Christ at their head, from which the church in its new form or under its new dispensation arose. And by their ministry it grew up into a stately temple of the Lord, as though it were a living building growing out of a living basement. This figure seems to have been in the mind of Peter when he wrote, 1 Pet. 2 : 4, 5 : "To whom coming as unto a living stone, disallowed indeed of men, but chosen of God and precious, ye also as lively stones are built up a spiritual house." And Paul says, Eph. 2 : 20-22 : "And (ye) are built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone ; in whom all the building, fitly framed together, *groweth* unto a holy temple in the Lord ; in whom ye also are builded together for a habitation of God through the Spirit." Here is plainly the figure of an edifice *growing* out of its foundation, which is composed of prophets and apostles, with Jesus Christ in the most prominent place, as the chief corner stone. This is not the foundation of the believer's hope and confidence, laid by the apostles in the preaching of the gospel, which

Paul says he laid at Corinth, (1 Cor. 3: 10, 11) because Christ does not here constitute the whole foundation, but is only the chief corner stone in it, and the apostles and prophets the greatest part. It is, therefore, the foundation composed of the apostles and prophets; a genitive of the subject and not of the agent. And this idea corresponds with the vision of the New Jerusalem described by the apostle John, Rev. 21: 10, etc., "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb."

The foregoing exposition does not afford any ground for the extravagant claims of the Papacy, or give any authority to Peter over the other Apostles, or constitute him the head of a succession in the government of the church. All the prominence it gives him is, in the more abundant labors of the ministry in the first preaching of the gospel to the Jews and Gentiles, and in gathering the church under the new dispensation. He was never treated as a superior by the other apostles, but always as an equal, as is evident from Acts, 11th and 15th chapters, and Gal. 2: 7-14. And that he himself thought of no superiority is evident from his own Epistles: 1 Epist. 5: 1-4; 2 Epist. 3: 1 and 2 and 15 and 16. The apostles did not contend for the lordship, but to excel in edifying the church; they strove not who should first put on the tiara and sit at ease on the crimson velvet, but to be in labors more abundant, approving themselves as the ministers of God in much patience, in afflictions, in necessities, in distresses, in stripes, in imprisonments, in tumults, in labors, in watchings, and fastings. 2 Cor. 6: 4, 5, etc.

On the remainder of the verse I must be very brief. The phrase *πύλαι ᾗδου*, in the opinion of good critics, means, both in classic authors and in the sacred Scriptures, the entrance to the region of the dead, or the unseen world of spirits. In Homer, Il. 23: 69-75, the spirit of Patroclus reproaches Achilles for neglecting his funeral rites and honors, without which he could not find admittance to hades, but was compelled to wander about the entrance, excluded from the passing throng of ghosts. With tears he beseeches his friend to help him:

θάπτει με ὅτι τάχιστα, πύλας αἰδαιο περήσω, line 71. So also in LXX., Is. 38 : 10 ; Wisd. Sol. 16 : 13 ; 3 Macc. 5 : 51. A parallel expression, πύλαι θανάτου (חַיִּים-יָמָיו), is found in Job 38 ; 17, Ps. 9 : 13, and Ps. 107 : 18. This then is but a figurative mode of speaking of that invisible region of death, where he reigns over all that fall under his power. But this tyrant will not destroy the church ; it will be perpetuated through every generation of this world, and finally raised to glory, when Christ shall destroy the last enemy, death. 1 Cor. 15 : 22-28.

But the devil is said to have the power of death, Heb. 2 : 14. And some suppose that the gates of hades imply his power and policy with all his agents, leagued against the church. The common phrase, the powers of darkness, is supposed to convey the idea of the foul spirits of the invisible world ; and the gates of it, their place of counsel and concourse, where their hosts are mustered. And it is not in the writer's power to prove that this is not the design of the expression ' the gates of hades,' in the text.

One thing, however, is plain : that Christ designs to assure us of the safety of his church against all, even the most powerful, of her foes. And that neither death nor he that has the power of death shall ever destroy it.

ARTICLE III.

SKETCHES IN GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY.

By Prof. WM. S. TYLER, Amherst College, Mass.

THESE sketches are not designed for scholars by profession. Such readers will find in them neither novel theories, nor original discoveries, nor profound researches. They will meet with little that can interest or instruct them. He who has heard the nightingale herself, will not care to listen to the best

imitations of her song. He who has been wont to gaze on the originals of the great masters in painting, will feel little curiosity to see the most faithful copies or the most graphic descriptions. And one who is familiar with the Dialogues of Plato or the Treatises of Aristotle, will expect but a poor reward for reading our imperfect analyses and accompanying remarks.

The writer does not aspire in these communications to tread the higher walks of criticism, or to earn the reputation of original investigation and profound scholarship. His aim is humbler and more *Socratic*. He would rather be a disciple of Socrates, than of any or all the other ancient philosophers. He would rather be an American and aid those who are instructing the American people, than be a German and dazzle the learned world. His hope is to be *useful* to that most numerous class of the readers of the Repository, who have (or *think* they have) too little time and too many pressing duties in the practical professions and active pursuits of life, to prosecute classical studies beyond the limited range of their College course. It will be his effort to bring such readers into the presence of Plato and Aristotle for a little season; to let them hear those master spirits, who have ruled so large a portion of mankind for so many centuries, utter their own sentiments in their own order and manner; in short, to *give* them as many as possible of the *thoughts* and *words* of *Plato* and *Aristotle*, and to *take* from them as few as possible of their valuable *hours* and *moments*. In so doing, he will hope to furnish them all with some useful hints, some important truths, some beautiful sayings, and perhaps to allure some of them back to the studies of their youth, or on to deeper fountains and loftier heights of classical erudition. In that case, he will at least have led his readers to that great attainment, which was set down by one of the seven sages as one of the three things that are difficult, viz., *to spend leisure well*.

We begin with the

WORKS OF PLATO.

We have already given our views in general of Plato as a writer. They accord in the main with the following high commendation by Taylor, allowance being made for the extravagance of that admirer of Plato, especially where he speaks of the demonstrative force of the Platonic Dialogues : “ Such is the unparalleled excellence of Plato’s composition, that notwithstanding all the artifice of the style, almost every word has a peculiar signification and contains some latent philosophical truth ; so that at the same time it gives elegance to the structure and becomes necessary to the full meaning of the sentence with which it is connected. Plato possessed the happy art of uniting the blossoms of elocution with the utmost gravity of sentiment, the precision of demonstration with the marvellous of mystic fables, the venerable and simple dignity of scientific dialectic with the enchanting graces of poetical imagery ; and in short, he every where mingles rhetorical ornament with the most astonishing profundity of conception.”

We have thirty-five dialogues generally ascribed to Plato, and thirteen epistles. They were originally collected by Hermodorus, one of his pupils. Besides the thirty-five, eight other dialogues have come down to us, which modern critics unanimously reject as spurious. German criticism, which is too often but another name for skepticism, has been laboring hard of late to disprove the genuineness of many others. But they do not agree among themselves ; and their arguments rest chiefly on diversities of style and those other internal differences, to which they are ever inclined to attach undue importance. We cannot pay implicit deference to the arguments or the men that have annihilated the very existence of the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey, and snatched one half of his prophetic inspirations from ‘ rapt Isaiah’s ’ hallowed lips. No two poems ever ascribed to Homer, differ from each other in style more than Cowper’s Iliad and Cowper’s Task. And neither of these disputed dialogues is so unlike the

acknowledged works of Plato, as Carlyle's French Revolution to his Review of Burns.

Ancient grammarians undertook to classify the Dialogues of Plato according to their several subjects, aims and forms. But their classifications are as whimsical as they are useless. Every Platonic critic of modern times has his several classifications. But they have succeeded little better than their predecessors. Their classifications are for the most part fanciful. They all impute to Plato a regard to method, which he never cultivated nor attained. It is quite certain, he would not be satisfied with any one of these modern arrangements. It is doubtful whether he could have satisfied himself, if he had made the attempt. It would require more than the logic of Aristotle to reduce the writings of Plato to a regular plan, for the simple reason that there was no such plan in the mind of the writer. We would as soon undertake to embody the fragments of Coleridge or the leaves of the Sybil in one consecutive, logical treatise.

The proper *chronological* arrangement of Plato's works is a question of more interest but of scarcely less difficulty. With the exception of a few dialogues, the data are not sufficient to determine the time or the order of their composition.

Waiving all such inquiries, as mere subjects of ingenious and fanciful speculation, we proceed to give some account of a few of the dialogues in the order in which they are arranged in the German edition of Tauchnitz, which begins with some of the more simple of them, and such as relate more immediately to the condemnation and death of Socrates. It is in these, as we have before suggested, that Plato, as if under the influence of his master, is animated by the purest love of truth and moral beauty, and shines forth, like the sun, unclouded and unspotted in his meridian splendor. Sometimes we shall present only a brief analysis. Sometimes we shall translate and comment more at length.

It may be well to premise that, for the most part, there are two leading characters in the dialogues, one of whom is Socrates, and the other gives name to the dialogue. Besides

the name of this leading character, each dialogue also usually bears another name indicative of its principal subject.

EUTHYPHRON, or concerning Holiness.

This dialogue is determined by internal evidence to have been written after the accusation and before the condemnation of Socrates. At least, that is the time when the conversation is represented to have taken place. And the dialogue was probably written while the subject was yet fresh in the mind of the author. The scene of the dialogue is laid in the public edifices, near the portico of the king, where the second archon (called the king) presided over the administration of justice, and where Socrates passed most of the interval between his indictment and his trial. Here he is met by one Euthyphron, a vainglorious youth, half pietist and half would-be philosopher, who, from a mistaken or affected notion of religious duty, had undertaken to prosecute for murder his own father, who had unintentionally caused the death of his tenant. The conversation arises very naturally touching their respective suits. On speaking of the indictment against himself, Socrates, in his characteristic vein of playful irony, compliments highly his accuser, the youthful Melitus, in that, while so young, he had attained to a perfect understanding of those difficult questions, how youth are to be corrupted and who are their corrupters, and had discovered, what their wisest statesmen had failed duly to notice, the necessity of beginning with the young every effort for social reform. Euthyphron in turn states the suit which he is about to urge before the king, and claims great credit for sanctity, in that, in the face of the remonstrance of his friends and of the common sentiments of mankind, he, a son, was proceeding to prosecute his father, and thus do an act, which however men might regard it, would certainly be pleasing to the gods. Thus is introduced the main question, which is discussed throughout the dialogue, viz., What is piety or holiness? The question is raised by the confident asseverations of Euthy-

phron, that he is doing a pious act in accusing his father. At the same time, Socrates brings the discussion to bear on the charge of *impiety*, which had been entered against *himself*, and calls upon Euthyphron, who professes uncommon wisdom, to teach him the nature of piety or holiness, that he may both defend himself now and avoid in future the charge of impiety. The end of the dialogue may, then, be said to be twofold: the defence of Socrates, and the discussion of the nature of holiness.

In reply to the question, What is holiness? Euthyphron first answers, that it is what he is now doing, in accusing his father for a criminal act. And in proof, he alleges that Jupiter, the greatest and best of the gods, had destroyed his own father for his injustice and cruelty. Socrates inquires, whether he really believed in all those poetic fictions about the quarrels of the gods, and whether he had knowledge enough of the character of the gods and the nature of holiness, to be sure he was not doing an unholy act. "Furthermore," says Socrates, "I did not ask you to mention *one* or *two* of the *things* that are holy, but to define that *essence*, by which the things that are holy, are made so." "Well, if you wish such a definition, Socrates, you shall have it." "I do indeed wish it." "Well, then, that which is pleasing to the gods is holy, and that which is not pleasing to the gods is unholy." "Now you have answered as I would have you, and to the point; but whether with truth or not, remains to be considered.* Did you not say just now, that the gods differ and contend with one another?" "I did." "And what do they differ and contend about? Is it about such questions as can be settled at once by counting, or measuring, or weighing?" "Certainly not." "Is it not about what is right and wrong, as it is among men?" "I must admit it." "Then some of the gods think certain things to be right, and others think the

¹ The reader need scarcely be reminded, that these arguments are very much abridged. The outline only is given. The filling up is exceedingly diffuse and inimitably lifeful and graceful. But it can be seen only in the original. Neither abstract nor translation can retain it.

same things to be wrong!" "Yes." "But they love the things which they severally think to be right, and hate the contrary, do they not?" "Certainly." "Then the same things are both loved and hated—both pleasing and displeasing to the gods." "It seems so." "Then, according to your definition, the same things are both holy and unholy at the same time." "So it appears." "Take care then, lest this treatment of your father, while it is pleasing to Jove, should be displeasing to Saturn and Uranus—pleasing to Vulcan and displeasing to Juno, and so of the other gods."

After various incidental points are disposed of, Euthyphron again defines holiness to be that which is pleasing to *all* the gods. "Now," says Socrates, "is holiness loved by the gods, because it is holiness, or is it holiness because it is loved by the gods?" At first, Euthyphron does not comprehend the question. But he is brought at length by an analogical process to admit, that holiness is loved by the gods because it is holiness; whereas, that which is pleasing or dear to the gods is thus pleasing or dear, because it is loved by the gods. "So then," Socrates proceeds, "holiness is not that which is pleasing to the gods; neither is that which is pleasing to the gods, holiness; but the one is different from the other. For if the holy were the same with the pleasing to the gods, then in case the holy were loved because it *is* holy, the pleasing to the gods would be loved, because it *is* pleasing to the gods; and vice versa, in case the pleasing to the gods were pleasing to the gods because it is *loved* by the gods, the holy would also be holy, because it is loved by the gods: whereas we see, on the contrary, that, as if altogether different from each other, the holy is loved by the gods because it is holy, while the pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them because it is loved by them. In other words, the one *is* loved because it is *such* as to *be* loved, while the other is *such* as to *be* loved, because it *is* loved. So it appears, O Euthyphron, that you are not willing to answer my question, what holiness *is* in its essence, but you mention one of its properties, viz., that it is such as to be loved by the gods."

Euthyphron afterwards concludes that the holy is the same with the just. But Socrates shows him that the holy is only a part of the just, viz., that part which relates to the service of the gods. Here, again, Socrates puzzles him by asking him how it is that we serve the gods, or what great work it is which the gods perform, using us as servants?

Once more, holiness is defined to be the science or act of sacrificing and praying. "Is not then," asks Socrates, "is not sacrificing giving to the gods, and praying asking of the gods?" "Certainly." "Holiness, then, is the science of asking of, and giving to the gods?" "That is my meaning." "To ask aright, must we not ask those things which we need from the gods?" "Yes." "And to give aright, must we then give them in return those things which they happen to need from us? For it is never wise to give to any one what he does not want." "You speak the truth, Socrates." "Now tell me, Euthyphron, what advantage do the gods derive from what they receive from us? For what they give is very manifest. We have nothing good which they have not given us. But what they receive, of what use is it to them?" "None indeed, O Socrates." "But what in particular are the gifts they receive from us?" "What else but honor, reverence and gratitude?" "Then, O Euthyphron, holiness is grateful or acceptable to the gods, but not profitable or pleasing, is it?" "I think, on the contrary, it is the most pleasing of all." "So you have come back at last to the old error, that holiness is that which is pleasing to the gods." Then Socrates complains again, that Euthyphron is not disposed to answer. "For," says he, in a beautiful and effective strain of irony, "you know, if any man does; for if you had not known to a certainty the nature of holiness and unholiness, you could not possibly have presumed to indict your father for murder, when he caused the death unintentionally of his tenant. But you would have been afraid of displeasing gods, as well as men. Tell me then, O Euthyphron, and do not conceal it: what is holiness?" Euthyphron pleads urgent business, and departs. While Socrates exclaims against his cruelty in thus

disappointing his excited hopes, and not furnishing him at once with a defence before his judges, and a safeguard against impiety in future.

This dialogue is truly Socratic. It does, indeed, in part incline more to the theoretic, than Socrates was wont to do. And it is purely of a negative character. The author ridicules the mythology of the Grecian poets, and the superstitious polytheism of the vulgar. But he teaches no truer and better system of divinity. Content with demolishing the doctrines and reasonings of his adversary, the Socrates of the dialogue rears no better system of religious truth and duty on the ruins. But the *real* Socrates humbled such philosophical coxcombs as Euthyphron, in the same way, exposing their ignorance and error without teaching and establishing the truth. It should also be added, that the definitions and reasonings of Euthyphron, as well as the arguments of Socrates, embody many important truths respecting holiness, and doubtless illustrate the real sentiments of Plato, though they do not reach that subtle essence, which his eager and curious mind sought to discover. Holiness is (and so Plato meant to be understood) pleasing to God. It is loved by God, and that because it is of such a *nature* as to be loved by him; and it does not become holiness merely because it is loved by God—and it would be well for modern theologians to remember, not only this distinction in the relation of holiness to God, but an analogous distinction in its relation to *happiness*. Holiness is that part of justice which renders to God his due. It is a service paid to God. It is the science or the act of asking of, and giving to God. All these are *properties* of true holiness. And when these have been summed up, all has been done that can be done, to define its nature. A simple idea can no more be *analyzed* (in the strict sense of the word) than a simple substance. The properties of gold may be easily discovered and enumerated. But its essence, no Bacon ever detected. In like manner, no Plato ever discovered the essence of holiness.

In this piece, the characters are introduced and the dia-

logues conducted with that indescribable air of naturalness and gracefulness, which Plato had so peculiarly at his command. With entire unity of subject and of argument, there is interspersed just enough of humor and episode to impart variety and sustain the interest.

The Defence of Socrates.

The scene of the foregoing dialogue was laid *before* the trial of Socrates. This purports to have been delivered *at* his trial, by Socrates himself. It was not written, however, until after the death of the moral philosopher. Forbidden by the injustice of prejudiced judges, to defend the *life* of his beloved master, Plato erects to his memory this monument, more enduring than brass, in the sight of all Greece. Dionysius of Halicarnassus calls this production a eulogium under the form of an Apology. Of course, it is not strictly a dialogue, though even here Socrates occasionally employs his favorite method of question and answer with his accusers.

We cannot suppose this to be just such a plea, as Plato would have made at the tribunal, where the life of his master was at stake. There he would doubtless have adopted a less offensive style of address, and spoken in a more winning and persuasive manner. This is a cutting reproof to the capricious populace, as well as the unjust judges, and a fearless assertion not only of the philosopher's innocence, but of his divine mission for the reform of his countrymen. Several such "Apologies" were composed by the disciples of Socrates. That of Xenophon and this of Plato, which alone are extant, accord so fully in their general sentiment and spirit, as to substantiate the essential truthfulness of both. It is doubtless just such a defence as Socrates himself actually urged before his judges, when disdaining to appeal to their compassion, and expecting nothing from their justice, he simply unfolded to them the history of his past life. It combines simplicity and modesty, with an uncompromising maintenance of the truth, and that unshaken confidence which a good man derives from conscious innocence.

The Introduction is concisely as follows: "I know not how you have been affected, O Athenians, by the harangues of my accusers. For myself, I almost forgot what I was, while they were speaking, so plausible were their representations. But they have represented nothing, as it is. And of all their numerous falsehoods, I marvelled most when they said you must be on your guard against being deceived by me, as I was very eloquent. For, that they should not be ashamed to assert, what your own senses must disprove the moment I begin to speak,—that seemed the most unblushing effrontery. If indeed they call him an eloquent speaker, who speaks the truth, then I must confess that I am an orator, though not after their pattern; for you shall hear from me the entire and simple truth, not in a speech splendidly decorated with nouns and verbs, and adorned in other respects like the harangues of these men, but in such language as may occur to me, and such modes of expression as I have been accustomed to use, when you have heard me converse. This is the first time I ever appeared before a legal tribunal. And I am now seventy years old. So that I am an utter stranger to the appropriate language of this place. If I were actually a stranger and foreigner, you would certainly pardon me, if I spoke in that dialect and manner in which I was educated. So now, I pray you, let me use my own language in my own way. And do you regard, not the manner of my address, but whether I speak the truth or not."

Socrates then begs leave to reply first, to his first accusers, viz., those less formal but more powerful accusers, who had been insinuating their slanders into the public mind during his life, and who had all the advantage of numbers and time, of a popular tribunal, and of not being confronted with the accused; nay, of being personally unknown, except some one of them might chance to be a Comic Poet."¹

¹ Referring to Aristophanes, whose ridicule of Socrates in his comedy called "The Clouds," was a principal means of turning the current of popular feeling against that philosopher.

The charges thus informally brought against him were, that "he inquired into things in heaven above, and things under the earth; that he made the worse appear the better cause; and that he taught others to do the same; in short, that he was a natural philosopher and a sophist." Socrates utterly denies the truth of these charges; declares his utter ignorance of natural philosophy as then taught, as well as of the sophist's art; offers to present witnesses in proof that he taught no such thing to his disciples; and calls upon all present to testify against him, if they had ever heard him in public utter a word on such subjects. However much others might know in those departments, and however valuable their knowledge might be, he had no participation in it, as those who were acquainted with him very well knew.

He admits that he bore the name of philosopher, or wise man. But he pretended to merely human wisdom, or such as pertains to the proper regulation of human life. And he did not ask them to take *this* on his own assertion.¹ He would refer them to the authority of the god. He never supposed himself to be a wise man in any sense, till the Delphic Oracle pronounced him the wisest of men. Not daring to discredit the Oracle, he then set himself to discover in what sense, if at all, he was wiser than others. Accordingly, he visited successively various classes of men in high repute for wisdom—politicians, poets, orators, philosophers, artisans, etc.; and he discovered to his surprise that, while they really understood pretty well their respective departments, they fancied they understood every thing else. In a word, they all thought they knew far more than they did know. Whereas, he was conscious that he knew almost nothing. And when he came to inquire whether he would choose to be as he was, or to have their wisdom with their want of self-knowledge, he was constrained to admit that he would rather be as he was, and so to assent to the truth of the Oracle;

¹ Cf. John 5: 31, 37.

though he modestly adds, that the chief intent of the Oracle was doubtless to teach this *general* truth: that he was the wisest of men, who preferred that *kind* of wisdom, viz., the moral and practical, which Socrates cherished, and who, *like* Socrates, was conscious of the poverty of his acquirements in knowledge.

In the course of the inquiry which he thus prosecuted, he offended all he visited by showing them that they knew far less than they thought they did. At the same time, his pupils delighted themselves in exposing, after his example, the ignorance of the many pretenders to superior knowledge. And *they* vented their spite not on his pupils, but on himself. Accordingly they began to call him a most impious fellow, a corrupter of youth, and the like hard names. When asked how; what he said; what he did; they were silenced for a time. But at length they invented the charge, against which he was now defending himself. They confounded him with those very philosophers and sophists whom he had ever labored to confute, and thus sought to concentrate upon him all the suspicion and indignation, which they had justly incurred.

So much for the informal charges. And these prepared the way for the formal indictment for corrupting the youth, and endeavoring to subvert the religion of his country. Of his three accusers, Socrates informs his judges, that Melitus was angry with him for exposing (as above described) the poets, Anytus for the artisans and politicians, and Lycon for the orators. All to a man were actuated by selfish and revengeful feelings. In defence of himself against the charge of corrupting the youth, Socrates enters into a dialogue with Melitus, in which he shows that Melitus, after all, neither knows nor cares how young men can be made either better or worse, and makes it appear incredible that any one should corrupt others, who maintained such a character, and knew so well as he did, how impossible it was to do so without a reciprocal influence that would corrupt himself. By a similar dialogue he involves Melitus in a contradiction touching the other point in the indictment.

Having thus disposed of his principal accuser, Socrates boldly tells the Athenians that he has chiefly to fear not the indictment of Melitus, but the hostility of the multitude, which had destroyed many other good men, and would probably destroy him. "Why then persist," some one may say, "why persist in a course of conduct which you expect will occasion your death?" "I should behave strangely," such is his reply, "if, when your commanders, O Athenians, stationed me at Potidæa, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I kept my post at the peril of my life; but, when the god sets me down in Athens to spend my life in the pursuit of philosophy, then I should leave my post through fear of death. In that case one might well and truly charge me with not believing in the gods, since I disobeyed the Oracle, and feared death, and thought myself wise, when I was not. For to fear death is to think one's self wise when he is not; for it is seeming to know what he does not know. None know death. They do not know but it is the greatest possible good; yet they fear it as if they knew it was the greatest of all evils. I will never flee from what may be the greatest good, viz. death, into such base and criminal acts, as must be the greatest evils."

"Were you to assure me of my acquittal, O Athenians, in case I would pledge myself to teach philosophy no more, my reply would be: I respect and honor you, but I will obey the god rather than you.¹ While I live and breathe, I will never cease to proclaim the superiority of wisdom and virtue, and a good soul, over riches, honor, and a good body, to young and old, to citizens and foreigners, but especially to you, my fellow-citizens, forasmuch as you are more nearly related to me. And if you put me to death, be assured, you will not injure me so much as yourselves. Me, none of my accusers can injure in the least, for I do not think a better man is to be injured by a worse man. I am therefore now defending not so much myself as you; that you may not put me to death, and so reject the gift of God to you, for you will not soon find an-

¹ Cf. Acts 4: 19.

other such divine teacher. That I am the gift of God to the city, you may see from this. Does it seem merely human, that I have neglected my own affairs so many years and attended to your highest interests, persuading you, each by himself, to cherish virtue, and that without any reward? For among all their false accusations, they have not dared to accuse me of receiving pay for my instructions; and if they had, my poverty would have been a swift witness against them."

"If you ask, why I have persuaded you privately, individually, rather than in your public assemblies, I answer, that if I had undertaken to act my part in public, I should have perished long ago, and that without any advantage to you or myself. Do not be offended with me for speaking the truth. No man can be safe in opposing the inclinations of your or any other popular assembly, and forbidding them to do wrong."

Socrates proceeds to say, that he will not degrade himself to the level of those men, who, in the last resort, seek to enlist the sympathies and excite the compassion of the judges in their behalf, though he too had a wife and children, and friends, whom he loved, and whose cries of grief might well move them to tears. But that would be wronging not only himself, but the judges, whose official duty it was, under oath, simply to execute the laws.

Neither would he adjudge himself to some lighter punishment, as he might, to escape death. For he deserved not punishment, but reward. If, therefore, he were to propose any commutation of his sentence, it would be to be supported at the public expense in the state-house, that he might without hinderance instruct the people in the first great duty of self-reformation. He was greatly confirmed in his purpose to die an honorable death, rather than save himself, as he knew he might, by such base means, from the fact that the god, who always warned him when he was going to do wrong, had given him no warning in the whole course of his trial. Hence he inferred that death would be to him not an evil, but a good. If after death, there were no conscious existence, that state would be as happy as a dreamless and senseless sleep,

and how few of our waking hours were as happy as the hours we pass in sound sleep ! But if, on the other hand, death were only a transfer from this world to another, there he should find *just* judges, such as Minos and Rhadamanthus ; there he would associate with Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer ; there he should meet with Palamedes, Ajax, and all such as had fallen victims to perverted justice ; there he should examine Agamemnon, Ulysses, and Achilles, as he examined men here, to see if they were truly wise. In conclusion, he assures his judges once more, that no evil can befall a good man in life or death, since the gods take care of his interests ; tells them that he harbors no resentment against them, since, though they meant it for evil, they had done him good ; entreats them to punish his sons, if they are ever seen to care more for riches or honor than for virtue ; and takes leave of them saying, Now it is time for us to depart—I to die, you to live ; and which of us is going to the better lot, is known only to the Deity.

Such in substance and in outline is the defence of Socrates, though much of its spirit and more of its life and beauty has been lost in the process of abridgment. It is a production of singular beauty and sublimity. It embodies the noblest sentiments under all the graces of the most fascinating style. There is in it a simple dignity, a moral elevation and a truthful earnestness, for which we look in vain in the dialectic quibbles and puerile sophistries and empty nihilities of too many Platonic dialogues. So far from believing that we are indebted to the imagination of Plato for the lofty character of Socrates, as he appears in this Apology, we cannot but feel that we owe much of the elevation and eloquence of the Apology to the real greatness and heroism of its subject. The grandeur of the subject lifted the author above himself in his conceptions of what is greatest and best in man. We suspect Plato would never have had the moral courage to have written and published this Defence but for that entire change of popular feeling, which, soon after his death, did full justice to the moral philosopher, and visited with righteous retri-

bution the sins of his accusers. Be that as it may, no uninspired pen ever furnished a better delineation of the *moral hero*. No reader can rise from the perusal of it without higher conceptions of what becomes him as a *man*, and better resolutions for the future conduct of his own life. It is every way worthy of Socrates. We believe he would not have been ashamed, we know he would not have been afraid, to have adopted it as his defence before his judges; and we only need to have heard it from the lips of Socrates himself to perfect the moral sublime. The man who could write it, must have been capable of the highest attainments in eloquence. As we read it, we scarcely wonder that the superstitious ancients should have pronounced his language to be that of Jupiter, his voice to be the voice of a god.

CRITO, or concerning what ought to be done.

Following the order of events which befell Socrates, the next Dialogue is the Crito, which presents him to us in prison awaiting the execution of his unjust sentence. There Crito, the earliest and among the truest and best of his friends, calls upon him at break of day, and finding him in sound sleep, sits down by his side in silent admiration of his calmness on the very eve of death. Socrates awakes, and, after speaking of the absurdity of shrinking from the approach of death, especially at his advanced age, asks the errand of Crito at that early hour. Crito replies, that the ship (during whose absence no one could be put to death at Athens) was drawing near on its return from Delos—that it would probably arrive that day, and Socrates must die on the day following. Socrates expresses his readiness to die whenever it pleases the gods, but adds his belief, that the ship would not arrive till the next day, and his execution would take place on the third day, assigning as the reason for that opinion a dream and vision, which he had just seen in sleep. A beautiful woman dressed in white had appeared to him, calling him and repeating the words of Homer touching the return of Achilles to his

native land: "On the third day, O Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Phthia," which he interpreted as a divine intimation, and therefore an infallible proof, that on the third day he would reach his *home* in a better world. Beautiful fiction, if the dream was the offspring of Plato's fancy! more beautiful fact, if the dream was really Socrates'! And we know not why we should doubt it. What more natural, than that such a notorious dreamer, so familiar with all the poetry of his country, especially that of Homer, and meditating of his speedy departure with lively and joyful imaginings by day, should dream of it under so poetical and attractive a form by night!

Crito then proceeds to press him with various and urgent motives—justice to himself, duty to his wife and children, regard to the affection and the reputation of his friends, and the like—to bribe his keepers, forfeit his bail, and make his escape, declaring that he and the other disciples would gladly meet any losses or dangers which might befall them in such a course, rather than lose such a friend, and incur the disgrace with the multitude, of sacrificing him to the love of money. "But why, my dear Crito," says Socrates, "why should we so much regard the opinion of the multitude? For the most worthy man will think these things to have been so transacted as they were." "Nevertheless you see, Socrates, that it is *necessary* to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude. For the present circumstances show, that the multitude can effect, not the smallest of evils, but nearly the greatest, if one is calumniated among them." "I wish, O Crito, the multitude could effect the greatest evils, that they might also accomplish the greatest good. For then it would be well. But now they can do neither of these. For they can neither make a man *wise* nor *unwise*. But they do just what they happen to do."

As to his escape from the prison without the consent of the rulers of the city, Socrates declares to them, that the great question and the only question he can entertain is whether it is right, since right reason was the only friend, to whose so-

licitations he ever allowed himself to yield. The alacrity of his disciples was very commendable, if rightly directed ; but if not, the greater it was, by so much it was the more blameworthy. Against the dictates of reason and conscience, he could not be influenced in the least by a regard to the reputation of his friends or his own life.

A discussion ensues, in which Socrates proves to the conviction of Crito himself, that, in such a question, regard must be had to the opinions, not of the ignorant multitude, but of the truly wise ; that by acting unwisely and unjustly the *soul* is corrupted and destroyed, which is a far greater evil, than disabling or destroying the body ; that it is not right to injure or retaliate an injury in any case, least of all, against one's country ; that one's country is to be honored and obeyed more than parents or any other friends ; that a citizen by no means stands on an equal footing with his country, so as to treat her as she treats him, or to pronounce judgment upon her acts, as she does upon his ; that every citizen who remains in any country, (especially if, like Socrates, he has remained during a long life, and never gone abroad at all, and never made any complaint of the laws,) has virtually assented to the justice of the laws, and has entered into a tacit *compact*¹ to obey them, as interpreted and executed by their appointed guardians, unless he can persuade them to alter their decisions ; and that were he to make his escape from the prison under these circumstances, he would do himself great wrong here, and greater injury in the future world. As the discussion proceeds, the laws seem to rise in dignity and importance, until they are seen embodied in a form more than human, and enthroned in unearthly majesty ; and they are heard, in meek yet authoritative tones, expostulating with Socrates on the

¹ To cite this (as is often done) in support of that mischievous modern fiction of government originating in, and deriving its authority from, a tacit compact among the citizens, is a manifest perversion. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, all regarded government as in a sense of divine origin, and obedience to it as a religious duty. They make ' a political being,' society, an original constitution and obedience to the civil authorities, a law of nature.

injustice, folly and pernicious tendency of the course which his friends are recommending. Socrates, too, catches, as it were, the spirit of the laws; rises into unwonted greatness, like the Pythian priestess or the inspired Corybant; and puts an end to the discussion in these sublime words: "The voice of these expostulations rings in my ears and I am unable to hear other arguments. Be assured, if you urge any thing of a contrary tenor, you will labor in vain. So the Deity teaches, and so let us do."

A dialogue so just in its sentiments, so conclusive in its arguments, so grand in its conception and so beautiful in its execution, speaks for itself. Eulogium is as needless to make it admired, as commenting is to make it understood. We do not know a better text-book of political morality. It anticipates the very sentiment and spirit of Christianity on this subject, and inculcates, as Christ and his Apostles did more fully and authoritatively three centuries later, the duty of submission to the powers that be, however unjust, oppressive or tyrannical they may be, just so long as they do not require the citizen himself to do what it is wrong for him to do, or to forbear what it is wrong for him to forbear. At the same time, it furnishes examples of the most heroic resistance to the unconstitutional, unlawful and unrighteous commands whether of aristocratic or democratic rulers. We could wish the *Crito* were read in all our schools and studied in all our higher seminaries. Young republicans would learn from it to reverence the laws, while young scholars would be taught by it to admire beauty. Would it were written on the hearts of all our citizens! It would teach them a loftier patriotism and would inspire them with a purer taste. If classical studies do not inspire us with a greater reverence for established laws and institutions, if Christianity does not teach us a more respectful deference and a more cheerful submission to the rulers of our own choice, if we do not learn in some way to pay a more sacred regard to the legally constituted authorities of our land, with all their imperfections and all their faults, our literature will be reduced to a beggarly account of

scurrilous newspapers, scandalous reviews and ribald songs ; our liberties will be trampled under foot with our laws by South Carolina nullifications, Rhode Island rebellions, Legislative mobs and Congressional “*rows* ;” and all our glory will soon have departed.

But to return from this episode. The *Crito* is a truly *Socratic* dialogue—true to the history, true doubtless to the sentiments of that great master in political, as well as moral philosophy. Socrates would doubtless have endorsed the doctrine as his own, while he would have thanked Plato for investing it with so beautiful and appropriate a form.

PHÆDO, or concerning the immortality of the Soul.

This is a dialogue within a dialogue. The immediate interlocutors are Phædo and Echecrates, the former of whom details to the latter the circumstances of Socrates’ death, and the conversation he held the last day of his life with Simmias and Cebes touching a future state. Of course, the scene of the conversation or *principal* dialogue is laid in the prison. The time is the day of Socrates’ death. The subject is suited to the occasion—the immortality of the soul.

We are persuaded that the arguments which are here put into his mouth to prove the immortality of the soul, would not have satisfied Socrates himself ; for they fall immeasurably below the clearness and conclusiveness of his demonstration of the Divine existence and benevolence, as recorded by Xenophon. They are mixed up with the Pythagorean doctrine of the preëxistence and transmigration of souls, and with various fables from the Greek Mythology. When compared, however, with the allegory and mysticism of many of the followers of Plato, of Olympiodorus, for instance, his biographer and commentator, whose comments are sometimes appended to the dialogues by way of *illustration* (?), they are transparency and demonstration itself. Moreover the reasoning is subtle and ingenious, and the accompanying narrative is invested with the charms of matchless beauty, simplicity

and pathos. Witness Phædo's account of the beginning of his own feelings and those of his fellow disciples, as they listened to this last discourse of their master—feelings not of pity, such as they commonly experienced at the death of a friend, for they thought Socrates more to be envied than pitied; nor yet of pleasure, such as they usually felt when listening to his philosophical discourses; but a wonderful sort of passion, an unusual mixture of pleasure and grief, and a singular union and succession of smiles and tears.

Again near the middle, when the doctrine of another life was established quite to the satisfaction and delight of the company, but Simmias and Cebes came out with objections that dashed their rising hopes and overspread the company with silent gloom, we have the following from Phædo: "I was sitting at that time at his right hand upon a low seat near his bed, but he himself sat much higher than I did. Stroking me on the head, therefore, and compressing the hair which hung on my neck, (for he used sometimes to play with my hair,) "To-morrow," says he, "Phædo, you will perhaps cut off these beautiful locks."¹ It seems so, indeed, Socrates." "But you will not, if you will be persuaded by me." "But why not?" "Because both you and I ought to cut off our hair *to-day*, if our *argument* must *die*, and we are not able to recall it to life again. And I, indeed, if I were you, would take an oath after the manner of the Argives, that I would never suffer my hair to grow, till by earnest disputation I had vanquished the objections of Simmias and Cebes." "But Hercules is reported not to have been able to contend with *two*." "Call upon me, therefore, as your Iolaus, while the *light yet lasts*." "I call then, not, however, as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as Iolaus upon Hercules."

But not to anticipate the dialogue. The conversation is suggested by the pleasing sensation which Socrates experienced in his leg, now that his irons were taken off, and which

¹ In token of mourning for Socrates.

leads him to remark upon the wonderful relation between pleasure and pain: "For," says he, "they are unwilling to be present with us both together, and yet if any person receives the one, he is almost always under the necessity of receiving the other, as if both of them depended upon one summit. And it appears to me that if *Æsop* had perceived this, he would have composed a fable, and would have informed us that the Deity wishing to reconcile contending natures, but being unable to accomplish this design, conjoined their summits in a nature one and the same; and that hence it comes to pass, that whoever partakes of the one is soon after connected with the other. And this, as it appears, is the case with myself at the present; for the pain which before was in my leg on account of the bond, is now succeeded by a pleasant sensation." This indissoluble connection between things of a contrary nature becomes an important principle in the subsequent argument, though it is dropped for the present.

In Plato's most natural and easy manner, Socrates is now led to advance the proposition, that a philosopher will be willing to die, and yet it is not right for him to commit suicide. The latter point is established by arguing that man, as the property of the gods, has no right to destroy the property of another, and as the servant of the gods, he must remain at the post which they assign him; and to flee from the service of such excellent masters, would be as foolish as it would be wrong.

But here the other point comes up: How then can the philosopher be willing to die and leave such a service? Socrates replies, that those who die as the gods would have them, will pass into the service of other and higher gods, still wiser and better, and into the society of good men and happy. *Simmias* and *Cebes* call for the reasons of this opinion, as if it were a new idea to them; and Socrates enters upon the discussion, not only to instruct his disciples, but to justify himself for being willing to die, expressing the hope that he shall succeed better in convincing his followers than he had done with his judges.

The whole study of philosophers, he argues, is to die. For it is their chief aim to attain to wisdom ; and wisdom is to be attained only by mortifying the body and abstracting the mind as much as possible from its influence. True knowledge is not to be derived from the perception of the changeful, outward forms of things by the delusive senses, for

“ We nothing accurate or see or hear,”

but from the apprehension, by the reason, of the true, the beautiful, the just, the good, and the like eternal and immutable *ideas*. Genuine virtue also is attainable only by escaping from the reigning, disturbing, and contaminating power of the bodily appetites and passions. The sensuous multitude may indeed refrain from vicious pleasures to avoid the resulting pains, and meet death with composure through fear of shame or some other evil. But to derive *fortitude* from *fear*, and to be *temperate* through *intemperance*, is absurd and ridiculous, and deserves not the name of virtue. They, therefore, who intelligently pursue after knowledge, virtue, wisdom—in other words, *philosophers*, will study to separate the soul as much as possible from the control of the body. And since they will become *truly* wise, only when the soul is entirely separated from the body, i. e. when they are dead, it will be the chief study of their lives to die. And it were most irrational and unphilosophical for those who have always been most desirous to die, to shrink from it when death approaches. Philosophers then will not fear, but desire to die, and go to that world, where alone, if any where, wisdom is to be found.

Cebes now calls for the proof, that the soul exists at all after death to find and enjoy wisdom. Socrates here calls the principle of contraries, as mutually and inseparably connected and necessarily generated the one from the other. Thus, whenever any thing becomes greater, it must become so from having been previously smaller ; and smaller, from having been previously greater. In like manner, the better is generated from the worse, and the worse from the better ; the

swifter from the slower, and the slower from the swifter; waking from sleeping, and sleeping from waking; dying from living, and living from dying. The dead are generated from the living, and the living will be generated from the dead. Mankind have actually gone through, we know not how many such series of generations. If the living were not thus generated in place of the dead; if generation did not revolve as it were in a circle, but proceeded as it were in a right line from one thing alone into its opposite, without recurring again to the other, all things would at length be extinguished, and existence would come to an end. Just as if men should fall asleep without waking again, all things would at length exhibit the delusions of Endymion, and be locked in universal and perpetual sleep.

The knowledge, which we have in this life, is only the *remembrance* of knowledge gained in a former life. This is obvious with regard to all *abstract* ideas. The abstract idea of equality, for instance, we do not derive from our senses. We see not *equality*, but equal *things*; and the *first time* we see equal things, the idea of equality is in our minds. It is *there*, then, when we *begin* to see, in other words, we have it when we are born. We must have acquired it, therefore, in a former life. The sight of a lyre will call up the idea of the friend whose it was, and the remembrance of the last time we heard him play upon it. In like manner, the sight of equal things will *call up* the idea of equality itself, which is entirely distinct from the equal things, and must therefore be a remembrance. So also our knowledge of the beautiful, the true, the just, the good, and those other *ideas* which constitute the proper objects of knowledge, is all reminiscence.

Simmias and Cebes seem to yield assent to these arguments. But the doubt still lingers, whether after all, the soul is not dissolved and dissipated with the body. Socrates then comes forward with an argument which is used in modern times to prove the immortality of the soul, viz., its immateriality. It belongs only to that which is *compound* to be *dissolved*. The soul is simple, invisible, intangible, and there-

fore indissoluble, indestructible. In proof of the simple and indissoluble nature of the soul, reference is made to its attributes and objects of regard, as compared with those of the body. The ideas of the beautiful, the equal, etc., which are perceived by the *mind*, are simple and immutable, while beautiful *things*, equal *things*, etc., which are perceived by the *bodily senses*, are composite and changeful. Moreover, the soul is formed to command, the body to obey. The former therefore resembles the divine and immortal nature, but the latter, the mortal. Some souls, however, become so intimately associated with, and attached to the body, that though liberated by death, they will be borne downward by an irresistible attraction and enter again into union with some bodily form. When the body is dissolved, each soul will go to its appropriate element—the stupid, into the bodies of asses; the gluttonous, of swine; the cruel, of wolves and kites; and the philosopher, to dwell with the gods.

To the argument from the simplicity and spirituality of the soul, Simmias objects, that the same may be asserted of harmony; and in the same way it may be proved, that harmony must exist forever, after the lyre or other instrument, from which it proceeded, is destroyed. Regarding the *soul* as a sort of harmony, he would know, why *it* may not die away like other harmonies, even before the body is fully dissolved.

Cebes also is not satisfied with the proof that the soul is *immortal*, though he assents to the proof, that it may survive a single body. Just as a man is longer lived than a garment, and yet some one of his garments may outlast the man, so may it not be true, that the soul will wear out many bodies, but die before the last is fully dissolved.

These objections greatly disturb the company, who were relying not a little on the strength of Socrates' arguments. Socrates discovers this at a glance, and before proceeding to answer the objections, he warns his disciples not to allow their confidence in *all* reasoning to be shaken. "Take care," he says, "lest you become misologists, haters of reasoning, just as persons become misanthropists, haters of men. For we

become both in the same way—by finding that reasonings in the one case and men in the other, in whom we have placed great confidence, have failed and disappointed us. Whereas we should infer in both cases, not that *no* men and *no* reasonings deserve our confidence, but that we ourselves have been unskilful in selecting and testing them. And therefore we should only be the more careful to select and test them wisely.”

The way thus prepared, much to the admiration of Phædo and Echecrates, Socrates now inquires of Simmias and Cebes, whether they assented to any of his arguments. They agree that the argument for the preëxistence of the soul was satisfactory. But, says Socrates, you must give that up at once, if you suppose the soul to be a sort of harmony of the body, resulting from the temperament and tension of the bodily organs ; for you would not credit yourself in the assertion, that a harmony existed before the harmonized elements that produced it. These two suppositions manifestly do not *harmonize*, as they ought especially to do, when we are discussing the *subject* of *harmony*. Which, then, will you give up ? Simmias replies, that he would rather give up the idea that the soul is a harmony.

Socrates then states other objections to that supposition, such as these : The soul leads and governs the body, whereas harmony follows and depends upon the organization from which it is produced. Again, one soul cannot be said to be any more a *soul*, than another. But one harmony can be said to be more a harmony than another. Further, if the soul is a harmony, what shall we call virtue and vice in the soul ? Shall we predicate harmony and want of harmony as attributes of harmony ? If the soul were a harmony, it would be quite incapable of vice, which is in its nature essential discord. Thus Socrates satisfies Simmias, that the soul cannot be regarded as a harmony. But neither of them seems to be aware, that the objection of Simmias still lies with all its force against the *argument* of Socrates. For if that argument would prove a harmony as well as a soul to be immortal, (no

matter whether the soul is a sort of harmony or not,) then the argument is not valid; for that which proves too much, proves nothing. Much as the argument from the immateriality of the soul has been used by the ablest reasoners of ancient and modern times, it is to us far from conclusive. He who made the soul, can destroy it at pleasure. Nay, unless he sustains it in being, it will of itself sink into non-existence. Unless, therefore, we can in some way ascertain his will, we can not be sure of our immortality. And if *this* argument is inconclusive, what shall we say of Plato's *other* proofs? But of this, more in the sequel.

In reply to the objection of Cebes, Socrates enters into a long dissertation upon the causes of generation and destruction, in which he declares his entire dissatisfaction with the doctrines of causation held by natural philosophers, and maintains that all concretes are caused by their corresponding abstract qualities. Thus a thing becomes greater only because it receives the abstract quality of greatness; and smaller only by receiving the abstract quality of smallness! To suppose that one man is greater than his neighbor and his neighbor less than he *by the head*, for example, is absurd. For it is to suppose that the greater is greater and the less is less by the *same cause*, viz. the head!! Besides it supposes that which is *small* to be the cause of a thing becoming *great*!!!

But to pursue the argument without all its illustrations. One of these abstract qualities never can receive its opposite. Greatness never can become small, nor smallness great. Neither can they coexist. Whenever a thing receives the one, the other is destroyed or displaced. Moreover that which, wherever it comes, introduces a certain quality, can never receive the opposite of that quality. Thus fire, which makes every thing hot into which it comes, cannot receive cold; but either retires before it or is extinguished. And snow, which introduces cold wherever it comes, cannot receive heat; but either retires before it or is destroyed. Accordingly the soul, which, being in the body, introduces life and so causes it to be alive, cannot receive death, but must either

retire before it or be destroyed. But that which cannot receive death, cannot be destroyed. It must therefore be immortal, and must retire a living soul, when death invades the body. And it is reasonable to suppose, that it will then find some appropriate element—with the brutes, in other human bodies, or with the gods, according to its character and tendency.

It requires no extended remarks to show that this famous argument for the indestructibility of the soul, is nothing but an accidental analogy, or a hasty generalization. From an instance or two like that of fire and snow, odd and even, he infers the universal proposition: that which, wherever it comes, introduces a certain quality, cannot receive the opposite quality. And then he applies it as an established truth to a subject, which has no natural nor logical relation to those from which he drew his premises.

In speaking of the various allotments of human souls, Socrates is led to develop his, or rather Plato's, theory of the earth. *If* the earth is round, he says, and placed in the midst of the heavens, it will remain self-balanced and self-supported, without the agency of any other cause. *We* inhabit only a *small portion* of the earth, about the sea, like frogs and ants about a marsh. There are many other chasms, of various forms, depths and dimensions, besides that in which we live, into which the damp noisome atmosphere settles, and which are inhabited by inferior intelligences; while better beings dwell on the elevated surface of the earth around these cavities, just as we do around the sea, and as superior to us as we are to the fishes and monsters of the deep. They dwell in the pure ether, walk among the stars, gaze with delight on brilliant gems and beautiful colors, and live in a state in every respect as superior to ours, as ether is more refined than air, or air than water. A very beautiful fancy this, but a fancy only. And yet it rests on nearly as good a foundation as that on which Plato rests the immortality of the soul.

We have already made it sufficiently manifest in various ways, that we think very little of Plato as a reasoner. We

have said, that the rhetorical and poetical elements far transcend the logical in him. We have alleged that with him an analogy is as good as a demonstration, and a beautiful theory quite as real as a homely fact. And we need no better proof of our allegations, than the *Phædo*. Its arguments are all built upon analogy. Its objections are suggested by analogy, and are answered from the same source. The author's fine-spun theory of the earth, his visions of heaven and his conceptions of hell, are all the offspring of analogy. Now all this may be very well, very useful, very necessary, provided the author makes a legitimate use of analogy, and is aware that he can prove nothing by it. But Plato does not know the difference between an analogy and an argument, and when he thinks he has made out a demonstration, he has at best only created a presumption.

The *Phædo* wears, in many parts, the aspect of mathematical closeness and severity in reasoning. But the quod erat demonstrandum at the end, is a quod est demonstrandum still. The argument against suicide, though one of the best, is a mere analogy, and, with its counterpart argument, produced contrary effects on different disciples.¹ The proof that the philosopher will be willing to die, is beautiful in its conception and elevating in its tendency. But it confounds the distinction between a natural and a philosophical death, and, as the Platonic Taylor himself admits, argues a willing separation of the body from the animating presence of the soul, *from* a willing separation of the soul from the contaminating influence of the body. The argument from the mutual and inseparable connection between contraries, besides carrying analogy to an unreasonable length, proves at last only an endless series of *earthly generations* of the living from the dead. The proof of the soul's præexistence is based on analogy, and convinces nobody now, though Plato seems to

¹ By reading these arguments Cleombrotus was led to commit suicide, and Olympiodorus to avoid it.

look upon it with special complacency. The argument from the immateriality of the soul proves too much, as we have shown. The argument for the indestructibility of the soul, from the nature of the causes of generation and destruction, (to say nothing of the ridiculous theory of causation¹ on which it rests,) begins, as just now observed, with a far-fetched analogy, and ends with a hasty generalization. On the whole, it were difficult to find a more ingenious tissue of plausible, yet fallacious, reasoning so seriously put forth on so important a subject.

Of course it is not reasonable to expect, in the absence of revelation, that clearness and cogency of reasoning on such subjects, to which we have attained by the help of Christianity. Revelation has suggested many an argument, as well as furnished many a truth, which now passes as current coin under "the image and superscription of reason." Nor is it quite right, in judging of Plato as a reasoner, to try him by our criteria of logic, and then charge upon him the faults of his age and nation. Certainly the Greeks, as a people, were lovers of novelty and debate, rather than lovers of truth, and in their dialectics most of the Grecian philosophers were more subtle and refined than convincing and conclusive. But it is right and reasonable, when Plato uses the name of Socrates, to expect from him some measure of *Socrates'* clearness and force of reasoning. Yet we cannot resist the conviction, that Socrates would have handled the subject of the soul's immortality far better than Plato has done. We know that on the kindred subject of the Divine existence and benevolence, he left nothing for the moderns to do but to carry out his method into its more extensive applications. And may we not infer that, if we had a treatise on the immortality of the soul from his pen, or from his lips through the pen of the faithful Xenophon, it would have been on the same inductive

¹ Query—How much of the *abstract quality of greatness* would it take to make a great man or a great mountain?

plan ; and, so far as it went, satisfactory to the impartial modern reader.

But little as we think of the Phædo as a specimen of reasoning, we scarcely admire it or its author the less on that account. It is not for arguments that we go to Plato ; and, if we do not find them, we are not disappointed. We read Plato for his fine sentiments, and lofty conceptions, and noble spirit. We love the pure, generous, aspiring soul, that could hold on to the doctrine of immortality, with or without proof. We admire the intuitive discernment that could discover so many great truths amid the darkness of heathenism. We are grateful for the multitude of analogies touching the soul and its immortality, which, though quite unsatisfactory as arguments, are so fruitful in hints and illustrations. We are surprised at the fancy that has strown flowers over the arid field of dialectics, and are delighted with the imagination which has built an ideal world so much fairer than ours, and peopled it with beings of more ethereal mould.

The narrative part of the Phædo is singularly beautiful. With all the simple graces of prose narration, it intersperses the finest gems of poetry. We gave an example or two at the beginning. Others have gleamed here and there through our analysis of the argument, though most of them have been sacrificed to logical conciseness. We cannot withhold the following in this connection. Observing on the morning of the last day of his life, that his disciples hesitated to interrogate him on philosophical subjects as freely as they had been wont to do, Socrates said : " I shall hardly be able to persuade others that I do not consider my approaching death as a calamity, since I am not able to persuade you, but you are afraid lest I should be more morose than I have formerly been. So, it seems, you think me more despicable than the *swans* in regard to divination, which, when they perceive that they must die, not only sing as usual, but even more than ever, rejoicing that they are about to depart to that deity in whose service they are engaged. But men, because they themselves are afraid of death,

falsely accuse the swans, and assert that their song is the result of grief because they are about to die. They do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or otherwise afflicted—neither the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor the lapwing, all which, they say, sing lamenting through distress. But neither do these birds, as it appears to me, sing through sorrow, nor yet the swans. But in my opinion, these last are prophetic, as belonging to Apollo; and in consequence of foreseeing the good which awaits them in Hades, they sing more at that period than at any preceding time. Now I consider myself as a fellow-servant of the swans, and sacred to the same Divinity. I possess a divining power from our common master, no less than they; nor shall I be more afflicted than they, in being liberated from the present life. Hence it is proper that you should interrogate me about whatever you please, as long as the eleven magistrates permit.”

The account of the death of Socrates at the close, is imitably beautiful and touching. It purports to have been given by Phædo to Echecrates, and it seems like an affecting story of a tragic event, told in the most familiar manner by a weeping spectator to a mourning absent friend. Plato was prevented from being present by sickness. But he had heard all the particulars and wept over them. Thence he knew how to draw tears from his readers. It was of Socrates' death, as narrated in the *Phædo*, that Cicero said he never could read it, though for the hundredth time, without weeping. It is from the same source that we have derived the impressions we all have of that sad yet sublime scene, which formed so befitting a close to the life of the Moral Philosopher. Xenophon has given us no account of his master's death. We would gladly give Plato's narrative entire, but we have already exceeded our proper limits. And why need we? Who is not familiar with all the particulars of the simple yet affecting story—his bathing, that the women might not have the usual trouble of washing the body—his only charge to his disciples and friends, whether present or absent,

viz.: to live agreeably to the principles of truth and duty, which he and they had mutually acknowledged—his answer to the question how he should be buried: as you please; only do not grieve when you bury this *body* as if you were burying *Socrates*—his kind and courteous farewell to the man who was the unwilling agent of his execution—the calmness and cheerfulness with which he drank the cup of hemlock—his fortitude and composure, while his friends were weeping and sobbing around him—and his symbolic utterance, as his last words, of the sentiment: “Thanks to the God of health and life; I am almost well.”¹ “Such,” says Plato, with a simplicity which crowns the whole narrative, “such was the death of our friend—a man, as it appears to me, the best of all our acquaintance, and besides this, the wisest and the most just.”

The *Phædo* is the last of Plato’s dialogues that have particular reference to the condemnation and death of *Socrates*. Over the composition of all these, though in different degrees, the spirit of that departed sage seems to have presided, like a good genius, restraining the wayward fancy of the author, and inspiring him with words of truth and soberness. In the subsequent dialogues, were we to pursue them further, we should find frequent occasion to regret the loss of that happy influence. We should meet with less of the practical, the useful, the Socratic—more of the fanciful, the ideal, the Platonic.

But none of Plato’s writings can be read without pleasure and profit. As to matter, he is eminently fruitful in valuable suggestions, as well as in high and generous impulses. No one can read him in his wildest vagaries or his emptiest negations, without being quickened in intellectual action, elevated in moral feeling, set to thinking for himself, which is far better than to be furnished with the thoughts of others. In manner, he is “*facile princeps* ;” in his department of composition, he combines simplicity with affluence, delicacy with exu-

¹ See *Bib. Repos. 3d series*, vol. xii. p. 49.

berance, reason with imagination, thought with feeling, philosophical acumen with rhetorical and poetical refinement, to a degree of perfection rarely if ever attained by any other writer. Plato is among writers, what the elm is among shade-trees. Xenophon may be more terse and methodical, like the smooth, clean, symmetrical maple. Demosthenes may be more masculine and vigorous, like the gnarled oak, which defies the northern blast. But there is in Plato, as there is in the elm of the Connecticut valley, a *graceful majesty*, a pleasing exuberance, a natural and simple yet profuse and magnificent drapery, which defies all the imitations of art. We know no substitute for the works of Plato, whether as a text-book in our higher seminaries, or as a reading-book for the learned professions. In neither of these ways do they now hold the place, which they deserve in public estimation. The utilitarian spirit of our age and country is adverse to their currency among us. And untoward circumstances have recently conspired with this spirit, to exclude them almost from our systems of liberal education. The *Græca Majora* contained the whole of the *Crito* and a portion of the *Phædo*. When that compilation went into disuse, there were no convenient editions of any of Plato's works for the student or the professional man. This desideratum is, however, beginning to be supplied. Single dialogues are being edited by our best scholars, in forms suited to the wants and the resources of American students. It is hoped that the day is not distant, when no graduate will go forth from any of our colleges without the quickening, elevating, and refining influence of that eminently spiritual, and therefore to us peculiarly *needful* discipline, which may be found in reading one or more of the Platonic Dialogues. And why may we not urge, and successfully urge, professional men to resort to this same wholesome discipline—a discipline which so spiritualized, enlarged, and refined the views of Good and Johnson in medicine, of Burke and Mackintosh in the law, and of Leighton, Taylor, and Hall in theology? There is a constant tendency in professional life to the merely technical and practical character—

to that which is narrow, partial, and illiberal. The man is too often merged in the profession—the all-conscious and immortal man, in the unconscious and short-lived profession. What properly aspiring man can consent to be forever over his pestle and mortar, or dealing out medicines, or setting broken bones, or prescribing for bodily diseases! Who would not flee occasionally from the investigation of contracts, bonds and mortgages in the office, the examination of witnesses, the rummaging of law-precedents, and the pleading of sixpenny suits in the court, to some more congenial and ethereal element! Who, even in pleading the cause of injured innocence and suffering virtue, does not feel his “ear pained,” and his “soul sick with every day’s report of wrong and outrage,” and sigh for retirement to some world of intellectual quiet, and ideal perfection? And they,

“To whom seraphic words are given,
And power on earth to plead the cause of heaven,”

are in danger of becoming too exclusive in their self-culture, too partial and formal in their public ministrations, and losing those comprehensive views, and that refinement of taste, which should ever adorn, above all others, the clerical office.

Now we know of no better antidote to this partial, mechanical, and merely practical tendency, than the reading and study of Plato. Let them turn aside at times from the customary walks of professional life, and seek retirement and recreation with the father of spiritual philosophy. Under his guidance, let them range through wider fields, strewn with unearthly flowers, and breathe a free atmosphere, undisturbed by the hum of business, uncontaminated by the breath of pollution. With him, let them scale the precipitous sides of this deep, dark chasm in which we live, and mount up to those higher abodes of better, happier creatures, who tread on pearls and precious stones, who drink in ether at every breath, and who, in the very region of the stars, hold converse with gods. They will return refreshed and invigorated to their work—better *men* and therefore more useful in their several callings.

ARTICLE IV.

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE.*

By L. P. Hickok, D. D., Prof. in Auburn Theological Seminary.

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY admits of a strictly scientific investigation, and construction into a purely philosophical system. For many purposes, and especially for thorough, systematic instruction in theology, it is highly important that the religion of the Holy Scriptures be thus subjected to the rigid rule of a true and valid science. When we speak of subjecting the Christian Religion to a science, however, it should by no means be deemed as involving any unholy blending of things sacred and profane together ; nor that it admits the presumption of attempting to help the wisdom of God by the foolishness of man. We design by it to express this deep conviction, that the truths of Revelation have a harmonious connection and interdependency with each other, and that it is practicable to bring them all into one intelligent system, possessing complete philosophic unity ; even as the single and isolated facts in nature have a reciprocal connection, and may all be bound up in their informing laws, and thereby present to the philosophic mind one combined and comprehensive sphere of being, which in its entirety we call *the universe*.

In the book of both Nature and Revelation, the facts as given to him who readeth are separate and disjoined ; they lie upon the page, as God hath published it, without any order or obvious connection among themselves. And yet, as truly in God's revealed word, is there an intrinsic order and beauty—an inner law which combines the whole in systematic unity—as in the works of God, which are thrown in such profusion

¹ The substance of the following article was delivered as an address, on the occasion of the author's inauguration to the Professorship of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary of Auburn, January 8, 1845.

over the heavens above, and upon the earth beneath us. It is the business of the philosopher of nature to find those laws by which all her facts are bound up into a system, and in which they can be expounded as rational and intelligible; nor is there any science of nature until this work is done, and the isolated facts are therein combined, and made to possess both consistency and unity.

And it is no more a rash intrusion within the sacred inclosure of God's secret counsels, nor any more an unauthorized intermeddling with sacred things, to go reverently to work within the field of Divine Revelation, and gather its separate truths, and combine them into system according to their real relations, than it is to go out and explore nature, and put the facts of God's work together in scientific order and unity. Yea, the manifold wisdom of God, in neither department, can ever be appreciated without this; and it is as much in accordance with his will, and certainly as much subservient to the higher interests of man, that there should be a thorough science of the Christian religion, as that there should be a completed science of nature. Both fields are full of God, and each exhibits the most astonishing traces, both of the magnitude and the minuteness of his superintending wisdom, and both should be studied both in their facts and their laws; and more especially the word of Revelation, inasmuch as here are contained those great truths, with which man's deepest interests and dearest hopes stand, by far the most intimately connected. Revelation may, therefore, as properly be subjected in its separate truths, to a science, as the separate facts connected with the structure of the earth or the movements of the heavens. A Philosophy of Nature no more legitimately exists, than there may legitimately exist a Philosophy of the Christian Religion.

Now all science, properly so called, involves both *facts* as they are given in experience, and the *laws* or *principles* by which their being and combination may be intelligently expounded. The facts and the principles are alike essential to the validity of the science. We might observe all the facts

which the senses can reach, and even retain the conceptions of them all in our minds, but such a collection of facts merely, will not be science; the mind has thus attained only the materials for science. On the other hand, we might assume any number of principles without facts, and we shall yet be as destitute of all true science as before; the whole is but merely hypothesis. Facts alone give mere appearance; principles alone give mere theory: facts, in combination by their principles, give valid science. In getting facts, we merely *observe*; in attaining principles we merely *speculate*; in binding facts into systems by principles, we first of all *philosophize*.

The precise conception of what science is, becomes an essential *preliminary* to the accomplishment of our present design; we shall, therefore, give a more full illustration on this point, relatively to both *fact* and *principle*, before we proceed with the main discussion.

I. *In reference to facts.*—The region for facts extends over the entire domain of the senses. The material, vegetable, and animal world lie around us, presenting their numberless single and separate objects. The world on which we dwell has its elements of fire and air, land and water; and the solid ground on which we tread, has its rocks and minerals, earths and fossils. The fields clothed with verdure, smiling with flowers, or rich in ripened harvests, spread forth the innumerable productions of the vegetable kingdom to our observation. The animals which inhabit the earth, whether as the tenants of the air, the stream, or the ocean; whether the domesticated flocks and herds of the cultivated pastures, or the savage beasts which roam in the wilderness; are all subject to our examination. All these constitute the separate items of facts, which may come within the perception of the senses; and to all these may be added the wonderful and glorious phenomena of the heavens above us. But in all this there is nothing which distinguishes the philosopher from the peasant. All may observe the facts, and so far as the senses reach, to all the same phenomena are given. This is simply appearance, not science.

The intellectual eye sees, beyond the mere facts, as appearance in sense, a clear and well defined operation of laws and principles, which weave all these facts into complex systems, and group them together in connected combinations. Not a blade, a shrub, or a tree ; not a leaf, or flower, or peculiarity of fruit, which has not its inherent law of growth, and form, and reproduction. Not an individual among fish, fowl, or beast, which has not its own law of life, and habitude, and perpetuation of its race. These laws, given in the intellect, bind up all these facts, as given in the senses, into the regulated groups of genera, species, and varieties of being. It is competent for science to put each fact where it belongs, and to determine for it, that it has its being and development under a law, which fixes the precise point of its relationship to the great family of nature. Not the facts alone, but the laws in the facts, give to us the combined systems of the natural sciences. Each department of science has its own facts within their own law ; and then these different departments are themselves circumscribed by a higher law ; and thus, ultimately, the entire aggregate of all phenomena becomes ensphered in one comprehensive system, constituting one grand whole of universal nature.

Facts, therefore, must not stand alone ; but in order to science, the law must be apprehended, by which all the facts become intelligible both in their variety and in their unity. Science is, in short, *the colligation of facts within their laws*. This is manifest, when we look at the subject on the side of the *facts*.

2. *In reference to principles.*—We may contemplate the action of mind in the light of its possession of principles alone. The intellect may go to its work without any direction from the senses. Theories the most ingenious and extensive, the most exact and self-consistent, may be constructed ; such as shall excite universal attraction and admiration ; and yet the whole shall have a being solely in the mind, with no outward reality conformed to it any where in the wide universe. There is in it a clearly-perceived law for something—a prin-

ciple after which some outward reality might be—and if that something could any where be found in existence according to this archetype, there would be science. But neither in the heavens above, nor in the earth beneath, is there any existing thing which corresponds to this beautiful ideal theory. It is a law without any facts, and as the mind which made the theory, cannot go further and also make the facts for it, so it is wholly incompetent to make any science out of it. In all its ingenuity, the hypothesis exists in the mind only, and is thus a mere void thought.

Hipparchus, centuries before the Christian era, formed his theory of epicycles, as the law for the movements of the solar system. This elaborate and astonishing production of genius, conforms in many respects most nicely to a great number of the appearances in the heavenly movements; yet, inasmuch as Hipparchus could only contrive pathways in the heavens for the planets, but could not make them actually travel in his paths, so his theory, to this day, stands out in all its ingenuity still without facts—a most splendid, yet wholly an empty conception. As a speculation, it is both ingenious and sublime, but as stubborn facts will not consent to conform to it, so it cannot make itself to be science.

How different the result, with the creations of Newton's genius! When twenty-four years of age, in the autumn of 1666, on a clear evening, he sat alone in his garden. In the stillness of his retirement, while the blue heavens were above, and the moon and planets were wheeling on in their bright courses, he was silently and intently meditating upon the power of gravity. He held this fact in his mind, that the force of gravity does not sensibly diminish at remote distances from the earth, at the tops of the highest buildings, at the summit of the most lofty mountains; why not, then—came the thought, sudden as an electric spark—why not, then, reach as far as the moon? If it does, was the conclusion as rapidly deduced, then her motion must be controlled by it. Perhaps she is held in her orbit thereby! Perhaps here is the solution for the question of every heavenly movement! This

grand leap of Newton's elastic mind reached a conclusion, which as yet was a mere hypothesis. It was as much a theory in mere empty thought, as the epicycles of Hipparchus. The law was assumed, but the facts were not yet reduced under it. But Newton's mind could not be satisfied with mere theory. He would spend no time in vain speculation. He can rest only in science. At once he seizes upon every fact found by Kepler, and Haller, and Galileo, and all his predecessors and contemporaries, and the application of his hypothesis fits them all, combines them all, expounds them all. It is hypothesis no longer. It is a law, not in thought alone, but now found to be a law in the facts; a law in the heavens, regulating all their positions and movements. It is thus a valid science, which endures as long as the planets roll.

We have been thus particular in the illustration, on the side of both fact and principle, that thereby it may be secured, that the mind shall carry along with it a clear conception of what is involved in science, when we shall pass on to investigate the facts in the Christian religion.

THEOLOGY, also, as a science, requires this same combination of facts within their principles. The field in which the facts are to be sought, is the inspired word of God; but when attained by the most careful application of the rules of philology and critical exegesis, they will constitute no science, but stand merely as the materials for theological science. The principle which is to bring all these truths into system, must be found, and made the *rationale* by which all is to be explained as intelligible and consistent. In this principle, the separate truths, as component parts of one system, must be seen to coalesce and become an organized body of divinity. Each part must be necessary for all, and all for each, and thus all inhere in one principle; and not stand out as a mere random aggregate of separate and heterogeneous particulars. The principle must not be the speculative theory, which has no existence except in the mind of the inventor; nor may the truths be forced and crushed into their places by some arbi-

trary rule ; but such a principle must be attained as shall permit the system to develope itself spontaneously, and leave every truth to fall of its own accord into its proper position, thus giving to the whole consistency, interdependency, unity.

As an example for illustration, we will take the facts which appear in connection with the mission of the Lord Jesus Christ in the flesh. Bring together the annunciation by the angel to Mary, the miraculous conception, the birth in a manger, the star, the wise men of the East, the flight to Egypt, the conference with the doctors in the temple ; his baptism, ministry, and miracles ; his transfiguration, agony in the garden, arrest, trial, and condemnation ; his crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension to glory ; and what meaning, as separate facts collected, can be made out of them, except as they are connected and made explicable by some principle ? Suppose we view them in the light of no other medium of connection, than simply that of the *times* and *places* of their occurrence ; it will be impossible, from such relationship alone, to make out any thing intelligible from these facts. We must have some principle of connection, or we can have no meaning. And this principle must be one that comprehends and harmonizes them all, or our theory will in some parts be self-contradictory. Let either of the following hypotheses be applied to these facts, as if competent to include and explain them all,—that Jesus Christ was a good man, devoting himself to a benevolent mission for his race—that he was a man whose force of genius and light of reason elevated him quite above the times and generation in which he lived—that he was an inspired prophet and messenger from God, to supernaturally communicate divine truth to man, and that he died as a martyr, to attest the sincerity of his own belief in the doctrines he promulgated—or, in fine, that he was a super-angelic being, and the first of all created existences. All these have had their day, and their strenuous advocates, and may be made to accord with more or less of the facts involved. But by no such hypotheses is it possible to include all the facts, and give to them a harmonious connection. Except as

we apply the one grand principle of a *vicarious sacrifice for sin*—an atonement involving the connection of Deity and humanity—we shall be wholly incompetent to bring all these facts into the consistent biography of any one personage. But under this principle, every fact at once assumes its proper place, proportion, and relation. The humility and the majesty, the submission and supremacy, the obedience and authority, the worshipping and receiving worship, the laying down of life and the power to take it again, are not merely all reconciled in this principle, but are all seen by it to be necessary. The principle demands just such facts; the facts precisely fill out just such a principle. This evinces itself to be the true system, in the light of its own conclusiveness and consistency. The facts are in colligation by their law, and there is valid science.

And now, this same result needs to be attained, for every fact and truth of God's entire revelation. Every separate truth has its place, and the right principle alone will determine that place, and fix the truth in it. Theology is only then completed, when it has collected all the facts, and found the principle which makes a place for all, and which binds all in their places. Religion will thus lie in scientific order, precisely as it is spread out before the Infinite Mind which has devised and disclosed it. A work far enough from being yet accomplished, doubtless, but for which constant study and prayer are demanded, and to the consummation of which, it may rationally be hoped that every successive generation shall approximate, until at length the entire revelation of God shall be seen "eye to eye," by all the watchmen of Zion. This perfection of Christian theology may not, perhaps, be sooner attained, than when Natural Philosophy shall have been fully completed, and the universe be thus presented in its facts and laws, entire and harmonious as its Maker beholds it. Each must, however, proceed in the same order, gathering the facts from their respective fields, and binding them up in their appropriate principles. Whether both shall proceed with equal step may be doubted, but of

this there is no room for doubt, that each shall be perfectly compatible with each; and that both shall be the more successfully prosecuted, in proportion as the light upon the one shall be permitted to throw its reflection fully and freely upon the other.

With this *preliminary* explanation of what is involved in all science now accomplished, we will give our attention exclusively to theological science. We shall divide the whole field into *three* distinct parts, and give to each such an examination, in their facts and principles, as the time will permit, according to the following order:

1. THE RITUAL OF RELIGION.
2. THE DOCTRINAL OF RELIGION.
3. THE SPIRITUAL OF RELIGION.

1. By THE RITUAL OF RELIGION, we understand all those rites and ceremonies by which religion is made to assume an outer form and dress, and through which it becomes manifested outwardly to the senses. The essence of all true religion is inward and spiritual, and all worship rendered to God, who is a spirit, must be offered in spirit and in truth. Still, external forms, significant of this inward spirit, are important in order that thereby its spiritual being may be symbolized to the senses, in some form of objective manifestation. From the earliest existence of religion in the world, there have been some peculiar observances, by which its votaries have been distinguished from those who made no pretension to its power and practice. And this will doubtless continue, while religion has any place in a world of flesh and sense. By divine appointment under the Old Dispensation, these ceremonies were exceedingly numerous, expensive, and burdensome; and under the New Dispensation, though greatly diminished in number, and simplified in their regulations, they still exist by an authority from God, which reaches onward to the second coming of Christ.

It is not a difficult matter to find all the ceremonies which have been sustained by a divine sanction from the beginning of the world. By a careful examination of the word

of God, we may collect all the facts which belong to any divinely-authorized ritual; but such a mere collection of single facts will not give any intelligible apprehension of a religious ritual, until we have applied some principle by which the facts may be brought into some rational and consistent system. This principle will give its significance to the use of these outward forms, and thus the whole ritual becomes an entirely different thing, when the facts are controlled and explained by the application of a different principle. A valid science of the ritual of religion demands all the facts, and then that these facts be combined into system, by a true principle.

There have been several different principles applied to the explanation of ritual observances, of which, it is to be noted, that no one can be the true principle, which is not competent to include and harmonize all the facts, and give to them systematic unity. Suppose then the assumption to be, that all rites and ceremonies in religion are to be explained by this principle—*that they are designed to awaken emotions, which are congenial with religious affections.* This will manifestly include quite a number of the facts, which belong to the ceremonies of religion. Rites and forms may be, and indeed often are, so arranged as to excite some of the deepest emotions of human nature. They may be made to arouse the mind to awe and veneration, to elevate the feelings of grandeur and sublimity; to exhilarate the mind and excite cheerful and joyous sensations; to melt in sympathy, or to depress the spirit in sadness and gloomy dependency. The ancient sanctuary, with its curtains and tables and altars, the holy of holies and the ark of the covenant; and especially when these were transferred to the costly and splendid Temple, with the order of the Levites, the priests in their courses, the high priest in his sacred vestments, with the smoking incense, the strains of music, the solemn reading of the law, and the responses of the multitude, must have most powerfully wrought upon the sensibilities of the Jewish worshippers, as they came together three times in the year to Jerusalem, in holy convocation.

But, in no form in which we may apply this principle to the facts, shall we be able to expound the whole ritual adequately and completely by it. It may be assumed, in *one form* of its application, that the emotions thus excited are properly religious affections, and that thus the ritual is designed to subserve religion directly, by awakening what is supposed to be religious and pious feeling. Doubtless many have been thus deluded. But how manifest upon reflection is it, that all these emotions are thus enkindled within us as men, merely, and not at all exclusively as *good* men. A Mohammedan, a pagan, yea, an infidel and an atheist, may become the subjects of all these emotions, from their participation in the common nature of humanity, while all the doctrines and duties of the Christian plan of salvation may be despised and hated by them. The feelings of awe and solemnity which are awakened by looking upon the ocean in its vastness, as it heaves its mighty billows upon the shore ; or, that sense of the sublime, and elevated veneration, which is induced by walking abroad in the stillness of midnight, and lifting the eye and the thoughts to the clear bright heavens, in their purity and their glory, might as well be deemed pious and holy affection, as any emotions enkindled in the mind under the natural influence of imposing rites and pompous ceremonies. It is a piety in which both the saint and the sinner, the believer and the infidel can participate.

Or, should it be assumed as *another form* of the application of this principle, that, although not properly religious affections, yet are they emotions so nearly allied to them, that at least they become preparatives and auxiliaries to genuine devotion ; and this aid, thus given to religion, is the true light in which a ritual is to be explained. To this we answer again, that though some facts may thus be interpreted, yet will this be found quite inadequate to include and expound all the facts which belong to the established ordinances of revelation. If this be the principle, then why so many ordinances which are so plain and simple in their outward observance, as scarcely to make any appeal to the natural

emotions? Why so grand and imposing a ritual under the Old, and so few, simple, unostentatious ceremonies under the New Dispensation? Why not at all times have ceremonies so striking, so various and splendid, that every susceptibility shall be aroused, and every natural emotion made auxiliary to our worship? If this had been the principle which controlled in the institution of religious ordinances, we should have had the books of the Bible like the Romish breviaries; and prostrations and genuflections; beads, wax-candles, relics, and images; splendid cathedrals, with their long arches and lofty columns; pictures, and processions, and organ chants, and papal benedictions and papal anathemas; would all have had their prescribed places in the gospel-ritual.

There is still *another* principle which has been by many assumed as the true law for combining all the facts in a ritual of religion. Though itself of an earlier date than the Oxford Tractarian movement, yet, in connection with that movement, it has been revived and become quite obtrusive, and somewhat extensively prevalent, both in England and in this country. In the awakened contest for forms, and transmitted authority through certain channels of succession, this principle indeed lies at the basis of the whole controversy; and the signs of the times give no doubtful intimation, that it is about to become the grand dividing line between the advocates for a religion of forms and ceremonies, and those for a religion of the moral influence of truth and motive. The principle is this—that *the officially administered rite is the divinely constituted channel, for the supernatural communication of the spiritual grace.* The work of the ceremonial administration, by the duly authorized functionary, itself works the requisite spiritual adaptations in the subject. Thus, for example, the rite of ordination is to be understood as itself conveying some spiritual prerogative to the person ordained; as, by the breathing of Christ upon the disciples, or by the laying of the hands of the disciples upon the heads of certain converts, the power of the Holy Ghost was communicated. The water in baptism also, duly administered, both in ceremonial form and in clerical authority, is, by a divine constitution, made to

work spiritual healing and cleansing in the subject, while no efficacy whatever attends the application of water by any other hands : even as the waters of Jordan were made to cure Naaman's leprosy by a seven times immersion, when the waters of Abana and Pharpar would have been applied utterly in vain. The ordinance, in all cases, is to be interpreted as an arbitrary arrangement, made efficacious supernaturally by the sovereign appointment of God, like the clay which Jesus made, and with which he anointed the blind man's eyes ; and all is made to depend upon the divinely authorized official administration, while in all other cases the ceremony is left in its own unmeaning worthlessness. Adaptations and tendencies in the ceremony itself, are not at all to be regarded as any reason for the observance ; but all rests upon the sovereign constitution of God, who has promised the grace in no other manner than through this appointed channel. We must come to gospel-ordinances, administered by such as have apostolic authority in direct succession, that thereby we may get gospel-grace, or be left utterly to uncovenanted mercy.

Now, that this is not the principle by which a divinely constituted ritual is to be explained, is quite manifest from this : that God requires the right heart, and the exercise of the spiritual grace, as the condition for coming to his ordinances. The ceremony is to be observed with gracious affections already in exercise, and not at all that thereby we may first attain them. Christians are first supposed to be, and then the ordinances are instituted for their benefit ; and not that the ceremony is first, and then that the sinner coming to it is thereby made a spiritual Christian. The ordinance, like the institution of the Sabbath, is made for man, and not man for it. The baptism of infants is no exception to this ; for the application of the ordinance to the infant, is wholly conditioned upon the supposed faith and obedience of the parents, as already in gracious exercise. Nor is this ordinance, as thus administered on the ground of the parents' faith, to be supposed as, arbitrarily and supernaturally, working any grace

in the heart of the child. Its great design is effected in throwing a moral influence upon the parents, which is to be blest by the Holy Spirit in the religious instruction and discipline of the child ; and also upon the child in subsequent life, by impressing upon the conscience the solemn fact, that as his birthright, the seal of the covenant, and the mark of the Lord Jesus Christ is upon him, which he must ratify or reject by his own act, and upon his own responsibility. The rite of ordination, moreover, must find the subject already qualified ; and must be administered as the public sign and manifestation that he has so been found ; and not at all, that as one unqualified, his ordination is about to make him so. His preparation and authority cometh not down through any official genealogy, but when found already endowed by God with the requisite talent and grace, the imposition of the hands of the Presbytery is publicly to indicate this fact, and to stand, ever after, as the authorized and accredited signal for his reception as such by the church of God. "The power of the keys," and "the gift by prophecy," are no *opus operatum*—a work wrought into a man, by the ceremony of his ordination. This notion of the constituted efficacy of mere ceremonial observances, is the very essence of all superstition. It is as really involved in the act of presenting the subject at the baptismal font, or that of coming to the Lord's table and partaking of the sacramental bread and wine, to be arbitrarily sanctified by this ceremonial observance, as is the act of the Romanist who crosses himself with holy water, and tells his beads to the virgin and the saints ; or that of the African, who hangs his charmed *fetisch* about his neck ; or even that of the Asiatic, who nails his prayers to a windmill, that they may be kept going before his god, day and night.

The true principle which gives consistency and system to all the facts in the ritual of religion, is this : *the ceremony is a divinely appointed symbol, for presenting and enforcing some spiritual truth.* God designs by it to teach man, and thus rationally to move him in the way of holiness and obedience, as a free, responsible being, by appropriate moral influence.

The grace is secured, through the operation of the Holy Spirit, in making the truth, which the symbol presents, effectual ; as in the case of all truth applied to the heart and conscience, whether preached to the ear, or read from the sacred page. Every fact, of both the Old and New Testament Ritual, will be effectually concluded by this principle. There is ever some important truth contained in and conveyed by the symbol. It is an outward sign of some inward spiritual grace, or privilege, or duty ; and the manner of its application, in the ceremonial administration, is to give to this truth its own peculiar impressiveness and force, other, and often perhaps higher, than that which the written or the spoken word would convey. But in all cases the end is to be gained only as the truth is apprehended, received, loved, and obeyed, under the gracious and special work of the Holy Spirit.

The whole Mosaic ritual held thus all its facts in this comprehensive principle, and was thereby "a schoolmaster to bring to Christ." It shadowed forth, in its symbols, the grand truths of the spiritual kingdom of Christ. The Epistle to the Hebrews may be considered as the statement in language of those great truths, which the Mosaic ritual embodied in symbols. The new dispensation has also its two main sacramental ordinances, which, in their simplicity and unostentatious beauty, embody in symbolic application all the peculiar truths of the Gospel Plan of Redemption. Baptism teaches all that belongs to depravity, and the necessity of regeneration and sanctification by the Holy Spirit. The Lord's Supper teaches all that belongs to the pardon and justification of the sinner before God. These ordinances, and all the services of the divinely established ritual are to be observed ; not that they may awaken emotions, which shall be mistaken for religious affections ; not that they may merely make constitutional feelings auxiliary to devotion ; not at all as working themselves, by a divine constitution, any spiritual grace in the heart ; but solely as a peculiar means, appointed and employed by God, for manifesting and applying spiritual truth to the minds of men, which is to work its end only by

being intelligently, prayerfully, and piously received, obeyed, and loved, under the accompanying agency of the Holy Spirit. In this principle only, shall we be competent to include all the facts of a religious ritual in a consistent, scientific system. In this principle, the ritual of religion will stand out complete and intelligible, working its grand issues in the great plan of salvation, rationally and consistently, without ostentation, delusion, or superstition. .

II. **THE DOCTRINAL IN RELIGION** includes all those leading truths of the Christian system, which by eminence have been called "the Doctrines of the Gospel;" or, as sometimes more discriminately, perhaps, termed, "the Doctrines of Grace." They include all the great facts of the entire plan of Redemption. Facts are things *made*; and these truths of Redemption are in this sense facts, that they are what God has constituted and appointed, as the permanent and only elements in his plan of a gracious administration. They are, moreover, in this view, facts, as given to us through his own agency in his inspired Revelation. While we embrace in this, the leading truths of the Christian scheme only, yet will those imply the great truths which are taught by nature, and apprehended by reason, concerning the being and the attributes of God, and the administration of a providential and moral government; and also will presuppose the facts involved in the fall of man, his entire depravity, his helplessness and hopelessness, if left to his own resources. With the recognition of such a God as moral governor, and of such sinners as moral subjects of his government, then the doctrines, peculiar to the Christian religion, are those great truths and leading facts, which God has wrought into his plan for recovering such sinners to holiness and heaven. Their combination in the Christian system must not only be harmonious among themselves, but must also harmonize with those truths presupposed by them, viz.: the being and government of God, and the sin, ruin, and still perpetual obligation and accountability of man.

And now, as in all cases these separate facts are to be found and collected, yet will the aggregate as brought together

constitute, not science, but the materials out of which science may be educed. Except as the principle is apprehended, within which all may be reduced to order and unity, there is nothing intelligible as a plan or system of salvation, and thus no theological science. With no principle, the facts can have no systematic combination ; and with an erroneous principle, the attempted combination must be faulty, and even the facts themselves will be very liable to misapprehension or perversion. All thus depends upon the principle by which we arrange and combine our facts into a system of doctrinal theology. In its own being the plan of Redemption is doubtless coherent, consistent, and in unity ; but if, in our study of this system, we apply faulty principles of combination, there will be, for some doctrines, no place at all found, and others will be forced out of shape and crushed into wrong positions.

But, notwithstanding the multiplicity of conflicting doctrinal theories, it is not a hopeless task to find, nor having found, to vindicate the true system. Let there be in this the same careful induction of facts within their laws as in the world of nature, and the true system must thus, ultimately, be developed, and it will vindicate its truth in the light of its own completeness and self-consistency. It will commend itself to all intelligent apprehension, just as the true system of astronomy does, or any completed system of natural philosophy. The facts will be so fully comprehended by, and so precisely combined in, the true principle, that no faulty system can abide enlightened comparison with it. Nor is there any hope of abolishing the conflicting systems of doctrinal divinity, in any other manner than by subjecting them all to the rigid tests of the inductive method of philosophizing ; gathering facts, and combining them in order under their laws. In this light, theological controversy becomes a dignified contest, on the high and broad ground of comprehensive principle ; and not the petty skirmishes, and passionate partisan conflicts, of sectarianism, dogmatism, or bigotry. When entire systems are arrayed in conflict, through their constituent

principles, the battle is soon over, and the victory of truth is complete and her triumph final.

And now, not to give faulty principles and their false theories in detail, we shall at once present the true principle which runs through and connects in harmony, every truth of the Christian plan of salvation, and this also in full agreement with every other truth, whether of the Bible or of nature. The principle is, in short, this—*the complete harmonizing of righteous authority with mercy*. The stand-point for studying the Christian scheme, is with the being and perfections of God as moral Governor, and with the guilty and lost race of man as free and responsible subjects, both in full view ; there to ponder the great problem, which so oppressed the soul of the patriarch Job, “How should man be just with God?”—how sustain inviolate the authority of the one, while benevolence shall rejoice in the visits of mercy and salvation to the other ? The astonishing plan of redemption refers every student of its facts up to that high point where, in the counsels of eternity, the grand covenant was ratified in the person of the Godhead. The great facts stand here disclosed in their principle. The light, in which this astonishing transaction is partially revealed, is from that sudden, transient, yet vivid flash, which breaks forth in the *prophecy*, or rather the *epiphany* of Isaiah,—“When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied.” Isaiah 53: 10, 11.

The great principle is here recognised, not only, but in the divine counsels viewed as already actualized in the sin-offering, and the travail of soul of God manifest in the flesh. Righteousness here stands firm, the authority of law is magnified ; and yet mercy goes forth, unhindered, on her message of recovery and pardon to the sinner. The programme is here given of that great plan, by which authority and grace may go out together over earth and heaven, and onward into eternity, and nowhere meet each other in collision. This grand principle was also the song of David, in strains of adoring

thanksgiving, and which cannot be put in a better form of expression than as we have it in the 85th Psalm ; “ Mercy and truth are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each other.” The angels also caught the same view, and recognised the same principle in their song over the fields of Bethlehem, while the shepherds watched their flocks by night. “ Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men.” Luke 2 : 14.

Permit then this principle, both in its righteousness and its mercy, in its glory to God and its peace on earth, to have full and free scope, and so to go forth in its control of all the facts, that the righteousness shall not hinder the mercy, and so also that the mercy shall not intrude upon the righteousness, but so that both may “ have free course, run, and be glorified ” together ; and it will carry us in our combination of the separate facts of redemption, over the same path which God’s wisdom and benevolence has already traced ; and will bring them all in unity within the same system which God’s purpose and grace have already matured, for glorifying both his mercy and his truth together. Bind up all the doctrinal facts of the Christian Religion in this law, and we shall have a doctrinal system full-orbed and glorious ; the exact counterpart of the divine reality, which the Bible discloses.

Vary in any place, and to any degree, from the rule of this perfect principle, and very soon in our progress, we shall find our facts becoming inextricably confused, and our whole system out of joint. Begin by at all encroaching upon the doctrines presupposed in the plan of redemption, by detracting at all from the independent sovereignty and authority of God, or by modifying at all the truth of the entire depravity and hopeless ruin of man, and the very foundations of such a system will be false and void ; for it is from the admission of these facts alone, in all their integrity, that there is the occasion for any plan of redemption whatever. If God be not the absolute sovereign, then has he no character as law-giver to vindicate ; and if man be not quite lost, then let him help himself. Again, take any theory which sends mercy

across the lines of right authority, and saves the sinner without an adequate atonement ; or saves an unregenerate sinner in his impenitence on account of an atonement ; and in no such system will it be possible to include all the facts which belong to the gospel plan of salvation, nor give to the system itself integrity and consistency. On the other hand, assume a principle which shuts the gate in the face of mercy, and puts the key in the hand of justice, not to open until literally the debt is paid, and, by a commercial transaction, the guilt and desert of the sinner have had their drop for drop of blood in the sufferings of the surety ; and all the facts can no more be comprehended in such a theory, nor explained by such a principle, than in the former case. No hypothesis, on the ground of any mercantile commutation, can be made to accord with the facts revealed. All grace is most effectually excluded thereby, except in the most inconvenient particular of the literal substitution of the innocent for the guilty, while the aggregate amount of suffering and punishment has in no respect been diminished.

In the true system, the facts must be so combined, that nowhere shall righteousness and mercy meet in interfering action. One must not seek to gain its end, in contravention of the claims and interests of the other. Where the aims of each would otherwise at all meet in contravention, the true principle must come in, and, by its remedial interposition, give freedom and unimpeded action to both. And where, too, mercy fails in the redemption of all, and some souls are left in their sin and wilful impenitence, to go down to death eternal, it must be seen that the restriction resulted from something, which, in the very nature of the case, was remediless, and which neither benevolence nor power could remove ; and not that the plan of Redemption was on so narrow a principle that it could not have kept the justice and the grace in harmony, if all had come back to God and been forgiven.

And now, such a principle, rigidly applied in the combination of the separate doctrines of the gospel into a system of Divinity, will, most assuredly, give far other than either a Pe-

lagian, or a Socinian, or an Arminian theory ; and will detect also, at once, the incompleteness and the obliquity of all these theories. It will, moreover, dissever and cast off all the excrescences and redundancies, which, through hasty assumption, and erroneous speculation, and false philosophy, have here and there deformed and encumbered the intrinsically sound and complete system of the immortal Theologian of Geneva. God's existence, as sovereign Ruler over all, and man's freedom and accountability, his sin and righteous condemnation, and thus his utter helplessness except through divine grace, will be all comprehended and confirmed in such a principle. The great truths, so emphatically taught by Revelation, of God's electing grace, and the Holy Spirit's effectual working in regeneration, and the final perseverance and perfect sanctification of the believer, will all be retained, and the whole will form one complete and sound body of Doctrinal Divinity, "fitly joined and knit together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth."

III. THE SPIRITUAL OF RELIGION is of more importance, and of far higher significancy, than all beside. In this consists the very life and power of the whole gospel, and of all religion. Both the ritual and the doctrinal may be fully comprehended in their facts and principles, and if the spiritual be excluded, all is worthless and vain. Formality is worthless ; and dead orthodoxy is worthless ; all of religion is worthless ; except as the spiritual is diffused through it, and interpenetrates and quickens every part. Religion, in order to be adequately known, must be studied as a living product. It is a germ, with its own inherent life and power, and which expands and unfolds from the action of its own vital energy. Whether in the heart and life of the individual Christian, or in the world of surrounding sin and death, its growth is never the product of outward forces, which could effect nothing other than external accretions, and mechanical combinations ; but it is ever through the workings of an inherent vitality, which assimilates to itself whatever it receives, and incorporates it into its own being, "changing it into the same image

from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord." In nothing is religion the product of ingenuity and skill, put together by art and man's device, and subject to the modifications of human contrivance. Like the majestic oak of the forest, which has not been made with axe and hammer, and its spreading branches joined to its trunk by tenon and mortise ; but an inner life, from its germ, has energized within it, and elaborated its own forms, and filled these forms with elements which it has assimilated in its own organization, and has developed itself in its beautiful proportions, according to a law within its own nature, which has been evermore guiding and controlling its secret working.

The Bible abounds in facts which belong to this inner vitality of religion. It is exceedingly to be lamented, that their import is so often overlooked ; and that, in consequence, we have so many who make the whole substance of their religion to consist in the empty and lifeless forms of the senses, or the dry logic and syllogism of the intellect. The inspired representation of religion is ever that of an inward and spiritual life. In the individual believer, it is a "seed which remaineth in him ;" a plant also, in progressive development, "first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the ear." Every Christian is a "branch," and through all Christians one life is diffused, by virtue of their union to the same "vine." The true church has so many organized members of the one body of Christ, as there are true believers, and one life is in them all. And when the apostles Paul and Peter represent the church under the figure of a building, they most carefully superinduce upon it, the never to be forgotten truth of the spirituality of religion. Instead of materials put together with trowel and mortar, we have "lively stones" in a "spiritual house ;" and the growth of each, by the one life which is in them all, gives to us the striking result, "all the building fitly framed together, groweth unto an holy temple in the Lord." And still further, when the prophetic vision is of "a stone cut out without hands," this stone has an inner life and growth ; it "becomes a great

mountain, and fills the whole earth." Thus abundant are the facts which belong to the spirituality of religion !

We are not, therefore, to study religion as a form, nor as a creed merely, but as a life—as every where a quickening spirit. Nor are we to lay it as a corpse upon the anatomical table, and with lancet and scalpel examine the form where life has been—the organizations which it has produced, and which it once inhabited ; but which it has now left, cold, senseless, and motionless. To be adequately known it must be studied in the beauty and strength of its living being, fresh in health, bright in expression, quick in sensibility, and vigorous in action. But, while all the facts that belong to the living power and spiritual agency of religion, are thus to be gathered together ; yet this will not complete our work, nor give to us any adequate apprehension of what this spiritual life and power truly is. The law of this living agency must also be recognized. The principle which shall comprehend the facts in the spiritual, is no less essential than those which combine the facts in the ritual and the doctrinal of religion. And what is this principle ? Not the law of the vegetable, nor that of the animal life. These are used for illustration, but they are not it ; nor, except in remote and faint degrees, are they analogous to it. Nor yet is it according to the law of the intellectual life, that we may interpret the facts which belong to the spiritual in religion. This life is completely *sui generis*. It has its own facts, and its own peculiar principle, and possesses very little in common with the ordinary science of biology. It is never to be confounded with the laws for the philosophical explanation of any of the phenomena of natural life.

The principle is most luminously disclosed in Paul's emphatic description of his own spiritual life. "Nevertheless, I live ; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me ; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me." Gal. 2 : 20. It is faith that secures the life of Christ in the soul. The grand principle of all spiritual life is "*faith in the Son of God.*"

Now, the very essence of all spiritual life is found in love. "He that loveth is born of God." This love is essentially complacency in God's moral character—complacency in all moral rectitude. Not *benevolence* merely—*wishing well* to all moral being; but much more than this, viz., *recte*volence—*wishing righteously* to all moral being. Righteousness, not happiness merely, is its object. *Worthiness to be happy*, is the ultimate end and aim of love, and now the only way to secure this end, is by the cross of Christ. In this fallen world there is no seed which can be planted—there is no germ which can be made to vegetate—and thus bring forth the fruit of holy love, except solely this principle of "faith in the Son of God." From a race dead in trespasses and sins, no spiritual life can be engendered by any other possible principle. Education; philosophy; social association; sacraments, administered by such as boast a succession, no matter how direct, from the apostles, or even by apostles themselves; scrupulous formality; rigid orthodoxy; all, except a living faith in Christ, are utterly powerless and profitless here. The soul is still dead in sin, and hopeless in its condemnation, when the utmost, which they all can do, has been exhausted. The living word of truth, and the life-giving Spirit of God, combine their agency in the securing of that act of faith, which fixes upon a crucified Saviour as the chosen portion of the soul. "The words which I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life." "It is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing." Where this living faith is, there is the strength of love to righteousness and to God, which many waters cannot quench, nor the floods drown. It lives and grows in spite of hostility and reproach, and in the face of persecution. It survives the rack, the gibbet, and the flame. This one principle includes within itself every fact of the spiritual, whether from the revelation of God, or from the experience of man. The whole system of the spiritual of religion is comprehended as a science, when we can trace through every fact, the grand principle of "faith in the Son of God."

This living seed has already been planted in our lost

world, by a divine hand. Though, to the eye of sense, it may have appeared "the least of all seed," yet is there in it a vital energy which far transcends all other. It must grow and spread forth its branches and its leaves, to give shelter and healing to the nations, for an irrepressible power of life is in it. Its spiritual working goes on from year to year, amid the families and nations of mankind, modifying all other forms of individual, social, political, and intellectual life, by its own. Divine promise and prophecy assure us that it shall ultimately pervade the earth, and expel all that is hurtful and destructive, in its universal extension. For this, every good man is praying ; for this, the church is laboring ; for this, "the whole creation groaneth, and travaileth in pain together, until now ;" for this, even Jehovah could say, "how am I straitened till it be accomplished !" A birth, amid throes of such energy ; a growth inducing such convulsions in nature, and such transformations of mind, bespeak the life of a spirit which is invincible and immortal.

We shall apply what has been now attained to *three* particulars, as matters of much practical importance.

1. *The proper limits within which philosophical speculation may be tolerated.* The full reception of the revealed truths of revelation—the facts in the ritual, the doctrinal, and the spiritual of religion—constitutes orthodoxy, in the proper and legitimate use of the word. Thus was it in the primitive age of the church. The plain declarations of the inspired word of God, were received with a simplicity of faith, which embraced and obeyed the truth in unquestioning love and confidence. As an exhibition of that spirit, which "receives the kingdom of God, as a little child," this simple faith is exceedingly lovely and desirable. Yet, while the same implicit and simple faith in the word of God is ever to be maintained and cultivated, it was not to be expected, from the very nature of the case, that it would long maintain its unquestioning position. With the same confiding spirit in the declarations of God, there were yet many things which would necessarily give to Christianity an inquisitive and

speculative direction. It would take too deep a hold of the affections and interests of good men, and interfere too peremptorily with the inclinations and practices of bad men, to admit that it should long exert its influence, without undergoing the most rigid and searching investigation. Its enemies will attack it; its friends will defend it; converts will sometimes be made from the ranks of science and philosophy; and thus, in various ways, the facts of the Christian religion will necessarily be made subject to a severe scrutiny. And the history of the early persecutions of the church, the "Apologies" which were written by the early Fathers, the controversies with pagans, infidels, and heretics, all testify, that the experience was in accordance with this rational expectation.

Yea, the simple study of the Bible itself, with a serious reflection upon its leading truths, induces the conviction of adaptations and connections among themselves, at once indicative of some plan and design in their original divine constitution. The invention and application of principles and theories, for the combining of those truths into system, and explaining their consistency, would be the natural and certain result. The great truth is indisputable, that God's revealed word is as much subjected to order and principle, as his works in nature. A philosophical study of the Christian religion needs, therefore, no apology. It is justifiable; yea, upon some it is obligatory. A true philosophy of religion may thus vindicate its own rights, and assert its claim to be, and to put forth its proper influence, without asking to be merely tolerated. As the simple reception of all the facts of the Bible is orthodoxy; much more, when all these facts are combined in their true principle, is it orthodoxy. This is orthodox philosophy.

But all philosophizing is not true, is not safe, is not justifiable. Very much is not merely speculation, but the application, manifestly, of erroneous principle, and thus the construction of false theories. The question, then, is to this point, How far shall such speculation be tolerated?

The answer, to us, seems obvious. If the man retain the facts—the full and complete truths of revelation—as God has severally given them in his word, he is wholly an orthodox believer. His speculative theory may be more or less faulty; rigid consistency might force him, if he followed out his theory, to give up, or so to modify as to pervert, more or less of the important truths of the Bible; but as he does not so push his theory, as he cleaves to the simple truths of the Bible, let him have the benefit of it, and full credit for it, though at the expense of his logic, and his philosophy. If his speculation induces the modification or rejection of important truth, as given in the word of God, he becomes heterodox, in proportion to the amount and importance of the truths excluded. But still, if these be not fundamental, though manifestly very important truths, he is to be tolerated as yet within the pale of Christian charity and fellowship. It is on this ground only, that Calvinistic and Arminian denominations can hold communion and fellowship. The one tolerates the speculations of the other, though one excludes many very important doctrines, which are included in the other. But when the applied principle cuts off, or so mutilates as to destroy, any one truth fundamental to the Christian plan of salvation, and the man gives up the truth in conformity to the false principle, it then becomes heresy, and allows no place for Christian charity. His “faith” is not that which was “delivered to the saints;” it is another gospel; and though it were an angel from heaven who embraced or preached it, the anathema of Inspiration would lie against him.

And so far as the discrimination is between the speculation and the speculator; between the man and his book; let the same principle of toleration be applied. If the man hold to the facts, while his theory manifestly excludes them; and these facts, though important, be not fundamental; expose the errors of the speculation, and refute the book, while you love, and commune with, the man who wrote it. But, if these errors reach to the exclusion of foundation-truths, and the denial of doctrines essential to salvation, and the theory denies

the doctrine while the theorist most inconsequentially and illogically admits it, then let the book be burnt, as "hay and stubble," but let also the man "be saved, yet so as by fire."

2. *We may hereby readily determine where is the true church of the Lord Jesus Christ.* In proportion as all truth, both of fact and principle, is held in its purity, and manifested in its living power, is the perfection of the church of God; and precisely in proportion as the truth and spirituality depart, the rightful claim to be called "the church," is lost. It, perhaps, may well be doubted, whether the spiritual in religion ever will become extinct, where the whole truth, both of fact and principle, is maintained and inculcated. Ceremonies, used as the divinely appointed means for impressing the truths symbolized upon the conscience; and doctrines, preached in harmony with the principle of giving to mercy and righteousness full conformity, may, perhaps, under the connected blessing of God, ever secure life and spirituality in the church. It is true, moreover, that the existence of spiritual life is consistent with much error, both ritual and doctrinal. But, this degree of error may become so great, as to be wholly incompatible with the least remnant of spirituality. The body may be so maimed and mutilated, or become so monstrously deformed and misshapen, that life cannot be kept within it. And when all spiritual life is clean gone, it is God's church no longer. It may still assume the highest prerogatives, and put forth the most exclusive pretensions, and arrogate supreme authority, and call itself apostolic or catholic; but after all, it is a dead body, putrefying and noisome; and which, for the comfort and the health of the living, needs to be buried out of their sight.

The test-point, by which to examine all high-church pretensions, is that of the existence of spiritual life. Is the grand principle of "faith in the Son of God," working there "by love, and purifying the heart?" If so, then own it as a church of the Lord Jesus Christ. Notwithstanding its many errors, that may make it weak and sick, nigh unto death, still cherish it; hold fellowship with it; heal it, if possible, of all

its errors, in ceremony and in creed ; and bring it back again to the beauty and activity of spiritual health. As long as there is life, there is hope.

But if, in fact, it be already dead, it is not proper that it should have its place among the living. By no process of galvanizing its dead members into violent and unnatural action, can it be made fit that it should longer have its place above ground. Nor, if the vital spark has indeed fled, can any externals give validity to its pretensions. Tradition may be invoked, the voice of antiquity may be pleaded, the fathers may be quoted, ancient and venerable forms, and vestments, and rubrics, and relics of saints and martyrs may be in it ; but as well might you hope to find the ancient nation of Egypt, by rummaging among the mummies in her tombs and catacombs, as to find the true apostolic, catholic church of Christ, amid such rubbish and remnants of mortality. The true, primitive, apostolic church of God, wherever it is, is *alive* ; and her spiritual life and health, her holy and vigorous action, are her best evidences of her apostolic origin and divine authority.

3. *An efficient Ministry will hereby be secured.* It is not sacerdotal descent, nor ceremonies, nor vestments sacerdotal, which give to the church an influential and efficient ministry. A superstitious reverence may be induced among the credulous and ignorant, by such factitious trappings of the priesthood ; but the real source of all the power of the ministry to do good, is in the spiritual religion which they exhibit in the life, and the living truth which they preach from the pulpit. If the ministry have this source of power, they may very well dispense with all other adventitious means of influence. The truth of the Christian religion, comprehended through all its facts by its principles, exhibited by the daily walk and conversation in all its spirituality and purity, and preached from Sabbath to Sabbath discriminately and faithfully, is adequate to any emergency which the church can meet. More power is lodged here, to move and mould the human mind, than in all the world besides. Religion, comprehended as a science, and applied to the multitudes of man-

kind as a spiritual energy, possesses within itself a vitality and an efficiency, by which it is more than a match for any thing which it can meet. Of every Christian, and especially of every Christian minister who is fitted for his work, may it be said emphatically, "greater is he that is in you, than he that is in the world." No other authority is so imperative upon the conscience, no other science has such power over the intellect, no other motives have such an influence upon the heart and will.

Compare Paul with Cæsar. Nero held the throne of universal empire. The legions of Rome, which had subdued the nations of the earth, were ready to do his bidding. The bodies and lives of millions were at his disposal. Paul was his prisoner, and stood in chains before his tribunal. But who wielded the power to work the mightiest and the most enduring changes? The history of the nations shows, that the sceptre of the Cæsars has been powerless, compared with the might which the primitive apostle to the Gentiles exerted. This simple principle, embodying the very life and soul of ministerial fidelity to his commission—"for I determined not to know any thing among you save Jesus Christ and him crucified," gave to Paul more sway over the minds of nations, than all the authority of Rome possessed.

So with all other sciences. Newton comprehends the heavens in their great law of order, and binds systems in their principles; La Place computes the tables, by which the motions and positions of the stars may be traced, and determined for centuries to come; Herschel sends his gaze through the immensity of space, discovering the furthest planet skirting its way upon the outer confines of our system, and writes his own name upon it, which is to be borne shining through the heavens while that bright world rolls on; but nor Newton, nor La Place, nor Herschel has taken hold of the highest nor the mightiest science. That faithful minister of the gospel, who studies, and lives, and preaches the spiritual truths of Christ's kingdom, has seized upon facts and principles which work more broad and deep, which reach on fur-

ther into futurity, and which stamp his influence and his name upon tablets more enduring than are included in all ancient and modern science. He controls and directs the energies of immortal minds, which shall still endure and work on when the earth and the heavens are no more.

For the training of such a ministry, and the sending abroad through the families of mankind such an agency, the perpetual help and blessing of Almighty God is needed, and the dignity and responsibility of such a work must be deeply felt, that divine aid may be sought, proportioned to its magnitude and our weakness.

ARTICLE V.

BAIRD'S RELIGION IN AMERICA REVIEWED.

By Prof. J. ALDEN, D. D., of Williams College, Mass.

Religion in America ; or, an account of the origin, progress, relation to the state, and present condition of the evangelical churches in the United States. With notices of the unevangelical denominations. By ROBERT BAIRD, author of "L'union de L'Eglise avec L'etat dans la Nouvelle Angleterre." New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1844.

THE primary object of this book is to give information to Europeans with respect to the religious condition of the United States. Information on this subject was greatly needed, not only on the continent, but even in Great Britain. We rejoice that the task of giving it was undertaken by Dr. Baird. His personal acquaintance with almost every part of our Union, his well known accuracy and patience of investigation, his ready appreciation of character and skill in selecting the right sources of information ; his calm, sound, practical judgment, his candid and catholic spirit, his scholar-like habits and cultivated taste, render him admirably qualified for

the execution of this work, and, we may add, for the department of labor now assigned him by the providence of God. It gives us pleasure to learn that editions of Dr. Baird's work have appeared in the French and German languages. A hundred copies in the French language have been sent to distinguished individuals in France, and other countries on the continent, including several crowned heads. Letters have been received by the author from the King of Prussia, the King of Wurtemberg, the Dutchess of Orleans, and M. Guizot, rendering him thanks for the seasonable information derived from his book. We rejoice that men occupying such commanding positions can appreciate the value of a religious work.

Although the book was written for European readers, yet it contains a large amount of information which will be new to most American readers. The intelligent American publishers were accurate in their judgment that the book would prove 'useful at home as well as abroad.

There are two points, in view of which we deem the work peculiarly valuable to American readers. First, the reader will get a more full and accurate idea of the religious character of the founders of the different colonies than from any other book with which we are acquainted ; and secondly, it will furnish him with an authentic account of the different denominations of Christians, and their plans for acting on the public mind.

We regard the first named point as very important. Owing to the custom which has obtained of dividing history into civil and ecclesiastical, our historians have not given that prominence to the religious character and acts of the founders of our states, which is necessary to a full understanding of our country's history.

The influence of this custom on history in general has been very unfortunate. It has led men to confine their attention to particular classes of facts without perceiving their connection with other facts. The student who is destined to the walks of civil life, reads what is called civil history, as

furnishing the instruction likely to be useful to him. The student who is destined for the ministry, reads what is called ecclesiastical history, as furnishing the instruction likely to be useful to him. Both come short of the true idea of history. Who does not know that an event in the church is often the cause of an event in the state?—that the religious history of a country is inseparably blended with its civil history? Who that believes in the moral government of God, does not believe that the facts which come under the head of religious history, control, in a great measure, the facts that come under the head of civil history? How then can the history of one class of events be written entirely disjoined from the other? Yet this is the way in which history has been written.

Suppose one should attempt to record the phenomena of vegetation, and state their causes; he makes a distinction between light and heat, which is indeed proper, and confines his attention to the influence of heat alone. It is plain that his account will be very imperfect. But will the account of the historian be less imperfect who leaves out of view the influence of vital Christianity in his account of the causes of events?

The truth is, the history of the world is yet to be written, and from a different standing-point from that occupied by our standard historians. It is to be written in view of the fact that God governs the world, that Christians are the salt of the earth. Then the Luthers, and the Calvins, and the Knoxes, and those who prayed and acted in their spirit, will appear in another light, and be no longer incidentally mentioned as fanatical disturbers of despotism and sin.

From the book before us, the reader will get a clear idea of the relations which exist between the church, and the state and general governments; and will be pleased to see it incontestably shown that our governments are not (as has been asserted by the advocates of the union of church and state) atheistic or irreligious.

We are disposed in this connection, to give our views of the nature and origin of the state, or of civil society; inas-

much as clear and elementary ideas on this subject will be serviceable to a full understanding of the true relation of Christianity to the state. We shall not be careful to prove every statement—as our object is to throw out hints, not to present a system.

Let us glance, then, at the origin of the state. Whence the origin of the state, or of civil society? for we regard the expressions as synonymous. The doctrine of a social compact,—of a general convention of the human race, the result of which was the formation of civil society, with its law of justice, binding in consequence of the consent then and there given,—this doctrine so often resorted to as the foundation of arguments, was exploded long ago by Paley, though he failed to point out the truth in relation to the matter—or in place of the error exposed.

At the outset of this theory, it is assumed that the savage state is natural to man. Now, perhaps, few whose opinions are of consequence entertain this idea; yet the language expressive of this idea is in frequent use. Inaccuracy in the use of terms often leads to error, when the error originally connected with those terms has been exploded. We shall therefore state what we conceive the natural state of man, properly speaking, to be.

We affirm that the natural state of a thing is that which is best adapted to cause it to attain the end for which it was made. The natural state of a tree is that best adapted to its growth and productiveness. The natural state of man is that which is best adapted to the development of his physical, intellectual, social, and moral nature: and that is a state of society—of civilization. It is not necessary to adduce proof of the truth that a social civilized state is necessary to the fullest development of all the powers of man. The true natural state of man is not the savage state.

Society, then, is the only necessary result of the constitution of man, and hence may properly be said to be of divine origin. God is the author of society, just as much as he is author of the constitution of man. It is not the result of hu-

man agreement; man does not become a member of it by giving his consent to its laws. "What," says a true Jeffersonian republican, who believes that all laws owe their just authority to the consent of the governed, "am I a member of civil society without my consent? Am I subject to its laws before I have had a voice in making them? I object to this—it is anti-republican."

We reply, it is true you are a member of society without your consent, you are subject to its fundamental law, the law of justice, whether you give your consent or not. The proof of this (if proof it can be called) lies in your moral nature. You see that you are a member of society—you feel that you are bound by its law—you might as well object to being born without your consent. You have nothing to do but to submit with the best grace you are able to assume. The facts are self-evident. The voice of your moral nature tells you that "these things are so."

It is commonly said that by becoming a member of society, man gives up some of his rights, that he may retain others—surrenders a part of his natural liberty, that he may retain the rest. We regard this as an erroneous assertion. In the first place, we object to the phrase, "becoming a member of society," as involving an erroneous idea. But not to dwell upon this; we affirm that liberty is wholly of social origin. We know not what is meant by natural liberty, unless it be liberty to be a savage or a brute; we deny that man ever had any such liberty to give up. The law of his nature forbids it. A man has no right to be a savage or a brute, for he thereby would defeat the end for which he was made.

Liberty consists in security against wrong. This definition was first given by Sir James Mackintosh, and its adoption removes a host of difficulties, and leads us along a way which bears infallible marks of being the true way. A man has liberty, when he is permitted to do right, and when he is secured against wrong. Society requires him, or can lawfully require him only to do what is right, and to avoid what is wrong. He gives up no right, for he had not the right of

doing wrong before—even if we could conceive of his existing anterior to society. He receives liberty.

We see, then, the relation between liberty and law, and the folly of the notion that men enjoy liberty in proportion to the absence of law. If laws were perfect, and perfectly executed, they would permit every man to do right, and secure him perfectly against wrong—which would meet our idea of a state of perfect liberty, where a man is perfectly free to do all that is right, and prevented from doing wrong; that is, the perfection of law would be perfection of liberty.

We have thus far spoken of civil society, of the state as distinct from government, with which it is often confounded. When we speak of the union of church and state, we speak of the union of the church, as a religious society, with the government. The church can be separated from the government, and must be, if it would attain the end for which it exists; but religion cannot be separated from the state. The state is a religious institution as much as man is a religious being. It is founded on the idea of justice—it exists for the realization of justice between man and man.

Government is the organ by which the state ordinarily acts. Its existence is needful to the attainment of the ends for which the state exists, and hence is of divine origin. The state is bound to adopt the form of government which is best adapted to carry out its ends; and as these may vary with the varying circumstances of the state, one form may be obligatory at one time, and another at another. The Scriptures teach this view. They speak of government as the ordinance of God, but are silent as to its forms.

If the state and government are institutions of divine origin, it is not necessary to prove that they are subject to the divine government and control. The principles of the divine government with respect to the state is a most interesting topic of inquiry, and one which we may discuss at another time.

ARTICLE VI.

NECESSITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT'S INFLUENCE IN THE
WORK OF MAN'S REDEMPTION.

By Rev. SETH WILLISTON, D. D.

THE universe, in its most extensive sense, comprehends all existence, whether created or uncreated. The parts of *creation*, in many respects, differ exceedingly one from another; some being nothing more than lifeless matter; others having vegetable, and others animal life; while other created existences bear the image of the only wise God. But there is one particular in which all parts of the *created* universe are perfectly alike; viz., in their dependence on the Creator. It is self-evident that one part of creation must have been as dependent for its first existence as another. An angel could no more begin to be, without the exertion of creative power, than an insect. Nor is the angel any less dependent than the insect, for the protraction of his existence, or the preservation and exercise of those noble faculties, which give him such an elevated place in the scale of being.

All can see that it would be absurd to suppose the attribute of *self-existence* imparted to any thing which is made. And I would inquire, whether it would be any less absurd, to suppose the created universe, or any part of it, after being brought into existence, henceforward to become independent of the Creator? If reason does not decide this point, revelation does. Revelation declares that God, particularly in the person of his Son, upholds all things, by the word of his power, and that by him all things consist. Heb. 1: 3, Col. 1: 17. According to the Bible, God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, both in the natural and moral world. At his pleasure, he gives us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons. Nor does the Bible represent man, the lord of this lower world, as any less dependent on his Creator than those creatures over which he rules. "Man's goings

are of the Lord." "We are not sufficient of ourselves, to think any thing as of ourselves." Even the hearts of kings, however absolute their government may be, are in the hand of the Lord, and are turned at his pleasure.

That portion of God's intelligent creatures, which have revolted from his government and set up for independence, are nevertheless as dependent as they were before their revolt. Their hearts are still in his hand. Therefore it is that he can cause their wrath to praise him, and the remainder of their wrath he can restrain. Were wicked men as independent of divine control as they wish to be, what could render it certain that their wrath would eventuate in the promotion of God's glory; or what could give an assurance that their wrath would be effectually restrained at that very point, where the interests of his kingdom require it? In this case, what could have rendered it certain that the brethren of Joseph would not have carried into execution their first project, namely, to kill him outright? or, in case this failed, their second, which was to leave him to perish in the deep pit, instead of selling him to the Ishmaelites? And these Ishmaelites, if God had had no control over their hearts, might have sold him to some other Egyptian besides Potiphar. But God's great and holy plan required that the captain of Pharaoh's guard, in distinction from every other man in the land of Egypt, should be Joseph's master. There are many devices in a man's heart, nevertheless the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand. If, however, the devices of a man's heart were beyond the control of the Almighty, we do not see how his counsel could always stand, so that he should be able to do all his pleasure.

But while all rational creatures are completely in the hand of their Creator, being dependent on him not only for the preservation of their intellectual powers, but also for their exercise, there is nevertheless a sense in which God is said, at certain times, to withdraw or withhold his influence, in distinction from other times; and from some of his rational family, in distinction from others of them. Concerning Hezekiah it is said that, "in the business of the ambassadors of the

princes of Babylon, God *left* him to try him, that he might know all that was in his heart." There was a particular time in the history of Israel, in which God says concerning them, "So I *gave them up* unto their own hearts' lusts." And concerning the heathen nations it is said, "For this cause God *gave them up* unto vile affections."

We have seen that the Scriptures assert the universal dependence of moral agents on God, even in all their voluntary actions; and yet, from the passages which have now been alluded to, we perceive that there is a sense in which, on a particular occasion, God withdrew his influence from one of his favorites; and that there was a time when he withdrew this influence from the holy nation; and that in this special sense he withdraws his influence from the whole pagan world, giving them up to vile affections. Hence we infer that, although there is a divine agency which pervades the created universe, there is a more special influence which produces and preserves holiness of character. This, in the Scriptures, is commonly distinguished from other divine efficiency, by its being attributed to the *Holy Ghost*. In the matter of our salvation, this peculiar divine influence is made as absolutely necessary as the atonement of Christ. I propose to show, in a number of particulars, what supreme importance the Scriptures ascribe to the Spirit's influence.

1. They ascribe a supreme importance to the Spirit's influence, by representing *all those who are not the subjects of it as being under the entire dominion of sin*. So it is represented in Jude, verse 19: "These be they who separate themselves, sensual, *not having the Spirit*." Christ describes the entire depravity of an unbelieving world by declaring it incapable of receiving the Spirit of truth: "Whom the world cannot receive." And Paul tells us that the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God. It appears then that, in Scripture dialect, to be destitute of the Spirit, is the same thing as to be destitute of holiness.

2. *A change of character* from sin to holiness is attributed to the Holy Ghost as the efficient agent. "Except

a man be born of the water and of the Spirit," said Christ, "he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Again he said, "It is the Spirit which quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing." The Spirit imparts the life of holiness to such as are dead in sin. In relation to this great moral change, Paul testified, "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy hath he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost." The salvation of men is no more possible without regeneration, than without an atonement for sin. But, according to the Scriptures, regeneration is never produced by any less powerful agent than the Holy Ghost. Just as important then as is the salvation of an immortal soul, is the Spirit's influence.

3. The *preservation* of a holy principle in the saints is ascribed to the same divine agent, who first imparts it. "Being confident of this very thing," said Paul to the Philippians, "that he which hath begun a good work in you, will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ." Saints are denominated *spiritual*, to denote the permanency of the Spirit's residence in their hearts. They are called the temples of the Holy Ghost. Christ said to his true disciples, "But ye know him," (i. e. the Spirit of truth,) "for he dwelleth in you, and shall be in you for ever." Paul says to the Roman Christians, "Ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you." "And hereby," said John, "we know that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us." From the whole tenor of Scripture, we are led to conclude, that the life of piety would become extinct in the Christian's soul, were it not for the abiding influences of the Spirit, with just as much certainty as the loss of his breath would put an end to the life of his body.

4. *Eminence in holiness* is accounted for by uncommon communications of the Holy Spirit. Why did the martyr Stephen excel his fellow Christians at Jerusalem? Because he was emphatically *full of faith*. But why was he so full of faith? The answer is, Because he was eminently filled

with the Holy Ghost: "They chose Stephen, a man *full of faith and of the Holy Ghost.*" Acts 6: 5. In describing Barnabas, Luke reverses the order, and mentions first the cause, then the effect: "He was a good man, and full of the Holy Ghost and of faith." That remarkable degree of sanctification which the Christians at Jerusalem had at the Pentecost, is expressed by its being said, "They were all filled with the Holy Ghost." And is, not the perfect holiness of the human nature of Christ described in the same way? "And Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost returned from Jordan." Was not his immaculate purity the effect of his having the Holy Spirit given him without measure? And may we not hence infer that the Holy Spirit is needed to preserve holy creatures from falling into sin, as well as to recover the fallen?

5. The Scriptures represent the special and abundant influences of the Spirit as constituting *the most important particular in the qualifications of Christ's ministers.* Those whom he chose for apostles, to go forth to disciple the nations, he kept with him all the time of his public ministry; so that they heard his public and private instructions and devotions; and yet they wanted the crowning qualification for their work, and that was a fresh and copious anointing of the Holy Ghost. He signified their need of this when, in his first interview with them on the evening after his resurrection, he breathed on them, and said, *Receive ye the Holy Ghost.* He encouraged them that they should receive power for accomplishing their great work, after that the Holy Ghost should come upon them. And when he was about to leave them, he commanded them to tarry in the city of Jerusalem until they should be endued with power from on high. Although in the fresh anointing which they were to receive after his ascension, the miraculous gifts of the Spirit were comprehended, yet they were not the whole, nor indeed the principal part of the blessing promised. That unction of the Holy One which does not enable Christ's ministers to work a single miracle, is of the

most importance to qualify them for their holy work. O for more of this precious unction to descend on the writer of this essay, and on all his brethren in the sacred ministry !

6. *Spiritual harvests*, which are a blessing infinitely superior to natural harvests, depend for their existence on the outpouring of God's Spirit. Religious excitement of a certain kind may, doubtless, be wholly the work of man, or of Satan transformed into an angel of light ; but all those revivals of religion, in whatever denomination, which give permanent strength to the church of God, are the work of his Holy Spirit. The ministers of the word, even after they have been abundantly replenished with the gifts and graces of the Spirit, are not sufficient of themselves to produce a genuine revival of religion. Still it remains true that the excellency of the power is of God, and not of them. Paul planted and Apollos watered, but God gave the increase. That wonderful success which attended the word on the day of Pentecost, is attributed to a remarkable effusion of the Spirit. When they who had been driven away from Jerusalem by the sword of persecution, travelled abroad preaching the word, their success is attributed to the same cause. "The hand of the Lord was with them ; and a great number believed and turned unto the Lord." Peter speaks of all the success of the gospel as the result of its being preached with *the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven*. Even the children of the covenant do not become prepared to subscribe with their own hand to the Lord, until he graciously pours his Spirit upon them. Isaiah 44 : 3-5.

7. *The millennium, the grand harvest of the church*, is attributed to a mighty and universal effusion of the Spirit of God. The promise, "I will pour out my Spirit upon *all flesh*," furnishes the only good reason to believe that true religion will ever become universal through this depraved world. The earth will remain a moral wilderness until the Spirit be poured upon us from on high ; and then the wilderness will become a fruitful field. Isaiah 32 : 15. When these effusions are withheld, it will revert to its wilderness-state, as we learn

from the 20th chapter of Revelation. But while the millennial day of the church shall last, "living waters shall go out from Jerusalem—in summer and winter it shall be." The winter will not freeze up these holy purifying waters. It is to this period of the church belongs that peculiar promise: "My Spirit that is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed." Isaiah 59: 21.

8. Nothing has a more intimate connection with the glory of God and the salvation of men, than *the scriptural orthodoxy of the church, and especially of the sacred ministry*. The church is called "the pillar and ground of the truth." But so far as she exchanges truth for error, her light is obscured, and she is less fit to advance the cause of holiness in the earth. Should her zeal remain undiminished; this may serve to render her the more mischievous. Is not this strikingly illustrated in the church of Rome? Nor will those Protestant churches, which have gone far away from the truth, aid much in advancing the cause of Christ, until they come back to the sound doctrines of the Reformation. Whatever, then, can be most relied on to cause the truth of the gospel to continue in the church, must be a thing of first importance. And what, I would ask, short of *special divine influence*, can be depended on to do this? The apostle John, addressing himself to true believers, says, "But ye have an unction of the Holy One," (by which he means the sanctifying influences of the Spirit,) "and ye know all things. I have not written unto you because ye know not the truth, but because ye know it, and that no lie is of the truth." Further on he says, "These things have I written concerning them that seduce you. But the anointing which ye have received of him abideth in you; and ye need not that any man teach you; but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things, and is truth and is no lie; and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in him." So long as the Christian church and the Christian ministry are favored with this holy anointing, the truth is safe; for then it

will not only be written with ink on the leaves of their formularies and their Bibles, but by the Spirit of the living God on the fleshly tables of their hearts.

9. The Spirit's influence is spoken of in the New Testament, *as comprehensive of all the good procured for us by the sufferings of our Redeemer*; and this shows the supreme importance of that influence. This, by way of eminence, is called "*the promise of the Father.*" To make way for the coming of the Spirit, Christ told his disciples it was expedient for them that he should go away. His mission would have been in vain, had it not been succeeded by that of the Spirit. It is the Spirit's office to take the things of Christ and show them to us. Without his efficient agency we have no true acquaintance with the Saviour of the world. But unto them who believe, by the teaching of the Holy Ghost, Christ is truly precious.

10. This seems to be the blessing which is *comprehensive of all we ask in prayer*: hence we infer its greatness and indispensableness in the work of our salvation. In a passage in the 7th of Matthew, Christ teaches us that our Father in heaven is ready to give *good things* to them that ask him; and in a parallel passage in Luke, he says, "How much more shall your heavenly Father give the *Holy Spirit* to them that ask him." This seems to imply that, in an important sense, the Holy Spirit comprehends all the good we need to ask in prayer. They who lived before the advent of Christ, prayed much for his coming. This was very much the burden of their prayers. This is what was intended by their "waiting for the consolation of Israel." But now, since Christ has already come, and gone through with his suffering work, nothing else remains to be prayed for, but the coming of the Spirit. As to the provision for our salvation, we have nothing more to ask. The atonement has been made. The revelation of God's will in the Scriptures is complete. We have not to ask for an additional chapter. The great blessing which remains to be given, and given in answer to prayer, is a more copious effusion of the Spirit's influence.

11. All that *fellowship in the moral system*, which is worthy of the name, is attributed to the agency of the Spirit of God. When Paul was treating on the subject of fellowship among Christians, he exhorts them to endeavor to keep the *unity of the Spirit*; and then adds, "There is one body, and one Spirit." The one Spirit, which gives unity to the mystical body of Christ, is the Holy Ghost. When this apostle was about to urge his Philippian brethren to be like-minded, and to have the same love, he begins by saying, "If there be any comfort of love, if any *fellowship of the Spirit*." This implies that all true Christians know, by their own experience, that there is a peculiar fellowship which is produced by the Spirit of God. Is not this peculiar fellowship the very thing which is intended by the "communion of the Holy Ghost," in the benediction which closes the second Epistle to the Corinthians? In the original language, the word for *fellowship* and *communion* is the same. The fellowship of the Spirit does not mean the same as fellowship with the Spirit, in distinction from the other persons of the Godhead; nor the same as fellowship with God, in distinction from other holy beings. It is doubtless called "the fellowship of the Spirit," or "the communion of the Holy Ghost," to denote that all the fellowship which exists between God and his holy creatures, as well as between such creatures themselves, is begun and perpetuated by their common participation of the Spirit's influence.

12. All *true happiness* is attributed to the special agency of the Holy Ghost. This circumstance gives him the appellation of the *Comforter*. After Christ had said to his disciples, I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever; even the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive; he added, "I will not leave you comfortless, I will come unto you." That is, I will come to you by the special and consoling influences of the Spirit of truth, whose office it is to comfort believers. Paul describes the true kingdom of God as consisting not in meat and drink, but in righteousness, and peace,

and joy in the Holy Ghost. "Joy in the Holy Ghost" is the joy which he produces: it distinguishes that enjoyment which he produces from all that which is derived from other sources. Joy is expressly said to be a fruit of the Spirit. "But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy," etc., Gal. 5 : 22. It is peculiar to that joy, which is the fruit of the Spirit, that it can be a contemporary with sore afflictions. Paul reminds the Christians at Thessalonica, that they received the word in much affliction, with joy of the Holy Ghost. The joy of the Holy Ghost, which often remains undiminished by affliction, is destroyed by sin. Between the pleasures of sin and the comforts of the Spirit, there is no agreement. David, by indulging in the one, lost the other. But when, like the prodigal, he came to himself, he cried, "Restore unto me the joy of thy salvation; and uphold me by thy free Spirit." As far as light excelleth darkness, does the joy of the Holy Ghost excel the pleasures of sin; and so far does it also excel the joy of the hypocrite, which is but for a moment.

That there is a Holy Ghost, we have both heard and believed; also that his agency has a necessary place in effecting the salvation of sinners. But concerning the nature and extent of his agency, there is not an entire harmony of sentiment among those who claim to belong to that department of the church, which has been distinguished by being called "the Orthodox." By answering three or four questions which relate to this important subject, I shall have opportunity to exhibit what, in my opinion, is the scriptural view of it.

The *first* and leading question is this: Is the agency of the Holy Ghost, on the hearts of those whom he renews and sanctifies, *direct*? There are but two different ways in which we are able to conceive that God can operate on the human mind; the one *mediate*, and the other *immediate*, or *indirect* and *direct*. It is not the invisibility of God's agency which makes it direct; for an angelic agent is invisible; and has power to use arguments to persuade us to virtue; but has no power to produce virtuous affections in our hearts. While God does

nothing more than to present arguments before our minds to persuade us to be reconciled to him, his agency is no more *direct*, in the sense we use this term, than that of an angel, or that of a preacher of the gospel. That agency which is restricted to the presentation of motives to the mind, by whatever agent, whether created or uncreated, they are presented, is technically distinguished by the name of *moral suasion*. One man may operate on the mind of another by moral suasion. But the other mode of operation, which we term immediate and direct, must be peculiar to God himself. The question before us is not, Does God make use of moral suasion in bringing back his revolted subjects? But it is this: Does he make use of any other influence besides that of moral suasion? Does he, besides presenting the truth and holding it up before their minds, exert a more direct agency to *cause* them to love and embrace it? That he does exert such an immediate and direct agency, I think is capable of scriptural proof.

1. The Scriptures make such a representation of God's agency in renewing the depraved mind, as very naturally leads us to contemplate it as an operation *peculiar to himself*. They inform us that those who receive Christ for their Saviour are such as were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. In harmony with this it is declared, "Neither is he that planteth any thing, neither he that watereth; but God who giveth the increase." Again, "That the excellency of the power might be of God, and not of us." And yet God's ministers can present light before the minds of their hearers; even the same light which God himself presents; for they have his word to enlighten them. And so far as God uses moral suasion to effect the conversion of sinners, he very commonly does it by human instruments, especially the ministers of his gospel. On the day of Pentecost, was not the moral suasion which he used directly from the mouth of Peter? It was when they heard what Peter spoke, that they were pricked in the heart. If, therefore, God does nothing more than to reason with his

creatures and press motives upon their consciences, where is the fundamental difference between him and his ministers ?

2. The Scriptures represent the work of renewing and sanctifying a depraved mind, as one of the *mightiest displays* of the power of the Almighty. Paul wished the saints at Ephesus to know what was the exceeding greatness of God's power toward them according to the working of that mighty power which raised Christ from the dead. When he had, at another time, told them that God was able to do exceeding abundantly above all they could ask or think, he adds, "according to the power that worketh in us." It would seem as if he could think of no display in all the world which would give Christians such an impressive sense of the uncontrolled power of God, as to refer them to that divine work which was going on in their own hearts. But if all which God does in subduing the hearts of rebels, consists in the mere presentation of arguments and motives, always leaving it with them to assent or dissent, where, I ask, is the exceeding greatness of this display of power ?

3. If God has mercy on whom he will have mercy ; if the Spirit quickeneth *whom he will*, does it not prove that he can exert an influence which is more direct than that of moral suasion ? Christ declared, that all whom the Father had given him should come to him. Yet are they by nature children of wrath and disobedience, even as others. They must be renewed by the Holy Ghost, or they will never come to Christ ; and yet we are assured they will all come. Hence we infer that the Holy Ghost is able to renew the most depraved heart. And does not this seem to settle the point, that his access to the heart must be more direct than ours ? If an effectual call, extended to all the elect, shows that the Spirit exerts a power above that of mere persuasion ; does not the final perseverance of all who are effectually called, prove the same ? Not one of their whole number gets out of the hand of Christ. But if nothing more than moral means were used to preserve them, could it be ascertained that none of them would perish ? And does not the everlasting stability

of their holy character in heaven, show that the power which preserves them from falling is more direct and effectual than that of moral suasion?

4. *Infant regeneration* proves that the mind can be approached more directly than by moral suasion. Christ said to Nicodemus, "Except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God." In the original it is, "Except *any one* be born again." That Christ meant to assert the necessity of the spiritual birth in relation to every child born into the world, is made evident: for he proceeded to say, "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit, is spirit. Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again." Whether all infants are saved, is not a point which we now need to discuss. That some of those who die in infancy are saved, none will dispute. And if saved, it must be by the washing of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost. But how can the Holy Ghost use moral suasion with an infant of a day old, or of a year old?

A second question is this: Does not a direct agency of God on the hearts of men *destroy*, or at least *impair their freedom*? I would say it does not; unless by freedom be meant the same as independence. If creatures cannot be free agents, except they are as independent as their Creator, free agency can have no place in the created universe. But why should it be thought a thing incredible with us, that God should make agents who are dependent and yet free? *Individuality* is attributable to created beings as well as to God. They are not parts of God, though altogether dependent on him. If they have reason, it is their own; and if they have a free will, it is their own. It is their own individual agency which they exercise: it is not God's. But though it is their own, it is that which he has given them, and which he constantly sustains and controls. When Adam was first created, was he not, in distinction from all the creatures around him, an intelligent moral agent? And yet he, as much as they, came directly from the forming hand of the Creator. If that creative power which was employed in giving existence to

a moral agent and putting him in motion, was immediate and direct, why should any subsequent influence of this kind be deemed incompatible with his freedom?

Is it right for us to bring God down to a level with ourselves, and to conclude, because we can go no higher than to form a curious machine, that he cannot create intelligent and voluntary actors? Or ought we to suppose that it transcends his power to govern the hearts of such agents, after he has brought them into existence? If by creative power he could at first give their minds a right direction, and yet they be perfectly different from all machinery, why can he not by as direct an operation create them anew unto good works, without destroying or even impairing their freedom of action? Why may not *he turn* them, and yet *they turn*? Their turning, when it is the effect of his direct operation on their minds, may be as free an act as if it had been effected by mere moral suasion. His act is the cause, and theirs the effect; but theirs is no less free than his. He can work in them to will and to do; and yet they both will and do. He puts forth a power which the rebel cannot withstand; and yet in the day of that power the rebel becomes cordially willing to submit. Ps. 110: 3.

Some may imagine that the Bible itself represents the divine agency in producing the renovated character in man, as annihilating his claim to moral excellence. I know the Bible teaches us that all boasting is excluded. It is required that he that glorieth should glory in the Lord. It teaches that our salvation is not of works, lest any man should boast; for that we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works. The reasons why the believer's salvation excludes boasting are manifest.

(1.) He has deserved the penalty of the law, and still deserves it. The righteousness through which he is justified was wrought out wholly by another, even by him who is "the Lord our righteousness."

(2.) His recovery from the entire dominion of sin is effected by the mighty power of the Holy Ghost, counteracting the

obstinate rebellion of his own heart. Our indebtedness to the righteousness of the Redeemer for justification, and to the special influence of the Spirit for sanctification, is urged as a strong reason why we should not be proud, but humble. Dependence on God for all our moral excellence, is a good reason why we should not feel self-sufficient, and why we should not glory as if we had not received it. But I do not know that the Scriptures ever represent the renovated character as any less excellent, or any less worthy to be esteemed and delighted in, on account of its being wrought in us by the power of the Holy Ghost. Enoch, one of the subjects of grace, obtained this testimony, that *he pleased God*. Daniel was informed by a holy angel, who had just come from heaven, that he was a man *greatly beloved*. And what is said of these two saints is true in application to their whole company, according to their various attainments in the divine life. We are told that "the righteous Lord loveth righteousness, and his countenance doth behold the upright." Christ manifested great complacency in those very characters which he had transformed by the agency of his Spirit. He as really took delight in their dependent holiness, in proportion to the degree which they possessed, as he did in the holiness of him who is the original fountain of all good.

I proceed to a third question: Is not a belief of dependence on the direct influence of the Spirit for holiness of character, adapted to *paralyze all human effort* to comply with the offers of salvation, and thus lead to a neglect of the means of grace? In answer to this question, I would observe,

(1.) That whatever may be the manner in which the Spirit operates, whether by direct or indirect influence, his operation is never considered as *necessary to lay us under obligation to possess a holy character*. The command, "Be ye holy, for I the Lord your God am holy," is binding on all creatures who have faculties susceptible of such a thing as holiness. A rational creature, though his heart may be entirely vitiated by sin, still retains all the natural faculties of a moral agent; so that he needs no additional faculty to en-

able him to return to his allegiance. So long as he retains the *natural* image of his Maker, he remains under perfect obligation to be conformed to his *moral* image. If he says, *I cannot return to God*, he ought to know that it is *wickedness*, not *weakness*, which creates the impossibility. He cannot but see that Christ's declaration, "Ye will not come to me that ye might have life," is descriptive of a voluntary alienation from the Son of God: and that the declaration, "No man can come to me, except my Father draw him," shows that alienation to be so great as to need a direct divine influence to overcome it. The Scriptures do not make it necessary for us to be able to ascertain that we have already some divine influence moving on our minds, to lay an obligation upon us to return to God. To know that we enjoy such influence, may augment our obligation, but is not necessary to give it existence. Were we to adopt the sentiment, that our obligation commences at that point where the Spirit begins his operation, (whether the operation be direct or indirect,) the sentiment would tend to stupify our conscience, and prevent our making any attempt to seek the Lord while he is to be found. But such a sentiment I conclude we have not adopted.

(2.) A belief in the direct influence of the Spirit is not adapted to paralyze human effort, since we are taught that *it is exerted in such a way as neither to destroy nor interrupt the freedom* of our actions. In those very instances where the Scriptures represent the Holy Spirit as the grand efficient agent, our own agency is not only required, but made absolutely necessary to our salvation. Nor can we know that we are the subjects of *his* operations, but by the affections and exercises which we discover in our *own hearts*. This imperceptibility of the agency of the Spirit, our Divine Teacher illustrates by the blowing of the wind, that mighty but invisible agent in the kingdom of nature. Though the love of God, wherever it exists in any of the fallen race, is shed abroad in the heart by the Holy Ghost; though it is he who gives repentance and faith, and the spirit of prayer; yet it is we our-

selves who are required to love God, repent of sin, believe on Christ, and pray. And unless we comply with these requirements, we are assured we can never be saved, but must all miserably perish.

Some may imagine that it is only when we forget our need of the special agency of the Spirit, that the exhortations of the Bible exert an influence to stir us up to escape from the wrath to come. But this is quite a mistake. There are those, on whom the most lively sense of dependence, even for the direct influence of the Spirit, has no paralyzing effect. They labor, striving according to his working, which worketh in them mightily. See Col 1 : 29. Our dependence on the special agency of the Spirit is not asserted in connection with every exhortation which is given us ; but there appears no design of concealing from us the fact, that without him we can do nothing. Sometimes our obligations to do that which is right, and our dependence on God to enable us to do it, are placed side by side in the same passage. Take these for an example : " Abide in me, and I in you." " Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling ; for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." " Praying in the Holy Ghost ;" that is, in dependence on his aid. " That good thing which was committed unto thee, keep by the Holy Ghost which dwelleth in us." We are not only required to do those things which we have no fitness or moral ability to do, without the special aid of the Spirit, but we are required to have the Spirit : " Be ye filled with the Spirit." " Let us *have grace* whereby we may serve God acceptably."

(3.) The doctrine of a direct influence of the Spirit in our salvation, is not adapted to lead to a neglect of the means of grace ; since this doctrine is far from *representing these means to be useless*. It is true that it supposes an influence more immediate and irresistible than that of moral suasion : and yet it gives to moral means their proper place. The minds of men need instruction and conviction to prepare the way for the renewing of the Holy Ghost. Besides, it is the

truth placed before them which draws forth the first gracious exercises from their renewed hearts. Their sanctification, from beginning to end, is promoted by the word of truth, and by all the other means of grace. Though God begets his children of his own will and by his own power, he does it with the word of truth. Though he sanctifies them by his Spirit, he sanctifies them through the truth. The ministry of the word is made the grand instrument, the word of truth the means ; but the Holy Spirit is the efficient agent in the sinner's conversion and sanctification. The Holy Spirit delights to put honor on all the efforts which God's people make, by their prayers, instructions, and holy examples, to bring their fellow men to an acquaintance with their Redeemer ; therefore they have great encouragement to use their efforts. The Holy Spirit also delights to put honor on the Sabbath and the sanctuary, as well as other times and places where prayer is wont to be made, and where the gospel of the kingdom is proclaimed. Hence it is, that we have reason to entertain stronger hopes of the salvation of the inhabitants of a country, where they refrain from labor and recreations on the holy Sabbath, and where they make a constant practice of seriously attending on the word which is dispensed in the Lord's house and other places, than of the salvation of a people where the means of grace are not enjoyed at all, or where they are treated with levity and contempt.

The last question I shall answer is this : Since it is granted on all hands, that men are to be pressed with motives to comply with their obligations, *what evils can result from adopting the moral suasion scheme of doctrine, in contradistinction from that of the Spirit's direct influence, even though the scheme should prove to be untrue ?* The truth, I would say, is always preferable to error. Therefore Solomon counsels us all to buy the truth and not sell it. Christ expected his disciples would be sanctified through the truth, and that alone. Peter had the same view of the influence of truth, when he reminded the Christians to whom he wrote, that they had purified their souls in obeying the truth. If

then it be true, that the Holy Spirit exerts an agency in renewing and sanctifying our hearts, which is entirely distinct from, and more direct than what is exerted by any created agents, either human or angelic, it is doubtless a truth which will have some influence in promoting good practical results. On the other hand, if the scheme of doctrine, which supposes the power of God to be limited to the use of moral suasion, be an error, there is no reason to believe it to be a harmless one. Some of the natural results of this scheme, which to me appear harmful to the cause of truth and holiness, I will now state.

First. I think it harmful to the cause of truth and holiness, because it makes *no fundamental difference between the agency of God and that of man*, in effecting the transformation of the depraved heart. The Scriptures, by making a fundamental difference between these two agencies, put God and man each in his proper place. They represent the agency of man as merely *instrumental*, but that of God as *efficient*. God says, "I will work, and who shall let it?" Believers are said to be born of God, in distinction from being born of the will of the flesh or of the will of man. "That the excellency of the power might be of God, and not of us." It is a thing of no small importance to decide the question, To whom belongs the glory of the great work of transforming a depraved mind and fitting it for heaven?

Secondly. The tendency of this scheme of doctrine is, in my view, to *quench the spirit of prayer*. It is essential to the spirit of prayer that we have faith in God—not that faith which is confident that in every case the identical thing which is asked will be received: but that faith which confides in the *all-sufficiency* of God. Whenever we ask any thing of God in prayer, we ought to believe that the thing we ask does not transcend his power to bestow. To the father, who brought his son that was possessed of a dumb spirit, Jesus said, "If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth." And to the blind men, who prayed for the restoration of their sight, he said, "Believe ye that I am able

to do this?" If prayer for the removal of these bodily diseases could not be acceptable, unless it was accompanied with a full confidence in Christ's power to remove them, can we pray in an acceptable manner for the removal of the diseases of the soul, unless we believe the thing we ask falls within the compass of his power? But can it be fully within the compass of his power, provided his agency is no more direct than ours? And is it not the common opinion of those who deny a direct divine agency, that whenever God leaves any sinner in his unregeneracy, it is because he is unable to bring him out of it—unable, because the sinner will not consent to come out, and because God has no power to cause him to consent, short of destroying his moral freedom? Now, have those who adopt this system every thing to encourage them to come to the throne of grace and continue there, which they have who believe that God has power, by a touch of his life-giving Spirit, to quicken whom he will? Is not a belief of God's omnipotency over the minds of rebels, a very great encouragement to ministers, parents and others, to pray for their unconverted hearers, children, and friends,—to pray and not faint?

Thirdly. That which I deem to be one of the greatest evils of the scheme in question, is *its tendency to produce spurious conversions*; such as are made by the skill of man, rather than by the power of God. There can be no doubt that there are two sorts of converts, differing as widely from each other, as holy love differs from that which is selfish. Nor can there be any doubt who makes the difference between them. "That which is born of the Spirit, is spirit." Every conversion which is effected by the renewing of the Holy Ghost, is sound; and every other conversion is false. He, whose new birth is of the will of the flesh, or of the will of man, is not a true convert. By mere moral means, without the transforming influence of the Spirit, sinners may resolve, and actually exchange, an immoral and irreligious course, for one which is moral and religious; but such means, when alone, are too weak to subdue the enmity of the carnal

mind. It is the Spirit's office to convince us of sin—of our sinful life and sinful heart. He shows us, though the freedom of the will has not been destroyed by the fall, that we are nevertheless in a strong bond of iniquity, which requires his mighty power to break.

They who reject the doctrine of a direct influence of the Spirit in regeneration, are apt to think that the inability which the unregenerate are under to come to Christ, is nothing more radical, or difficult to remove, than their inability to undertake a particular journey, where they only need a few additional motives to bring their minds to a decision. When both preachers and hearers entertain such views of this subject, will they not be apt to trust in moral means as sufficient to produce a saving change? I think we have much more reason to have confidence in those conversions, which have been preceded by a clear conviction of moral impotence and dependence on the immediate agency of the Holy Ghost, (like that of David Brainerd,) than where such conviction is wanting. And if I am not greatly deceived, it has been the effect of the moral suasion scheme, to throw out of sight our real need of the special grace of God to open our blind eyes, and turn us from darkness to light. It is my full belief that it is the natural tendency of the scheme, to fill the world with a kind of religion which does not bear the trials of the present life, and which there is reason to fear will not prepare for an admission into the world of glory.

Fourthly. The scheme which I am seeking to expose, appears to endanger the cause of truth by its *striking at the doctrine of native depravity*. This doctrine has heretofore been considered as lying at the foundation of the system of gospel grace. "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh." "How can he be clean that is born of a woman?" The Saviour urges the necessity of a second and spiritual birth, from the circumstance of the entire depravity of that nature which we receive at our first birth. By the *man*, who must be born again in order to see the kingdom of God, he evidently meant every human being who is born into the world. But how

does this agree with their doctrine, who assert that God never exerts any direct influence in renewing the mind, but ever confines himself to the mere moral influence of the truth which he presents? Do they not make regeneration such a kind of change as infants are incapable of experiencing? They seem, therefore, to be necessarily driven into the belief, that infants are not depraved. For if they are depraved, they must need, in common with others, the washing of regeneration, to prepare them for heaven. But in their case there can be no way to effect a change of nature, except by a direct influence on the heart. And rather than acknowledge a direct influence, they reject the doctrine of infant depravity; leaving us at perfect uncertainty as to the time when our children shall stand in need of the benefit of our intercessions in their behalf, that they may be washed in the laver of regeneration.

Fifthly. *The saints' perseverance*, one of the pillars of the fabric of grace, is *very much shaken* by a denial of the Spirit's direct influence. I conclude there are none among those who believe that the Divine Spirit exerts an influence on the rebellious mind, in regeneration, adequate to the disarming it of its rebellion, who do not also believe that he will, in every instance, carry to perfection the work which he then begins. They believe that he begins this work with a full purpose to bring it to such a termination; and that what he purposes, he is infinitely able to perform. But the greater part of those who reject the doctrine of the Spirit's direct influence, reject also the doctrine of the certain perseverance of the saints. And their disbelief of the one is legitimately connected with their disbelief of the other. For if it appears to any to be inconsistent for God to put forth an influence to renew the mind, which shall, without fail, secure its renovation, it must also appear inconsistent that he should exert an influence on the renewed mind, which shall necessarily secure its perseverance in holiness. But if God has power to quicken whom he will, he doubtless has power to preserve his saints from falling. "Unto him who is able to keep you from falling." Yea, "Unto him who is able to do exceeding

abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us."

Lastly. I am inclined to believe that the moral suasion system does not operate as favorably as the other, *to promote a life of faith and humility*. It is the office of faith to relinquish self-confidence, and to put its trust in God. Faith not only goes out of its own righteousness, to trust in that which was wrought out by the obedience and sufferings of Christ; it also renounces its own strength, and depends on the Spirit's influence to preserve in the heart that holiness without which no man shall see the Lord. An impressive sense of dependence in both these particulars, namely, for a Saviour's justifying righteousness, and the Spirit's sanctifying influence, are the grand means of promoting an humble walk with God. But a disbelief of the Spirit's direct and immediate influence upon the heart, tends to diminish a conviction of dependence on his agency to preserve spiritual life. What was it kept Paul so humble amid a series of splendid and successful labors in the cause of Christ? It was not merely a retrospect of the past. He had a deep conviction of remaining depravity, accompanied with a lively sense of his entire dependence on new incomes of the Spirit to sustain his renovated life. After saying "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live," he hastens to add, "Yet not *I*, but *Christ* liveth in me." At another time, when he had spoken of his laboring more abundantly than his fellow servants, he is careful to give all the glory to the grace of God: "Yet not *I*, but the grace of God which was with me." And again, "Whereunto I labor, striving according to his working which worketh in me mightily."

In the diary of President Edwards for January 2, 1723, he gives us the view which he then had of his entire dependence on the quickening influences of the Holy Spirit to preserve life in his soul. After acknowledging that his mind was dull, he says: "I find by experience that let me make resolutions and do what I will, with never so many inventions, it is all nothing, and to no purpose at all, without the motions

of the Spirit of God: for if the Spirit of God should be as much withdrawn from me always as for the week past, notwithstanding all I do, I should not grow, but should languish and miserably fade away. There is no dependence on myself." Is it not one important use, which God designs to make of such a case of dereliction as that which is here stated, to teach us, by our own experience, that we need the continual operation of the Spirit of God to keep us in the way of his commandments? By such means he teaches us, that we never run in the way of his commandments except when he enlarges our hearts; and that when he holds us up, and then only, we are safe.

It is not easy to see how it can be, that they who believe in a self-determining power of the will, and who restrict the agency of God to a mere moral influence, such as one man exerts on the mind of another; and such as God exerts on mankind promiscuously; it is not easy to see, how they can have as much foundation for a life of humility and self-emptiness, and a life of entire dependence on God, as those who believe that without the Spirit's immediate agency, to begin and perfect their deliverance from sin, there would be no hope of their salvation.

She who is the fairest among women, the bride, the Lamb's wife, is described as coming up from the wilderness leaning upon her beloved. She *walks*, yet she *leans*. Her faith does not destroy her activity; nor does her activity weaken her faith. Divest her of either of these characteristics, and you despoil her of her beauty. Her activity would lose all its holy lustre, were it self-sufficient; and if her faith did not produce correspondent works, it would be as devoid of moral excellence as the faith of devils.

ARTICLE VII.

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL HISTORIES :

As embraced in a Report submitted to the "New Jersey Society of Teachers and Friends of Education," at a quarterly meeting held March 7, 1845.

By M. WILLSON, N. Y.

THE Report, from which the following article is abridged, was prepared for the New Jersey Education Society, by its request; and in accordance with a resolution of the Society, the same is now submitted to the public.

The importance of the subject announced will be manifest, when it is remembered that it is from our *common school* histories, those unassuming companions of the school-room, and not from those more elaborate writings which grace the libraries of the men of wealth and the professional scholar, that the great mass of our citizens must ever derive their knowledge of the character, toils, and privations of our fathers, and of the origin and nature of our free institutions.

It is the object of the following article, to give our prominent school histories such a review, as will enable all who feel an interest in the subject, to judge more understandingly of their comparative merits, and of their relative claims to the confidence and the patronage of the public. The task that we have undertaken is, of itself, a delicate one; and the more so, from the circumstance, that the reviewer exposes himself to become the reviewed. The spirit of searching criticism, however, has already gone abroad among teachers and friends of education; and who shall check its progress? It is the ordeal through which every important school book must hereafter pass to public favor. The able and critical discussions upon the merits of school-books, recently called forth in the Educational Society of New Jersey, are indications of the same spirit; and we begin to have some confidence, that the

popularity of a school-book will, at no distant day, depend upon its intrinsic merits; and not, as heretofore, upon the favor of popular names, the wealth and enterprise of publishers, and the chance condition of getting it into certain fortunate channels of trade.

The subject of school histories will be examined under four heads: Arrangement, Anachronisms, Accuracy, and Literary Merits.

1. *Arrangement.* Two different plans of arrangement have been adopted by American historians, in treating of our early colonial history. One plan is that of particular or individual history; the other, that of common, or general history. The former, technically speaking, is history *ethnographically* arranged, or, according to nations and tribes: the latter is history *chronographically* arranged, in which events in different nations are brought together and given in the order of time in which they occurred. The first of these methods, as applied to our own country, pursues the history of each colony separately down to the period of the French and Indian War, in 1754, after which, the separate and individual history of each colony is abandoned, and all are united in one common history. This arrangement has been adopted by Hale and Olney; and by Frost, with respect to all the colonies except those of New England.

The other plan of arrangement carries along together the contemporary events which happened in different colonies, and thus, as far as possible, blends the whole in one common history. This latter plan has been adopted by Goodrich, Grimshaw, Mrs. Willard, and in the pictorial history of S. G. Goodrich, the author of *Peter Parley's Tales*.

It is obvious that the history of a colony may be learned much more readily where the events are narrated in one unbroken series, and in one chapter, than where the series is frequently interrupted and the events are found dispersed through a dozen chapters. Let any one search for the colonial history of Virginia in the volumes of Bancroft, and he will find a little here, and a little there; and unless he

should read the three volumes through, he will be likely to omit some portion of Virginian history. Let it not, however, be supposed that we depreciate the value of Bancroft's History. We regard it as the best, for its purposes, that has yet been written. In our view, it is well adapted to those already familiar with the separate history of each colony, but exceedingly unfit for a school-book. Circumstances in the history of one colony are often narrated by Bancroft in connection with those of another colony, for the purpose of elucidating some important principle. They are links taken from the chain of particular history, and, for especial purposes, formed into new series; and unless the reader can restore them to their proper places, the histories to which they belong must appear incomplete and broken. More fully to show the faultiness of this mode of arrangement for a school-book, we refer to Mrs. Willard's History, and to Goodrich's Pictorial History, in both which this plan is adopted.

Of those histories that have adopted the other plan of arrangement, the well-known and early work of Hale yet stands preëminent in this particular, and greatly in advance of any of its competitors.

In some of our school histories, a highly important feature has recently been introduced, which may properly be noticed under the head of arrangement. We allude to the introduction of maps.

There are those living who recollect the time when geography was studied in our schools without the aid of maps; but how preposterous would now appear the attempt to teach a child a knowledge of localities by description only. We believe the day is not far distant, when the attempt to impart a knowledge of history, without the aid of historical maps, will be deemed almost as great an absurdity. Will it be said that our ordinary school atlases furnish all the necessary aids? Without stating other numerous objections, we remark that the reader may search in vain, on modern maps, for the names of numerous places, familiar in history, but forgotten in modern topography, because important only

in the remembrance of what they have been. But one or two dilapidated dwellings now mark the site of Jamestown, and among the ruins of the fortress of Louisburg, the once called Gibraltar of America, a few sheep roam for pasturage, and a few fishermen's huts now grace the site where once frowned the royal batteries. In the topography of the present, the monuments of the past are fast wasting away, and if we would restore their already half-effaced inscriptions, like Old Mortality, we must chisel them anew. No American school history should be written without its historical maps, on which should be given, with enlarged plans when necessary, the localities of all places distinguished in our history; such as Ticonderoga and Crown Point; Lexington and Bunker's Hill; Forts Stanwix and Schuyler; Forts Washington, and Lee, and Edward; Forts Clinton and Montgomery, Stony Point, Valley Forge and Wyoming, and the names of numerous other places not found on common maps.

In our school histories, historical maps have been introduced only in those of Mrs. Willard, and in the Pictorial History of Goodrich.

2. *Anachronisms.* The length of a year was fixed by Julius Cæsar at 365 days and six hours, which is about eleven minutes and a fifth more than the true solar year, amounting in 130 years to one entire day, and a small fraction over. At the time of the Council of Nice, in the year 325, it was found that the vernal equinox had changed from the 25th to the 21st of March, and there it was fixed by the Council; but in 1582, it had receded to the 11th. To bring it back therefore, Pope Gregory decreed that ten days should be taken out of the month of October, 1582; and that what would otherwise have been called the 10th should be called the 20th. It was, moreover, decreed that to prevent the accumulation of the same error in future, three days should be abated in every 400 years, by restoring leap years to common years at the end of three successive centuries, and making leap year again at the close of every fourth century. In other words, the

year 1600 should be leap year as usual, but 1700, 1800, and 1900, the first three successive centuries, although their numbers are divisible by 4, should be common years, allowing February but 28 days ; while the year 2000, being at the close of the 4th century, should be leap year ; and thus in every subsequent 400 years. This correction leaves but a small error, amounting to less than a day and a half in 5000 years.

As different European nations then commenced the year at different periods, some on the 1st of January, some on the 25th of March, and others on the 25th of December, Pope Gregory, in order to produce uniformity, adopted the Roman method, and decreed that the year should commence on the 1st of January. Catholic nations and Catholic writers immediately adopted these regulations of the Pope, but they were for a long time rejected by Protestants. The Scots, who from time immemorial commenced the year on the 25th of March, adopted the Gregorian style in 1599, but the English, with wonderful pertinacity, held out against these wise regulations during more than 150 years ; during which time all their historians retained the old style in their dates. In 1751, the English Parliament enacted that the year should commence on the first of January, and that the 3d of September of that year should be called the 14th, thereby striking out eleven days, which the English calendar then required to reduce it to the Gregorian.

As most of our colonial history is embraced between the time of the Gregorian reformation in 1582, and its adoption by the English Parliament in 1751, and as our historians have taken their materials partly from Catholic, and partly from Protestant writers, as might be expected, a great confusion of dates has arisen, and we frequently find, on the same page, even in our best histories, part of the dates in old style, and part in new. More particularly is this the case in regard to the dates in the days of the month, for in most cases recent historians have made the change with respect to the date of the year.

During most of the period of our colonial history, a French colony occupied Canada on our North, while French and Spanish colonies were seated in Florida and Louisiana, on our South and West. These were Catholic colonies, and their histories, intimately connected with ours, have been written by Catholic writers, who adopted the Gregorian or new style. Our colonial writers, on the contrary, retained the old style. That our modern compilers, in taking their dates from these two sources, have not been at all careful to distinguish between these two styles, and that they thus present a great confusion of dates, we shall show by examples.

In the accounts given of the destruction of Salmon Falls in 1689, Mather's *Magnalia*, vii. 68, Belknap's *New Hampshire*, i. 132, Williamson's *Maine*, i. 618, and Holmes's *Annals*, i. 431, following the English authorities, date the event March 18, being old style; while Drake's *Indian History*, B. iii. 118, and Bancroft, iii. 182, both following Charlevoix, ii. 51, give the date according to new style, with the exception of an error of one day. Thus, in the different accounts of this event which American writers give, we find a discrepancy of ten days in the date. It may be remarked that, on the same page with the foregoing, Bancroft dates the destruction of Schenectady according to old style, thus changing his mode of reckoning within the compass of a few lines. All our histories, however, date this event according to old style, because they take the date from the English writers, for although Charlevoix gives a minute account of this transaction, he omits the date. The most particular account we have is from Colonel Schuyler, then mayor of Albany, who wrote it nine days after the event, under date of 15th Feb., 1689, equivalent to 25th February, 1690.

Bancroft, iii. 184-185, gives the events of the expedition of Sir William Phipps against Port Royal and Quebec in 1690, according to the French dates, (see Charlevoix ii. 82-87,) while Holmes's *Annals*, i. 432, Williamson's *Maine*, i. 598, and other works, give the English dates, a difference of ten days. Thus Bancroft dates the summons for the surren-

der of Quebec, Oct. 16th, the landing of the troops Oct. 18th, and their reëmbarkation Oct. 21st; while Holmes dates these events Oct. 6th, 8th, and 11th. It may be remarked here that Murray's *British America*, Edinburgh edition, a valuable English work, follows the new style throughout in its history of Canada. The singular fact is presented that all the histories of Canada under the French, give the dates in new style, while all the histories of the contemporary English colonies retain the old style.

The account of Frontenac's expedition against the Onondagas in 1696, is taken exclusively from the French authorities, from Charlevoix, ii. 168 to 175, and here all our histories follow the new style. All our accounts of the massacre of the French by the Natchez Indians, in 1729, being taken from French writers, follow the new style. Charlevoix, ii. 457, dates the event Nov. 28th. Thus also Holmes, i. 545, and Bancroft, iii. 360, etc.

Holmes, Hutchinson, Belknap, Trumbull, Smith, etc., in the accounts which they give of the expedition of Nicholson against Port Royal in 1710, give the dates in old style. Bancroft, iii. 218, gives the marginal dates according to both modes, old style and new. Charlevoix's account is in vol. ii. 343-345, where, as usual, the dates are given in new style.

All our histories, with one exception, follow the old style in giving an account of the conquest of New Amsterdam, (now New-York,) by the English in 1664. The articles of capitulation, as given in full in Smith's *New-York*, i. 19-21, are dated thus, "August the 27th, old style, 1664." Bancroft is the only writer who dates this event according to new style; but, strange to say, his account of the surrender of Albany a few days later, and of the reduction of the Swedes on the Delaware, retains the old style.

Important European treaties likewise have received different dates from our best writers. Thus the treaty of Ryswick, which closed King William's war, is dated in some of our histories, Sept. 10th, 1697, and in others Sept. 20th, the for-

mer being old style, and the latter new. The treaty of Utrecht, which closed Queen Anne's war, is dated by Holmes and by most American writers, March 31st, 1713; but by Bancroft it is dated April 11th; which is the date given by French writers. All our school histories which give the date, retain the old style, although even here they commit an error of one day, dating March 30th, instead of March 31st.

Examples of this kind might be greatly multiplied, but those already given are sufficient to show the numerous discrepancies in dates among our best writers. Not one of them appears to have endeavored to make his dates correspond to either style throughout, and in most cases not the least attention, apparently, has been given to the subject, the author having taken his dates indiscriminately from such authorities, either Catholic or Protestant, as best suited his convenience. It might be supposed that the highly valuable and otherwise accurate history of Bancroft, would not have overlooked this matter, and that the dates would have preserved a uniformity either according to old style or new. But while Bancroft, the same as most other writers, always changes the date of the year from old style to new, he sometimes changes the date of the day of the month and sometimes he does not. We have given a few examples in which he has made the change. We will notice a few in which he has not. Throughout our colonial history, generally, he has not made the change. The dates in the New England history are mostly in old style. The landing of the Pilgrims is dated December 11th, etc. In the following cases, among many others, the date of the year is correctly changed, but the date of the day of the month is not.

The adoption of the early constitution of Connecticut stands on the records of the colony, January 14th, 1638. See Trumbull's Connecticut. As this was inserted according to old style when the year commenced on the 25th of March, the true date in new style is Jan. 24th, 1639, a year and ten days later. But Bancroft, i. p. 402, instead of dating it Jan. 24th, says Jan. 14, 1639.

The patent, incorporating the Providence and Rhode Island Plantations, is dated in the original March 14th, 1643. See Knowles's *Roger Williams*, Appendix. This is equivalent to March 24th, 1644, new style. But Bancroft, and most of our recent writers, retain the March 14th, while they change the year.

The articles by which Virginia submitted to Parliament are dated March 12, 1651, equivalent to March 22, 1652. Holmes, Bancroft and others, change the year, but not the day.

The original grant of Carolina to Lord Clarendon, is dated March 24th, 1662. In the *Memoirs de l'Amerique*, iv. 554 to 585, it is found in French with the date in new style (with an error, however, of one day), viz., April 4, 1663. Bancroft, Holmes, etc., change the date of the year, but not of the day.

The date given to the first constitution of New Jersey, as found in full in Smith's *New Jersey*, Appendix, p. 512 to 521, is "Feb. 10th, 1664." This, according to our mode of reckoning, would be previous to the grant to the Duke of York, and before there was any such province as New Jersey. Gordon, in his history of New Jersey, Note, p. 24, supposes therefore that Smith's history, and other authorities which he had consulted were wrong. But had he known or reflected that this date is in old style, making the true date a year and ten days later, the whole difficulty would have been removed. Bancroft, ii. 316, retains the Feb. 10th, but changes the year to 1665.

The charter or fundamental laws of West New Jersey, as given in full in Smith's *N. Jersey*, Appendix p. 521 to 539, are dated March 3, 1676. This being old style, the date in new style would be March 13, 1677. Bancroft, ii, 358, accordingly dates it 1677, but he retains the March 3, instead of giving March 13.

We should here remark that in England, previous to the civil war, which resulted in the subversion of monarchy in 1649, public documents, charters, deeds, etc., did not usually

receive the date of the year of our Lord, but the date of the year of the king's reign. Thus the charter of Mass. Bay colony is dated in this manner. "Witnes ourself at Westminster the fourth day of Marche in the fourth yeare of our raigne." After the subversion of monarchy, the date of the year was given according to old style, previous to 1751. The examples we have just quoted are such as received the date of the year.

If the confusion and discrepancies which we have noticed are found in American histories, where there seems to be so little occasion for them, it might be interesting to inquire how it is with European histories, where Catholic and Protestant writers give an account of the same events. An examination will show that in French and in English histories similar and even greater discrepancies prevail. The histories of England and France are intimately connected toward the close of the 17th century, and during the first half of the 18th, and although during this period the French writers generally followed the new style, while the English retained the old, yet the writers on either side frequently abandon their system, when they are obliged to go to the opposite side for authorities. We will compare a few dates as given in the French History of D'Anquetil, and the English of Smollet.

The naval battle of La Hogue in 1692, is dated by Smollet May 19th, by D'Anquetil May 29, the former in old style, the latter in new.

Battle of Hoch Stadt in 1704, both agree.

Battle of Turin, Sept. 7, 1706, both agree.

Battle of Malplaquet, July 11, 1709, both agree.

Treaty of Aix la Chapelle in 1748, Smollet says Oct. 7, D'Anquetil Oct. 18.¹

Let us, however, return to American common school histories, and witness the effect there produced by such discrepancies. Notwithstanding the comparatively few dates that are retained in these works, there is enough to show the sources from which they originated. Our English histories

¹ Most of the examples of this class are omitted.—Ed.

of France present these same discrepancies, giving dates, part of them in old style, and part of them in new, showing that the authorities relied on were mostly English. Our common school histories of the United States have adopted the old style throughout our colonial history, except in a few instances, some of which we will now notice. Events pertaining to Canadian history alone, are generally given in new style, when the dates are mentioned. It is well known that the eastern coasts of America were granted away by series of patents both by the English and the French monarchs. Our histories give the dates of the French patents in new style, and those of the English patents in old style.

Some of our school histories date the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth Dec. 11th, 1620. This is old style, and is the date given by Hale, Webster, Frost, and Grimshaw, and the date probably designed by Mrs. Willard. Both Olney and Goodrich, however, date this event Dec. 22d, a date which they erroneously supposed to correspond in new style with Dec. 11th, old style. In the same verse with this date, Olney says the Pilgrims arrived at Cape Cod Nov. 9th. Yet Nov. 9th is the date in old style. Here are then two dates, only two lines apart, one in old style, and the other in new. Goodrich, with the exception of the date of the landing of the Pilgrims, gives all the other dates, throughout the colonial history, in old style. The Pictorial History, by S. G. Goodrich, the author of Peter Parley's Tales, throughout the whole account of the voyage, landing and first winter of the Pilgrims, gives the dates accurately, in new style; but throughout all the other colonial histories, it gives the dates in old style. Why these changes, this want of system, of uniformity, we leave to others to explain as best they can. But let them not judge our common school histories too severely, for we have shown that our large and best histories are equally, if not even more censurable.

It has been observed that Olney and Goodrich date the landing of the Pilgrims Dec. 22d. This is the date which most of our modern writers give, when they attempt to

change the date of this event from old style to new. Holmes, in his *Annals*, vol. i. p. 163, speaking of this event, says, "The 22d of December, new style, *corresponding* to the 11th, old style, has long been observed at Plymouth, and occasionally at Boston, in commemoration of the landing of the Fathers." The 22d of December has indeed long been observed in this manner, yet it can easily be shown that it is not the anniversary of the event which it is designed to commemorate. The true anniversary is the 21st of December, and not the 22d. This may be shown, both by actual computation, and by reference to the decree of Gregory, in 1682. At this date, the revision of the calendar required *ten* days to be struck out for its correction, and as, at the rate of eleven minutes and a fifth per year, it would require an addition of 130 years for the error to amount to an entire day, eleven days should not be struck out until the year 1712. Gregory, however, decided that the change should be made in the year 1700. Ten days, therefore, and not eleven should be struck out in order to change dates from old style to new between the years 1600 and 1700. For 1620 the change can be only ten days. The error of the New England people, and of the historians who have copied it, arose from not reflecting that the decree of Parliament, abating *eleven* days, was inapplicable to events that occurred prior to the year 1700.

3. Having completed our examination of the **ARRANGEMENT** and **ANACHRONISMS** of our several school histories, we shall now proceed to examine their claims to **ACCURACY IN THE STATEMENT OF FACTS**. Under this head, we do not know that we can do better than to point out briefly the errors, whether of ignorance or of carelessness, into which we believe they have fallen, giving at the same time, whenever necessary, our authorities for their correction. We shall quote from all our prominent school histories indiscriminately, arranging the supposed errors according to the dates of the events to which they refer. We commence with the year 1497, the year of the discovery of the North American continent.

Hale, Goodrich, Olney, Webster, Grimshaw, and Mrs. Willard, have adopted an error of early writers in supposing that Newfoundland was the first land discovered by the Cabots in 1497. It is now conceded we believe, by all modern writers of repute, that the land first discovered was the coast of Labrador. See Memoir of Sebastian Cabot, p. 51. Murray's British America (Edinburgh Edition), ii. 277. Also Bancroft, i. p. 9, etc.

In Webster's history, pp. 76-77, it is stated that the Cabots discovered "Prima Vista," supposed to be Newfoundland, in 1494 or 5, and that during the *second* voyage, in 1498, the *first* discovery of the continent was made, June 11th, old style. It is now a well established fact that the Cabots sailed on their first voyage in May, 1497, instead of 1494 or 5, as Webster states, and that they discovered land on the 24th of June, old style, of the same year. See with reference to this supposed voyage, in 1494 or 5, Bozman's Maryland, i. 11, Note, in which the account is shown to be unworthy of credit; see also Appendix 1st, establishing the date of the patent to the Cabots.

Frost, p. 21, says that Cabot discovered the continent June 14. On the contrary, the true date is June 24th, old style, or July 3d, new style. See in Hakluyt, iii. 6, the words of Sebastian Cabot himself, "Die 24 Junii," etc. "Hanc autem appellat terram primum visam." Of course, Cabot dated according to old style.

Mrs. Willard, in giving an account of the expedition of De Soto, who landed in Florida in 1539, states, that after his death "the officer who succeeded him in command lost no time in conducting the poor remains of the army down the Mississippi, *and thence to Cuba.*" The same general statement is made in Goodrich, p. 17, Goodrich's Pict. Hist., p. 22, and Olney, p. 28. The error is probably taken from Belknap's Biography, article De Soto. Belknap inadvertently states that the remnant of the party *embarked for Cuba*, but his authorities state differently. Instead of the statement being true that the party *lost no time* before they

embarked on the Mississippi, they actually spent six summer months in attempting to penetrate to Mexico by land, after which they returned to the Mississippi and there passed the winter ; so that it was *a year and forty days* after the death of De Soto before they embarked on the Mississippi, and then instead of returning to Cuba, as is stated, after leaving the Mississippi they turned to the right, followed the coast and terminated their voyage at the river Panuco, *in Mexico*. The party did not return to Cuba at all. The materials for obtaining a correct knowledge of the facts are sufficiently ample. Besides the original Portuguese and Spanish narrations, which are mostly copied by Herrera, Purchas, Harris, and others, an account of this expedition, given with great minuteness of detail, may be found in Theodore Irving's "Conquest of Florida."

Mrs. Willard, on p. 20 of the Abridgment, enumerates the Cherokees as belonging to the Mobilian family of tribes. But we believe that no other writer has thus classed them. They formed a distinct nation, speaking a language which had no affinity to the Mobilian or Muskogee—Choctaw. See Gallatin's Synopsis in vol. ii. of *Archæologia Americana*, and other works on Indian history.

Frost, p. 51, speaking of Port Royal, says, "It was the oldest Christian settlement in North America, having been founded in 1605." Yet the Spaniards had settlements in Mexico nearly a century previous, and St. Augustine, in Florida, was founded in 1565, thirty-nine years before Port Royal.

Goodrich's Pictorial History says, the design of the Virginia colony which settled at Jamestown, was to settle on Roanoke *river*. On the contrary, they designed to settle on Roanoke Island.

Grimshaw, p. 82, in speaking of the respective claims of the French and the English to American territory, adduces as an argument in favor of the French claim, that Quebec was settled before Jamestown. Yet, on the contrary, Jamestown was settled about fifteen months before Quebec.

Some of our histories state that the master of the Mayflower, having been bribed by the Dutch, intentionally carried the vessel further north than Hudson river, etc. See Hale, p. 28, and Grimshaw, p. 46. These statements are now generally conceded to be erroneous. The New-York historians reject the idea of treachery. See also Bancroft, vol. i. p. 309, who says, "Not by the treachery, but rather by the ignorance and self-will of their captain." See also Gordon's New Jersey, p. 7, who says, "The allegation that the captain was bribed by the Dutch, is not entitled to credence."

Mrs. Willard, p. 38, states that "Weston's colony," which settled at Weymouth, came out in the fall of 1621. Mrs. Willard likewise states that they passed the *winter* with the Plymouth colony, enjoying their hospitality, etc. Both are errors. The colony came out in the summer of 1622, and removed to Weymouth in the autumn of the same year. See Bancroft, vol. i. p. 318, Morton's New England Memorial, p. 79, Baylie's Memoir of Plymouth colony, vol. i. p. 93, Holmes's Annals, p. 177, and Prince's Chronology, p. 204.

Hale, p. 32, Frost, p. 93, and Olney, p. 58, date the banishment of Roger Williams from Massachusetts Bay colony in 1634. Yet the decree of banishment was given in the latter part of 1635, and he did not leave the colony until the beginning of the year 1636. Olney, in a biographical note, p. 71, gives the correct date. Holmes's Annals, vol. i. p. 225, gives the wrong date. See Bancroft, vol. i. p. 377, and Baylie's Memoir of Plymouth Colony, p. 221.

All the common school histories that we have examined, and which give the date, viz. Hale's, Olney's, Goodrich's, Grimshaw's, Frost's, Mrs. Willard's and Goodrich's Pictorial History, date the settlement of Delaware by the Swedes, in 1626 or 7, except Webster, who says between 1630 and 1637. Although the statements found in the first seven of our school histories just mentioned, are such as are given by all early writers on American history, yet later writers have conclusively shown that they are errors, and that the Swed-

ish colony was not planted until 1638, eleven years after the time usually stated. Gordon's *New Jersey*, p. 10, says the common date "is an error, arising from the historian having inferred that a colony had been established immediately after the proposition for forming it had been published in Sweden." Moreover, it is known that the settlement was not made until after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, which occurred in 1632. Gordon's authorities are very satisfactory, but Bancroft, ii. 286, is even more explicit, and removes all doubt about the date. It is surprising that none of our common school histories have made the correction. Mrs. Willard, p. 77, commits a still further error, by stating that the Swedish colony settled on the *east* side of Delaware river, calling the country New Sweden. On the contrary, as is well known, the colony settled on *Christiana Creek*, near Wilmington, in the present state of Delaware. *East* of Delaware river would have been in New Jersey; but it was Delaware, and not New Jersey, that was called New Sweden. Moreover, Mrs. Willard is giving an account of the first settling of Delaware, and her account presents the singular inconsistency that the first settlement in Delaware was made in New Jersey. And to show that the mistake in the location of the colony is not a typographical error, it may be mentioned that the writer soon after speaks of a Dutch colony being planted "on the *west* side of the *same* river." Moreover the chronological table in the large work gives the following items: 1627, Swedes and Fins colonize the *east* side of the Delaware river." For authorities with respect to the Swedish settlement we refer to Gordon's *New Jersey*, p. 9, Gordon's *Pennsylvania*, 15-16, Dunlap's *New York*, i. 50, Bancroft, ii. 281, and other recent histories.

The result of the examination given to eight of our most prominent school histories, shows a list of more than TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY ERRORS;¹ allowing for those that are

¹ Want of room has obliged us to exclude, from this article, the greater portion of the errors enumerated in the manuscript. Ed.

repeated by different writers ; and, of these errors, the most numerous and the most important are found in Mrs. Willard's Abridgment. A large number of those enumerated, consist of errors in dates ; and when it is considered that comparatively few dates are found in most of our school histories, the number we have presented, of this class of errors, must appear surprisingly large. In numerous instances, erroneous dates might with justice have been inferred from the context, and from the order of narration ; but these we have in most cases passed by. In no case have we enumerated, as errors, dates given accurately either in old style or in new. With one exception, that of the Pictorial History of Goodrich, the works reviewed have been before the public from nine and ten to twenty-five years ; during which period abundant time has been allowed the authors and publishers for their correction. One of these works has recently made its appearance as " Revised and enlarged from the *one hundredth* edition ;" in which, however, notwithstanding the *revision*, the old errors have been stereotyped anew. If authors will not take the trouble to correct their own works, how much are they indebted to those who will do the labor for them !

4. We now come to the fourth and last division of our subject, the LITERARY MERITS of our several common school histories. Here we must be brief, and without any remarks on what we regard the appropriate style for different kinds of school-books, and on the importance of always placing in the hands of youth, works both grammatically and rhetorically correct, we shall proceed to notice only such things in our school-histories, as require little comment, and about which we believe there can be no diversity of opinion.

The writers of some of our school histories have not been sufficiently careful to avoid the introduction of language which cannot readily be understood either by teachers or pupils. We give a few examples, without specifying authors.

In a well known and popular school history we have the following account of a naval battle. " In five minutes the

main-top-mast was shot away, and falling down with the *main-top-sail-yard*, across the *larboard fore* and *fore-top-sail yard*, rendered her *head yards* unmanageable during the rest of the action. In two minutes more, her *gaff* and *mizzen-top-gallant-mast* were shot away." The author has here incorporated part of the official account of a naval battle, into a school book designed for the reading of children. Although, doubtless, sufficiently intelligible to a seaman, few of the pupils in our schools could understand it. And why fill their heads with sounds without meaning?

From another work we quote the following. "Talleyrand demanded a *douceur* of 250,000 dollars for himself," etc. "A *quo warranto* was issued against the company of Massachusetts Bay," etc. "The French Chargé d'Affaires at the Hague," etc. "The number placed *hors du combat* was four hundred and fifty." Why not say in these cases Talleyrand demanded a present, gift or bribe, etc.; a writ of inquiry, or *an order was issued; the number disabled or wounded*, etc.; the French minister at the Hague?—for these terms would have been intelligible to all.

We do not say that these things are characteristic of any of our school histories, but we believe that Hale's history is the only one that is entirely free from unexceptionable expressions. The language of Hale, although generally censured as being tame and spiritless, we believe to be far superior to that of any school history yet published.

Mrs. Willard's history has received the highest commendations both for its accuracy and its high literary merits. Of the character of its claims to accuracy, we have given abundant examples. Its claims to literary excellence, we shall now proceed to examine with that brevity which the space already occupied by our extended review demands.

In the following sentence, on p. 17, the figurative and the literal are so combined as to render not only the rhetoric but the grammar also faulty. "Of these *branches* of the Delaware or the Algonquin race, the first *who figure* in the early history of our nation were the *Powhatans*." This analyzed

gives the following. The first *branches who figure* were the *Powhatan Indians*. The relative *who* here refers to *branches*; *branches* are said to *figure*; and then we are told these *branches* are certain Indians.

This is exceedingly awkward: "The authorities of Hull in the meantime *got notice*; and the Dutch commander, at the sight of a large armed company, having a fair wind, with oaths, hoisted anchor, and sailed away." p. 52.

The following are obscure and inelegant, owing to the frequent repetition of the pronoun, and the frequent transition from one person to another. "Miantonomoh sought the life of Uncas, because *he* was aware that *he* could not make *him* unite in a conspiracy which *he* was exciting against the whites. A Pequod whom *he* hired, wounded the Mohegan chief, and then fled to *him* for protection. *He* refused to surrender the assassin but dispatched *him* with his own hand." p. 101. Again, "They set fire to Charlestown. The Americans await their approach in silence until they are within ten rods of the redoubt. Then taking a steady aim they pour upon them a deadly fire. They are thrown into confusion and many of their officers fall. They are twice repulsed. Clinton now arrives and they again rally," etc. p. 197. On page 198 we have the following language relating to those accused of witchcraft. "The unhappy persons were confronted with those who accused them, and asked 'Why do you afflict those children?' *If answered, I* do not afflict *them*, *they* commanded *them* to look upon the children, at which *they* would fall into fits, and then declare *they* were thus troubled by the persons apprehended." After supplying a very awkward ellipsis we will construe this sentence. If *they* (the accused, in the plural form) answered *I* (singular form) do not afflict *them* (the children), *they* (the judges) commanded *them* (the accused) to look upon the children, at which *they* (the children) would fall into fits," etc.

Of the numerous examples of faulty construction we select the following: "By means of his acquaintance with the Narragansetts, Williams learned that a conspiracy was form-

ing to cut off the English, headed by Sassacus, the powerful chief of the Pequods." p. 67. The construction here implies that the *English* were headed by Sassacus.

"They reached through many discouragements, by disaster, treachery and climate, the great Illinois." p. 119. The construction and the punctuation of this sentence express the meaning that the *means used* in order to reach the Illinois were disaster, treachery, and climate; whereas, the meaning intended was, that there were discouragements by disaster, treachery, and climate. The sentence should have been expressed thus. Through many discouragements by disaster, treachery, and climate, they reached the great Illinois.

"To survey the estates of Lord Faifax, then residing in Virginia, he first began his career of active life." p. 154. This states that he first began his career of active life *in order to* survey the estates of Lord Fairfax. On the contrary he began by surveying, etc. The adverb *first* is superfluous. *He began*, is sufficient.

"He then revealed a conspiracy which the Indians had formed and requested him to join." p. 60. By the construction, the verb *requested* is in the imperfect tense, having for its subject the pronoun *he* understood; whereas, the meaning intended requires it to be in the pluperfect tense agreeing with Indians.

"New Plymouth now began to flourish. For the land being divided, each man labored for himself and his family. *Their* government was a pure democracy." p. 60. In this extract there is nothing to which the pronoun *their* can refer. Instead of *their government*, it should have read *the government of the colony*. On pages 176 and 183 may be found examples in which the construction requires a meaning different from that intended.

"Yet they never repined *or* repented of the step they had taken." p. 58. *Never* should have been followed by *nor*. *Or* gives an antithesis of sentiment not intended, and renders the latter part of the phrase an affirmative declaration.

“They saw neither sun moon *or* stars.” p. 52. Again, “They neither ate, slept *or* labored, *or* even worshipped God in the sanctuary without arms and ammunition at hand.” p. 72. *Neither* should always be followed by *nor* ; *either* by *or*.

Speaking of an error of sentiment and feeling which the Puritans indulged, the writer says, p. 114, “This produced uncharitableness towards others, and the bad effects of the religious sentiment perverted.” We suppose the writer designed to speak of a perversion of religious sentiment.

The following requires no comment. “We have already mentioned Colonel John Washington. Lawrence Washington was *his* son ; Augustus Washington *his*” p. 153.

“He gave them their choice, to labor *for* six hours a day or have nothing to eat.” p. 42. The unnecessary introduction of the word *for* here conveys an idea of *price* which was not intended. The following is somewhat objectionable for a similar reason. “East Jersey, the property of Carteret, being exposed to sale, Penn purchased it for twelve Quakers.”

We give a few examples of the wrong use of words. Speaking of the claims which the Dutch made to the country bordering on the Connecticut river, the writer says, p. 47, “The court of England *disowned* those claims,” meaning, probably, that the court of England denied the justness of the claims of the Dutch. The meaning of *disown* is *not to admit as one's own*. One person cannot *disown* the claims of another.

Again : “The Indian chief freely gave land to Williams whose *neighborhood* he now coveted.” p. 67. *Neighborhood* signifies either a community of neighbors or the place they occupy, and the word cannot be appropriately applied to proximity of person.

Again : “The governor left the province, and Leisler *assumed to administer* the government.” To *assume to do* a thing is an impropriety of speech. Again : “The son of Pocahontas survived and reared an offspring *which is per-*

petuated in some of the best families of Virginia," p. 45. Surely that identical offspring could not have been perpetuated! Characters, principles, races, etc., may be perpetuated, but that persons may be perpetuated is a new thing in philosophy.

We select a few examples which show an occasional lowering of the style unbecoming the dignity of a historian.

"At last a few followers having joined him, he *fixed* at Seekonk, since Rehoboth, within the limits of the Plymouth colony," p. 67. "Afterwards they changed their location and *fixcd* where Albany now stands." p. 92. "Soon after this Zeisberger led a party who *fixed* for a time on the Alleghany river," etc. etc. p. 260. "They gave notice that Massasoit, the Sachem of the Pokanokets was *hard by*." "The *high manner of* Vane, his profound religious feeling, and his great knowledge so *wrought* in his favor," etc. p. 65. "This would naturally *breed* quarrels and bloodshed." p. 15.

We close by noticing a few strictly ungrammatical phrases.

"He therefore sent out two ships *laden* with conscientious Huguenots." p. 27. (There is no such participle as *laden*.)

"The natives were as *kindly* as their climate and soil," p. 34.

"The admiral, with Sir Thomas Gates and Sir George Somers, *were empowered* to govern the colony until his arrival." p. 43. (That is, *the admiral were empowered*.)

"Before spring, half of their number, among whom *was* the governor and his wife," etc. p. 58.

"The whole settlement, thus constantly excited, *were* in the feverish condition of intense and continual fear," p. 72.

"Fear and terror *was* on every side." p. 124. "Every *one* of Dade's army *were killed* on the fatal field." p. 322.

"If force *was employed* against them, they would repel it by force." p. 176.

"A large *quantity* of ammunition and stores *were deposited* at Concord." p. 193.

We add, from the questions, a few examples of the use of the wrong case of the pronoun.

“ *Who* did he send as leader of the colony ?” p. 26.

“ *Who* did the Plymouth company send out ?” p. 37.

“ What did the proprietors obtain ?—*Who* make governor ?” p. 63.

“ *Who* did he send to take the country ?” p. 95.

“ *Who* did he send over as governor-general ?” p. 110.

“ *Who* did king William send over in 1790 ?” p. 122.

“ *Who* did Fletcher succeed ?” p. 133.

“ *Who* did Queen Anne make governor ?” p. 134.

“ *Who* did Sir Henry Clinton authorize ?” etc. p. 238.

“ *Who* did they make treasurer ?” p. 241, etc. etc.

We might have made a much larger collection of similar examples. Those we have selected are taken exclusively from the common school edition of Mrs. Willard's works, although we notice, generally, the same, and even more numerous errors in the larger history, called the library edition. We ought, perhaps, here to remark, that Mrs. Willard's history is not a recent work, as many suppose ; and that the sentences we have selected have not, therefore, gone forth in haste from the hands of the writer, without sufficient time for their revision. The original work, if we mistake not, was published more than fifteen years ago ; but in the changes through which it has passed, to its present *improved form*, well may we ask, where are the corrections ?

In our remarks, we trust we have not gone beyond the legitimate province of the reviewer ; we have spoken of works, now the property of the public, with that freedom which we believed the subject demanded ; and should the cause of education gain any thing by our efforts, we shall deem ourselves most amply rewarded.

ARTICLE VIII.

DOMINICI DIODATI I. C. NEAPOLITANI, DE CHRISTO GRÆCE
LOQUENTE EXERCITATIO.

Translated by Rev. O. T. DOBBIN, LL. D., of Western Independent College, Exeter, England.

Continued from page 366, Vol. I.

PART III.—*Answers to the positions and objections of those
who advocate other views.*

As we have now, we conceive, more than demonstrated our assertion that the Jews, from the time of the Maccabees, and that the Lord Christ used the Hellenistic tongue, it now only remains that we weigh the opinions of others on this point. The remainder of our plan, then, engages us in the double task of canvassing and refuting the various theories of our opponents, and of meeting the objections which the patrons of these theories urge against our own hypothesis.

CHAPTER I.—*The various opinions concerning the language
of Christ are described and refuted.*

There are three opinions upon this subject. Of these the first is, that Christ spoke Hebrew, which has met with but a small share of public approbation. The second is, that he used the Latin tongue. This is confined to but one or two.

The third, and the most commonly received is, that he spoke the Chaldee or Syriac. These we shall refute in order. But pardon, gentle reader, the preliminary observation, that we speak here of the language *naturally spoken* by Christ, or which is the same thing, of that which prevailed in Judea during the period of his life. For, apart from this question, who will deny that he knew all languages? The mere accident of his using a Chaldee or Hebrew word occasionally does not, by any means, of necessity imply that he commonly spoke these tongues, or that either was his vernacular language. Far from it. To our purpose however.

§ 1. *The Hebrew tongue was neither vernacular to Christ nor to the Jews of his day.*

Some suppose that Christ spoke Hebrew, on the ground that that language was more sacred than any other : just as if sacredness could characterize the tones and modulation of a tongue. Otho Sperling¹ was of this opinion, together with a few others to whom the Sacred History must have been very imperfectly known. The great body of the learned teach us that this language ceased to be vernacular after the Babylonish captivity. In the reign of Jehoiachim, the Chaldeans came up against Judea and inflicted the direst cruelties upon the inhabitants : many were slain ; and of those who survived, the greater part was carried captive to Babylon.² There they were constrained to learn and use the language of their captors ; and thus they gradually forgot their own during the course of seventy years. Their dispersion amongst the Chaldeans, and their intermarriages with the women of the country, would aid in producing this effect, as all the children of such connections would speak only the language of the native Chaldeans. It is natural also to believe, that the elder members of the Jewish community must have died off during this long period, while the juniors, born and brought up among the Chaldeans, would be ignorant of the Hebrew tongue, and use only the dialect of the country with which they were familiar from childhood. From all this it would readily happen that, when the Hebrews returned to the land of their fathers, they could not understand the language of their fathers. Nehemiah tells us that, when the book of the law was read in Hebrew in the temple, the people wept because they could not understand it, and when Ezra interpreted the divine statutes in Chaldee they were affected with the liveliest joy. Hence it came to pass that, after the return of Ezra, the law

¹ Sperlingius de Num. non cuspis, cap. 18, p. 110.

² Jerem. cap. 25 ; lib. 2 Paralip. cap. 36.

³ V. Nehemiam, cap. 8, et Interpr. ibi.

was translated into Chaldee for the benefit of the people, because they had forgotten the Hebrew during the captivity, as the Rabbis Azariah and Gedaliah,¹ with others, inform us. Hence, too, originated the composition of the Books of Daniel, Nehemiah and Ezra, in Chaldee rather than in Hebrew. Hence, too, the use of the Chaldean era in chronological computation,² as we find it adopted by Daniel³ and others.⁴ Moreover, while the Jews were in slavery they adopted the Chaldee instead of the Hebrew characters, for those we now call Hebrew are really Chaldee, the older Hebrew having been what we now designate Samaritan. How can it be, then, with the least appearance of likelihood, that that language which had so long ceased to be spoken should yet, in the time of Christ, be the vernacular tongue of the Jews? The supposition is manifestly absurd. Let us now look at another hypothesis.

§ 2. *Hardouin's opinion laid open and confuted.*

John Hardouin, a man of distinguished genius and wonderful learning, at the close of his commentaries on the New Testament, says, that the Latin Language was familiar to our Lord and to the Jewish people. "Ever since," he says, the Romans obtained the supreme power in Judea and Jerusalem, after the establishment of Herod the Great, but especially after the death of Archelaus, when the prætors or procurators were sent thither by the emperors, the Latin language was used every where by the people on account of their necessary intercourse with the Romans. The Jews of Jerusalem, therefore, spoke Latin with the Romans, just as much as the inhabitants of Avignon French, those of Rome Italian, those of Germany German, and those of England English." In this citation I have exposed, not the grave sentiment of a

¹ R. Azarias et R. Gedalias, citati in p. 75.

² Ut in lib. 4 Reg. cap. 1, v. 17, cap. 3, v. 1, etc.

³ Vide Danielelem, cap. 2, v. 1.

⁴ Esdras, cap. 1, v. 1; Nehemias, cap. 5, v. 14.

philosopher, but the phantasy of a lover of paradox (τοῦ παραδοξοράτου). The volume in which such absurdities are broached can claim no milder name for its author or his work, and so far as I have learned has not yet secured the suffrage of a single intelligent mind.¹ That this hypothesis is utterly unworthy a man of sense and erudition, will at once appear upon consideration. It is true, indeed, as we expressed it in the beginning of this essay, “that the languages of conquered nations have frequently given place to those of their conquerors.” Yet the case of Judea, when invaded by the Romans, forms a notable exception to that axiom. Twice before the birth of Christ had that warlike people made incursions into Judea and taken possession of the holy city. The first occasion was in the year B. C. 59, under Cneius Pompey, who reduced the Jews to subjection.² Previous to this, and during the Maccabaite period, the Jews had been in alliance with the Romans,³ but even when Pompey invaded them, the object of the Roman General was not so much to hold the country, as to settle the disputes between Aristobulus and Hyrcanus about the succession. Jerusalem being taken and the temple entered, Pompey took nothing therefrom, believing that the people would be more easily attached to him by kindness than kept down by fear, for which he is commended by Cicero⁴ and Josephus.⁵ He ordered that the temple should be purified and sacrifice presented; and having restored Hyrcanus to the pontificate, departed.⁶

The second time was in the year B. C. 33, when Sosius went to Jerusalem, by order of Antony, to assist Herod in

[¹ Ineptum sane libellum super eodem argumento nuperrime scripsit M. Molkenbuhr, cui titulum fecit: *Problema Criticum, Sacra Scriptura Novi Testamenti in quo idiomate originaliter ab apostolis edita fuit?* Paderbornæ, 1822. Qui totam hanc rem ex vero dijudicare vult consultum eat A. J. Binterim, *Pro-pempticum ad Problema Criticum.* Moguntiæ, 1822.—Ed.]

² Tacitus, lib. 5 *Historiarum*, cap. 9.

³ Lib. 1 *Mach.* cap. 8, 12, et 14.

⁴ Cicero, *Orat. pro Flacco*, cap. 28.

⁵ Joseph. de *Bello*, lib. 1, cap. 7, p. 67 ad 69.

⁶ Id. *ibidem*, cap. 6 et 7, p. 65 ad 69.

obtaining the kingdom. When the city was taken on this occasion, Herod repressed the license of the soldiery, and forbade them not only to enter the temple, but even to plunder the private dwellings in accordance with the usages of war. Wherefore Sosius, after he had dedicated a golden crown to Jehovah, left Jerusalem and the neighboring region unpillaged in the hands of the new king.¹

But we do not read of either Pompey or Sosius leaving Roman colonies in Judea, or changing the religious rites of the country, or introducing any new observances whatsoever. On the contrary, we have many Roman decrees in which great respect is paid to the Jews, and they are allowed to retain the religion of their country, and profess it without molestation in every quarter of the world, as may be fully seen in Josephus.²

Besides, the soldiers led by Pompey³ and Sosius⁴ into the country were not Romans, but in the greater part Syrians. We know, indeed, that in the 9th year of Christ the land of Judea was reduced to the condition of a Roman province. Yet, not even then did any thing occur to change the language of the natives, for the Roman troops left to garrison the country would be always few in number, as the soldiers were perpetually drafted off from Judea to the eastern wars. Even the Roman army at the downfall of Jerusalem, if you except a few legions, was raised entirely from Syria, Arabia, Ascalon and Cæsarea.⁵ Such was the tenure by which the Romans held Judea. Who then can believe that two short invasions of Palestine by the Romans, before Christ, and the tenure of the country by so few troops after his birth, could introduce, to any considerable extent, the Latin tongue?

¹ Idem, lib. 1 de Bel. cap. 18, p. 98, 99.

² Idem in Antiquit. lib. 14, cap. 10.

³ Idem de Bello, lib. 1, cap. 7, § 5, p. 66.

⁴ Idem in Antiq. lib. 14, cap. 15, § 10, p. 734.

⁵ Idem de Bello, lib. 5, cap. 1, § 5, et alibi. Tacitus, libro 5 Historiarum, cap. 1.

Nor does history alone oppose Hardouin, but the very coins of that period which have been handed down to us, and are copied by our author himself in his work, *De Numis Herodiadum*. These coins are found to bear not Latin, but Greek inscriptions. Besides, the cities which were newly built in Palestine and named in honor of distinguished Romans, received Greek appellations; for instance Σεβαστή in honor of Augustus, Λιβίας in honor of Livia, Δρουσος of Drusus, and Τιβεργιάς of Tiberius.

I cannot then conceive why Hardouin should say that the Latin language was, at that period, as common in Judea as French at Avignon, Italian at Rome, and German in Germany, for there is unquestionable evidence to prove that, at that period, Greek was the more widely prevailing language. We appeal no further than to the testimony of Cicero, who in his speech for Archias says: *Græca leguntur omnibus fere gentibus; Latina suis finibus exiguis sane continentur*. This hypothesis, therefore, may be regarded as exploded, and may be numbered among the paradoxes of Hardouin.

§ 3. *Neither the Chaldee nor Syriac was vernacular to Christ and to the Jews of his day.*

We now come to consider the opinions of those, who represent Christ as speaking Chaldee or Syriac. John Albert Widmanstadt, Jurisconsult and Senator, who first edited the New Testament in Europe in the Syriac language, in his dedication of that work to the Emperor Ferdinand, contends that the Chaldee or Syriac idiom, which the Hebrews learned during the Babylonian captivity, continued in use in Judea down to the time of Christ: consequently that our Lord, the blessed Virgin, the Apostles, and all the Jews besides, spoke Chaldee. George Amira Edeniensis² of Lebanon adopts the same strain, in the preface to his Syriac Grammar. Arias

¹ Cicero orat. pro Archia, cap. 10, n. 23.

² Amira in Præl. Gram. Syr. de Ling. Syr. Dignit.

Montanus,¹ Maldonati,² Walton,³ Saumaise,⁴ Grotius,⁵ Huet,⁶ Richard Simon,⁷ Breeword,⁸ Calmet,⁹ and very many others subscribe, in general terms, to this opinion, although they differ among themselves as to the particular dialect. Widmanstadt and Amira, for instance, will have it that Christ used the dialect in which the Syrian New Testament is written, the dialect we call the Syriac. Others, on the contrary, contend for the Chaldee, in which the paraphrases of Onkelos and Jonathan are composed. Both these opinions come to the same thing: for either dialect ranges itself under the general name of the Chaldee.

But I wonder that men acquainted with antiquity have not paid more regard to the frequent changes that passed over Judea during the dominion of the Greeks, of which we have spoken with such fulness in the earlier portion of this essay. Thus, though it be true, that the Hebrews when they returned from Babylon brought the Chaldee tongue with them, yet it is equally true that this did not continue in use till the time of Christ, but only during the four generations that immediately succeeded their return, so that in the age of the Maccabees it was extant no longer, having given place to Hellenism. And the very arguments upon which my opponents rely, when they maintain that the Hebrews in captivity adopted the Chaldee and gave up the Hebrew, I myself rely upon to show that the Jews under the dominion of the Greeks rejected the Chaldee and embraced the Greek. If my opponents triumphantly allege that the Jews were seventy years under the yoke of the Chaldeans, I aver that the same nation

¹ Montanus Adm. ad. Lect. de Syriac. N. T. libris.

² Maldonatus ad Matth. cap. 27, v. 46,

³ Waltonus in Prolegom. 13, § 5.

⁴ Salmasius in Fun. Ling. Hellen. p. 42 et alibi.

⁵ Grotius, Com. in Matth. 27, 46, Marc. 15, 34.

⁶ Huetius in Demons. Evang. prop. 4, c. 13.

⁷ Simonius, Hist. Critiq. du N. T. p. 60 ad 70.

⁸ Breewordus, de Ling. et Relig. cap. 10.

⁹ Calmet. Com. ad Matth. cap. 27, v. 46.

was one hundred and ninety years and upwards under the sway of the Greeks. If, when the Hebrews were carried away eastward, Judea was justly said to be made a widow by the Gentiles,¹ under the Greek empire not only were multitudes of the Jews transported into Greek cities, and restored to their own land only after a very long period when they spoke Greek, but the entire country was so covered with Grecian colonies, that it might be truly called a habitation of strangers, as it is in First Maccabees: "And it was made a habitation of strangers."² Moreover, if in Babylon the Jews were compelled to speak Chaldee and disused their own tongue, in like manner, whatever Jew would not receive Hellenism at the bidding of the Greeks, and renounce his country's institutes and language, was exposed to the heaviest penalties, not excepting death itself.

But both in the shape of fact and argument I can allege much more than my opponents in dealing with the argument in hand. For the Jews of their own accord were prone to Hellenism. The proof is obvious. They willingly gave themselves up to the dictation of the Greeks,³ and purchased at a high rate the privilege of establishing the Grecian games at Jerusalem. But that I may not repeat what I have advanced in detail under the second chapter of the first part, hear the testimony of the author of Second Maccabees: "And deeming their country's honors of no account, they regarded the Grecian glories as those of chief esteem."⁴

If, then, according to the representation of my opponents, the Chaldean bondage imbued their speech with a Chaldean tinge and effaced the Hebrew, much more did their Grecian bondage obliterate their Chaldean idiom and place the Greek in its stead. We must, however, give ourselves a little more closely to the proof of our position, that in the time of Christ the Jews no longer spoke Chaldee.

¹ Vide Jerem. Thren. cap. 1, v. 1.

² Lib. 1 Mach. cap. 1, v. 40.

³ Lib. 1 Mach. cap. 1, v. 12 et seq.

⁴ Lib. 2 Mach. cap. 4, v. 15 et seq.

While Christ was hanging upon the cross he called upon his Father in the words of Psalm xxii: *אֱלִי אֱלִי לָמָּה שְׁבַקְתָּנִי* Eli Eli lamma sabactani; "My God, My God, to what hast thou left me?" These words are pure Chaldee, as is known to the merest tyro in the oriental tongues; the more evidently so as they agree with the Chaldee paraphrase of Onkelos and Jonathan. And our opponents Vatablus, Grotius, Drusius, Munsterus, Zegerus,¹ Scaliger,² Walton³ and others, inform us that Christ uttered this complaint in the tongue that was then vulgarly known and used among the Jews. Well: how will this tally with the fact that the Jews who stood by the Cross, so far from understanding the Chaldee words, misled by the similarity of sound, conceived the sufferer to have called upon Elias? "Wherefore they wondered among themselves and said, He calls upon Elias; but others said, Hold, let us see if Elias will come to release him."⁴

So much for the Jews understanding Chaldee! Who can believe that they used that language commonly, when of this dying plaint in Chaldee they comprehended not a word? But my antagonists, fully feeling the force of this consideration, how it smites their opinions to the ground with a stroke, seek to evade its force by a thousand devices. Let us note their evasions that we may refute them one by one.

And in the first place, John Maldonatus, Cornelius a Lapide, Augustin Calmet,⁵ and others, inform us that they were Roman soldiers, who supposed Christ to have invoked Elias, from their ignorance of Chaldee. They support this opinion by alleging that he who, in Matthew and Mark,⁶ conceived Christ to have called upon Elias and gave him to drink, is proved by the records of John and Luke⁷ to have been

¹ Omnes in Comm. ad Matth. cap. 27, v. 47.

² Joseph Scaliger, Epist. 449, lib. 4.

³ Walton. Proleg. 13, § 5.

⁴ Matth. cap. 27, v. 47 ad 49.

⁵ In Com. ad Matth. cap. 27, v. 47.

⁶ Matth. ib. Marc. cap. 15, v. 35, 36.

⁷ Luc. cap. 23, v. 36; Joan Ev. cap. 19, v. 23, 29.

one of the Roman guards. But this interpretation of the affair seems to me unworthy the reputation of these distinguished men ; for what did the Romans or other Gentiles know of Elias ? It is notorious that the Jews allowed themselves in no social intercourse with strangers, and that their sacred books were guarded from communication with jealous care. Hence it came that the history of this singular nation was unknown to Gentile authors, a fact sufficiently proved by not one of them writing upon it or even remotely alluding to it. I except from this, of course, Demetrius Phalereus, the Pseudo-Aristeas, Flavius Josephus, Apollonius Molon, Lysimachus, and others, and confine my assertion to the Romans. Not one of these last knew any thing of the prophets or history of the Jews. Although Trogus Pompeius bestowed long research upon the subject, he gained nothing by his pains, through the reluctance of the Jews to communicate the information he required. The fact he accounts for thus : “ They were chary of much communication with foreigners ; which practice, originating in special reasons, afterwards became a habit and a religious scruple with them.”¹

Thus, when Peter went to the house of Cornelius the Centurion, as he found a number of Romans assembled, he said : “ Ye know how that it is unlawful for a Jew to associate closely with or enter the house of a foreigner.”² And the Apostles, when they heard that Peter had gone into the house of a Roman, inquired of him, “ Wherefore didst thou go in unto one uncircumcised and eat with him ?” To whom Peter made answer, that he did it by the command of an Angel.³ But could not Martial, it may be asked, and Tacitus, have arrived at an accurate knowledge of Jewish affairs ? Most certainly they might have done so, for great numbers of Jews were living at Rome in their day ; but they as certainly did not, for when they even touch in the lightest manner

¹ Apud Justinum, lib. 36, cap. 2.

² Act. Apost. cap. 10. v. 28, et cap. 11.

³ V. Math. 9, v. 11, 12 ; Joan. 18, v. 28 ; Galat. 2, v. 12.

upon the Sacred History, they strangely disfigure it with fiction. This circumstance has given rise to an exercitation by Christianus Wormius, "*De corruptis Antiquitatum Hebræorum apud Tacitum et Martialem Vestigiis*," and to another by George Kasper Kirchmayer, "*Ad C. C. Taciti Historiam libri quinque de Rebus, moribusque Judæorum*."¹ As a specimen of the absurdities of the Roman historian, let the following appear: "It is recorded of the Jews," he says, "that, banished from the island of Crete, they settled upon the nearest portion of the Lybian continent, about the period when Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter. Their name enables us to trace their origin; inhabiting the famous mountain Ida, they got the name of Idæans, and this, by a slight barbarian increment, became Judeans."² This naturally provokes a smile, but if the learned historian was so ill informed, can we believe that the Roman soldiers at the cross were so acquainted with the Jewish annals as to know correctly who Jonas, Habakkuk, Micah and Elias were? Nor in point of fact do the Evangelists make the case quite clear in favor of Maldonatus, who will have it that John and Luke declare him to be a Roman who, according to Matthew and Mark, tendered the vinegar to Christ. The attentive reader will perceive that the persons of whom the Evangelists respectively speak are different. Besides, neither Luke nor John specifies them to be *Roman* soldiers who gave the vinegar to Christ, but both, in general terms, speak of *soldiers* as the executioners of the Lord, the terms employed meanwhile in the Gospels and the Acts, evidently implying that they were Jews after all.³ It is then ridiculous beyond measure, so to narrow the sense of the word soldiers, in this narrative, as to confine it to Roman soldiers alone, just as though in the world there were no other soldiers but these. But in fine, the very Jews themselves remove all doubt upon the point by

¹ Uterque exstat apud Ugolinum in Thes. Ant. Hebr. t. 11.

² Tacitus, Libr. 5 Historiarum, cap. 2.

³ Joan cap. 19, v. 14 ad 18; Act. Apost. cap. 2, v. 36; 4, 10.

informing us that it was their custom to give vinegar to crucified persons to refresh them amid their agonies :¹ for which we must refer our readers to Grotius,² Casaubon,³ Gallonius,⁴ John Gerard Vos⁵ and others. They were not then Romans who tendered the vinegar to Christ, nor consequently those who believed him to call upon Elias.

The correctness of this conclusion Grotius evidently perceived, for in his commentaries on the passage he says : “ These, I conceive, were not Roman soldiers to whom nothing was known about Elias, nor yet Palestinian Jews ; but Hellenists, who, not understanding the Hebrew words, supposed they caught in the sounds uttered the familiar name of Elias.” This is the explanation adopted by John Gerard Vos,⁶ and very inconsistently by Calmet on Mark xv. 35, who overlooked what he had committed himself to in his comment on Matthew xxvii. 46. Grotius is right in the principal point, but I much doubt whether what he subjoins upon the Hellenists can stand. Whom does he mean by Hellenists ? Grotius, following Heinsius, supposes they were the Greek Jews accustomed to the use of a Hebrew phraseology and living beyond the bounds of Judea. This opinion, however, has been amply refuted both by Salmasius, and by ourselves in our Excursus on the subject, in which we have shown that they were none other than Greek inhabitants of Judea, or the children of such born in the country, observing the heathen religion, but speaking the language current among the Jews. But whomsoever you may style Hellenists, whether Greeks, or Heathens, or foreign Jews, by no one testimony or argument has Grotius proved that it was this particular designa-

¹ V. Talmud. tract. Sanhedrin, cap. 6, fol. 43.

² Grotius, Com. ad Matth. cap. 27, v. 34.

³ Casaubonus, Exercit. ad Baronium 16, cap. 16.

⁴ Gallonius de SS. Martyrum Cruciatibus. [Gallonio, Antonio, Trattato degli Instrumenti di Martirio e delle varie maniere di Martirizzare, etc. Romæ, 4to. 1591.—Ed.]

⁵ Vossius, lib. 2 Harmon. Evang. cap. 9, § 16.

⁶ Jo. Ger. Vossius, lib. 2 Harm. Evang. cap. 8, § 21.

tion of persons who mistook the invocation of Christ upon the tree. On the other hand, the Gospels clearly show that it was either the inhabitants of Jerusalem themselves, or at least natives of Judea, who said, He calls upon Elias. Hear Matthew : “ But certain who stood there and heard, said, He calls Elias ; and straightway one of them ran and filled his sponge with vinegar and put it upon a reed and gave him to drink. But others said, Hold, let us see whether Elias will come to release him.”¹ This bitter mockery bespoke the most cruel hatred of Jesus ; a feeling that could not possibly have place in the breasts of Romans or heathens, or in short of any foreigners having no acquaintance with Jesus, and unaffected in their fortunes by his life or death. But the Hierosolymite Jews, we know for certain, were stirred up by the chief of that nation to clamor for his death, and raised in consequence the impiouscries : “ Away with him, and release to us Barabbas ;”² “ Crucify him ;”³ “ Ah, thou that destroyest the temple of God and in three days raisest it again, save thyself ; if thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross !”⁴ All this manifestly proves that it was the Jerusalem Jews who put the interpretation on the words of Christ, that he called upon Elias. This harmonizes with the frequent reproaches cast upon them for their ingratitude, in the course of the Evangelical history : whereas of the foreign Jews or the Heathen no such reproachful representations are made by our Lord. Nay, Christ had frequent intercourse with the Heathen, according to Tertullian,⁵ and sometimes emphatically commended their faith, as he did that of the Centurion, professing that he had not found such faith even in Israel.⁶ The conjecture of Grotius, then, in regard to the Hellenists, may be fairly deemed exploded. But others, while they acknowledge the futility of his supposition, and coincide with us

¹ Matth. 27, v. 47 ad 49.

² Luc. 23, v. 18.

³ Luc. ib. v. 21.

⁴ Matth. 27, v. 40.

⁵ Tertullianus, lib. de Pudic. cap. 9, p. 561, ed. Paris.

⁶ Matth. cap. 8, v. 10 ; 11, v. 11, 12.

that they were Jews who said, He calleth Elias, yet add that they said this, not through misunderstanding the Chaldee, but out of mere malicious wantonness, making the similarity of sounds between Eli and Elias an occasion to mock the dying man. This is the opinion of Lucas Brugensis,¹ whom Lightfoot follows.² But to all such we reply that, if these Jews really understood Eli to signify the name of God, they would never have dared to make it the ground of an unfeeling joke and an occasion of insolent contumely. It is well known that no people was ever more scrupulous than the Jewish on this head, nor any more reverent in the use of the divine name. God himself has proclaimed himself to be exceeding jealous over it: "Ye may not pollute my holy name, that I be sanctified in the midst of the sons of Israel."³ In Deuteronomy also to the like effect: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain, for the Lord will not hold him guiltless who taketh his name in vain."⁴ The law is repeated in Exodus,⁵ Ezekiel⁶ and elsewhere. Whosoever, then, in violation of that law, sinned by abusing that name, or taking it in vain, or making it the subject of a profane jest, whether he were Jew or foreigner, was stoned to death.⁷ So extreme was their scrupulosity in this regard after the Babylonish captivity, that the Jews with superstitious zeal refrained from pronouncing the word יהוה, which means God, substituting for it אדוני, which signifies my Lord. Whenever, therefore, in reading the Sacred Text, they met with the name Jehovah, they pronounced Adonai, lest that most solemn name of Deity should grow cheap among them from daily use, and be liable to be taken in vain from being often upon their lips.⁸ Even the false Gods of the Gentiles, I may add,

¹ Brugensis, in Com. ad Mat. cap. 27, v. 47.

² Lightfoot, in Armon. Evang. § 86, p. 57, col. 2, tom. 2.

³ Levit. 22, v. 32.

⁴ Deuter. cap. 5, v. 11.

⁵ Exod. cap. 20, v. 7.

⁶ Ezech, cap. 20, v. 14.

⁷ V. Selden. de J. N. lib. 2, cap. 11, 12, 13, tom. 1, p. 261.

⁸ V. Calmet. Com. ad Judith, cap. 16, v. 16, Buxtorfium in Lexico Hebraico, voce יהוה.

they did not dare to blaspheme and mock, this being forbidden under heavy penalties according to Josephus ; *Βλασφημοῖτο δὲ μεδείς θεοῦς, οὓς πόλεις ἄλλαι νομίζουσι*, "Let no one revile the gods which other cities regard as such."¹ Neither did they swear by false gods, a practice forbidden in the Book of Exodus.² They refrained from reviling the gods of the Heathen for these two reasons. The first, *Λιγὴς ἔνακα προσηγορίας τοῦ Θεοῦ*, Because the name of God was called upon them.³ The second, lest, in the words of Philo, *οὓς ἕτεροι νομίζουσι θεοῦς εἶναι, μὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ διακηθέντες ἂ μὴ θάμιν φθέγγωνται κατὰ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος*, if they took this liberty with those whom others considered to be gods, they in turn should be excited to pour forth blasphemies against the true God.⁴ According to the same author, their scrupulousness upon this head almost exceeds belief.

Who, in the presence of such statements as these, can conceive that these persons would dare to abuse the word *Eli*, and make it the burden of a jest? It must be conceded, then, from the foregoing facts and reasonings, that those who supposed Elias to be invoked were Palestinian Jews, and that they were prompted not by a derisive spirit, but by mere ignorance of the Chaldee tongue ; and misled by the similarity of the words *Eli* and *Elias*.

Hence, in the time of Christ, you find no author in all Judea who wrote in the Chaldee or Syriac tongues ; no longer were the Chaldee Scriptures read ; and no longer did the nation use the Chaldee names and moneys of which Daniel and Nehemiah make mention. On the contrary, all wrote in the Greek language, read the Sacred Volume in Greek even in their Synagogues, assumed Greek names, and circulated a Greek coinage, as has been stated at length in a preceding chapter. In fine, to use the words of Voss : "*Vel unum sal-*

¹ Joseph. Antiq. lib. 4, cap. 8, § 10, p. 230.

² Exodus, in cap. 23, ver. 13.

³ Joseph. lib. 2, cont. Apion, § 34, p. 490.

⁴ Philo Jud. lib. 1 de Monarch. tom. 2, p. 219, ed. Augl.

tem (adversarii) proferant testem, qui eo tempore lingua Syriacæ, aut Chaldaicæ fecerit mentionem." "Let our opponents bring forward a single witness of that day, who makes mention of the Syriac or Chaldee language as prevailing in the country."¹

So far for the present topic. Let us now examine what our adversaries allege in favor of the Chaldee or Syriac.

CHAPTER II.—*The Arguments adduced in favor of the Syriac Language are answered.*

§ 1. *Of Paul speaking to the Jews in Hebrew.*

The first difficulty started here takes its rise from the xxi. and xxii. chapters of the Acts, in which Paul is said to have addressed the Jews *Ἑβραϊδὶ διαλέκτῳ*, in the Hebrew dialect, and thus to have appeased the Jews who were ready to tear him in pieces:—"Paul standing upon the steps waved with his hand to the people, and when a deep silence was made, addressed them in the Hebrew tongue, saying, Men, brethren and fathers, hear the account I am now about to give to you. Now when they heard him speak to them in the Hebrew tongue they kept a silence the more profound."²

From this narrative our adversaries conclude, that, as the Jews were more attentive when they heard Paul speaking in Hebrew, they must have been manifestly familiar with the Hebrew, Chaldee or Syriac, taking these as virtually the same, differing only from each other in dialectic peculiarities. Thus Saumaise explains it: "*Ἑβραῖς* or *Ἑβραϊκὴ διάλεκτος* must be understood, as applied in the New Testament, to mean the common Syriac which was then spoken in Jerusalem and in all Judea. When critics inform us that the Gospel *κατὰ Ματθαῖον* was written in the Hebrew language, we must understand by that, on Jerome's authority, the Chaldee or Syriac dialect which prevailed in Matthew's time, and was

¹ In Obser. ad Iter. Simon. Object. Resp. p. 375.

² Act. Apost. cap. 21, v. 40, et cap. 22, v. 1 et 2.

the idiom used by Christ himself and spoken in the capital.”¹ To the same effect write Grotius,² Simon and others.

But the Codex Cantabrigiensis, the oldest of all our manuscripts, (*omnium vetustissimus*,) together with others, removes the difficulty out of our way by reading τῇ ἰδιᾷ διαλέκτῳ, *in their own tongue*,³ instead of Ἑβραϊδὶ διαλέκτῳ of the vulgate Greek. According to this lection, Paul addressed the Jews in the language then current in Jerusalem. What, we ask, was this but Hellenistic? But that we may not be supposed to flee to a various reading as a last resort, (*tanquam in aram*,) I affirm that nothing can be easier than to escape this difficulty, even if we allow the common reading to stand. The simple fact of Paul’s accosting the Jews in Hebrew being recorded by Luke as something novel and unexpected, shows clearly that the Hebrew had fallen into disuse at that period. Many speeches, conversations, etc., etc., of the Jews are recorded in the Acts, that of Peter, for instance, about the election of a new Apostle in the room of Judas,⁴ that in which he urges the need of repentance,⁵ that of Stephen the Protomartyr before the Sanhedrim,⁶ those of Paul before Ananias the chief priest,⁷ and before Agrippa,⁸ and many others besides; but in none of these cases is Hebrew stated to be employed, save in the xxvith chapter and 14th verse, and in the passage under consideration. In the former, the words, Why persecutest thou me? are said to have been spoken in this tongue; and in both, the Hebrew is named with an emphasis which bespeaks it to have been unusual at the time. The reason why Paul should have employed it I will give by and by. I must first, however, premise an observation or two on Saumaise and those who follow in his wake, who take Hebrew to mean Chaldee.

¹ Salmasius, in Fun. Lin. Hellen. p. 40 ad 43.

² Grotius, in Act. Apost. cap. 21, v. 40.

³ Vide Calmet. et Grot. ad Act. Apost. c. 21, v. 40. [iōte, A. Scholz.—Ed.]

⁴ Act. cap. 1, v. 16 et seq.

⁵ Ib. 2, v. 14 et seq.

⁶ Ib. 7, v. 2.

⁷ Ib. 24, v. 10.

⁸ Ib. 26, v. 2.

To meet them, then, we commence by laying down the rule, that it is a dangerous practice to attach any other sense to the Scripture than that which is written (*Scripturæ verba aliorum atque posita sunt accipere*). Why, for instance, when we read that Paul used the Hebrew, should we interpret this to mean the Chaldee or Syriac? Do these differ nothing from each other? Yea, truly. For, though we grant that the Hebrew does in some sort comprehend under it the Chaldee, and that many Chaldee words are derived from Hebrew roots, yet that the two languages differ from each other in character, terminology and pronunciation, is matter of universal notoriety.

In their *characters* they differ, that is, the older and genuine Hebrew did, which we now call the Samaritan, for the modern Hebrew letters in which our Bibles are printed are Chaldaic. Ezra introduced the Chaldee character after the Babylonish captivity.

In their *terminology* they differ, for each tongue has vocables proper and peculiar to itself. Some of these are on record in holy writ. In the Book of Genesis, the same altar of the covenant which was erected by Laban and Jacob, was by the former, whose native language was Chaldee, called יגַר סַחַדוּתָא *Jegar Sahadutha*, but by the latter, whose vernacular was Hebrew, גִּלְגָּל *Galaad*.¹ And thirdly, in *pronunciation* they differ; moreover also in *the flexions of verbs and nouns*, which are strikingly different, as a comparison of the Hebrew and Syriac grammar will show. The testimony of Jerome on this point is convincing, who, after he had learned Hebrew, took incredible pains to become acquainted with Chaldee and its pronunciation: "Having obtained a somewhat competent knowledge of Hebrew, I became a learner of the Chaldee; but to say the truth, up to the present day my proficiency in the latter better qualifies me to read and translate than to pronounce it."² But had the Chaldee and the He-

¹ Genesis, cap. 31, ver. 47.

² Hieronym. Præfat. ad Danielelem.

brew been identical, Jerome assuredly needed not to have encountered such toil to become acquainted with the one dialect after learning the other. The conclusion indisputably is, that the man who studies the Syriac or Chaldaic alone will not understand the Hebrew. A very clear proof of this is furnished by the circumstance recorded in the fourth Book of Kings, namely, that when Rabshakeh addressed his threats to the princes of the people in the Hebrew or Jewish tongue, they beg of him to speak in Syriac that the people may not understand: "We pray thee that thou wouldest speak to us thy servants in Syriac: since we understand this tongue, and speak not to us in Jewish, in the hearing of the people."¹ If Rabshakeh had spoken in Syriac, it is evident from these words that he would not have been understood by a Hebrew speaking people. To the same effect is the prophecy of Jeremiah, in which he foretells the Chaldean captivity: "Lo, I will bring upon you a nation from afar, O house of Israel, saith the Lord: a strong nation, an ancient nation, a nation whose tongue thou wilt not know, nor understand what is said to thee."² Of the same nation Isaiah prophesies in these terms: "For with the speaking of the lip and with another tongue will he speak to this people."³

So also Baruch: "For he brought up upon them a nation from afar, a cruel nation, and of another speech."⁴ To these testimonies may be added that of Daniel, who describes Nebuchadnezzar as ordering certain Hebrew youths to be brought up in the knowledge of the Chaldee language and literature.⁵ Thus, then, it has been *proved* that those who knew Hebrew did not necessarily know Chaldee.

We are now to show on the other hand, that the man acquainted with Chaldee might, at the same time, be ignorant of Hebrew. Daniel furnishes us with proof here also, for the Hebrew words מנא חקל פרש, which appeared upon the wall of his

¹ Reg. lib. 4, cap. 18, v, 26 et. 27.

² Isaias, cap. 28, v. 11.

³ Daniel, cap. 1.

⁴ Jerem. cap. 5, ver. 15.

⁵ Baruch. in cap. 4, v. 14.

palace to Belshazzar, no Chaldean could read nor understand. "Then all the wise men of the king having entered in were not able to read the writing nor to tell the interpretation to the king."¹ Daniel, who was a Hebrew, read it with ease. With what semblance of probability, then, can Salmasius say that Hebrew and Chaldee were one, differing in dialect alone? And why, when Luke describes Paul as speaking in the Hebrew tongue, does Salmasius understand it of Chaldee or Syriac? It cannot be too distinctly stated that Paul used the Hebrew alone, and that no other dialect is to be put in its place. But that language ceased to be vernacular from the time of the Babylonish captivity, as we have shown in an earlier portion of the essay, and almost all the critics, including Salmasius, agree in the representation. Hence the truth is, that the people did not understand Paul at all: and forthwith topples to the ground the argument of Salmasius, built on the foundation that the Chaldee was at that period familiar to the Jews. So far our course has been easy: not so the portion that remains to us, and which has been almost entirely neglected by commentators. This difficulty has regard to these two points: I. If the Jews did not know the Hebrew, why did they listen the more attentively to one speaking in that tongue? II. If the people did not really know Hebrew, how came Paul to appease their rage by an address in that tongue?

Addressing ourselves to the clearance of these points, we must not be astonished in regard to the first, that the people, although they knew not Hebrew, were quiet and attentive when they heard that tongue; we ought rather to admire the sagacity of the Apostle, who, seeking to soften down the resentment excited against himself, took a means that so effectually removed the suspicions of all at the very commencement of his discourse. For the Jews had thought him a Gentile and a profaner of the temple: and hence the commotion that was raised. To allay this, Paul took measures

¹ Daniel, cap. 5, v. 8 et seq.

which proved him directly to be a Jew and a devout observer of the law. As the Hebrew was the language which they held in the highest veneration,—because that in which their Sacred Books had been written, and that in which Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob with the twelve patriarchs had conversed,—he prudently adopted that language in his address. In consequence of this, the Jews who had hitherto thought him a foreigner, perceiving with what facility he expressed himself in a tongue far from familiarly known to their learned Doctors, were hushed in a moment :

“Conticuere omnes, intentique ora tenebant.”

And although they understood not a word of his harangue, they listened with attention through pure curiosity to see whether he would be able to continue the discourse in the same language. But after a while they interrupt him, for the simple reason that they did not understand him : and this is the occasion of the speech in the Acts being given in the imperfect state in which the reader will perceive it to remain.

Nor again, ought we to wonder in regard to *the second point*, that Paul should expect to allay a popular ferment by an address in an unknown tongue. It is important to bear in mind that Paul spoke not only to the mob, but also to the Doctors of the law, the chief Priests and others distinguished by birth or rank, who had a knowledge of Hebrew derived from books, as indeed Salmasius, Grotius, Cornelius a Lapide, Tirinus, and others allow.¹ The very exordium of the speech proves it : “Men, brethren, and fathers, hear!” By *brethren* he means the populace, and by *fathers* the heads of the people. These last had great influence with the commons, as is apparent from the case of Christ alone ; inasmuch as it appears, on the testimony of Matthew² and Mark,³ to have been at their instigation that the multitude clamored for the death of the Redeemer. Their commanding influence

¹ Com. in Act. Apost. cap. 22, v. 1.

² Matthæus, cap. 27, v. 20.

³ Marcus, cap. 15, ver. 11.

made it important for the Apostle to satisfy the minds of this class, and this he sought to do by the use of the Hebrew, which was known to them by study. Had these influential persons been satisfied, the rest would have readily acquiesced and set him free. But all the while Greek was the vernacular tongue of Paul and the Jews, as the same passage proves, for it was in this language the Apostle asked leave of the Tribune to speak to the people.

§ 2. *Of the Syriac words which occur in the New Testament.*

Our second section conducts us to an examination of George Amira's argument, which is in his own opinion impregnable.¹ From the Greek and Latin, no less than from the Syriac New Testament, it is most evident, according to him, that Christ and his Apostles spoke usually the Chaldee or Syriac. For Christ says in Matthew, "Whosoever shall say to his brother, *Raca*, shall be guilty in the council"—the word *raca* being Syriac according to Amira. In the same Evangelist, addressing the multitude, the Lord says: "Ye cannot serve God and *Mammon*," the last being a Syriac word also. Moreover, Christ wishing to call Peter the son of a dove, gives him that name in Syriac, *Bar-jona*. Further, in Matthew we read *Corbona*, *Golgotha*, *Eli Eli lama sabactani*. In Mark the words *Boanerges*, *talitha cumi*, *ephphetha* and *abba* are found. In John, *Cephas* and *Bethsaida*, and in all the Evangelists, *pascha*. In the Acts we read *Hakel-dama*, *Sapphira* and *Tabitha*. And finally, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, the phrase *Maran-atha* occurs. As all these words are pronounced by Amira to be Chaldee or Syriac, so they prove in his esteem that Christ, the Apostles and the Evangelists, spoke this language rather than Greek. Amira and our opponents confirm this view by the undoubted fact that the ground bought with the price of

¹ Amira, in Præl. Gram. Syr. de Ling. Syr. Dignit.

the betrayal of Christ, was named *Hakel-dama*, which name the sacred narrative declares was given in the language of the inhabitants of Jerusalem. "And the fact was known to all the dwellers in Jerusalem, so that field was called in their tongue *Hakel-dama*, that is, the field of blood."¹ But *Hakel dama* are Chaldee words, therefore it follows that the language of the inhabitants of Jerusalem and of all that region was Chaldee.

But the first argument, if it be of any avail, proves nothing more than that Christ and his Apostles sometimes used Chaldee words, which we do not deny; but it does not by any means follow from thence, that this was their vernacular tongue. The real vernacular language of Christ was the Hellenistic, as we have shown above. And what is the Hellenistic but a mongrel jargon, (*hibrida lingua*,) its main strain being Greek, but having Hebrew and Chaldee vocables wrought up with it here and there. This is the very idiom in which the Books of the Maccabees, those of the New Testament and the Septuagint version have been written. It was naturally to be expected that, in books of this class, Hebrew and Chaldee words would frequently occur. Besides, we must protest that all these words are not Syriac which Amira claims as such, but partly Greek, partly Hebrew, and partly mixed. To begin with *raca*,² for example, this is a Greek word used frequently by Homer, Demosthenes, Galen, and other Greek writers. Especially is τὸ ῥάκος, ῥάκος, in the sense of *mean*, *contemptible*, used by Aristophanes and Lucian. By slightly changing the plural of this noun τὰ ῥάκα, the Jews made ῥάκα out of it, retaining the sense it bears in the Greek. Next, the word הפתח *ephphetha* is Hebrew, from the root פתח *he opened*. *Corban* קרבן also is Hebrew from root קרב *to offer*. In like manner טליתא קומי *alitha cumi* are Hebrew, as Jerome correctly shows.³ But *Bar-jona* בר-יונה

¹ Act. Apostolorum, cap. 1, ver. 19.

² V. August. lib. 1, de Serm. Dom.

³ Hieron. ad Pammach. de Opt. Gen. Interpr.

on the other hand, is mixed, for בר *bar* is the Syriac for *son*, and יונה is common to both Hebrew and Syriac. All these instances do not more decidedly war against Amira's position than they go to establish my own, namely, that the Hellenistic was the familiar language of Christ, the Apostles and the Jews, and that the Hebrew and Chaldee was a foreign tongue to them. For, though the Jews did occasionally employ both Hebrew and Chaldee words, yet their meaning and power were becoming obsolete from day to day. To this cause should we attribute the fact that a Greek interpretation is usually subjoined to a Hebrew or Chaldee word, when either occurs in the text of the New Testament. Thus in Matthew, "Emmanuel, which is interpreted, God with us."¹ "Eli, Eli, lama sabactani; that is, my God, my God, to what hast thou abandoned me?"² Likewise in Mark, "Talitha cumi, which is interpreted, Damsel, (I say unto thee) arise."³ And elsewhere in the same way; a practice the Evangelists had never adopted if the Chaldee or Hebrew tongue had been their vernacular.

The other objection we meet with the same argument. For the words *Hakel-dama*, although properly speaking they are Chaldee, nevertheless obtained a place in the motley Hellenistic. The Jews, who at first spoke Hebrew, and afterwards Chaldee, when they learned a new language under the successors of Alexander, retained several words out of both the preceding tongues: and these old words they continued to use familiarly in the Apostles' time, although they spoke Greek. Nor is such an experience as this confined to that nation and that day. Take the English for an example of the same thing. They formerly spoke Saxon, but although they have given that language up for centuries, they still retain many Saxon words in common use—as *sunna*, which they call sun, *mona* moon, *beo* bee, *mode* mood of mind, and hundreds besides. Thus *God*, *man*, *he*, *bed*, and countless others

¹ Matth. 1, v. 23.² Id. 27, v. 46.³ Marc. 5, v. 41.

are pure Saxon, yet the English have so completely made them their own by daily use, that they are called, and rightly, English words. In Naples, also, the same process may be observed. This is about the tenth century since the Greek ceased to be the vernacular language of this kingdom, yet the presence of several Greek words is still to be detected among us. Such are *vallana*, a roast chestnut, from *βάλανος*; *vastasso*, a walking-stick, from *βαστάζω*; *strummullo*, a whirlwind, from *στροβίλος*; *catapano*, a surtout, from *κατὰ πᾶν*; *nfenocchiare*, from *φενακίζω*, to deceive; *smorfia*, from *ἀμορφία*, deformity; *centrella*, a goad, from *κέντρον*; *chiafeo*, from *γναφεύς*, a fuller, etc., etc. The same may be said of the Greek still lingering in occasional words among the people of Bruttio and Sicily, and of the Latin among the Italians, French, and Spaniards. If the case be unquestionably as we have put it, among the English and Neapolitans, who so many generations back lost the Saxon and Greek, what must we say of the Jews of that day, who only two centuries before had spoken the Chaldee? Beyond all doubt they would employ unnumbered words, phrases and idiotisms peculiar to the Hebrew and Chaldee, and retain them as native and familiar forms. They would the rather do this because of the composition of the Hellenistic itself, which we have already proved vernacular in Judea. So completely was this made up of foreign admixtures, that, were all the contributions from various quarters removed, little would remain. To make bold, then, to say that Gabbatha, Bethsaida, Hakel-dama, Rabbi, and Osanna are Hellenistic forms, is to say nothing more than circumstances warrant, for that dialect abounds in such words, and so thickly are they scattered over the Books of the New Testament, those of the Maccabees, and the Version of the Seventy, that one may almost stumble over them at every third word. If *Hakel-dama*, then, be called a name derived from the language of the dwellers in Jerusalem, it gives us no serious concern, nor does it, for the reasons assigned, at all shake our confidence in the truth of our opinion, that the Jews spoke this bastard Greek.

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1.—*A Commentary on the Apocalypse.* By MOSES STUART, Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary at Andover, Mass. Andover: Allen, Morrell & Wardwell. New-York: Mark H. Newman. 1845. 2 vols., 8vo.

Few, if any, in our country, have prosecuted Biblical studies with so much zeal and for so long a time, as Professor Stuart. And to the work now before us he has devoted the unremitted researches of many years. It must, therefore, of necessity be a work of more than common value. And, from the partial examination we have hitherto been able to give it, we are of opinion that it is the result of more critical investigation, and contains more accurate critico-historical interpretation, than any work hitherto given to the public by an American scholar.

Whether men agree with Professor Stuart or not, in his interpretation of the Apocalypse, all will confess that, in these volumes, there is compressed an unusual amount of learning, and not a little of argumentative power. The first volume, treating of the numerosity, trichotomy, economy, æsthetics, time, authorship, etc., of the Apocalypse, is a rich mine of wealth, especially to those unacquainted with the German language, and the labors of German scholars in this department.

Whilst Professor Stuart pays great respect to the biblical scholars of Germany, (and in their critical acumen and research they are unquestionably before any other people,) and adopts rather the German than the English system of interpretation, he by no means concedes the claims of Eichhorn, Herder and others, who regard the book more as the production of mere genius, than of intellect and genius under the guidance of the Spirit of all truth. He attributes to it a full inspiration, the same which lies at the basis of all the sacred Scriptures. He shows conclusively, we think, that it is not properly speaking *dramatic*, but a symbolical representation of truth adapted to encourage and console the Church under all the trials and persecutions of her pilgrimage.

The Professor's interpretation of the text, embraced in the second volume, will, doubtless, offend the prejudices of some; and as it departs from the beaten track of exposition as applied to this portion of God's word, will not *seem* to be the right one. Yet, we think the Professor's views well worthy of serious consideration; and if to be overthrown, it must be by careful research and thorough knowledge of the established principles of hermeneutics. No superficial science, no every-day interpretation will do it. We hope some able critic will occupy our pages with a review.

2.—*Plato contra Atheos. Plato against the Atheists; or the Tenth Book of the Dialogue on Laws, accompanied with Critical Notes, and followed by extended Dissertations on some of the main points of the Platonic Philosophy and Theology, especially as compared with the Holy Scriptures.* By TAYLER LEWIS, LL. D., Professor of the Greek Language and Literature in the University in the city of New-York. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 378, 12mo.

We welcome such a book as this to our shelf for Classical Literature. Its exterior is attractive; its interior well executed; its inmost,—its style and spirit,—admirable. The whole is worthy the taste and scholarship of its author, and must tend to give reputation to the classical department in the Institution with which he is connected.

The design is, in these pages, to develop some of the higher views of Plato on philosophy and theology, and to compare them with the revelations of God in the Scriptures. The book, therefore, becomes eminently a Christian Classic. True, its basis is the work of a heathen, but of a heathen whose thoughts on philosophy and morals were scintillations from that bright Luminary, which subsequently rose upon the world and diffused the light of *life* in all its reality and glory. And then the commentator is deeply imbued with the Christian spirit, and brings his familiarity with the truths of the Bible to bear, with force, upon the text of Plato.

In the volume will be found,—an Introduction—Statement of the Argument—Greek Text and Critical Notes,—and Excursus LXXV.

These last abound with beautiful and striking classical and Scriptural illustrations, and discuss points of exceeding interest to the Greek scholar and to the theologian, e. g., Platonic View of the Parental and Filial Relations—Subjective sense of the word *Ἀληθεύω*—Orphic Poetry—Divine Justice the ground of Human Law—Universality of the Belief in a God—Principle of Authority—Soul older than Body—Philosophy of the verb *To Be*—Platonic Doctrine of the Evil Principle, etc., etc.

Although some will not accord with Prof. Lewis, in his eulogy of Plato, and depreciation of Aristotle, yet is it true that “the young man who is an enthusiastic student of Plato can never be a sciolist in regard to education, a quack in literature, a demagogue in politics, nor an infidel in religion.

We desire for this work an extensive circulation, and feel persuaded that none can study it without pleasure and profit. The higher classes in our colleges, and theological students would find it valuable.

- 3.—*Notes, Explanatory and Practical, on the Epistles of Paul to the Ephesians, Philippians, and Colossians.* By ALBERT BARNES. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 331, 12mo.

These are brief Epistles ; and consequently the Commentary, intended as it primarily is, for Bible Classes and Sunday Schools, is by no means extended. This one small volume embraces the notes on the three Epistles, with a useful introduction to each, elucidating all the points usually included in Introductions to the books of Scripture.

Whilst we do not consider this equal to the Commentary on Job, we put it on a par with his previous Notes on Epistles, and consider it well adapted to the uses intended. All who are familiar with the others will, doubtless, possess this volume, and they will find in it much excellent comment, and many interesting and wholesome practical remarks.

- 4.—*The History of the Popes ; their Crimes, Murders, Poisonings, Parricides, Adulteries and Incests, from St. Peter to Gregory XVI. ; including the History of Saints, Martyrs, Fathers of the Church, Religious Orders, Cardinals, Inquisitions, Schisms, and the Great Reformers : with the Crimes of Kings, Queens and Emperors.* By LOUIS MARIE DE CORMENIN. Translated from the French. Philadelphia: James M. Campbell. New-York: Saxton & Miles. 1845.

The title sufficiently describes the intent of the author in this work. Although, specifically a history of the Popes, it becomes, of necessity and in fact, a general history of the state of the world from the time of Christ to the present period. M. de Cormenin is a Roman Catholic, who has imbibed deeply the spirit of liberty, and who sees and confesses the existence of the most horrible crimes in the bosom of his own Church.

He appears to write without prejudice, and probably details what he believes to be the facts in the case. In respect to his history of the lives of the Popes, he cannot be supposed to be actuated by any desire to blacken the character of the papacy and priesthood in his own communion, and consequently his testimony on this behalf cannot well be called in question.

Whilst he concedes *the right* to Protestants, in many instances, he is evidently not imbued with an evangelical spirit, and probably regards Christ as nothing higher than a pure teacher of a lofty morality, and the gospel as a valuable book of history and philosophy. The Introduction or Analysis, embracing the first fourteen pages, we think, requires some correction, especially the first part of it, in order to make it truthful history. What is said about the Christians of the

first century, is a relation evidently either derived from infidel sources, or colored by skepticism in the author's own mind.

The work is to be issued in numbers. Two have appeared, the first containing two beautifully colored lithographs, one of Sabaa, Bishop of Jerusalem, the other of Clovis I., King of the Franks.

5.—*Travels in the Californias, and Scenes in the Pacific Ocean.* By THOMAS J. FARNHAM. New-York: Saxton & Miles. 1845. pp. 416, 8vo.

Mr. Farnham is known as the author of "Travels in the Western Prairies, and Oregon Territory," in respect to which he has diffused some interesting and useful information. He here discloses to us his travels through the Californias, and his views of things in some of the islands of the Pacific. As the former have been but little known among us, those who read this volume will find themselves rewarded with some pleasant and useful intelligence. His account of the proceedings and death of Capt. Cook, derived from an aged woman in authority, enters more into particulars than the ordinary narratives of this event, and shows that the first provocation was on the part of Cook's men, and that his death was in consequence of the death of a chief by the hand of Cook. There seems to be great simplicity and apparent truthfulness in the statements of the old lady, in respect to Vancouver's visit in 1779.

The incidents of the revolution of 1836, under Alvarado, aided by Americans and Britons, of his subsequent adhesion to Mexico and horrid treatment of those same foreigners, are thrilling, and, in some parts, almost blood-congealing. His notices of the American Mission at Hawaii, and its meliorating influence on the native inhabitants, although mingled with some philosophical views, which would not be altogether acceptable to the lover of Bible-truth, are commendatory, and confirm the testimony given by all unprejudiced beholders.

We cheerfully recommend the volume to any of our readers who wish to acquire information about the Californias.

6.—*The Romish and Prelatical Rite of Confirmation examined: and proved to be contrary to the Scriptures, and the practice of all the earliest and purest Churches, both Oriental and Western.* By THOMAS SMYTH, D. D. With an Appendix, on the Duty of requiring a Public Profession of Religion. New-York: Leavitt, Trow & Co. 1845. pp. 213, 18mo.

This is another useful little volume from the prolific pen of Dr. Smyth: and whilst it most triumphantly proves the rite of confirmation, as practised by prelatical churches, to be unscriptural and of human invention, it also contends, in an appendix, for a public profession of religion, by a form of covenant, entered into in presence of

the church. Here, again, Dr. Smyth departs from the usage in a large portion of the Presbyterian Church, and shows how much we may differ, on minor points, and yet belong to the same ecclesiastical organization, and move on harmoniously in prayer and labors for the extension of the Redeemer's kingdom. We gladly commend this small volume to the attention of all who desire information on the subjects of confirmation and public profession.

7.—*The Name, Nature and Functions of Ruling Elders ; wherein it is shown from the Testimony of Scripture, the Fathers and the Reformers, that Ruling Elders are not Presbyters or Bishops : and that, as representatives of the people, their office ought to be temporary. With an Appendix, on the use of the title Bishop.* By THOMAS SMYTH, D. D. New-York: Leavitt, Trow & Co. etc. 1845. pp. 186, 18mo.

We like this book much. It is a clear, convenient and convincing statement of facts in respect to the Eldership in the Presbyterian Church, going to show that Elders are not Presbyters, and that their office was originally, and should be now, temporary. Dr. Smyth will, doubtless, find many, in his own portion of the Presbyterian Church, to differ with him, on some points. This he expects, and in his Preface takes pains to prepare the Church for these differences, by contending that we must not seek for *uniformity*, but only *unity*. We like the book for this, as much as for other things in it, because it is just what we have always believed, and because we perceive in it sentiments at war with some action of the Assembly of 1837, and tending strongly to union, on proper and liberal principles, among those who do not materially differ in doctrine or discipline.

8.—*Elizabeth Thornton ; or the Flower and Fruit of Female Piety. With other Sketches.* By SAMUEL IRENEUS PRINCE. Second edition. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1845. pp. 211, 18mo.

Elizabeth Thornton, judging from the narrative, which we doubt not is truthful, was one of those sweet, lovely persons whom God has made to win the affections of all they meet. Her naturally amiable character was sanctified by grace ; and thus qualified, she went forth to do the service of her Master, in her own quiet way, and was honored with the privilege of setting some gems in her Redeemer's crown.

Like her, there are many in the private walks of life, whose names are never blazoned in the heraldry of earth, but who, walking in the steps of Jesus, and adorned with the humility of the gospel, the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, will reap their reward in the rest of heaven, and find their names recorded, in illuminated letters, in the Lamb's Book of Life. To be such an one, is better far than to be known as a world's hero to "the utmost verge of this green earth:"

better to wear the robe of righteousness than the robe of state—to inherit the crown of glory, which fadeth not away, than the heaviest gemmed-crown of emperor or king.

Let others learn, from the example of Elizabeth Thornton, to go and do likewise. Of the sketches, so well known and so well appreciated by our readers, we need add nothing.

9.—*Expository Lectures, or Discourses on Scriptural Subjects, designed for the improvement of Christian Knowledge and Piety.* By LEWIS MAYER, late Professor in the Theological Seminary of the German Reformed Church. Harrisburg: Hickok & Carline. 1845. pp. 268.

These Lectures are from the pen of one whose personal acquaintance we have enjoyed, who has long labored faithfully for the advancement of the German Reformed Church, in knowledge and piety. We trust the present volume, so full of sound doctrine and wholesome practical instruction, and written in so chaste a style and so good a spirit, will be extensively circulated among the ministers and members of his own denomination. Nor do we, by any means, wish its circulation limited to those of his own church, but desire that many more may read its instructive pages.

The Lectures, among others, embrace the following subjects:—The Christian Ministry warned against false and unworthy Exhibitions of Christianity—Connection of Faith and Holiness—Causeless Anger—On being Righteous Overmuch—Self Deception in Religion—The Sin of offending Weak Brethren in Christ, etc., etc. The last mentioned, the fourth in the volume, is a clear and satisfactory exhibition of the principles of the Gospel in respect to things indifferent, and of the duty of the strong toward the weaker brethren. We commend it to the attention of those who doubt as to the propriety of certain courses of conduct.

10.—*Domestic Slavery Considered as a Scriptural Institution: in a Correspondence between the Rev. Richard Fuller, of Beaufort, S. C., and the Rev. Francis Wayland, of Providence, R. I.* Revised and corrected by the Authors. New-York: Lewis Colley. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1845. pp. 254, 18mo.

We are glad the Discussion of Domestic Slavery fell into hands so well qualified to execute the work. Dr. Wayland is better known to us at the North than Dr. Fuller, yet at the South, the reputation of the latter is quite on a par with that of the "Author of the Moral Science." These letters are a beautiful specimen of controversy, imbued throughout with the spirit of love and of a sound mind. We have never read so clear and strong an argument in favor of the institution of slavery, as that presented by Dr. Fuller in this volume;

and yet we think the statements and reasonings of Dr. Wayland are such as are not and cannot be met by any process of reasoning. It strikes us that the chief difficulty about the argument of Dr. Fuller is, that it looks too exclusively at the mere abstract question of bondage; yet no one can peruse his letters without the conviction that great forbearance and kindness are demanded of those, who advocate abolition. The book ought to be read by every one.

11.—*Republication of the Penny Magazine.* New-York: J. S. Redfield.

This Magazine is already too well known to require any special notice. Suffice it to say that it contains a vast amount of valuable information, adapted to the wants of a family, and there is scarcely any book which children will consult with more eagerness. Its pictures attract their attention, and its interesting matter pleases their taste. Mr. Redfield is issuing it in large royal octavo numbers, of about 140 pages each, in good style and with an illuminated cover, at the low price of 25 cents each. How much better this than the miserable trash so plentifully huckstered about.

12.—*Vital Christianity: Essays and Discourses on the Religions of Man and the Religion of God.* By ALEXANDER VINET, D. D., Professor of Theology in Lausanne, Switzerland. Translated, with an Introduction, by Robert Turnbull, Pastor of the Howard, street Church, Boston. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1845. pp. 353, 12mo.

With Professor Vinet's writings we had been already somewhat familiar: and we remember to have said to a friend, after reading his Essay on Religious Convictions and the Union of Church and State, "*There is a rare book, such an one as it is profitable to read, and such as you very, very seldom meet with in these days. It is full of thought, exceedingly suggestive, and cannot be perused without awakening thought.*" We cannot but rejoice, therefore, that the Rev. Mr. Turnbull has made his Essays and Discourses on other, more general subjects, accessible to the English public. Vinet has been called the "Chalmers of Switzerland." Without his reputation as a preacher, he certainly resembles him in many of his characteristics, and differs from him in others. He is more analytical, more acute, more profound in philosophy, whilst he wants the brilliancy and energy, and profusion of imagery which belong to Chalmers.

He is an elegant scholar, a forceful reasoner, a spiritual Christian, and is now exciting a powerful influence on France, and indeed on Europe, by his advocacy of the independence of the Church.

The Essays and Discourses in this volume, so well translated by Mr. Turnbull, are rich in thought and adapted to secure the attention

of educated men, who think on the subject of personal religion, but whose views are rather skeptical. To such, especially, but by no means exclusively, we recommend the careful reading of these Essays. We should be glad, indeed, to find such discourses constituting more of the intellectual repasts of Christians.

13.—WILEY AND PUTNAM'S *Library of Choice Reading*. *Undine and Sintram—Imagination and Fancy—Diary of Lady Willoughby—Table Talk—Opinions on Books, Men and Things—Headlong Hall and Nightmare Abbey—The French in Algiers—Ancient Moral Tales—The Crescent and the Cross*.

In our last number we spoke of Wiley & Putnam's plan of a Library, and commended it, with a notice of the first two volumes. We now have ten additional numbers, all of them interesting and valuable books, even less exceptionable than Eöthen and the Amber Witch.

Undine and Sintram, by La Motte Fouqué, are acknowledged to be among the purest and most beautiful tales in the German language. *Imagination and Fancy*, by Legh Hunt, is a book of choice selections from the English Poets, with critical notices of the writers, and Legh Hunt's answer to the question, "What is Poetry?" The *Diary of Lady Willoughby*, is a lovely development of the inner workings of the heart of a loving and confiding wife and mother—a pleasing picture of domestic life among some of rank in the days gone by. Hazlitt's *Table Talk*, and *Opinions of Men and Things*, are volumes of no ordinary interest, and of real value. Hazlitt is noted as one of the most remarkable writers of his day, a man of vigorous thought, of elevated genius, and of acute critical power.—*Headlong Hall and Nightmare Abbey*—a satirical representation of the Times, abounding in humorous passages, reflecting, as in a mirror, the spirit and manners of the Age.—*The French in Algiers*, a book in two parts, one by a German Lieutenant, the other by a French naval officer; both communicating what they saw in Algeria, during the struggle of the French for dominion there. The book unfolds new things, and sets Abd-el-Kader in a somewhat different light from that in which he sat for his portrait as given in the newspaper reports.—*Ancient Moral Tales*, from the *Gesta Romanorum*, is a volume popular in style, and containing much singular information, and wholesome instruction.—*The Crescent and the Cross*, in two volumes, by Eliot B. G. Warburton, Esq., is a work somewhat similar in its character to that of Eöthen, in some respects perhaps surpassing it, written in the same off-hand style, and we think looking upon the religion of the East rather too believingly, or with too much indifference to truth and error. Valuable information, however, is to be gleaned from these amusing and interesting pages.

14.—*A Dictionary of the English Language, containing the Pronunciation, Etymology, and Explanation of all words authorized by eminent writers ; to which are added a Vocabulary of the Roots of English Words, and an Accented list of Greek, Latin and Scripture Proper Names.* By ALEXANDER REID, A. M. With an Introduction by Henry Reed, Professor of English Literature in the University of Pennsylvania. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: G. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 564, 12mo.

When we first saw the plan of this Dictionary announced in Edinburgh, we were favorably impressed with it ; and having now seen the work, we cannot but express our gratification with its execution. Some of its advantages are the following:—Its orthoepy is correct—it contains all authorized words—it gives the primitive word in each case, and then the derivative alphabetically—the original term and the language from which each primitive is derived—a vocabulary of the roots of English words—an accented list of 15,000 Greek, Latin and Scripture Proper Names.

Its definitions are generally clear and accurate ; and embracing, as it does, 40,000 of the words of our language, carefully selected, and appropriately arranged on the above plan, we unhesitatingly pronounce it the best *school Dictionary* we yet have.

15.—*Ocean-Work, Ancient and Modern ; or Evenings on Sea and Land.* By J. HALL WRIGHT. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845. Philadelphia: Geo. S. Appleton. pp. 168, 18mo.

No better idea of this volume can be given than by copying some of the titles of chapters: e. g., The Ocean as Rock-maker—as Polisher—as a Mausoleum—as Valley-cutter—as Lapidary—as Fossilizer—as a Shark's Workshop—as Fertilizer—as Destroyer—as a Shell-Factory—as Mermaid's Hall—as Volcano Quencher, etc., etc. In thirty-six evening conversations, the wonders of science in respect to the vasty deep, are here unfolded to the capacity of the young. A useful and interesting book.

16.—*A History of Germany ; from the Earliest Period to the Present Time.* By FREDERICK KOHLRAUSCH, Chief Counsellor of the Board of Education of the Kingdom of Hanover, and late Professor of History in the Polytechnic School. Translated from the last German edition, by James D. Haas. With a complete Index, prepared expressly for the American edition. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 487.

Kohlrausch's History of Germany is one of acknowledged authority on the Continent ; and in its English dress supplies a want which has been felt. Although a country of so much importance in the his-

tory of civilization ; although the seat and centre of the great Reformation, and so intimately connected with our own land, yet are we comparatively unacquainted with it. At the present day, the literature of Germany is exciting more influence over us, than perhaps that of any other people, and it is destined to be yet more extensively influential. German works are more frequently translated, and the language is becoming more generally studied.

It is due to Germany, then, as well as to ourselves, that more should be known of her history by our people. The opportunity is now afforded by the valuable translation before us ; and we can promise those who read it, much interesting and valuable information.

It is very cheap at \$1 50, and is intended to be one of Appleton's Historical Series.

17.—*Poems*. By WILLIAM W. LORD. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Phil.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 158, 18mo.

The taste with which this volume is "got up" by the enterprising publishers, is sufficient, in itself, to sell the book ; and indeed, to make *poetry* saleable, in the present day, seems to require something besides the poetry itself.

There is so much of poetry now in history and even in science, that the public generally appear to be content with that and an occasional reference to the old standards.

Mr. Lord is evidently gifted in poetic genius, and has published in this volume some rich and exquisite sentiment. Yet we are far from believing that it will suit the popular taste ; and we fear, too, the effect on the author of *too* high eulogiums on the part of some of his friends. We would give him a friendly admonition not to rest his hopes either of fame or usefulness on the cultivation of poetic harmonies.

"Worship" is ethereal. "Niagara" is a magnificent conception. Many of the "Ballad Fantasies" are enchanting.

18.—*An American Dictionary of the English Language. First Edition in Octavo, containing the whole vocabulary of the Quarto, with corrections, improvements, and several thousand additional words. With an Introductory Dissertation.* By NOAH WEBSTER, LL. D. In two volumes. Springfield: G. & C. Merriam. 1845.

We heartily commend THIS Dictionary of Dr. Webster. It is, probably, well known that we do not approve of the introduction of his School Dictionary into our common schools. We have serious objection to much of the orthography : nor can we find any writer, even the warmest admirer of Webster, who is conformed to it. At the same time, we agree with Profs. Fleming and Tibbins, who say, in the Preface to their French Dictionary, "Webster has touched upon

every thing: on Etymology, the secret of which he has often detected by following it through all its Protean changes; on History and Chronology; on Commerce and Navigation; on the Arts and Sciences; more especially on the language of every day life;" and with Rev. Dr. Humphrey, when he says: "Dr. Webster's American Dictionary of the English language is an honor to the country which gave him birth, to the age, and to the language which it so admirably traces up to its etymological sources, so skilfully analyzes and so happily explains."

No scholar can well afford to be without the large Dictionary. It stands *alone* in its etymological research, and in the truth, extent and precision of its definitions, and is, unquestionably, the most copious, philosophical, and accurate Dictionary of the English Language now in existence, with the single exception of its mode of spelling.

The present edition is recommended by its cheapness, (\$10 50,) and by the fact that it contains the supplement of words published just before his death, in 1843.

ADDITIONAL NOTICES.

Kitto's Cyclopædia—Nov. 13, 14, 15—continued from the word "Mediator." As before said, an excellent work for the illustration of the Bible.

Martin's Bible—Nos. 3, 4, 5—each adorned with an elegant engraving, and the text as beautiful as ever. See notice in April No. of Repository.

Judæa Capta—Taylor's uniform edition.

NOTE.

As the brief allusion to the Rt. Rev. Bishop Southgate in the Article on Prelacy in our last number is liable to misapprehension, we take pleasure in saying that it was not designed to express any opinion as to the merits of the charges preferred against him, or to cast any reflection upon the moral character of Bishop S., but simply to illustrate the relative character of the Episcopal and other Ecclesiastical Supervision.

ARTICLE X.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

It is known that Böckh is publishing a grand collection of Greek Inscriptions. The first part of Vol. III. has appeared, containing, among others, the inscriptions found in Lycia by Mr. Fellowes. Weissenborn has offered, in his Hellenic Contributions, some new and interesting views of some points of German History.—The third volume of Dr. Birch's "Ludwig Philipp der Erste" has appeared, and is characterized by industrious research, lucid style and arrangement.—K. Weiseler, of Göttingen, has published a Chronological Synopsis of the four Gospels, of great value, in which he investigates the time of Christ's birth and death, the extent of his public ministry, etc.—Number of students at some of the principal universities: Berlin, 1548, foreigners 561; Göttingen, 637, for. 201; Halle, 721, for. 166; Heidelberg, 809, for. 541; Leipzig, 880, for. 267; Tübingen, 852, for. 71.

France.

Jesuitism is reviving and becoming so bold as, even in Paris, to hunt up and exhibit the old *relics*. What a conflict is coming on!—The Polytechnic School of Paris has been closed, in consequence of a rebellion, and is re-organized and subjected to the supervision of the Minister of War, as formerly.

Spain.

Journals in Madrid, 48:—daily, 19; bi- or tri-weekly, 9; weekly, 7; semi-monthly, 5; monthly, 8. Of the whole number, *two* are religious, one daily, one tri-weekly.

Russia.

The University of St. Petersburg has 66 officers, 557 students; Moscow, 87 officers, 836 students; Dorpat, 66, 489; Kieu, 63, 320. There exist in Russia 83 gymnasia.—The emperor has directed the Minister of Public Instruction to select a number of young men, of proper political views and established character, and send them, at the public expense, to Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France, and England, that they may become qualified for professorships in the Russian universities, and thus avoid the necessity of employing foreigners.

THE
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY
AND
CLASSICAL REVIEW.

THIRD SERIES, NO. IV.—WHOLE NUMBER LX.

OCTOBER, 1845.

ARTICLE I.

THE USE OF CHURCH CREEDS.

REV. JOHN G. HALL, South Egremont, Mass.

HUMAN nature possesses, generically, a marked propensity for extremes. It may be said of it, as one has said of woman,

“Aut amat, aut odit, nihil est tertium.”

As if the fall struck the fiercest blow at the moderation of the race, the opinions and practices of men oscillate from right to left—from deepest centre to furthest circumference—with vast rapidity. It has always been common for proselytes to be “tenfold more the children of” enthusiasm, than they who proselyted them. The great attempt of the French, to loose from their necks the iron bands of a most rigid despotism, had but fairly begun, ere the shadows of the extreme result, which was a more rigid democracy, began to forecast themselves. And thus, it is no marvel to the world, to witness the straight flights of men from one extremity in politics, religion, morals, or manners, to another exactly the opposite.

To such a frailty of the human character, it might, perhaps, be charitable to refer, along with numerous other eccentricities, the favorite outcry of so many of the present age against the use of church creeds. The creeds, or confessions of the churches, during the era of the Reformation, and shortly after it, (as was indeed not surprising, at a time when the elements of the truth had to be drawn out from the huge heaps of falsities with which a thousand years of darkness had overlaid them,) may have been too ample and minute to comport with the features of different times. The fathers were all eagerness to show to the world, so long bewildered with the errors of Rome, what "be the true sayings of God." And thus their formularies of faith were oftentimes long, usually minutely explicit, and frequently, to us, undeniably tedious. Circumstances seemed to call them to define the very *verge* of truth.

But other ages have advanced. There has been a great, merciful, and marvellous revival of the truth. The fathers have slept; and their children, and children's children, for many generations, have inherited their possessions. And some of them, now in these remote years, forgetful of the straits of their fathers, or, perhaps, what is more true, forgetful of the straits of *humanity* at any period, from the full summaries of Christian doctrine, arranged and recorded by past ages, go, at a single bound, to the utmost opposite, and sternly disavow all creeds, formularies, or symbols of belief whatever, exterior to the simple text itself of the Scriptures: for a shield, grossly perverting that noble sentiment, "The Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants."

Of such men, single and clustered, and in ecclesiastical bodies of various sizes, it is a grief to say, that our own loved country, the North and the East, the sunny South and the portentous West, (not to mention other lands,) is much too full. The names under which they pass, familiar in their more appropriate localities, and more or less known to the reading public, it is not necessary here to repeat. Some of them are evidently wide from the meaning, or intention, of the

sacred Scriptures ; and though clinging to the “letter,” yet plainly have not the “spirit.” Others of them are mainly evangelical ; and sometimes knock at the doors of our churches, asking for occasional communion. And this very latitude, or “liberty,” of belief which they use, they proffer to us as their best recommendation. It is their fair front, also, which they show to the world ; claiming thereby those sympathies which profess to eschew “bigotry ;” and present themselves, as obviously, the truest examples of that “liberality,” or charity, which is the innermost soul of Christianity. And of this, we are pained to say, a prominent instance occurs in the case of the late “Southern Baptist Convention,” May, 1845 ; whence, in an address, written for every section of the Union, and for “all candid men,” the following incidental paragraph was sent forth : “We have constructed for our basis no new creed ; acting in this matter upon a Baptist aversion to all creeds but the Bible.” Underscore the word Baptist, and consider the reflection it contains upon the customs of other prominent sects, or families, of Christians.

It is not the intention of this short article to enumerate the many objections gathered against the use of creeds in the churches, nor to array against such objections, the ample replies that lie at hand. Examples, both of the objections and their answers, may occur casually in the succeeding remarks. Indeed, were it not that some of these objections wear a specious aspect, and so have power to inveigle the unwary, in many quarters of the land, and are even used as entering wedges of division in our covenanted churches, the whole subject might be passed by, as one of mere secondary importance. But the outcry is loud ; and it imitates boldly the shibboleth of the Scriptures, bidding the world beware of the multitude of churches, and of the priesthood thereof, who “teach for doctrines the commandments of men.” And for such outcries the world has an “itching ear.” Nevertheless, if the church have an answer, the world will hear it. And such an answer should, verily, be ever ready. Both ministers and people, and each individual for himself, should be pre-

pared with a reason for this conformity of theirs, in the matter of confessions and covenants, to the long tested custom of their fathers.

A few desultory hints, on this whole subject, may be found in what follows :

1. The ordinary definition of the word creed, as signifying a summary or confession of faith, expressed in phraseology varying more or less from that of the Scriptures, agreed to as a basis of special or local union among a body of professed Christians, cannot be much controverted. It seems to be necessary to a creed, that some of its language should so vary from that of the Scriptures, as to define the particular *sense*, which those who adopt it may have, of the nature of particular scriptural passages, personages, or doctrines. It also implies a covenant, or agreement of adherence among those who subscribe it.

It is not vital to the genuineness of a creed, that it expresses all which those who adopt it may believe, or regard, as taught in the Scriptures. But few of the creeds of Christian churches speak of the existence of angels ; yet all, or almost all of them believe in their existence. Thus the length or brevity of a creed, is not an item vital to its nature. The solemn avowal of the Ethiopian eunuch, " I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God ;" or that of Martha, " Lord, I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the world," may have been as really and properly the subscription to a creed, as though all the predictions of Moses and the prophets concerning the Messiah, and concerning the true nature of his office, and all the particular items of their fulfilment in the case of Jesus of Nazareth, had been in long detail recited.

2. It is supposed by many, and by some widely proclaimed, that the use of creeds, or confessions of faith, in churches, entirely lacks scriptural authority.

Indeed, a few inconsiderately aver, that the great Master of the house left his positive record against them, in his quotation of the words of Isaiah, " Howbeit, in vain do they

worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men.” It needs but a single thought, however, and a brief glance at the *comment* which our Saviour made upon these words, to see that the “commandments of men” are declared to render the worship of God “vain,” only when they *contradict* those of God ; or, in Christ’s own language, when they lead men to “*reject* the commandments of God.” The question, whether or not the existing creeds of Christian churches are of this character, is one to be settled by their inspection and examination individually. The question, also, whether the creeds of the existing evangelical churches of the land, or world, are habitually used, or are capable of being used, as were some of the “traditions” which the Saviour so denounced, (Mark 7 : 10–13,) to screen the conscience from the pressure of natural, moral, or religious duties, is one, perhaps, whose answer the revilers of Christian creeds would prefer to decline.

Neither does the controversy concerning the authenticity, or genuineness, of the “Apostles’ Creed,” so called, much affect the point before us. The “Apostles’ Creed” may be the production of a century succeeding the latest of the apostles, and yet the use of ecclesiastical formulas of doctrine be plausibly shown to possess the authority of apostolical example. Paul wrote to the Romans, commending them for obedience to “that *form* of doctrine which was delivered unto them :” *τύπον διδαχῆς*, Rom. 6 : 17. Beza translates it, “*formæ doctrinæ*,” *scheme*, *fashion*, or *set form* of doctrine. Is there not here implied, that Paul “delivered” unto the Roman converts some explicit *sense*, mode, or pattern of Christian doctrine, or doctrines, to which they gave their assent, confession, or “obedience ?” Did he not enjoin upon them certain tenets, commented upon, or expressed in definite language, not found, *identically*, in the then received Scriptures ? Or must we admit the position that the whole Scriptures then known, verbatim et literatim, and which were common to both receivers and rejectors of Jesus, constituted that “form of doctrine” which he had delivered unto them !

The same expression occurs also in 2 Timothy 1 : 15,

“Hold fast the *form* of sound words, which thou hast heard of me.”

In Acts 16 : 4, it is narrated, that as Paul and Silas “went through the cities, they delivered them the decrees for to keep, that were ordained of the apostles and elders which were at Jerusalem.” To the *churches*, in those cities, of course, they were delivered. Let us inquire, now, whether those churches, as they received new members to their bosom, would not demand of such an express assent to those “decrees,” or definite formulas of belief on certain points, sent to them by the apostles? And should such applicants, or members, decline acquiescence therein, or reject that “form of doctrine,” thus carried about and taught by the messengers of the churches, would not the churches have regarded them as “denying the faith,” and “breaking covenant” of fellowship, and hence unworthy of being longer “walked with” as brethren? Doubtless.

The origin of these decrees, “ordained of the apostles and elders,” seems to be given in Acts, chap. 15. Let there be a careful consideration of the contents of this chapter; of that ministerial convocation at Jerusalem; of the circumstances which gathered it, and of the matter before it: and it would seem impossible for one hereupon to affirm, that the apostles and elders did *not* thence send down to the churches, (whether mandatory, or recommendatory, is unessential,) a *creed*, summary, or rule of faith and practice, on one particular point of religious doctrine treated of in the Scriptures at large.

But if it be alleged, that such a use of the apostles’ decrees at Jerusalem or elsewhere be inadmissible, inasmuch as all Christians now nominally receive what the apostles wrote and decreed as *Scripture*, and that creeds express doctrines in language varying from what is now received as *Scripture*; it is only necessary to answer, that such an objection to the above use of what the apostles did, gives up, at once, the whole question of appeal to apostolic authority. For, what we find recorded as the doings of the apostles, necessarily took place *before* the record was complete, as it is now. For, how could we have *scriptural* attestation of what the apostles

practised, or recommended, after the canon of Scripture was forever *closed*? There is no way. Hence, there must be *no* appeal to apostolic authority on this subject at all, or else it must be frankly conceded, that churches, in expressing the evident doctrines of Scripture in their own chosen forms, or in such phrases as are expository of their sense of the Scriptures, or, in making prominent, such definite delineations of truth and duty as may tend to promote harmony in any supposed body of believers, are but following in the footsteps of the holy and blessed apostles of the Lord Jesus Christ.

When anti-creedists assail the custom of their fellow Christians, in placing at the doors of their churches some definite expressions of belief (on disputed or other points) commonly called creeds, they must either decline entirely the appeal to apostolic authority, or else be prepared to have that authority arrayed, with all its vast power, directly against themselves.

And here might the whole discussion, since the use of Christian summaries of faith and practice is found of such ancient origin, be safely rested. The custom which the apostles gave to the churches is *the* custom of them. No church can ever be a true church, which is not prepared to "contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints." Here the authority of church creeds, if they are *true*, and do not "reject the commandments of God," *does* rest. But there are some other considerations of interest.

3. Looking at the variety of character which pertains to those who desire to "profess and call themselves Christians," and at the great variety of views, prejudices, and preferences, which such entertain, it would seem to be very apparent, that if churches, or societies of Christians, are to be gathered, and be kept together, the use of creeds is vitally *necessary*.

How else could men sufficiently *harmonize*, securing love, peace, and prosperity? Is mere scriptural phraseology, unparaphrased, naked, and without comment, a competent basis of such harmony? There have not been wanting bodies of men to make the trial; and the result in such trials, however the fact may be misconstrued and abused by opposers of the

Scriptures, has conclusively shown that there can be no permanent and prosperous church organizations, without some definite, and more or less extensive, summaries of faith, or creeds. Certain ecclesiastical bodies, indeed, continue and prosper, who say they have no creeds; but, in truth, they have creeds; if not written, at least verbal; commonly understood and agreed on among themselves; which, any one will see, amounts to the same thing. Such are out of the case. The supposition is, that the basis of fellowship and ecclesiastical organization be the mere, unillustrated, uncommented, Word of God.

When Dr. Taylor, of England, the Arian, published his commentary on Romans, Archbishop Magee expressed his opinion upon the system therein developed, to the following effect: that it was "nothing more than an artful accommodation of Scripture phrases, to notions utterly repugnant to Christian doctrine." These two men had before them one and the same book, the same phraseology, the same imprint; but how could they agree? And unless agreed, how could they "walk together"? How could they "stand fast in one spirit, with one mind, striving together for the faith of the Gospel"? How could they "walk by the same rule," and "mind the same thing"? How "keep the unity of the Spirit, in the bond of peace"? Let these two doctors be lodged under one roof, and seated habitually at the same table, and be called a church, and they would present to the eye a fair pattern of all the churches of Christendom, provided those churches were destitute of formularies of faith. It is a disposition universally common to men, by reason of sin, to be "artful." This *art* they will carry, without qualms, every where; except when restrained by grace. And thus multitudes of men are found, who so apply "artful accommodations of Scripture phrases to notions utterly repugnant to Christian doctrine," as to propagate among their fellows, under the avowed sanction of Scripture, with a bold mien, the worst of all possible errors:

"Concealed beneath a fair outside,
The filth of rottenness, and worm of pride:

Their piety a system of deceit,
Scripture employed to sanctify the cheat."—COWPER.

Peradventure, as an offset to the tenor of these remarks, the recollection may arise to some of certain successful Bible society organizations, composed of various denominations of Christians, and including, also, (especially in Massachusetts,) a sect generally deemed, on a very vital point, broadly heterodox. But a single moment's consideration is sufficient to establish the wide difference between such a society, and a *church*. Such a Bible society is, in verity, but little more than a religious *printing* society; a benevolent association to subserve the information and interests of men in matters of the highest known wisdom. What else can be said of it, when its members acknowledge themselves so widely apart on points of the most essential importance in the question of a uniform belief? Let each sect composing such a society, insist on having its distinctive *belief* printed in each copy, as *comments* on the text, and how quickly would the whole organization be shivered to pieces! So that such a society may not only actually exist, but even long prosper, and yet the argument of Harmony, as advanced above, be not at all invalidated thereby.

Add to harmony, the subject of church *discipline*, and how plainly the necessity of a creed, or a formulary of faith, appears. Such an argument, we are aware, to those who eschew so unchristian a work as the disciplining of a wayward member, is of no force. But to those of an opposite mind, it is a point of no mean strength. By the same art with which men can embrace and teach error, can they evade the *charge* of it. If the only creed of the church be, "Thus saith the Lord," men may take part in the very rankest of errors, and yet answer to every complaint, "Thus saith the Lord;" beat off every assailant, let him "fetch what compass" he please, with the trusty weapon, "Thus saith the Lord." Witness, in confirmation, the ineffectual attempts (few and far between) of the Unitarian community of Massachusetts, to purge itself of the dregs of error.

“If he will not hear the church,” says the Saviour, “let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican.” But what is the church to which the offending one should listen? Is it the *Scriptures*? A new interpretation! One more step this way, would make the *Bible* exactly identical with the reader of it. But go back again to the range of reason, and let the reader of the *Scriptures* interpret them; give the church the right of a conclusion as to the *meaning* of the sacred oracles; leave her the “keys” which the Lord gave her, and then she is prepared to arise and do the work which is so vital to her purity.

Let us look at an example. Mr. O. H——, (now dead,) once a member of a church in Berkshire, Mass., was charged with holding the doctrine of universal salvation; the complaint was prosecuted unto conviction, and final condemnation. He was heard in defence; and what had he to say? He *admitted* the charge, but denied the *heresy*. He took his stand on the broad basis of the *Scriptures*. But fortunately for that church and its members, and fortunately for its character, influence, and very existence, it had a *creed*. By that creed this man was a “covenant breaker.” It was impossible for him to “wrest” the creed, as he so lamentably wrested the *Scriptures*. And thus, “after the first and second admonition,” the church “rejected” him.

After this manner, a thousand particular cases might be brought, to show how utterly futile would be every attempt of a church to enforce that command, “A man that is an heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject,” if churches were associated without definite agreement on the most important, and especially on the most controverted, points of doctrine. Who is this “heretic,” whom the church is to reject? What *constitute* the “heresies” of which Paul and Peter, apostles of the Lord, and planters of many of the churches of primitive times, speak, once and again? Without an exposition of Scripture, an adopted *sense* of it; without a formula, or confession of faith, expressed, or definitely understood; in other words, without a *creed*, there is no possible answer.

4. When men associate in the capacity of a church, the adoption of some special tenets of belief, commonly expressed among themselves in phraseology not found in the Scriptures, is almost literally *unavoidable*.

Men, so long as they remain men, *will* adopt something as their belief. This belief, whether written or unwritten, is their *creed* (credo). And this creed, in disregard of all attempts and shifts to the contrary, will, ever and anon, or constantly, show itself. Hence it comes to pass, that even those churches which professedly discard all creeds, not only hold to special and distinguishing views of Scripture truth, but those special views are openly and widely recognized as theirs. All the world knows, that such as properly pass by the name of Socinians or Unitarians, though with no avowed creed, hold common sentiments concerning certain contents of the Scriptures, which imply the free use of exposition, comments, and private interpretation, or opinion, upon those Scriptures. So, also, various branches of the great Baptist brotherhood, both at the North and at the South, notwithstanding their loud and reiterated assertions of a deep-rooted "aversion to all creeds but the Bible," and their careful avoidance of written or printed formulas, yet are plainly seen, by all men, to possess as definite and actual a creed, as any other cluster of believers whatever, or wherever. Do they admit any to their number or fellowship who refuse the rite of *immersion*? No. Here then, is their private interpretation of Scripture. The word *immersion*, by which they expound or explain baptism, contains their *gloss* of the sacred oracles. This is their formula of faith, their *symbol* of belief, their *sine qua non* of membership, their creed. And if, of their possession of a bona fide creed they themselves are ignorant, they are ignorant of something of which the whole world around them is well aware.

To produce in the minds of men some definite views of scriptural meaning, is the evident design, as well as tendency, of the whole functions of the *ministry*. It is to be the aim of the preacher, says Paul, to make men *believe*. That aim is commonly reached. Men *do* receive "the form of doctrine"

which is "delivered to them." Upon such a fact rests the existence of every sect. And this, indeed, incidentally furnishes us with the true origin of the diverse sects of Christians, viz. the diverse views, or beliefs, among the preachers or ministers of the word. "So we preach, and so ye have believed."

But *how* do men preach? By reciting *memoriter*, or exactly verbatim, the inspired word, and nothing more? Is a *reader* a *preacher*? Nay, "*Understandest* thou what thou readest?" said Philip to the eunuch. "How can I, except some man should guide me?" it was replied. This *guide* is the preacher. And unless some man had "guided" our fellow men of certain names, we doubt whether they would ever, as distinct societies, have identified baptism with immersion, or have denied that the Lord Jesus Christ was that Messiah who "brought in the atonement."

In short, how apparent it is, that so long as men *preach*, so long as men *hear*, they will *believe*; and that while there pertains to them a right, that each be persuaded in his *own* mind, these beliefs, or views, will more or less differ; and that these doctrinal differences among Christians, well known to each other, whether written or unwritten, whether ordained as permanent canons, or not, if sufficient to separate them into distinct clusters, are verily the undeniable *creeds* of their different churches.

5. To this subject, in all its simplicity, and in whatever apparent insignificance, the exigencies of the times seem to summon the careful attention of all who cherish the established order of most of the evangelical churches. As before suggested, the land swarms with those who impugn the common custom of the churches, under guise of appeal to the Scriptures, and with professions of great love for apostolic simplicity and purity. These calumniators, whenever and wherever found, either singly or associated, should, for the sake of the truth, the church, and the world, be boldly met. Their fallacies should be broadly unveiled; an exposition of the great absurdity of their position, the utter groundlessness of many of their

charges, and the absolutely untenable nature of their projects, should be repeatedly given to the world. The bandied phrases, also, of some circles, and so favorite with some prints, of the "bars and bolts" of churches, "human dogmas," "man-made creeds," etc., should be carefully analyzed, and answered, as occasions may offer. The young, and the misguided of every age, should be informed, and often reminded of it, that the appellations, so invidious and frightful when applied to ordinary confessions of faith, can be as properly applied to any speech, opinion, or *preaching* of men, whatever, that varies one jot or tittle from the precise phraseology of the Bible. Let them, for instruction's sake, hear the repeated retort, "human preaching," "man-made sermons," etc. For so says the preacher, who "moreover was wise:" "Answer a fool according to his own folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit." Let them be prompted to throw off the shackles of sound, or a *name*; for the great "decree" of the apostles at Jerusalem was a *dogma* (δόγμα, Acts 16: 4); and so all the commands of the "lively oracles;" and so all the wise sayings of pious men of every age, though not tending, as some think a dogma must, to "reject the commandments of God."

ARTICLE II.

CRITICISM OF RHETORIC.

By Prof. H. N. DAY, of Western Reserve College, Ohio.

WE are thoroughly conscious in our own minds, that it is with no vain conceit of effecting, in the humbler department of rhetorical science and art, what Kant, by his Critic of the Pure Reason, effected in that most noble province of mental science, that we have borrowed a hint from that celebrated work, for the plan and title of the present article. Yet convinced, as we are, that as a sense of want is the condition of

all efficient activity for man, so a clear perception and determination of the precise nature and source of the want, is the prerequisite for the successful regulation of that activity to procure the supply, we have been unavoidably driven upon this track in an endeavor to contribute something to the advancement of this important and interesting art. Not that we, by any means, expect or intend to establish, in these few pages, the principles on which an art of rhetoric must be constructed, in all their fullness and completeness. Our design is simply to suggest some particulars in which our present systems of rhetoric, indeed the prevailing views of this art, appear to us to be defective. Our eyes will, accordingly, be directed mainly to the present condition of rhetoric ; and the suggestions we shall offer, while we shall abstain from all extended criticism upon individual writers, will yet be taken from the historical point of view.

We conceive that it is time to look for a reconstruction of this art on a more firm and unquestionable philosophical basis. The want is felt extensively in our schools and séminaries of learning, indicating that the human mind has made that advancement in the kindred sciences and arts, which is needful for such a more perfect reconstruction. The present condition, too, of those kindred sciences, seems to call for the effort. Human intelligence, in all the various departments of its development, whether in science or in art, is, so to speak, subject to the laws of concrete growth. Philosophy and art, as the product of an organic mind, does not perfect first one branch, and then begin at another ; and so on, successively, in all its ramifications, into a full-branched tree. Root, branch, and twig, wait, to a certain extent, for each other ; rather develop themselves together, and mutually derive aid and nourishment, the one from the other. Rhetoric, indeed, presupposes logic and grammar ; as the branch presupposes the root, and the leaf the branch. It is extremely doubtful, nevertheless, whether logic or grammar can arrive at full maturity, without some culture of rhetoric. We shall not, in these preliminary remarks, stop to show this necessary dependence, in

respect to development, of logic and grammar on rhetoric. Our more immediate design, here, is to present the question in its full and proper light. Does not the present condition of these kindred sciences or arts indicate that the time has arrived for a corresponding advance on the part of rhetoric?

We shall have occasion, in the sequel, to look more closely at the relation between these sciences or arts; and shall here assume, that rhetoric, from its very nature, as the art of speaking, that is, of communicating thought by language, presupposes general logic, as the science which teaches the laws by which thought appears in the human mind; as also grammar, or the science which teaches the laws by which the forms of thought, as ascertained and determined by logic, appear in language. Now these presupposed sciences, are, we apprehend, in a so much more mature condition than they were when our present systems of rhetoric were for the most part constructed, that they seem not only to warrant, but also to call for a corresponding advancement of rhetorical art or science.¹

The relation of rhetorical science or art to the products of that art, equally indicates that the time has arrived for a reconstruction of our systems of rhetoric. Rhetoric and eloquence develop themselves together, in mutual dependence. There cannot be expected any perfect eloquence till after rhetoric has received some corresponding development, any more than there can be expected skilful physicians without some progress in the science of medicine. Systems of art, and productions in art, mature themselves step by step, harmoniously together, in the individual mind of the artist, and among men generally. Now the prevailing systems of rhetoric, derive their essential features from ancient eloquence. They have

¹ We name here as mere individual indications of this advancement in General Logic, as distinguished from Deductive Logic, and in Grammar, the masterly treatises of Prof. Tappan, on Logic, and of Prof. Latham, on The English Language. These are indexes of the present state of these sciences in our own language; and their appearance gives occasion for hearty congratulation to all the lovers of science.

but very partially, indeed, taken counsel from the new and striking forms which eloquence has assumed in later times. We have the authority of the author of the best, and the most popular work on rhetoric in the language, Dr. Whately,¹ for asserting, that "but little has been added, either in respect of matter or of system, to what the ancients have left us." We need, in illustration, to refer but to one entirely new form, which modern eloquence has assumed, that of the pulpit. For this department of eloquence, Aristotle's famous classification, adopted substantially by most succeeding writers among the Greeks and Romans, although professedly founded on the necessary conditions of all eloquence, and hence to be expected to embrace, not only all actual, but all possible forms of eloquence, makes no provision whatever. Now of all the departments of eloquence, this very one admits, perhaps, most readily, of a rigid reduction to philosophical system, and of being presented in the strictest form of an art. This department, in fact, has been in later times most cultivated; and is now, so far as respects reduction to the strict form of an art, most matured. We apprehend, however, it will be found, that even homiletics, so far, at least, as it has been developed in our own language, has not cast off its leading strings; and is still blindly following, to a great degree, the irrelevant teachings of the ancient rhetoricians.

If now, on all sides, there appear plain and decisive indications, that a reconstruction of our systems of rhetoric is demanded, it will not be deemed an idle or unpromising labor to endeavor to ascertain and establish the necessary principles, on which the work of such reconstruction must proceed. Our specific design, accordingly, in what follows, is to indicate some particulars in which the art of rhetoric, as it now exists, particularly in our own language, may be improved. In order that our remarks may be more clearly understood, we shall present them under the three following general heads, viz.:

¹ Elements of Rhetoric, Int. § 2.

the proper subject-matter of rhetoric ; the particular aim which it should seek ; and the mode of effecting this aim.

I. *The subject-matter of Rhetoric.* It is most obvious, that until the subject-matter of rhetoric be accurately determined, it must be utterly impossible to construct an art that shall possess any pretensions to philosophical accuracy and precision. And this is the first step to be taken. Until a man knows of what subject he is to treat, he certainly cannot determine with what aim he is to handle it ; much less select the means by which this aim is to be accomplished. If the general subject be known, and yet its precise boundaries and limitations be not ascertained and established, the whole work of constructing an art must proceed in blindness, and the result be but confusion and perplexity. What, then, precisely, is the subject-matter of rhetoric ? The object we have in view at the present time, will lead us to give an historical, rather than a philosophical answer to this question. We shall accordingly, present the views of leading rhetoricians on this point.

That rhetoric has to do with discourse, in the wider sense of that term, as signifying the expression of thought and feeling in language, all agree. This is far, however, from defining and distinguishing the province of rhetoric. Grammar, logic to a certain extent, poetry, vocal music, have to do with this general subject. How is rhetoric distinguished, so far as respects the determination of the subject-matter, from other, and all kindred arts ?

Aristotle defined rhetoric to be the power of perceiving, in any particular subject, whatever can persuade.¹ We are not to suppose, however, that Aristotle, in this, was intending to give an exact and complete definition of rhetoric, by which it shall be distinguished from *all* other arts or sciences. It is obvious, from the context, that he was aiming to discriminate it only from *certain* other arts, as medicine, geometry, etc.

¹ Rhetoric, B. I. c. 2.

These arts produced persuasion in regard only to particular subjects, as disease, accidents of space ; while rhetoric regarded any subject whatever. Quintilian's criticism, founded on this definition,¹ that it excludes style, is not warranted by the actual view which Aristotle presents of the rhetorical art. Indeed, in near connection with this definition, he says that credibility, so far as it depends on the character of the speaker, must be procured by the discourse itself, and not by the previous judgment formed of him by the bearer ; which remark obviously implies a comprehension by the writer of something more than mere topics of persuasion in his idea of rhetoric. The subject-matter of this art, in the view of Aristotle, is persuasive discourse, including as well style and delivery as matter.

Quintilian, the next most celebrated writer on the art among the ancients, took a far more comprehensive view. He embraced in the subject-matter of rhetoric all good discourse whatever. "Rhetoric," he says, "is the art of speaking well." That, however, he did not intend to include poetry, or even history, is plain from the plan of his treatise. Cicero, likewise, evidently viewed rhetoric as identical with oratory.

In none of the ancient writers do we find any thing like a clear, precise, philosophical determination of the subject-matter of rhetoric. Nor, indeed, have the moderns, for the most part, succeeded any better. Campbell, who without question, has furnished the best contribution to the science that our language contains, in his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, is at best but obscure on this point. While he adopts Quintilian's definition of eloquence, interpreted to mean "that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end," and thus includes all kinds of discourse, he still seems to regard all

¹ *Instit. Orat.* B. I. c. 15, § 13. Dr. Whately seems equally to have misapprehended Aristotle, in the remark that he includes under the term Rhetoric nothing beyond the finding of topics of persuasion, as far as regards the matter of what is spoken. *Rhet. Inst.* § 1.

discourse as address, and hence identifies rhetoric with oratory. Not, however, in the same sense as Cicero. Cicero excludes history, essay, and the like; Campbell expressly includes all kinds of composition, provided, at least, it be in prose. Blair, in his Lectures on Rhetoric, has avoided all discussion of the question respecting the proper province of rhetoric; while he embraces in his work the principles of taste generally, the nature of language, and the various departments of literary composition. Dr. Whately, in his Elements of Rhetoric, has taken ground peculiar, so far as we are informed, to himself. He confines his treatise to *argumentative composition*; assigning, as his reason, the origin of rhetoric from logic. "Considering rhetoric," he says, "(in conformity with the very just and philosophical view of Aristotle,) as an offshoot from logic."¹ This limitation of the subject-matter of rhetoric, we conceive, is entirely fanciful, and cannot long be retained. It is opposed to the most generally received notions on the subject; is irreconcilable with the settled use of language; and rests on no philosophical basis. Argumentative composition includes the demonstrations of mathematical theorems, the processes of analytical geometry even, as well as judicial discussions; the jejune disquisitions of metaphysics, as well as the impassioned oratory of the senate. At the same time it excludes from the province of rhetoric not only historical composition, but also, all those kinds of oratory into which syllogistic reasoning does not enter; consequently all that department of eloquence, denominated by the ancients Pan-

¹ That Dr. Whately is right in regarding rhetoric as an offshoot from logic, no one can question. But all will not agree with him in limiting the application of the term Logic to "the art of reasoning" merely. This, others, we think more correctly, have regarded only as one department of logic—that which teaches the development of those judgments which are derived by deduction from other more general truths. Logic, in its more general sense, embraces the consideration of the origin of all our conceptions and judgments. Rhetoric must properly be regarded as founded on this General Logic; and its subject-matter is coextensive, in a certain sense, with the basis on which it rests. That is, all the conceptions and judgments, the origin of which is explained in General Logic, may be materials of the rhetorical art.

egyric, as well as all explanatory discourse in the eloquence of the pulpit. Dr. Whately, himself, seems to have been advised of the inaccuracy of his position ; and seeks to save himself by distinguishing conviction generally, the admitted object of all reasoning, into conviction proper and instruction.¹ But if reasoning be allowed to include the processes of instruction, as well as those of conviction proper, then the apparent philosophical basis he had thought to secure for the determination of the subject-matter of rhetoric, deductive logic, vanishes at once ; and rhetoric no longer rests on this alone, but on something else, viz., the science of cognitions generally. It is not strange that Dr. Whately loses sight almost entirely, in the subsequent part of his work, of the processes of instruction, so far as distinct from those of conviction, and confines himself to the latter.

Among the moderns, the Germans, as might have been anticipated from the philosophical character of their minds, have labored most to lay a scientific foundation for the art of rhetoric. The particular question now under consideration, however, has not, so far as we know, been discussed in this specific form. It is not difficult, still, to ascertain their views, from the kindred subjects which they have investigated to great lengths. As near as we can determine from the limited examination we have been able to make of their rhetorical systems, they have, for the most part, followed in the track of Aristotle, and regarded as the proper subject-matter of rhetoric, only what in speech is adapted to persuade. Schott, in his *Theory of Eloquence*, classifies all discourse into three grand divisions, corresponding to the three departments of human activity, viz., the faculty of cognition, the capacity of feeling, and the will. These divisions are, accordingly, 1, Proper prose, which expresses the condition of quiet perception and thought ; 2, Poetry, the language of vivid feeling ; and 3, Eloquence proper, which proceeds from the condition of an internal endeavor, and seeks to obtain a control-

¹ Rhet. Part I. c. 1, § 1.

ling influence over the will of others.¹ Rhetoric, thus, according to this theory, embraces whatever in speech is fitted to move the will, including not only argumentative discourse, but also explanatory, or what is fitted to instruct, and likewise pathetic, or what is fitted to excite the feelings. This theory contemplates strictly, however, no further employment of either of these three species of discourse than is necessary in order to produce an effect on the will.

Not very dissimilar seems to have been the view of Richter, in his *Compend of Rhetoric*.² He appears not to regard it as at all inconsistent with this, to include history, epistolary composition, dialogue, etc., in the proper province of the art; since he maintains that the personality of the writer enters into history, and gives character to it. Without this personality, history has nothing in common with eloquence.³

We can hardly bring ourselves to acquiesce in this view, without extending the signification of the term "persuasion" further than usage will warrant. If nothing but persuasive discourse can properly be admitted to constitute the subject-matter of rhetoric, and persuasion respects the will alone, then some of the leading departments of oratory, as ever heretofore regarded, are at once excluded. We find in it no place for explanatory discourse; none for pathetic, when the aim of the speaker is accomplished, when he has unfolded the truth to the intelligence of his hearers, or awakened their passions, or gratified their fancy. Even argumentative discourse, where the conviction does not contain a practical truth, is excluded.

It is to be remarked, that in the views of the proper subject-matter of rhetoric thus far presented, the principle of limitation is sought in the aim or end to be effected by the speaker in the mind of the hearer. It will have appeared, we trust,

¹ See his *Kurtzer Entwurf einer Theorie der Beredsamkeit*, §§ 4-7. We have not his larger work now at hand.

² *Lehrbuch der Rhetorik* von Heinrich Richter, weil. Prof. der Phil. in Leipzig. 2te Aufl. Leipzig. 1842.

³ *Id.* § 62.

from the cursory representation that has been given, that this is not the principle of limitation which is applicable to the case. It is arbitrarily assumed, and is shown, by the erroneous and inconsistent results to which it leads, to be incorrect.

Another German writer, G. C. J. Hoffmann, has founded his classification of discourse in the kind of activity which it calls forth.¹ Poetry is distinguished from prose by the circumstance that in it the mind uses the material freely in its creative power, (*ποίησις*, creation,) giving it such form as it pleases: whereas in prose, the material is allowed to retain its own determinate character; and in the representation of the thought, the objective element in the material furnishes the law. Rhetoric has to do only with prose, and is, to use his own language, "the doctrine of the laws of the representation of an objective content in the thought."² He afterward distinguishes three varieties of prosaic representation, according to the different relations in which the mind may stand to the object to be represented: the historical, the systematic or philosophical, and the proper rhetorical.³

It will be observed, on a narrow inspection of the different views that have thus been taken of the subject-matter of rhetoric, that writers on the art have taken the one or the other of two different positions in their respective views. As discourse, of which rhetoric treats, consists of a twofold nature—the thought, a pure, spiritual essence; and language, the body in which thought manifests itself—it was natural that writers should direct their attention, more or less, rather to one side than the other. When the logical side has been taken, as in the case of Hoffmann, Schott, Whately, and Aristotle, the range given to the subject-matter has been more limited;

¹ *Philosophie der Rede*: Stuttgart und Tübingen. Cotta'schen verlag. 1841.

² Introduction, p. 20.

³ Chap. III. We forbear attempting to exhibit the grounds of this distinction, from the fear that our representation, without extending it too far, might be unintelligible to our readers, as well as from the distrust of our own apprehension of the author's meaning in all respects being correct.

and poetry, history, and, sometimes, even other forms of composition have been excluded from the province of rhetoric. When, on the other hand, the grammatical side has been taken, as in the case of Cicero,¹ and our English and French rhetoricians, and the expression has been the main thing regarded, it was not easy to discover the boundaries which separated the various kinds of composition, and poetry, history, and oratory came alike within the range of view.

As, however, rhetoric is neither logic nor grammar, any more than speech is thought or sound simply, so the proper determination of the province of rhetoric is to be sought from the essential nature of speech, and not from the laws of thought or vocal sounds. Anthropology, as a science, does not find its limits exclusively either in metaphysics or in animal physiology; and all the subdivisions of the science must be sought in itself as a whole, existing by itself, but distinguishable into parts. So rhetoric must receive its limitations from the essential nature of discourse, of which all agree it treats. Speech, being essentially the verbal communication of thought, is founded at once on the opposition of speaker and hearer, as its most generic and fundamental idea. Its true original form, therefore, is address—oratory, as distinguished from mere eloquence or expression without exterior aim. This, therefore, constitutes the proper subject-matter of rhetoric.

But language may be employed for uses entirely incidental. It may be used for a medium of thought, merely, as the symbols and diagrams of the mathematician are employed to facilitate the processes of investigation. Language may be used, likewise, merely as a repository of thought. In other words, the activity of the mind may seek to embody itself in the forms of language, without distinct and prominent refer-

¹ Cicero seems to struggle between the two. He had embraced the Aristotelian system; but he lost sight, as Hoffmann well observes, of the distinctive end of rhetoric that characterizes that system, and veering to the *formal* side of discourse, appears sometimes inconsistent with himself, and does not know what to do with history, whether to embrace it in rhetoric or not; and cannot distinguish poetry from oratory by any well defined lines. See de Orat. I. 16.

ence to an effect on other minds. This exterior reference may be more or less lost sight of; and the representation of thought accordingly deviates more or less from the proper function of speech as a medium of communication. Now in poetry, history, and scientific compositions, obviously, this opposition of speaker and hearer, to a greater or less degree, disappears. The thought appears more as a mere incorporation in language, with no distinct and controlling design on another mind, with a view to produce a determinate effect there. It ceases to be address. They are hence to be regarded as abnormal forms of discourse; and should be so regarded in rhetoric. In other words, rhetoric should confine itself to address—to discourse in which the opposition of speaker and hearer is prominent. This contains in itself all the principles of rhetoric; and it is unnecessary for any practical utility, or even for any scientific purpose, to treat distinctly of the essay, history, etc. Rhetoric, indeed, as the art of oratory, embraces the consideration of all the various processes of representation of thought, as by narration, description, argumentation, etc. But these are to be treated, as in fact they are, only as specific forms of address.

But, further, speech is in its original, essential form, oral, and not written. Epistolary composition, therefore, although keeping prominent throughout the opposition of speaker and hearer, is yet, as communicated only through written symbols, and not implying the presence of the hearer, to be regarded, likewise, as an abnormal form of discourse.

The dialogue, moreover, is indeed grounded on this opposition lying at the foundation of all oratory; but, in its proper form, is distinguished from proper address, by its being broken, while address is continuous. This fragmentary character, together with the circumstance that, except when it is merely imitative, the two or more minds that unite in it give to it a double or manifold unity, so to speak, places it out of the proper range of art. Where it is imitative, that is, where the unity of a single mind is represented under the form of the

opposition of two or more speaking, it conforms to the principles of proper oratory.¹

We might proceed to show thus, how all the other various forms of composition which do not belong to the class of oratory proper, should not constitute the proper subject-matter of rhetoric. The remarks we have already made will suffice; and we trust to show that pure address, in which the opposition of speaker and hearer is a controlling element, determines the range of rhetoric, so far as respects its subject-matter; while other forms of representation of thought in speech should be treated only incidentally, and as abnormal forms. This idea of the proper subject-matter of rhetoric has a true philosophical basis in the nature of speech. It would give unity, precision, and completeness, as well as order, to a scientific development of the rhetorical art. At the same time it precludes the necessity of a distinct consideration of what have been taken to be distinct specific forms of discourse; since for them all the general principles are provided in the development of the proper oratorical art.

II. *The particular aim of Rhetoric.* We are yet far from having determined the proper province of rhetoric when we have ascertained merely its subject-matter. It remains still to define the mode of using this subject-matter, in order to distinguish it from kindred sciences or arts.

A preliminary question arises here, Is rhetoric properly a science, or an art? This, indeed, is a question which is more important for him to settle, who is about to construct a rhetorical system, than for those devoted to other arts or sciences. They need only to know the relations of rhetoric to their own departments; and obviously the boundaries of rhetoric remain the same, whether it be regarded as a science or an art. But

¹ Most rhetorical critics have remarked the close alliance between the dialogue and proper oratory. That alliance is founded in the opposition that is kept up both between speaker and hearer; on the other hand, they have cautioned against suffering the discourse to fall to the form of the essay. The caution is just, for the essay drops this opposition.

for him it is an all-important question. The determination of it determines at once the entire character and form of his system. Now this, it would seem, is a question which most writers on rhetoric have forborne to discuss or settle. We find, accordingly, the respective peculiarities of a science and of an art mingled confusedly together in most existing treatises; some authors leaning more to the scientific side, others more to the side of art.

It is unnecessary here to develop at length the particulars which distinguish a scientific system from an art. It is sufficient for our object to assume, what all will allow, that there is a fundamental distinction between them. A science has to do with principles, with no reference to their application, but merely with reference to their truth and relations. An art, on the other hand, assumes the principles as established, the relations as ascertained, and applies those principles to the cultivation and regulation of the particular activity which the art involves. Every art is founded on science; and hence, a philosophy of rhetoric must precede a systematic art, as it must constitute the basis on which the latter rests, and furnish the materials which it is to employ. A strictly scientific system can never accomplish the object of an art. The most faithful study of the principles of acoustics, of harmonies, and whatever science lies at the basis of music, will never make a musician. A science gains its end, when it is known; an art, when it can be exercised skilfully. The former respects mere intelligence, or knowing; the latter, the creative powers. Philosophies of rhetoric may be of great service to the man of science; they may, by being studied, discipline the intellect, as may the study of any other science; they may give to the writer and the speaker, a more accurate and intelligent understanding of the art of oratory; but it is too much to expect of them that, of themselves, in the accomplishment of their legitimate design, they will ever make accomplished orators, or even develop and cultivate the powers of expression. This is the province of the art of rhetoric.¹

¹ It is, we conceive, because Dr. Whately's *Rhetoric* has assumed more the

In the construction of these, writers would do well to bear in mind the just observation of Aristotle, that, in proportion as any one endeavors to discuss either dialectics or rhetoric, not as powers, but as sciences, so far, he ignorantly destroys the nature of them.

We have before observed, that logic and grammar are presupposed in rhetoric. They both have to do with the same subject-matter, so far that no determination of that will accurately distinguish them from rhetoric. We have to look, accordingly, elsewhere for the further limitation of the latter science or art. We discover the principle of limitation in the different aims which these sciences respectively propose to themselves. Logic exposes the laws of thought generally, without reference to the content or object of thought. It enumerates the possible kinds of thoughts, whether conceptions, judgments, or conclusions; classifies them, and determines their forms. Grammar unfolds the laws by which these forms of thought appear in language; by which logical conceptions embody themselves in words, and logical judgments and conclusions, in sentences. Now these general forms of thought and of language are independent of the particular content of thought. The conceptions and judgments of logic, and the words and sentences of grammar, are accordingly isolated and aimless. It is the aim of rhetoric to fill these empty forms of logic and grammar with meaning. It penetrates them with a living aim, or intent, and by this makes the scattered, lifeless fragments of these sciences living and constituent members of a whole. As an art, more exactly and precisely, it developes and regulates the power of selecting the appropriate thoughts that have been gathered up in experience, clothing them in the necessary logical and grammatical forms, and thus

form of an art, than the works of Campbell, Blair, and Jamieson, which are rather philosophies than arts, that it has so generally displaced them in the lower classes of our colleges and in our high schools, where the training of pupils in the power of communicating thought is particularly aimed at. And yet how defective is Whately's treatise, regarded as an art, in the strict sense of the term! It is, after all, more a philosophy than an art.

using them most effectively for the attainment of the great ends of speaking. Rhetoric, thus, while it grounds itself directly on logic and grammar, is distinguished from them both by a well defined boundary. As a science, it cannot be well comprehended without a previous knowledge of the principles both of logic and grammar. As an art, however, this previous knowledge is not indispensable; just as an acquaintance with the scientific principles of harmonies is not indispensable as a prerequisite to the culture of music. This distinction is important as determining the place in which the study of sciences and of arts of rhetoric in our courses of education should be arranged. The art of rhetoric may be inculcated gradually from the earliest stages. Indeed, as it is of the utmost importance that the creative power should be developed harmoniously with the taste, it should be introduced early. The science of rhetoric, on the other hand, must necessarily be a dry, uninteresting study, for the very good reason that it is unintelligible, if it be made to precede these studies in the course.¹

But rhetoric bears a close relation to another science or art, from which it is needful carefully to distinguish it; and the more needful because the distinction has been still less observed than that between it and logic and grammar. We allude to the science of criticism, or taste. Discourse, as appearing in the forms of language, comes directly within the scope of æsthetics. Oratory belongs to the class of the fine or elegant arts, as employing the highest and noblest powers of the human mind. Its productions must necessarily proceed in conformity with the principles of taste. But rhetoric is not

¹ The study of Jamieson's treatise, excellent as it is as a compendious philosophical system of rhetoric, and well adapted to more advanced classes, could not but prove almost useless to students who know nothing of logic. Yet this treatise, as if to accommodate itself in part to this difficulty, touches but lightly on the logical side of rhetoric, and gives great prominence to the grammatical. But even this was not sufficient to save it from being rejected; for only advanced students, as a general truth, acquire enough of the principles of language to be interested in that science.

æsthetics, nor a mere branch of that science. Yet some writers, mistaking a mere line of contact for actual field, because they perceived that rhetoric and æsthetics possessed something in common, have rashly assumed their identity, and represented rhetoric as a merely critical art. Indeed, most if not all the writers on rhetoric in our language have fallen more or less into this serious error; and most of their treatises are rather applications of æsthetics to rhetoric, than arts of rhetoric. But geometry is not algebra, although analytic processes may be applied to that science; neither are music, elocution, poetry, and rhetoric, constituent parts of æsthetics. It would be just as absurd to attempt to teach gardening or music on æsthetic principles, as rhetoric. No one of these arts just named can, with propriety or truth, be denominated critical arts, on any other ground than this, that the principles of criticism are applicable to them.

This confusion of rhetoric with æsthetics, which consists essentially in substituting mere form for substance, has been in the highest degree detrimental. Not only has it given a one-sided development to systems of rhetoric, and thereby led to theoretical errors, but it has also still more injuriously affected practical oratory. By giving chief prominence to criticism, wherever systems of rhetoric constructed on this view have been in use, it has directly obstructed the very culture of the art they were designed to promote. In oratory, (and the remark is equally applicable to all kinds of composition,) as in every other art, invention constitutes the main element of artistic power. This is the more purely intellectual element; and the other constituent of artistic power, execution, is the mere power to carry out and represent in sensible forms the products of the intellectual element, or invention. It is true of both of these, but more emphatically true of invention, that it cannot proceed with any success, unless perfectly free. Although necessarily working in taste, and although the highest taste is indispensable to the highest art, still, if the artist, the inventor, be steadfastly regarding the principles of taste, be criticising, studying the manner, his

work must proceed most limpingly and awkwardly. To act the critic while inventing, is unavoidably to kill invention. And this is precisely what our systems of rhetoric occasion. They make students critics ; they develop the taste disproportionately, and then make criticism the chief thing in oratory, or composition generally ; and the necessary result is, that invention is at a stand. Those who have had any opportunity of making observations in this matter must have noticed, that the chief hinderance to the successful culture of the art of writing and speaking with young students, is the extreme disgust they feel with every effort they make. These æsthetical systems of rhetoric only make this difficulty tenfold greater. It is by no means to be wondered at, that so many men of sound judgment and accurate observation, especially men who have themselves surmounted all the difficulties in the attainment of high artistic power, have rejected arts of elocution and rhetoric as worse than useless. Our own conviction is decided, that æsthetical treatises in either art are directly hostile to the most successful culture of these arts, until the artistic power is developed to a considerable degree. And, with scarcely an exception, in our language such beauties have been, in their predominant character, æsthetical.¹

¹ It is most remarkable that Dr. Whately, with all his acuteness, has failed to perceive the real source of the objection against most of the existing systems of elocution. While he utterly reprobates these systems, and we think justly, so far as constructed chiefly as critical and not as developing arts, he yet admits that the system he reprobates is precisely the same as that he has recommended and taught in that very treatise in respect to the conduct of arguments. The distinction which he endeavors to make, for the purpose of obviating the charge of inconsistency, between the essential natures of the two arts, does not exist. It is as true of invention in arguments as of elocution, that reflex attention on the act necessarily impedes its performance. In both, but, if possible, in a still higher degree in invention, the whole soul must be exclusively occupied in the creative act itself. If it turn aside to criticise what it has produced, it must necessarily cease, in part at least, creating ; or, what is the same thing, producing arguments or appropriate verbal utterances. His whole reasoning on the subject furnishes as good an example of sophistry for the application of the principles of his logic as could be desired. The sophistry consists in the equivocal use of certain words or phrases ; such as, " deliberately " " giving attention

The taste, almost unavoidably in our courses of education, is cultivated disproportionately to the creative powers. Arts of rhetoric, whose aim it is to develop these powers, so far as the communication of thought in language is concerned, should, therefore, in order to be successful, if any thing, give still less prominence to rhetorical criticism, or æsthetics, than otherwise would be requisite in a full, scientific development. It should be their aim to give a decided stimulus to the inventive faculties, both as it respects thought and language; to furnish occasion for the exercise of these powers, and direct in their operation; while criticism should be kept rather in the background, until the work of invention can proceed freely, and without embarrassment; certainly until progress has been made beyond that line, within which the dissatisfaction a refined taste feels with the products of a feeble creative power, impedes the exercise of invention, and repels from undertaking it. The exertion of artistic power is one of the happiest employments of man. It should ever be made attractive and inviting. To be so, however, it must be in-

to," etc. In one sense of these expressions, the inventor of arguments and the speaker must be "deliberate," "give attention to" what he is doing. He must argue, speak as an intelligent, conscious being. In another sense, neither can well be "deliberate" or "attentive." He cannot make his invented arguments or his vocal expressions matters of reflex deliberation and attention; he cannot even deliberate or direct his attention on what he is doing, without obstructing his work. For when he does this, he enters on another entirely different, indeed, opposite employment; and they both cannot go on well together. Speaking and arguing are both alike free, spontaneous acts; and a state of conscious reflection is hostile to both. Dr. Whately has applied these expressions in one sense to arguing, in the other to elocution; and thus "*seems to say something*." But even this argument, admitting its soundness, will not save what he has introduced on the subject of style in his Rhetoric.

The truth is, that just so far as systems of art, so called, tend to lead the learner to *reflect* on what he is doing in practising them, so far they oppose the very aim of all such systems. It is because our systems of rhetoric, and also of elocution, almost without exception, as remarked in the text, have this tendency, that judicious men have so much reprobated them.

It is but due to justice to say here, that so far as we know, Dr. Whately's Art of Rhetoric is the only one in the language on that subject which is not obnoxious to this fatal objection.

spired and sustained by the pleasure with which it contemplates its own happy exercises. A refinement of taste, disproportionate to the creative power, is fatal to this pleasure. Raphael, in the maturity of taste, would never have attempted another work with his pencil, if his artistic skill had not matured with his taste : and the works of his earlier style would have been his last, or if not the last, certainly the best.

III. *The particular mode by which the art of Rhetoric is to effect its aim.* We have indicated the general aim of rhetoric to be the development and regulation of the power of attaining the great ends of discourse, through the forms that are given by logic and grammar, and under the control of æsthetic principles. This, at least, is the specific aim of the art of rhetoric ; and a science or philosophy of rhetoric differs from an art only in this : that the former investigates and establishes the principles and relations of rhetoric, while the latter assumes these principles and relations, and applies them to the regulation of the faculty of discourse. The general answer to the inquiry, by what means the art of rhetoric is to effect this aim, is given us by the very nature of an art. Every art respects an activity ; and its proper aim is to develop and regulate that activity as exerted on the proper subject-matter of the art. The exertion, however, of all proper artistic power, must proceed in taste. The particular means, therefore, by which an art is to effect its aim are indicated in the answer to the question, How may the æsthetical development of the artistic power be effected ? The analysis of the complex activity called forth in oratory will hence determine, at once, what are the particular means by which the rhetorical art shall accomplish its aim. For it is plain, the successful culture of any complex activity in man can proceed only by singling out the particular activities that constitute the complex whole, and by directing the attention distinctly and successively to each. The human mind learns generals only from particulars. The accomplished musician has not acquired his skill by practising from the beginning, and only, on overtures. He attended first, perhaps, to the

mere attitude ; and before he produced a musical note, he received minute instruction as to the position most favorable to the happiest execution. Next he was taught the method of fingering. Then he was initiated into all the complicated mysteries of melody, step by step, one function after another, one part of each function after another part, the intervals, the chords, etc., etc. Time, force, harmony, taste in execution, successively were brought before him ; and mastering one by one, he ultimately attained the perfection of the concrete art.

It will not be difficult to effect such an analysis of the activity exerted in oratory. It divides itself into the invention of the thought animated with the appropriate feeling, the embodying this thought in language, and the oral delivery. These are all constituents of oratory in the full sense. But the last named, oral delivery, including gesture, is not a necessary constituent ; inasmuch as the part which it is to perform in the art, the execution or exhibition to the minds of others, may be performed by another process which involves no art—writing or dictation. The other two are essential ; since the product of the art can in no sense exist until the body of the language is completed. It is not a sufficient reason for excluding style from rhetoric, as Dr. Whately has seemed to think, because style is common to other arts. Even if oratory may not properly be considered to embrace all normal forms of composition, the mere fact that a process is common to several arts, is not a sufficient ground for separating it from all or either. It is the legitimate business of an art to embrace all that is essential to the completion of its proper product.

If now, we confine the scope of rhetoric to the two ever indispensable constituents, the provision of the thought, and the investment of it in forms of language, it will not be questioned, that the activities engaged in these two processes respectively, may be so separated, as that one may receive commanding attention, and the other, for the time, be dropt from view. So, likewise, are these individual activities susceptible of further analysis, at least in regard to the occasion on which

they are to be exercised, so that the attention of the learner may be confined to a still narrower part of the process.

In regard to the first process, the provision of the thought, as is well known, the ancient rhetoricians constructed a complete art by itself, which was denominated invention. In this they proposed to furnish to the young speaker the needful guides and aids for acquiring the power to command thought for all species of discourse and for every part of it. To this end, they divided the discourse into its several parts, as the exordium, the narration, etc., and enumerated the classes of thoughts, or rather the sources from which thoughts might be derived appropriate to that particular part. Under the head of confirmation, as one such part of discourse, came, of course, the invention of arguments, which Aristotle treated under the denomination of the Topical art. On this one branch he wrote an entire treatise, now lost; and after him, Cicero thought it of importance enough to warrant him in drawing out at length the whole system of topics, for the use of a practical orator. This topical system, so much cultivated by ancient rhetoricians and studied by ancient orators, so much perverted and abused and corrupted in succeeding ages, so much despised and neglected by moderns, and especially in our own language, had, we conceive, a philosophical idea for its basis, and was constructed, so far as respects its general character, on sound and judicious views of practical utility. Indeed, the experience of the ancient orators, who made it their earnest study, sufficiently proves its usefulness.¹ The gross abuses and perversions which it, in common with almost every thing else, experienced in the subsequent degeneracy of the race, are an adequate explanation of the prevalent neglect of it. It is to be admitted, indeed, that the topics of the ancients

¹ There is no doubt in our minds that the great success which has attended the publication of Dr. Whately's *Art of Rhetoric* is to be attributed to the fact that he has introduced into it the essential features of the topical system. His first part on Conviction, which is little else than a system of topics, is the part which gives character and value to the work. It is this part which possesses most of the character of an art, as distinguished from a science.

were not, at least in our opinion they were not, a perfect system. The principles of general logic were not sufficiently ascertained and settled to render possible the construction of a perfect topical system. The ideas of eloquence entertained by the ancients were also too contracted in some respects. Their topics were suited only to argumentative discourse, and, indeed, constructed almost exclusively in reference to judicial eloquence. Those systems of rhetoric, accordingly, as for instance, that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which were founded, not on the idea of a discourse generally, but on eloquence as consisting of various species, did not even admit such topical arts.

The principle on which these systems of topics were constructed seems to be this: that all arguments or proofs could be reduced to a few distinct classes; by an acquaintance with which, the speaker might readily turn at once to the class appropriate to any given case of argumentation; might at once satisfy himself whether in invention he had explored the whole field of proofs or arguments applicable to the case; might determine, also, the relative weight of arguments of different classes, and thus the proper order in the arrangement; might, above all, for this is the great practical recommendation of such systems, by exercise in searching in particular fields of arguments, render himself more ready, expert, and dexterous in the invention of arguments generally. It was but a most gross abuse of this art that it was made a substitute for a thorough investigation of the subject, or for general and extended acquisitions of knowledge; that ignorant rhetoricists, if we may so call them, like ignorant sophists in dialectics, endeavored to make the mere forms of proofs,—for the topics, in enumerating merely the classes, gave only the forms,—pass for the substance and content of arguments. On the contrary, the legitimate tendency and effect of these systems was to invite the young orator to explore all the fields of knowledge, and thus enable himself to adduce arguments at need, in all the different forms or of all the different classes which the topics had enumerated to him. We regard it, therefore,

as a great defect in our English systems of rhetoric, that this department of the art has been so much underrated and neglected.¹ The Germans have been wiser in this respect.

The analysis of the activity employed in invention may proceed on diverse principles, each of which it will be expedient to adopt and apply to a certain extent, independently of the others ; yet, also, to a certain extent, as principles of generic and specific analysis. We may distinguish discourse generally into its several kinds, and we shall thus obtain the specific departments of eloquence, as of the Senate, of the Bar, of the Pulpit, etc., in each of which, obviously, the process of invention goes on in a manner peculiar to itself. Or we may take the discourse itself as the concrete whole, which is to be separated into its several parts ; and then what is peculiar in the several processes of invention for the exordium, narration, etc., will be exhibited. Or again, we may adopt as the principle of analysis, the diversity in the processes of representation generally, as of description, or the representation of objects in the relations of space, and the analogous relations for abstract and spiritual objects ; of narration, which represents objects in the relations of time with its analogous forms in the spiritual or ideal world ; of philosophical or scientific representation, which conceives of objects in reference not to an objective unity, as in narrative and description, but to a subjective ; of argumentation, which constitutes a distinct species

¹ We earnestly hope that none will suffer themselves to form a judgment of the true merits of systems of topics from the few and rare specimens we have in our language. Sturtevant, in his *Preacher's Manual*, has given from Claude an application of this system which is as repulsive to every generous mind as it is philosophically corrupt. It is, indeed, a most wretched misconception and abuse of the whole thing. The object seems to be not to facilitate and quicken invention, and so promote originality, but to furnish thought, and so repress and deaden all impulse to originality. The cure of the evil, except in regard to the credit of the topical art itself, is, however, in itself. No man will ever submit to the drudgery of acquiring it. It is a marvel that the author could have submitted to the drudgery of writing it. Dr. Whately alone seems to have comprehended the true spirit and aim of the system. Yet it is easy to show wherein his system fails in practical utility.

of representation in reference to the varieties before named, and is distinguished from them by the circumstance, that while they seek as their end information or instruction, this seeks to convince ; of that species of discourse, in which the gratification of the taste is the end proposed ; of pathetic and persuasive discourse, the one aiming to excite or assuage the feelings, the other to move the will.

It is not necessary here, to expose, much less to attempt to justify, a still further analysis of these particular processes. What has already been observed in speaking of the topics as the art of cultivating invention in the particular department of argumentation, will serve to show at once the practicability and utility of such more extended analysis. It is clear that the more specific, individual, and distinct the exercise proposed to the learner, the more perfect will his training be likely to be.

In the same manner may that particular activity in discourse which is employed in arranging or disposing the thought be analyzed in reference to the particular kinds or parts of discourse, or the process of representation. It is, indeed, hardly distinguishable from invention proper, in the nature of the activity or the time of its exertion. It, however, admits of distinct study and culture. It has principles of its own, which may be represented in distinct and peculiar forms. It admits, especially, of perhaps a more ready treatment in the actual training of the pupil, than even the processes in invention proper.

The other necessary constituent of oratory, the embodying of the invented and arranged thought in appropriate language, although both processes in the concrete art go on simultaneously together, may yet be conceived of and represented distinctly, with a view to distinct and separate study and culture. It will be found, moreover, to admit of a similar analysis into the particular activities or processes which it embraces. Although this branch of the oratorical art belongs to the second grand department of artistic power, denominated execution, in distinction from invention, it partakes essentially of the same nature. It is, like the other, the exercise of an

activity ; while invention represents to the mind of the artist, execution carries out and represents the invented conception or idea to the minds of others. They are both, in their exercises, creations ; and as activities, equally admit of indefinite degrees of development and culture.

The analysis of this activity, the representation of invented thought to the minds of others, with a view to a certain effect there, must be founded on the actual nature of the activity as a complex whole, or what in fact amounts to the same thing, the occasions of its exercise. It is apparent from the merest glance, that there are three things that determine the character of this activity ; they are, the thought to be represented in all the characteristic individuality of the living speaker ; the medium of representation, viz., language ; and the aim or effect to be produced in the mind addressed, which must vary, so far as the manner of representation is concerned, according to the individual peculiarities of that mind. We have, then, at once, the foundation given us for an accurate and philosophical classification of the various processes of verbal representation. In other words, we have the principle for the enumeration and classification of the different properties of style. They are those which are founded on the particular thought to be represented as it lies in the speaker's mind ; those founded on the nature of language, and those determined by the particular effect on the mind addressed. Inasmuch as it is the verbal representation which constitutes the essential character of this branch of the oratorical art, we may, for the sake of convenience, denominate the properties of style which are founded on the medium of representation or language, the absolute properties ; and the other two classes, the relative properties ; the one, consisting of those founded in the thought in the speaker's mind, the relative-subjective ; the other, the relative-objective. These classes are obviously susceptible of still further division ; and the subdivision will show where must fall what are so loosely denominated *figures*¹ It is our object now, however, not to

¹ The subject of figures, regarded from a philosophical point of view, is yet

make out a complete and scientific analysis of style, but simply to indicate the possibility of effecting it, and the principles on which it must be done.

It will, we trust, be conceded by all, that if this analysis of the whole complex process of writing and speaking can be scientifically made ; if the particular parts of the process can one by one be detected and set forth distinctly to view, so that they can be identified, conceived of, and perfectly understood, in connection with an exhibition of the principles which must guide in executing them respectively, not arbitrarily or fancifully applied, but derived from the very nature of the process itself, an art, a practical system, would be constituted, which might prove of eminent service in the acquisition of the art. Even the production of entire pieces of art, under the regulation of particular principles at the time, or with a distinct view to the nature of particular parts of the process at the time of composing, would, most evidently, conduce in a high degree to a successful culture. In this way, all the principles might be successively applied and made practically familiar ; so that the trained orator shall speak under the perfect but unconscious control of them in their full application. For it should ever be borne in mind, that while it is true that it is the perfection of art to conceal art, it is also true in a higher, and so to speak, truer sense, that it is the perfection of art to forget art. This is the only effectual concealment of art, that the artist be so practically familiar with the principles of his art, that he creates unconscious of their influence ;—that his creations come forth from the spontaneous powers of his mind, unchecked by any reflective notice of their conformity to rules. The accomplished musician performs, indeed, in precise conformity with every principle of his art—with every requisition of the gamut, and every precept of thorough-bass ; but it is only the tyro that consciously refers to those precepts and rules in the produc-

a forest wilderness. The best classification we have met with, although this is not perfectly satisfactory, is given by Prof. Schott in the compend before cited.

tion of sounds. No one can question, that the most promising mode of attaining this degree of perfection in art is by practically mastering successively the individual principles of the art. If, as we have remarked, only the principles be set forth, analytically and systematically, so that each can be mastered by itself, by actual application in practice, much will be done to aid the acquisition of the art. But more than this can be done and should be done in an art of rhetoric. It should furnish, also, the *occasion* for applying each particular principle. It should provide suitable exercises for this purpose. In the different processes of invention, on the different parts of discourse, on the various principles of arrangement; in style, also, in regard to its several properties, it is believed, not only exemplifications which shall illustrate the principle, but exercises may be devised, which shall call forth the particular activity of the mind regarded in the principle. This is, indeed, perhaps, the most important function of a systematic art, that it incites to practice. The old maxim is a true one in relation to every art, 'Practice makes perfect.' The great, fundamental, all-important direction in the culture of artistic power and skill is—practice. The comprehensive direction, indeed, is practice, in conformity with the principles of the art. An art which should throw this into the back ground, and substitute mere theoretical study of rules, defeats its own end.

We have thus set forth our conceptions of some of the main principles which should regulate in the construction of an art of rhetoric. It is our deep conviction, that the existing treatises on this subject are defective;—we have indicated in some particulars, and in reference to the leading works, particularly in those in our own language, wherein this defectiveness consists. We believe that an art of rhetoric constructed on philosophical principles, and in strict reference to the true idea and aim of an art, is a great desideratum in our means of education. It has been our aim to set forth these principles and that aim:—how successfully, our readers must judge.

ARTICLE III.

THESES ON THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH.

By Professor HENRY TAPPAN, D. D., New-York.

I. Christianity is not a system of Philosophy, but a collection of facts, historical and biographical ; a system of truths assumed as already revealed in the Conscience and Reason, such as the Divine existence, and the distinction between Right and Wrong ; and truths revealed upon the Divine authority, such as the Divinity, Incarnation, and Atonement of Christ, and the work of the Holy Spirit : a code of cardinal moral laws, as given at Sinai and expounded by Christ, and moral precepts, reaching to the whole inner and outer life of man, familiarly conveyed and illustrated, and receiving their perfect exemplification in the life and death of the Son of God : and a gift of exceedingly precious promises, covering all the events and trials of the present life, so as to transmute them into a spiritual and heavenly discipline, and comprehending all the glories of the world to come. Christianity is not *speculative* but *practical*.

II. Christianity, as a system of facts, truths, duties, and promises, is connected with the whole character and destiny of nations and individuals ; it must, therefore, be connected with the whole philosophy of human nature.

III. The facts, truths, duties, and promises of Christianity, may be received in all their simplicity as a body of belief, or system of faith, and their full saving benefits experienced, independently of all systems of philosophy whatever, taught in the schools. Jesus Christ said, " I thank thee, O Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes : Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

IV. Christianity, as a revealed and practical system, identifies in mind and spirit, in life and hope, all who receive it

in its integrity, however diverse may be the denominational names under which they are embodied, however conflicting the sects to which they may belong. All such compose the Church, or the Assembly of the true Disciples on Earth, and will compose the Assembly of the Saints in Heaven.

V. As a true disciple is one who heartily receives and habitually practices this system, so also a true minister of the Gospel is one who heartily receives and practices this system; and who, in addition to this, together with gifts and qualifications which fit him to be a clear and effectual expounder of the Gospel, has the inward call of the Holy Spirit to this great and solemn work.

VI. No body of men, calling themselves a church, and professing to be a part of the catholic or universal church, have a right to exclude from their communion any true disciple, or to reject the ministrations of any true servant of Christ, preaching and exemplifying the Gospel of his master.

VII. All the ministers of Christ are of equal authority and dignity. And he that would excel in gifts and graces, must serve best with an humble and loving spirit; for the Master hath said, "he that is least among you all, the same shall be great." And this ministerial parity refers not merely to rank and authority in managing the affairs of the church, but also to the liberty of thought and of speech, so that no one minister of Christ, be he Chrysostom, Cyprian, Augustin, Calvin, Luther, Arminius, Laud, Cranmer, or Edwards, hath any higher prerogative in teaching and promulgating his opinions than the humblest; much less has he any right of imposing his dogmas upon others. Only as he speaks in accordance with the plain word of God, does he speak with authority; and into this plain word he may not foist any subtleties of his own, so as to make them appear to be a part of the same.

VIII. The word of God is the supreme and infallible rule of faith and practice; and "those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation, are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture

or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them." (Con. of Faith of the Pres. Church, ch. 1, § vii.)

IX. Inasmuch as the great end which the gospel contemplates, in respect to man, is salvation, "those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation," must be the greatest and the best things, and he must be the best Christian, and he the best Christian minister, who is best versed in and most obedient to them.

X. "Those things which are necessary to be known, believed and observed for salvation," are not only well and experimentally understood by all the faithful disciples of our Lord, but they are also embodied in the formularies of the Reformed Churches generally, as well as in the writings of the most apostolical Fathers; but are nowhere so clearly, simply and satisfactorily set forth, as in the Scriptures themselves: for the writings of the Fathers, as well as the formularies of the churches, are the compositions of uninspired and fallible men, and contain many things irrelevant, unnecessary, and purely of a philosophical character.

XI. "The infallible rule of interpretation of scripture is the Scripture itself; and, therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any scripture, (which is not manifold, but one,) it may be searched and known by the places which speak more clearly." (Ibid, § ix.)

XII. "The Supreme Judge, by whom all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture."

XIII. Creeds and confessions, when fitly formed, are convenient summaries of scriptural doctrines; and are binding only so far as they express these doctrines, and have no other authority than that which lies in these doctrines. The decrees of councils and synods can afford no higher sanctions to

that which is from God, and cannot bind the conscience with that which is not from God.

XIV. Neither may synods and councils decide authoritatively what shall be the interpretation of any scripture, although they may give their collective opinion and judgment; for the interpretation of scripture can legitimately be made out only in the free and unimpeded exercise of the reason in comparing scripture with scripture, and in employing all those helps of learning, which go to make the sense of the original more plain as expressed in one's vernacular tongue.

XV. It hath not pleased God to reveal to man the truths of philosophy and science; but He formed him with an intellect capable of achieving them, and afforded him in the wide world the occasions, the phenomena, and the means. Many centuries have worn away, while man has been slowly gaining these truths. It was ordained that he should develope his being in the struggle, and become great only as he became wise. God has revealed to him only those truths for which he could not wait through the long toil of centuries, and which even the toil of centuries would have failed to find. Man makes himself the philosopher, the artist, the poet, the mechanician, the statesman; God's grace gives him the light, and makes him the child of heaven.

But if God revealed that which philosophy had not found and could not find, and yet philosophy itself be not revealed, but left as a legitimate object of human research, to be wrought out by the unaided human faculties, then how preposterous to set the dogmas of philosophy above, or to commingle them with, the pure word of God! On the one hand, the revelation is degraded from its throne of pure light, to be illumined by the murky gas-light of human wit; and philosophy, as yet unachieved and only in a progressive state, is elevated to expound the great truths which lie beyond her province. On the other hand, the progress of philosophy is interdicted, since the authoritative dogma consecrates the philosophy, however crude, which gave it birth, and prohibits as heresy those researches which, reaching forward to a more perfect philosophy, tend to modify, if not to overthrow, the dogma.

XVI. The Divine grace met man in the midst of his philosophy, as well as in the midst of his ignorance and his wretchedness. The ignorant and the wretched embraced the Gospel as a relief. The publicans and the harlots passed into the kingdom of heaven ; but the philosophers, even when they embraced it, went on speculating, and aimed to settle the great questions awakened by the contact of Christianity with human nature. Hence arose all the forms of philosophical Theology, of Christianity Gnosticized, Manichæized, Platonized, Peripateticized, and so on.

XVII. Contemporaneously with philosophico-theological dogmas, was the rise of the Hierarchy ; and the creed which the philosopher had formed, the mitred Bishop proclaimed with an assumed apostolical authority ; and by a terrific mimicry of Heaven's thunderbolts, and a real display of earthly power, awed the timid, confounded the ignorant, and struck down the rebellious.

XVIII. Saint Augustine, we have good reason to believe, was a sincere and devout disciple, and was eminent for setting forth in his writings the great central doctrine of Justification by Faith ; but he was also imbued with the philosophies of his time, and particularly with Manichæism, which wrought in him, even after he had professedly renounced it, and impressed itself upon his theological system. His doctrine of the total inability of man, was the source of his peculiar views of original sin, imputation, the efficiency and necessity of baptism, prevenient grace, and absolute election.

XIX. During the middle ages, the doctrines of Scripture were inwrought with the ancient philosophies, until their true original form no longer appeared. The great doctors, who drew after them thousands of disciples, and whose subtle and angry disputes are but partially preserved in the ponderous tomes which now lumber old libraries in the old world, or take voyages to the new, to astonish, if not to pollute our fresh and free thoughts ; these great doctors were but men, philosophizing under ancient authorities, and theologizing without Scripture.

XX. When the blessed and glorious Reformation took place, men were called back to the simple Word of God, and magnified, as of old, the fundamental and plain doctrines of salvation. And now, why did not all who felt the fresh beams of the Sun of Righteousness rising again with healing under his wings, have again a perfect unity and harmony in one faith, one Lord, one baptism, as in the sweet prime of Christianity, when the Apostles were upon the earth? There were just two hinderances: First, the habitual awe which men felt for a hierarchy, which was hoary and venerable for its antiquity, analogous to the awe they felt for the old kingly authority in the civil government. Secondly, their reverence for the philosophical dogmas, which had been associated for ages with Gospel truths, so that hallowed creeds and all theological language had taken form in accordance with them. Hence, the glorious men of the Reformation did not get rid entirely either of the hierarchal spirit or of the dogmatical modes of thinking and speaking. Luther was an Augustinian monk, and retained to a great degree the Augustinian philosophy. Calvin, and the Reformers generally, drank at the same ancient fountain, which seemed then to be haunted by none but heavenly spirits. And the hierarchy prevailed more or less, but most of all in England. In this age, and in the age immediately following, sprang up many dogmatical controversies, and the creeds which were formed, embodied the points for which the parties contended. These creeds still exist, in very form or in substance, and are those which we are now called upon to subscribe.

XXI. It is not fit that creeds formed amid the heat and uproar of the battle of the Reformation, or amid the conflicts of the contending sects afterwards, should be retained for the time of peace and concord which the church is sighing for and the dawn of which is opening upon us.

XXII. It is not fit that creeds shaped by particular philosophical tenets should be received as standards, whereby to judge of Christian character or ministerial qualifications. To private Christians generally, they must be inappropriate, inas-

much as philosophy is not a common study, and no one can truly and safely receive a dogma shaped by a philosophy, who is unacquainted with the grounds, the history, and the methods of this philosophy. Again, to candidates for the sacred office they are inappropriate. Philosophy, like all other parts of human knowledge, can be fitly pursued only in obedience to the laws of rational cognition. Hence, philosophical dogmas cannot be laid down by authority. And the student of theology, if he comprise philosophy in his educational course, must pursue it with all the freedom of mind and thoroughness of investigation, which the terms of rational cognition demand. But, if philosophical dogmas are embodied in creeds, and then these creeds are required to be received at the very porch of theological study, and at the very beginning of our ministry, free investigation is precluded; and we do, in fact, embrace upon authority, what authority has no right to determine. We do, indeed, and very properly, receive the revealed truths of the Bible upon the authority of the great and all-wise God. But we may not, side by side with this, receive the speculations of doctors, and councils of doctors upon *their* authority, and thus enslave our free and rational thought; and, instead of walking in the open field of truth, with the light of Heaven shining upon us, hide our heads in affright beneath the clumps of brambles and briers, which have sprung up here and there, and which, frowning at each other, claim authority in the whole domain.

XXIII. There are manifest evils, as well as absurdities, in requiring of the student of theology to study philosophy, and then commanding him to study according to the *order* of certain doctors, and to mould himself according to certain formularies. In this way the so-called great, and learned, and titled theologian becomes one, who, with a large capacity of dogmatical deglutition, swallows down the prescribed doctrines, and acquires great facility in technical words and forms, while his soul, still dwelling in darkness, attains no clear, philosophical perception. On the other hand, the simple-hearted child of truth, who is toiling up the hill manfully in the way

of God's appointment, and who reaches eminences from which he obtains celestial visions, often becomes the mark of theological odium, has his good name cast out as evil, and is decided as a heretic, because, like Galileo, he knows more than the cardinals.

XXIV. Men generally think there is but one pope in the world; but, in reality, there are two. There is the pope of the polity, who orders the outward forms and rituals; and he will let you believe any thing, or be any thing, that will accord with kissing his toe, and acknowledging the apostolical succession. And there is the pope of the dogma, who will give you great freedom as to outward forms, and will laugh with you at the apostolical succession; but wo be to you, if you differ from his formularies of belief. These two popes sometimes make friends, like Pilate and Herod, and sometimes they are warring against each other. But one thing is certain, that as yet the Christian world, to a great extent, is governed by one or the other. Like Scylla and Charybdis, they stand frowning and roaring on either hand. The path of freedom and truth lies midway between them, but the navigation is dangerous.

XXV. In embracing any creed, no man can lawfully be required to assent to any more therein contained, than what is plainly derived from the Scripture, as "things necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation."

XXVI. It is earnestly to be desired, that the creeds of the reformed churches generally be reformed so as to be simple summaries of "those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation," and which "are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them." The advantages to be expected from this are manifold:

1. Many sects, now widely separated, and often conflicting with each other, would at once melt into one harmonious band of brethren; and the whole Christian church return, ere long, to the unity and fellowship of the Apostolic age.

2. Much time, talent, money and labor, now expended by the different sects, in a vain strife for victory, would be brought to bear upon the evangelization of the world.

3. Christianity would go forth among the heathen without reproach and without weakness.

4. A multitude of discussions would be removed from the church to the schools of philosophy ; where, no longer regarded as cases of conscience, but as matters of science, they would be handled without wrath and bitterness.

5. Many points in philosophy, hitherto unsettled, now subjected to unencumbered thought, would be in a fair way of final determination. Among these would be that most important point, *human freedom*. All the different schools of theology admit this under some form, and admitting it, acknowledge moral responsibility, and thus are prepared for a reception of the Divine code. Indeed, men generally make no question of it. In the philosophical determination there are various forms of it, and these have had linked with them different theological systems which have divided the church. We may mention three : 1. The Augustinian, which Luther and Calvin also adopted, and which assigns to man a self-determining Will previous to his fall, but insists that in the fall it was totally lost, bringing in a total inability. 2. The Arminian, which maintains that the Will retains its self-determination and freedom after the fall. 3. The Edwardean, which is a mixture of the two, maintaining, in opposition to Arminius and Augustine both, that a self-determining Will is an absurdity in itself ; maintaining, with Arminius, that man is as free in the faculty of freedom, after the fall, as he was before it ; and again, supporting a theory which involves all the inability contended for by Augustine. This vexed point removed from the church, would calm many angry waters ; relieve many oppressed brains ; and becoming purely a psychological question, would finally be settled by a legitimate method.

XXVII. A distinction between God's system of truth, contained in the Bible, and a system of philosophico-theologi-

cal doctrines received as a creed, is all-important. The first system must be received ; the second, is a matter of choice or opinion.

XXVIII. It is to be deprecated as an evil, not only that creeds have been formed by compounding Bible truths with philosophical dogmas, but also that the names of certain great doctors have been affixed to them, e. g., the Calvinistic creed or Calvinism, the Arminian creed or Arminianism. In the first place, these names are exceedingly indefinite. Calvinism, in strictness, is that system propounded in Calvin's Institutes ; and Arminianism, that system which Arminius has himself clearly propounded in his articles of belief ; and yet many who call themselves Calvinists, and are received as such, and who express great opposition to Arminianism, discard from their system certain points held by Calvin, and embrace others held by Arminius. The Calvinistic system, as it is called, differs in different branches of the Presbyterian church, in the school of Edwards, and in the school of Hopkins and Emmons. The truth is, men will assert their liberty to philosophize, and with every change in philosophy, some modification in philosophico-theological creeds must follow. In the second place, these names become the watchwords of parties, and partake of all the evils of party watchwords. They perpetuate the prejudices and divisions of sects, and preserve an appearance of differences where they do not exist, or at least are trifling. They afford a covert to ignorance, and offer a premium to hypocrisy. They impede free, manly, and rational inquiry, and the consequent progressive development of truth ; and crush, with the weight of an unthinking hostile public opinion, the noblest efforts of great and honest minds, and brand with ignominy the names of men who deserve most of their age and of posterity.

In the third place, they are anti-scriptural. The lives and sentiments of Christ and his apostles are diametrically opposed to sectarianism and sectarian names. Paul forbade the Corinthians to form themselves into sects, and to name themselves distinctively by the names of the apostles, or even

of Christ. "Is Christ divided?" said he. They were all disciples, all Christians. The apostolic prohibition, and the reasons for it, have never been abrogated. Why do we call ourselves Calvinists or Arminians? Or why do we say a man must be a Calvinist or an Arminian to belong to this or that church? Have Calvin and Arminius communicated to us any gospel truths beyond those which were known to the apostles and proclaimed by them? Certainly not. Then why name a system of truths received from Christ and his apostles by the name of Calvin or Arminius, and that, too, in the very face of the prohibition above alluded to?¹ But what have Calvin and Arminius and other fathers and doctors achieved beyond the Apostles? Simply this:—Inasmuch as Gospel facts and truths are connected (as we have stated in Thesis II.) with the philosophy of Human Nature, they have attempted to expound this philosophy in this connection. They have attempted a development of science upon the revealed facts and truths. The names, therefore, ought to be taken merely to designate the dogmatic systems, and not to characterize the gospel truths. Now, in connecting myself with the church, I must receive the gospel system of truth, upon which the church is founded, but I cannot be required, without a violation of the laws of Christ's kingdom, to receive a philosophical system of mere human authority, however great or venerable that authority may be. Here Christianity and the interests of philosophy alike demand that I be permitted to think for myself.

XXIX. There is a striking analogy between the liberty

¹ It is quite proper to use the epithets *Aristotelian*, *Platonic*, *Baconian*, *Newtonian*, to designate certain systems of philosophy, because the men whose names these systems bear are their accredited authors. So, also, it is proper to use the epithets *Augustinian*, *Calvinistic*, *Arminian*, to designate certain systems of *dogmatic* theology; understanding by these, particular theological sciences formed by the application of philosophies to Biblical facts and truths, because Augustine, Calvin, and Arminius, were the authors of such systems. But it cannot be lawful to apply any human name to the pure gospel truths as they come from the fountain of inspiration, because neither Paul, nor Augustine, nor Calvin, nor any other man, was the author of these truths.

and limitations of establishing ecclesiastical polities in the church, and the liberty and limitations of philosophizing upon the facts and truths of Scripture. As Dr. Whately has clearly shown, no particular system of polity is laid down by Christ for universal and perpetual adoption: he has only laid down the fundamental principles; and left it to the judgment of the church to constitute the particular systems according to times and circumstances on the basis of those principles. Thus, ministerial parity is a fundamental principle, which no particular system of polity may violate. So with respect to the other, facts and truths are clearly laid down, and we are permitted to philosophize freely upon them, only we must take care not to violate their integrity. They must stand unscathed, undiminished, unperverted; and a true philosophy will serve to show their exceeding loveliness, adaptation, and harmony.

XXX. Coleridge's conception of *heresy*, derived from the etymology of the word, conjoined with the history of the thing, is just and striking—*αἵρεσις*, a lifting up of some dogma or opinion into improper conspicuity. While the pure and simple truths of the gospel took precedence, and formed the standard of faith, heresies were not found. They began, as the history of the church makes plain enough, by lifting up and thrusting forward notions drawn from the ancient philosophies, and from Judaism and Paganism. Hence, every creed embodying points not contained in the Scriptures, nor required by them as conditions of church membership, or of the exercise of ministerial functions, are just so far heretical: they are just so far a violation of the cardinal laws of Christ's kingdom.

XXXI. Bigotry and ecclesiastical tyranny, in exacting conformity to points not authorized by the Scriptures, have been the parents of heresy in another way. Minds of a lofty order, and determined to maintain the mind's birthright of free thought on subjects of science and philosophy, having crossed, in their investigations, the dogmas of the church, have been persecuted, and hunted down, and stigmatized, until,

rendered desperate, reason has actually swerved from its balance, and they have plunged into errors, from which kind and magnanimous treatment would have preserved them.

XXXII. It is an important inquiry, how far the Scriptures have authorized the formation of creeds, or whether they have authorized them at all. It is a striking instance of the misapplication of Scripture, that the phrase "form of sound words" is applied to creeds of human formation, when the apostle says "which thou hast heard of me." The first is often only a *sounding form of words*, while that which comes from the apostle rests upon a higher authority; to use his language in the immediate connection, "by the Holy Ghost which dwelleth in us." Certainly it cannot be shown that either Christ or his apostles gave any direction respecting the formation of creeds. It is then only a measure of convenience and expediency. But what is the only true and legitimate aim? To present a summary of gospel truth. What is the authority of the creed? It derives no authority from those who form it. Its authority is the authority of the Bible, so far as it has any authority; and it has authority only as it is a correct form or representation of Bible truth. A creed, therefore, is fallible; this is not denied. It is not, then, a sure standard of faith, and it is no crime to differ from it. But how far may we differ from it? Just so far as it differs from the Bible. But how are we to judge of this? By comparing it with the Bible. The Bible, then, is the ultimate authority to which we are to appeal; and it matters not how much one may differ from the creed, if he can show he does not differ from the Bible. And no one may be excluded from a body claiming to be a church, or be shut out from the ministry of that church, however he may differ from its creed, if he can show to that body that he holds the "form of sound words" of the Scriptures. If he be condemned out of the creed, and yet cannot be condemned out of the Scriptures, then it may be said of him, "Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that justifieth."

XXXIII. It is not fit to say that if an individual Chris .

tion do not like the creed of the denomination with which he is connected, he may seek a church fellowship where the creed is more accordant to his views. For, in the first place, since creeds are fallible in their nature, he may see fallible points in the creeds of all denominations, and be thus driven about without finding any communion on earth in which to rest. In the second place, while a true disciple must indeed feel himself at home wherever he finds the gospel doctrines held and practised; yet from choice and habit he may be attached to a particular communion, notwithstanding things irrelevant and undesirable in its dogmatical creed; and it cannot be regarded as less than a breach of Christian communion to force him into other connections by a mere exertion of human authority, when Christ's authority would retain him where he is. Thirdly, this appears the more inconsistent, and even flagrant, when, if an individual Christian comes to entertain views different from his sect in points not fundamental, and in consequence enters into other connections, he is always visited with a measure of odium by the party which he leaves. And what is his crime? Simply that he has dared to think for himself, and has arrived at conclusions different from others, who, perhaps, have never exercised independent thought, and remain content because they never question, and are supereminently orthodox because they passively submit to opinions ready made to their hand.

XXXIV. There is much merit gained without worth, by simply affirming, "I am a Calvinist, and I hate Arminianism;" or, "I am an Arminian, and hate Calvinism;" or, "I stand fast as a good Churchman," or "a good Presbyterian," where every thing is received upon authority: and hence it is much more easy and comfortable to be a warm and determined party-man, than to entertain charity for, and to seek communion with, Christians of all parties; or to aim to be a faithful servant of truth, irrespective of all parties. The man of a sect will always find friends and support in his sect; while a man of the truth is likely to fall between all parties. But, notwithstanding this, it is becoming a high call of duty

in our day, to aim to heal the divisions of the catholic church, and to bring together in a loving fellowship on earth all those who are truly preparing to hold fellowship in heaven: and this great result can be attained only in the way above propounded, namely, by eliminating from our creeds the dogmas of philosophy, so as to present to all Christians, as the ground of fellowship, the pure and unmixed faith of the gospel.

XXXV. Nor is it to be thought a difficult matter to arrange a simple, gospel summary of "things necessary to be understood and believed for salvation." In the first place, it is to be presumed that the all-wise and infinitely good God, in propounding the way of salvation, would make it plain and simple, so that none need err therein. God surely understands the minds which he hath made, and the laws of language in addressing those minds. Neither Athanasius nor Calvin, the Council of Trent nor the Synod of Dort, can be supposed to think so well or to speak so plainly as the Divine Saviour and his inspired apostles. What we might have presumed is abundantly realized. There is no book so plain as the Bible itself, interpreted by itself. The Westminster Catechism is not so intelligible to our children as the discourses of Christ. What are the writings of the Fathers, compared with the writings of the apostles? Where do we find the clearest spring of truth?

In the next place, all good Christians give a summary of gospel truths, when they relate their experience, offer their prayers, or teach their children and others the way of salvation. And this summary is every where the same. All faithful ministers preach the same truths, when they are most earnest in their work; and, universally, where there is most love and most of heavenly zeal, and the great interests of the soul are most directly contemplated, there is the most perfect agreement. When we begin to dogmatize, we begin to differ; when we preach Christ, and live the life of Christ, we are one. Those truths which all good ministers must preach for the salvation of souls, those truths which all good Christians must receive and live by in their walk to heaven, must be the

truths of a universal creed—the creed of the true catholic church. And this creed must be embodied and received to the exclusion of all others, ere the day come when the gospel shall cease to be a sword, and shall be peace on earth and good will among men.

XXXVI. It has ever been an error in the church, that, instead of trusting truth with her own defence, clad as she is with heavenly panoply, she has been fortified by cathedrals and mitres, the decrees of councils and synods, and the terrors of inquisitions and excommunications. She has been treated as a feeble old woman—of no intrinsic excellence and might, although of queenly quality, supported by easy and gilded crutches, invigorated by aromatic and costly stimulants, surrounded by gorgeous equipages, followed by crowds of officious attendants, and protected by armed guards. The splendor of circumstance has withdrawn attention from herself, or rendered it impossible to gain a clear vision of her angelic countenance. Perhaps we should rather say, that a miserable automaton has been deified in her place, while she has been a poor pilgrim, whom the meek and the lowly in heart have found, because they were willing to follow her into the desert, or to sit with her in the hovels of the poor. Truth fears not the most fiery trial of thought. Those are false, or at best, mistaken friends, who would save her from it. She is not to be prostrated by open and free inquiry; and it is only by such inquiry that the human mind can elevate itself to her sphere, bask in her radiance, or repose in her embrace. Scientific truth has been gained only by the free, manly, and multifarious research inculcated by the Baconian philosophy. Those truths and knowledges which stand immediately connected with Christianity, whether of philology, history, antiquities, or psychology, demand for their successful prosecution the same liberal spirit, the same rational method. Nay, one great reason why metaphysical science, in comparison with physical science, has been so slow in its progress is, that philosophical dogmas, early incorporated into church formularies by metaphysico-theologians, became consecrated and clothed with

ecclesiastical power ; and have ever since stood like frowning giants with iron flails before an enchanted castle, in which philosophy sits spell-bound, and can be approached only by uttering magical words, which are often as senseless as “*open sesame*” to the poor trembling devotee who uses them. The tyranny of ancient dogmatism must be overthrown. The rebellion began with Luther : the struggle has been going on ever since. It is a protracted struggle, because in every generation there are men who, either to escape the labor of thought, or from an absurd veneration for that antiquity which Bacon pronounced the juvenility of the human mind, are crying up the old authorities, and filling timid souls with affright by calling up phantoms of heresy. But there are always courageous minds enough to prevent the battle from flagging altogether ; and who, strong in the truth of God, which they have received first of all in its simplicity and heavenly brightness, will go on manfully with all noble researches in philosophy, and before whom all terrifying phantoms are but as the gigantic water-sprites springing up in the path of the bold knight in the enchanted forest, which, whenever he smote at them with his good sword, were dissipated into harmless vapor, or dispersed into gentle rills.

XXXVII. Expediency is a judgment of propriety, in the absence of an absolute law ; but where an absolute law exists, we may not resort to expediency. Now it is unquestionably an absolute law of Christ’s kingdom, that all his disciples shall love one another, and hold with one another the most open, kind, and intimate fellowship. Even those who are weak in the faith are to be received and cherished. By this kindred spirit the church is made one. Thus it was constituted by Christ : thus it is contemplated in all his provisions and promises. It must be laid down, therefore, as a fundamental principle, that, in every particular church organization, those peculiarities which go to preclude any true disciple from its charity and fellowship, are errors, and violations of the great law of Christian communion. To plead, in justification of such cases, the rule of expediency, is palpably absurd.

XXXVIII. The trial of sectarian exclusiveness as a rule of expediency has been fully made. What has been gained by it? It has made more heresies than it has cured; and, instead of healing divisions, it has been the very spirit of dissension. It has been the sceptre of tyranny and the sword of persecution. As long as we keep up sectarianism, we cannot even approximate to the unity of the church. It is time to make another experiment. Instead of excusing our differences by our many infirmities, and repeating the stale truism, "When we all get to heaven, we shall surely think alike and be in perfect fellowship"—thus adjourning to the morrow of eternity what ought to be done to-day—Protestants ought to regard it as their great mission, to bring back the church to the condition in which Christ left it when it was a holy Catholic Church. The course to be pursued is plain. We are to oppose both the Pope of the polity and the Pope of the dogma, by the free spirit and the pure truths of the gospel. In some communions we shall find more of the first; in others more of the second. If we belong to a communion which contains either, but which at the same time contains and proclaims the truth as it is in Jesus, we are not to separate from that communion because of its errors, but we are to array ourselves against its errors, and to labor to bring it into the pure, unmixed fellowship of Christ. Our particular denomination is the point from which we are to work to get into the grand central unity of the church universal.

XXXIX. The Romanist and the High Churchman are both right in proclaiming that there is but one true church, and that this church was intended by Christ to exist in a visible unity; they err as to the mode of effecting this unity; they attempt to effect it by a unique ministry, ordained in an apostolical succession, and by ordinances administered by them. This, indeed, accomplishes a visible unity, but nothing more. But the unity at which Christianity aims is, first of all, a unity of faith, and love, and well doing, and the visible unity is to be the natural out-growth of this—the unity of men acknowledging and obeying a common Saviour, and engaged in pro-

moting a common cause, namely, the establishment of his kingdom ; not the establishment of a particular sect or order, but simply the establishment of his kingdom of light, love, and peace. Now there are marvellous inconsistencies on all sides. Those who bow down to the Pope of the polity will not acknowledge any one, who denies the polity, to be of the church, whatever may be his character and life. Those who bow down to the Pope of the dogma, acknowledge a spiritual unity between many sects, and yet will not consent to a visible unity, save on condition of submitting to the dogma. They are all one in the essential and true life, and in the heavenly hope, and yet they may not be one in visible relations, because they belong to different schools of philosophy, and have named themselves by the names of certain great doctors, who, some centuries since, were engaged in a hot logomachy.

XL. It is essential to the triumph of the gospel, that the mass of Protestant sects, who hold alike the fundamental truths of Christianity, should form a visible and hearty union, and be known as the church of the Bible, that is, *the Church—the true Catholic Church*, in opposition to the *Church of Tradition and of the Hierarchy*. It is a reproach from which we cannot at present easily escape, that the church of tradition and of the hierarchy is one, while those who profess to build upon the simple word of God are divided and discordant. The enemy may now say, in triumph, “ They have the Bible, and yet they are forever warring with each other ! The facts prove that the Bible cannot safely be submitted to private interpretation, and that the judgment of the church, the interpretation of tradition, is the only effectual preventive of dissension.”

Now, in reality, we are warring about our favorite dogmas, and stretching Scripture into conformity with them. The evil comes not from the Bible, but from our philosophical creeds ; but the explanation is difficult to make to an enemy. Let us cast aside our dogmas, and cling to the simple Word, and we shall indeed be one, and make our unity to appear.

XLI. There are three great labors to be performed in

our day, by minds nobly inspired with the love of truth and righteousness. First, To set forth the pure Gospel system, by comparing Scripture with Scripture, without any foreign admixture, that all the true servants of God may see eye to eye, and dwell together in goodly and loving fellowship. Secondly, To show, from the history of philosophy and of the church conjointly, how this pure system has been debased. Thirdly, To set forth, on its own legitimate basis, a true philosophy, as the element in human nature which responds to all God's revelations, as the statue of Memnon was said of old to send forth strains of sweet melody, when the morning sun shone upon it. In fine, it is to redeem the Bible from false philosophies, and to redeem philosophy itself from the product of these false philosophies appearing in the form of tyrannical ecclesiastical dogmatism.

XLII. The great and vital truths of Christianity have been warmly proclaimed and nobly exemplified, by men who, at the same time, were attached to doubtful, impracticable, and even palpably false philosophies. Their glorious virtues, their venerable names, their wide-spread and healthful influence were all derived from the pure practical truths of the Gospel, which were incorporated with their systems of doctrine, and which inspired their preaching. Their philosophies, as far as they prevailed, only served to deform and to impede. Their philosophies were inconsistent with the body of their faith; and the union between the two was effected by logical subtleties and scholastical dogmatism. The greatness of Augustine, of Luther, of Calvin, of Edwards, lay in the strength with which they seized upon, and the ardor, eloquence, clearness and faithfulness with which they proclaimed the central doctrine of justification by faith, and its co-ordinate Gospel truths. Their weakness lay in their psychologies and ontologies; and yet these very psychologies and ontologies are worshipped simply on account of their association with the former, however strained and unnatural. Augustinism, Calvinism, Lutherism, and Edwardism, when taken to represent the Gospel system, are not required; for this sys-

tem needs no name of man or angel: and, when taken as the titles of philosophical systems, they must be placed on the common level of all such systems, and submitted to the ordeal of rational investigation.

XLIII. The vital and conservative power of the doctrine of Justification by Faith and its co-ordinates, is strikingly exhibited in the history of the Romish church. Within its bosom there have been found men of undoubted and eminent godliness, who held the absurd doctrine of Transubstantiation, paid respect to relics and the crucifix, invoked the saints and the virgin, prayed for the dead, frequented the confessional, performed penances, and acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope. Amid this mass of errors, by holding steadfastly to the great central truth, they still had life and salvation, and dwelt in the radiance of the Divine communion. The Father of mercies compassionated and bore with their follies and weaknesses during the ages of darkness, while they had the pure faith, if only as a grain of mustard seed. Such men were Thomas à Kempis, Fenelon, Pascal, and the Port Royalists. Shall not this teach us a lesson of charity towards all Protestant brethren holding the great central truths, and abjuring all the above-named errors?

XLIV. The peculiar mission of Protestantism is to give every man the Bible in his own language, with an unlimited privilege of reading it for himself. It gives freedom to thought, and freedom to conscience, under that divine light by which thought and conscience may be guided aright.

The numerous sects which sprung up with the Reformation formed but the symptom and the consequence of religious freedom. The human mind, when first released from its long imprisonment, unaccustomed to the open sunlight, and to the motion of unchained energies, saw, in connection with the true and the real, many strange sights, and fell into some uncouth vagaries. But he judges with narrow-mindedness of the great struggle of human nature to find the truth, and has no insight into the blessedness of free thought, and no prescience of its glorious and triumphant end, who suffers himself to be offend-

ed by this. Let Protestantism be true to its great principle. Let every encouragement be given to independent thought and investigation. Let us not be surprised and filled with wrath, when new opinions, or even new sects arise. Let the trial and conflict of thought have free course. Let every difference be fully expressed. Let every difficulty be considered and disposed of. Let no opinion be met with heat, bitterness, or calumny, but be calmly weighed in the balance of reason ; if it be not of God and of truth, it will, sooner or later, perish ; if it be of these authorities, it can never perish. Thus the triumph of Protestantism will be the triumph of freedom, of charity, of truth, and of the Gospel, which embodies them all.

ARTICLE IV.

THE WEST AND WESTERN ELOQUENCE.

By Rev. JOSEPH F. TUTTLE, Marietta, Ohio.

“ WESTWARD the star of empire takes its way,” said a far-sighted man, and the results of the last half century have singularly verified the prediction. The Genesee and Red Stone countries once were called the Far West ; then the wave of population rolled on, successively covering Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. But none could say to these mightier than the waters of the ocean, “ hitherto shalt thou come and no farther, and here shall thy proud waves be staid ;” and sweeping over Wisconsin, they burst across the Father of Waters, and subdued Missouri and Iowa. As well attempt to drive back the flames, like fire-demons rushing over Western prairies, as withstand this peopled wave until it reaches the Pacific. An “ old man eloquent” once thrilled an audience with this thought. “ I have followed the duties of my calling forty-four years, and Oh ! what changes have taken place ! Some of my friends had gone to *the West* on .

horseback; and where was that? Only to the Genesee country. But how different now! The West! it is rushing toward the Pacific; and I, who saw the Genesee settlers starting for their 'Far West,' am myself at Cincinnati. And when are we to overtake this population sweeping westward? It was the custom in my native town, if a man saw a whale in the harbor, to swing his jacket and shout the news. One morning I heard the shout and rushed to the shore. A single man was wanted to man the boat. Without a word I leaped in, and we pushed off. "Pull, pull, my lads," cheerily cried our helmsman, "we are *almost* up with the whale!" And we did pull, and that right heartily, for the whole forenoon, but the whale was still *far ahead of us*! So with the Far West; we have pulled, and pulled, but it is still far ahead of us. The chase has been fruitless as pursuing the horizon!"

On the same occasion another clergyman elicited a burst of applause by an anecdote. "A short time since," said he, "I met a gentleman on one of our steamboats, who told me, that when he should reach Marietta, he would be two thousand miles from his starting point, far up the Missouri. I remarked, 'You must live out at the Far West!' 'No, sir,' was his rejoinder, 'I live where they fit out expeditions to go West!'"

But supposing our Western boundaries already to be fixed, a glance suffices to show that here is territory broad enough for a family of nations. Pour in millions upon millions, and yet population will be sparse. Organize and admit new States, and there is still room for more. In the States already admitted, the fiftieth part of the resources is not developed. Place Great Britain, with her 25,000,000, in this valley, and at the lowest calculation, only one quarter of its prodigious resources will be exhausted. Transplant the 230,000,000 of Europe to the Great Valley, and so Egypt-like is the soil, that it is believed there would "be bread enough and to spare." Open the flood-gates still wider, and let in the 450,000,000 of Asia, that reservoir of nations, and there are some, and they not regarded as visionary, who believe that the West can afford sustenance to them all. Be this as

it may, the man who makes voyages of thousands of miles on Western rivers, or travels for months across Western plains, must needs feel the conviction, that here are resources of incomprehensible magnitude, and that numerous millions can, and will derive their sustenance here.

The laws of nature are immutable. The immense herds of buffalo, taught by instinct, rush in unwieldy columns to luxuriant and well-watered plains. Accumulating waters burst through the weakest barriers, or overleap the lowest, and pour onward until an equilibrium has been established. Just as certainly will population, accumulated and restrained by unnatural barriers, be heaved as by volcanoes, and struggle in the majesty of its deep-seated and internal energies, until the unnatural barriers are hurled prostrate, and these souls hurry forth in vindication of rights bestowed by God. Let your Columbus, La Salle, and Boon, cleave a path through unknown oceans, or sail along rivers unrecorded, or penetrate forests consecrate as God's altar, against "which no man hath lifted up any iron;" let them proclaim that a wide, extended continent, magnificent savannas, and unmeasured plains have been discovered, and are now mutely pleading for enlistment in the grand enterprise of sustaining human life; and in spite of restraints, mankind will listen to, and obey the voice of wild nature. The truth of this has been verified in the history of America, and especially the history of Western Immigration.

Regard the West in what light you may, its greatness overwhelms the mind. There it is calmly reposing within its mountain walls, coursed by the mightiest rivers, embracing a most magnificent territory, with princely beneficence lavishing bread upon seven millions, and with prophetic foresight expecting the day when it may do the same to hundreds of millions. The patriotic politician is fired at the prospect, as he glances at the political elements at work, and augmenting with prodigious rapidity. The jaundiced eye of political and hierarchal demagoguism has caught a view of the same prospective greatness, and gloats over its expected prostitution to intriguing selfishness. Christian philanthropy has cast a

glance radiant with heavenly benevolence, over the same field, has measured the mighty causes sweeping on to a destiny of joy or wo, and, startled by the ominous premonitions, lifts her tearful and earnest look to heaven, that salvation may descend. Every sincere patriot, not to say every Christian, alive to the real condition of things, cannot but eagerly inquire, Is corrupt passion here to rage like the surges of the ocean, defying restraint, and with stupendous strength rolling on to a consummation of ruin? Is this vast concentration of power, energized with demoniacal influence, Samson-like to lay hold of the pillars of society, and bury millions in its fall? Or shall it become the choicest instrumentality in hurling prostrate the brazen walls with which Satan's kingdom is begirt, and sounding the jubilee of a world's redemption?

But it is not my purpose to attempt a solution of these questions. They obtruded themselves, and could not well be passed in silence. Let us notice a few facts concerning the West, as prefatory to some remarks which it is proposed to make concerning Western eloquence. And first, consider the rapid increase of population. It flows in upon us in no measured quantities, but like the tides of Fundy, surge upon surge, rising higher and higher, with astonishing rapidity. When did the world ever before see the startling phenomena of nations almost literally born in a day? Scarce half a century has elapsed since General William Rufus Putnam and his noble associates attacked the wilderness at Marietta, and yet so wonderful has been the progress, that in 1844, in Ohio, 335,000 men wielded the energies of the ballot-box; and more than 1,000,000 throughout the West swayed the same potent sceptre. Six States, themselves kingdoms, have joined the confederacy, and another is knocking for admission. One of these States, Ohio, at the last census ranked as third in the Union; and in 1850, all believe it will be second only to the Empire State. Many a son of the "Buckeye State" is sanguine enough to believe that New-York, in spite of its metropolis, will flag in the race for supremacy; and be compelled to crown the young giantess of the West. A single

fact is worthy of notice, as illustrating the relative increase of these two States. In 1840, New-York had forty-two electoral votes, and Ohio had nineteen. Under the new apportionment law, New-York has only thirty-six electoral votes, while Ohio, in spite of the increased ratio of representation, has twenty-three.

And here I may be allowed to quote a few statistics, derived from a responsible source. From 1796 to 1806, the entire immigration to this country did not exceed 40,000. In no year previous to 1817 did it exceed 10,000. One writer estimates the amount of immigration, from 1780 to 1816, at 220,000; being an average of about 6,000 per year. In 1817 the number was 22,240, which was thought extraordinary. From January 1st, 1818, to January 1st, 1844, there were landed at the single port of New-York, 684,460 immigrants; being an average of 45,631 per year. But during the first seven of these years, the average was 38,966, whilst the average during the remaining years was 54,137. Taking into the account those landed at Boston, Philadelphia, New-Orleans, etc., and those entering the country from New-Brunswick and Canada, no doubt, during the fifteen years ending January 1st, 1844, 1,000,000 of foreigners were added to our population; being an average per year of 66,666. The increase per annum, during the last specified period, has been eleven times greater than the average during the thirty-six years immediately succeeding the Revolution. Of course, there has been deposited upon our shores during the last fifteen years an amount of foreigners equal to one-fifteenth of the whole population! *Vide Journal of Commerce, as quoting Seybert and Blodget, etc.*

One important reason for quoting these statistics is, that the majority of these foreigners go to the West; and the majority of those who go West are Papists. Among all the forms of error that here abound, none is so dangerous as Romanism. Wealth, numbers, concentrated executive energy, controlled by an ambition for universal power, make this form of error more dangerous than all others. Institutions of learn-

ing, nunneries, churches, and cathedrals, with a population of more than one million, show the energy of that religionism which plots the overthrow of Christianity in our land. Romanists have so influenced truckling statesmen, as, in one case, to break down a liberal scheme of general education. They have burned Bibles, and the act has been repeatedly sanctioned in their high places of power; and they may now justly claim fellowship with Bible-burning French Atheists! Their mobs have swept through our cities, and they have been mildly rebuked! Are these things unworthy of notice? Is our ship so tempest-proof, that storms and breakers may not dash it, proud and strong as it is, to atoms? We sleep; but the enemy does not sleep. Entrenched within the bulwarks of our glorious faith and free principles, we open our gates, and court ruin, whilst the enemy is on the alert, disciplining his forces, and watching the moment when he may spring upon us, unarmed and sleeping, and rivet upon us chains forged beneath. For we may depend upon it, that the assertion, so often reiterated by Romanists themselves, is true; this hierarchy has not changed its essential character. She may wreath her face with complacent smiles, and deck her head with the noble crown of toleration, and robe her form with the drapery of external meekness and piety, and yet she is the same; and professes to be the same, which for ages crushed the life of millions; which bathed the earth with holy blood, and burdened the kindly winds with the lamentations of suffering saints. Whence came the Inquisition? From its mother, the Papal Church. Who gave birth to that monstrosity, which by all foul lies ever devised, and all base artifices ever invented, has been compassing the ruin of men? The Papal church claims the Society of *Jesus* (!) as her favorite child, and lovingly leans upon the arm of this child of darkness! Who, during the reign of cruel Mary, sacrificed five hecatombs of saints, and slaughtered in Germany one thousand hecatombs? It was the Papal Church. Where did blasphemous anthems insult high Heaven, ringing through the arches of cathedrals, re-echoing responses of joy, as it was told that 60,000 Pro-

testants had been butchered in cold blood? It was at Madrid and at Rome—and gorgeous ceremonies, long processions, flaunting banners, martial music, were subsidied in rendering thanks to the Most High, for the success of treachery and cruelty without a parallel! Aye, and the Pope, accompanied by the dignitaries of “*the church*,” joined one of these processions, and stamped his approbation upon the infamous joy! And yet this church, seven-headed, ten-horned, and something worse, professes to be the same, and unchanged! May kind Heaven deliver us from her bloody embrace!

These remarks are made to show not only that population is rapidly increasing, but the kind of men who are assuming the privileges of the elective franchise.

But there is another feature of Western society which claims notice, *its heterogeneity*. In this respect the West is peculiar. All nations have their representatives there. The shrewd Yankee, the luxurious Southerner, the positive Englishman, the metaphysical Scotchman, the jovial Irishman, the excitable Frenchman, the passionate Spaniard, the voluptuous Italian, the debased African—and who not?—are flung together in this mighty crucible. The antagonistic elements are in contact, but refuse to unite, and, as yet, no chemical agent has been found sufficiently potent to reduce them to a splendid unity. To use a different figure, society at the West is in a fragmentary state, “iron mixed with miry clay,” and so repellant are the fragments that they “cannot cleave to one another, even as iron is not mixed with miry clay.” As yet, no common sympathy binds them together, no common nationality links them into a harmonious and happy brotherhood; no great heart sends its generous blood throughout the system, to impart to each member a healthful and vigorous vitality.

One result of this state of society has been to create great mental activity. Europe produced the lion-hearted Richards, and Godfreys, and Bayards, when law was such a farce that the most skilful and successful warrior subdued others to his own control, and made personal prowess and

skill the sure stepping-stones to the highest political preferment. Our own country never furnished so fearless and hardy a race of men, as when danger so pressed them, that they were obliged to carry in one hand the implements of husbandry, and in the other the weapons of war. Circumstances in no small degree give character to men. Accordingly, bring together men unlike in every particular, in sympathy, education, politics, religion, and they will most certainly wage war upon each other. Place a New Englander, proud to stand as the representative of some stern Puritan ancestor, in contact with an Irish Jesuit, abhorring in his deepest soul every thing savoring of Puritanism, in church and state; place face to face a positive English monarchist with as positive an American republican; or a gay, excitable Frenchman, with a heavy, plodding German; or a voluptuous, reckless Italian, with a hungry, law-abiding Scotchman; or a passionate Spaniard, with a calm, but decided Quaker, and you will have fierce intellectual conflicts, even should the prevailing spirit of order prevent more bloody struggles. And the occurrence of such scenes is by no means uncommon, and the result is a restless mental activity. He who supposes Western mind to be sluggish, has fallen into a gross mistake. Where do common men most fiercely discuss every thing which can agitate the community, whether in politics, morals, or religion? At the West. Where do such men as Campbell, and Purcell, and Rice, grapple in the close conflict of public debate? and such as Corwin, and Hamar, and Clay, and Marshall, mount "the stump" to defend their political sentiments, in other words, to become political gladiators, giving no quarter, and asking none? At the West such things are common, looked upon as matters of course, and exciting no surprise.

Another peculiarity is worthy of attention. *The people acquire more by hearing than by reading.* The mania for cheap publications has not materially affected this fact, notwithstanding the tons of trash which have been wheeled into the valley. By this it is not intended to assert that there is not a multitude of extensive, and attentive readers, but that

the great masses form their opinions from what they hear, rather than from what they read. Facts are proclaimed and opinions promulged, from the pulpit, the platform, and "the stump." The election gathering, the social circle, the mass meeting, the travelling company, in short, all kinds of gatherings, are used to disseminate information on all subjects. Nor is it to be denied that this method is liable to strong objections, since facts are liable to be distorted, and the passionate fervor kindled in a large assembly, by favorite speakers, is apt to blind the judgment. An anecdote is somewhere told of Dean Swift, which may be an appropriate illustration of this very defect. This eccentric genius was riding with some friends who had a great admiration for him, and he determined to see how far he could gull them in the face of every thing reasonable. The day was perfectly clear. Suddenly the Dean, throwing himself back in great horror, demanded of his friends whether they did not see that huge monster obscuring the sun? At first they could see nothing but the clear bright sun, but the Dean pressed his question with such frantic earnestness, that at last one thought he did see the monster, and then another thought he saw it, although not very distinctly! Swift carried his point through the excessive admiration accorded to him by his companions, since they all became convinced that the monster was actually before the sun! Many a Western Dean Swift has pointed frantically to the religious or political heavens, and convinced his quaking worshippers that they did, plainly and with their own eyes, see some horrid monster, teeth, toes, and tail, and they have gone away to proclaim the fact to such of their neighbors as had not the felicity of witnessing it for themselves!

There are some other noticeable peculiarities in Western society, but these are sufficient for my present purpose. It might be expected that such influences as have been described, would modify the style of eloquence, if not create a style unlike all others. A territory wide enough for the dwelling place of many nations, a population composed of heteroge-

neous elements, rushing up to unparalleled accumulations, and withal, the masses getting their knowledge, and forming their opinions, from passionate eloquent speech, rather than from dispassionate, well-weighed writing, these circumstances must, in the nature of things, fashion an eloquence, and eloquent men, of a peculiar stamp.

The principle at work is obvious. The Jacobin Hall, whose presidential seat was a dark gothic monument, whose tribune was like a scaffold, whose walls were ornamented with inquisitorial instruments of torture, and whose silence was haunted by screaming bats, wrought out its own horrid characteristics in the French Jacobins of 1793. The grand movements attending this revolution produced that stormy master-spirit, Mirabeau, and heralded in the "man of destiny." The stern, heaven-high Alps, have in some sense become stereotyped in the character of the Genevan Reformer. An examination of history proves that circumstances fashion men. Luther, Calvin, Cromwell, and Washington, were summoned into existence by the irresistible fiat of circumstances, to accomplish the great results which Divine Providence had decreed.

Let us briefly trace the workings of this principle on the style of eloquence at the West. And here embarrassment is felt as to what mode of development to adopt. The West is scarcely half a century old, and the most of its distinguished men are still living. This imposes trammels so far as the specification of individuals is concerned.

The effect of coming in contact with the Great West, is well shown in the case of an eastern clergyman who once addressed a benevolent society at Cincinnati. His friends were astonished at the energetic and fiery eloquence which flowed from his lips, and one remarked "that Mr. ——— could not have made such a speech, had he stood any where else than in the midst of the Great West, with its plains stretching far toward the setting sun, its rivers burdened with human life and wealth, its population rushing in with terrifying rapidity, and withal, with the unceasing working of ruin's

enginery breaking upon his ear, accomplishing with fatal certainty the destruction of millions!" The circumstances had inspired him with new life, and breathed upon him an eloquence to which he had hitherto been a stranger. Nor is this an isolated instance. Men with deep original susceptibilities have climbed some mount of vision, and thence with telescopic glance having taken in the outline of this young empire, they have poured out an impassioned eloquence, astonishing even to themselves. Could a man, in whose heart lived the elements of eloquence, gaze from Mont Blanc upon an empire of clouds, mountains, and kingdoms, or could such an one lift his eyes to the "world of floods" thundering over the brink of Niagara, and not feel "there's a divinity" raising in his soul a tempest of great, unspeakable emotions, which could only be imaged in passionate exclamations? And can such a man, from some cloud-reaching mount, gaze down upon this vast Western empire, or lift his eyes to those Niagara floods of human souls, which are breaking over into this valley, and not feel an eloquence, if not utter it, worthy an inspired prophet? And this is a characteristic of Western eloquence. It possesses a fiery energy which spurns the mere adornments of rhetoric, and rushes forward, like a soldier at the breach, to take men's hearts by storm.

And here we may notice a peculiarity more easily described than named. It arises from the heterogeneous character of the assemblies to be moved by the arguments and appeals of the orator. The magician Mirabeau breathed his spell over restless, passionate, infidel Frenchmen, and the same incantation bewitched all. The Agitator, O'Connell, utters his stormy appeals to oppressed Irishmen, who have groaned under the same burdens, and been crushed into a mighty unity, which moves forward single-hearted, to the accomplishment of a common purpose. And even the great orator of New England, Webster, produces his happiest effects, when addressing men who inherit a common character from Puritan ancestors. But of what materials is not a Western audience composed? The orator's spell may bewitch one, and enrage

another ; it may kindle to white heat the enthusiasm of one, and perfectly disgust another. The allusion which convulses one with merriment, may be a centre-shot at the enshrined idol of another ; the appeal which arouses the patriotic ardor of one, may drive another to thoughts of treason. It is no easy task to address such an assemblage, and at some times to make an appeal successful would do honor to the tortuosities of a Machiavel. Indignantly denounce England, and you will catch new fire from the flashing eye of that Frenchman, who drinks in your words as though they were heaven's own nectar ; England is the hereditary enemy of France. But how will your courage sink at catching sight of yonder enraged Englishman ; you have denounced his mother. Eulogize Wellington, and your Frenchman is in a rage ; eulogize Napoleon, and your Englishman and German are in a rage ; let your eloquent fervor sweep before it all obstacles, and unite all hearts, but make an unfortunate allusion to some Punic war or Waterloo battle, and the agitation of yonder broad brim will almost articulate its rebuke, " Friend, thee doest wrong to inflame the passions of men for war ! "

To some extent, the same is true at the bar and in the pulpit. Perhaps the preacher finds more diversity in his congregation, in reference to the mode of preaching, than its matter. Men who have been trained under the carefully written discourses of Richards, Griffin, Spring, and Bedell, are apt to consider all extemporaneous preaching as vague and diffuse. Nothing extemporaneous pleases such, be it ever so clear or eloquent. But others, and these are generally Western and Southern men, who have enjoyed the rapid, impassioned, extemporaneous efforts of such men as Stiles, Durbin, and Bascom, are apt to be dissatisfied with written discourses, however able and eloquent. An anecdote was related last winter, by a gentleman in Columbus, concerning some written discourses preached some years since by Bishop Hamline, whilst he was a circuit rider. This practice went directly athwart the prejudices of his hearers, and their comments certainly are pithy and characteristic. " Very good,

very good, and pretty enough, but we don't want such ! we want Holy Ghost preaching, hot from heaven !” Nor are these feelings confined to a single denomination. It more or less modifies the pulpit efforts of all. If the orator expects to move his hearers, he must accommodate himself, in some sort, to the peculiarities which meet him. A clergyman of splendid attainments, most eloquent heart, and unaffected piety, whose preaching is adapted to a New England taste, might be cited as an instance ; aside from the cultivated few, his efforts are spoken of as being “very good, but so dull !” Yet in New England he is a real lion, flattered and caressed enough to spoil a man less great. And what is singular, is, that his best efforts, even in New England, are made when he has thrown off all trammels, and addresses them in the free Western manner.

The heterogeneous character of Western audiences opposes no ordinary barrier to the highest success in eloquence, and results in two marked characteristics : excessive caution in alluding to any thing calculated to excite prejudice in a mixed multitude, and the use of appeals founded on principles so broad and incontrovertible as to be universally admitted.

Whether these are favorable to the growth of eloquence, let others decide ; and yet facts stand out prominent, showing that vast masses of men at the West, have been moved by such means, as when a tempest rushes over the calm ocean, stirring its lowest depths, and marshalling the world of waters into contending waves. An instance of this kind occurred at the great political meeting held at Dayton, Ohio, in the fall of 1842, in honor of Henry Clay. There was tremendous enthusiasm manifested when this distinguished statesman addressed the multitudes, variously estimated from 80,000 to 120,000 ; but it arose not so much from the actual power he then exerted, as from the remembrances of an eventful life, crowded with splendid achievements, which now gathered their laurels about his head. Of course the town was crowded full ; and in such a crowd but little rest could be obtained during the night succeeding the meeting. The fatigues of the

previous day and night would not predispose men to be moved by eloquence. There was one man, however, conscious of power to control men under any circumstances. He mounted the platform, and at the sound of his trumpet-toned voice the multitude gathered in dense masses around him. America on the highway to ruin from the conscienceless measures of demagogues, was a fine theme for popular effect, and he manifested a tremendous power. The fatigues of the barbecue were forgotten, and all yielded themselves to the potent incantation. At one moment, the tears coursed down sun-burnt cheeks, and ere they had dried, would be succeeded by convulsions of laughter. Then that "sea of upturned faces" would glow with wrath, as corruption, fraud, and demagoguism were revealed to them for their unqualified abhorrence. Then this passed away to be succeeded by the glow of high-souled patriotism. The transitions were rapid and fitful as the changes of a spring-day; and the multitude gave evidence that the orator's power was resistless.

A cool Scotchman told a friend, that when Mr. Corwin commenced his speech, his own fatigue was so great, that he calmly took his seat on the opposite side of the street, at some distance from the platform, careless whether he heard the speech or not. "But," said he, "in a very little time I found myself standing in the middle of the street with the crowd, like a simpleton, in perfect ecstasy gazing up at the wonderful man whose words were subduing us."

This seems a favorable opportunity to speak of this gentleman, as affording one of the finest specimens of the native Western orator. In the remarks already made, and those yet to be made, let me disclaim all political bias, my only object being to speak of orators without regard to party. His enemies being judges, Thomas Corwin—now in the United States Senate—is an eloquent man, able to excite in his hearers just such feelings as best please him. A splendid compliment was paid him by John Q. Adams not many years since, in the House of Representatives. A member from Michigan had made some slighting remarks concerning Ohio, which

called Mr. C. to his feet. He gave the offender a severe scourging; and the process was so annihilating, that Mr. Adams the next day alluded to the demolished member as "*the LATE Mr. ———, of Michigan!*" A retentive memory, careful observation, calm investigation, perfect control of all his knowledge, unite to lay a broad foundation for the superstructure of eloquence. The English language, in all its capacities for wit, humor, ridicule, pathos, passion of every kind, and for lifting him, as on eagle pinions, to the third heaven of purest eloquence, is a slave to the man. His arrows reach the heart of every one. So broad are the principles upon which he bases his appeals, and so cautious is he to arouse no adverse prejudice, that he compels the assent and sympathies of all. Certainly if any man on earth be able to make his hearers believe fully, that they do see with their own eyes, "that horrid monster obscuring the sun," that man is Thomas Corwin, of Ohio.

Perhaps nothing contributes more to the effect of his well-chosen words, than his face, which is altogether a "*nonsuch*." That swarthy face is a noble one, and there is no passion nor feeling in his heart but is proclaimed by his countenance before words can utter it. It is a magic mirror reflecting upon his auditors wrath, contempt, patriotism, pity, ridicule, sarcasm, so strikingly, that all feel themselves sympathizing with him in emotions not yet articulated. Those who were witnesses, will never forget the indescribable drollery of his tones, gestures, and physiognomy, in 1840, at Columbus, whilst answering the objections of some man of straw antagonist. Mr. C. had, the day previous, addressed a multitude of forty or fifty thousand, and was to address as great a number the succeeding day. The citizens of Franklin county waylaid him, and compelled him, although greatly exhausted, to speak. His strain of remark was uncommonly brilliant, seeming to transcend his usual efforts. He supposed an honest inquirer and opponent to be proposing questions in reference to the cry that "times are killing hard." "Why, my dear sir," says the opponent, "how can it be possible that so much trouble

and such hard times exist, and yet the men whom we have elected to office, and in whom we have unshaken confidence, never whisper a word of all this? Sir, you must be mistaken, or our office-holders would speak!" Mr. C.'s countenance was the very impersonation of the "serio-comico" gravity whilst stating this objection. Then began that droll working of his features, at the very sight of which, before he had said a word, hundreds found it impossible not to laugh outright. "Fellow-citizens," said he, in deliberate tones, "I ever allude to the Holy Scriptures with the deepest reverence, and on occasions like the present but seldom. But that venerable patriarch, Job, has so completely unravelled the difficulties of my honest opponent that I must trespass to quote his words: "*Doth a wild ass bray while he hath grass, or loweth the ox over his fodder?*" By this time his form was bent down toward his hearers, his fun-speaking eye was glancing from one countenance to another, and his whole face radiant with inimitable queerness. Who could resist it? Sedate old men held their sides to rear; the younger portion stamped and screamed with laughter, till the tears started. Peal of laughter succeeded peal so rapidly and boisterously as to preclude the possibility of speaking for some minutes. Had some old Roman pantomime witnessed the swarthy face of "Tom the Wagon-boy"—as his constituents sometimes affectionately term him—effecting such prodigies, he would have died of sheer envy!

But Mr. Corwin is capable of far nobler things. He so speaks on some occasions, that the multitudes forget to shout. Such an instance occurred during the late political campaign, whilst unmasking the annexation scheme, for the detestation of his hearers. Wit, ridicule, and satire were laid aside, as instruments unworthy the high issue here made, and like a giant he grasped the momentous bearings of the scheme on human happiness. A magnificent land was unrolled before us, upon which, under the fostering care of Jehovah, had been accumulated all that is desirable in natural products, religion, and government. Then came the dark reverse of war, rapine, and fraternal bloodshed, with all the pack of insatiate

hell-hounds following civil war. Human freedom in chains, here received its direst stab, and the woes of millions were perpetuated hopelessly, until Heaven's wrath should herald in their release, with fire, tempest, and carnage. No sound interrupted the orator. He was sweeping a cord too deep to elicit stormy applause. He had dragged them to the brink of a yawning gulf, bidding them gaze down into its horrid depths, and they shrank back in pallid silence. It was only when he had closed this splendid peroration, and had taken his seat, that the multitude remembered what was due to their idol, and rent the air with their long, vociferated acclamations.

Perhaps all the faults and excellencies of Western eloquence are more prominent in this gentleman than in any other, and for this reason we have dwelt at some length upon his peculiarities.

And here a qualifying remark must be made in order to estimate this eloquence correctly. Judged by strict rhetorical rules, many of these speeches would not stand trial. There might appear too great a luxuriance of figure and anecdote, or words might be used which Walker would condemn. Peradventure some of these orators would be classed in the same form with a certain remarkable character. "On the whole, Professor Teufelsdröckh is not a cultivated writer. Of his sentences, perhaps not more than nine-tenths stand straight on their legs; the remainder are in quite angular attitudes, buttressed up by props—of parentheses and dashes—and ever with this or the other tagrag hanging from them; a few even sprawl out helplessly on all sides, quite broken-backed and dismembered." Your lynx-eyed Quintilian may discover this harsh word, that rudely constructed sentence, or the other unsanctioned phrase, marring what would otherwise be surpassingly beautiful. And yet if "eloquence is the art and talent by which discourse is adapted to an end," (Campbell,) and if the index of this is to be sought in the success which attends an effort, then are these Western orators eloquent, and that in a high degree. The fisher boy, whose rude utterings, in spite of highborn lordlings and intellectual aristocrats, made

him master of Venice, was eloquent without the graces of the schools. The gifted Red Jacket, whose flashing eye and graphic fire-painting of the Indian's wrongs, roused his nation to frenzy, was eloquent, albeit he had never practised before any other mirror than soul-speaking eyes, and had enjoyed the polishing touch of no other elocutionist than his own great soul struggling for utterance. Many a speaker may be found whose style is so faultless that Blair could not condemn, but every one knows that he is not eloquent. Many a speaker may be found with gross rhetorical faults, whose rugged, impassioned earnestness takes your heart captive, and convinces you that he is one of the favored, over whom the God of eloquence has thrown his mantle. Nor is the paltry trickery of mannerism, however ingenious, to claim the consecrated epithet, *eloquent*. Mere earthworms, whose souls never have felt the sacred unction, may "mouth" a speech, and "saw the air," and "tear a passion to tatters, to very rags, to split the ears of groundlings," and are no more eloquent than a child, tricked out with his feather and wooden sword is a Napoleon.

"Poor, mean, mechanick souls! who little know
A few short words of energetic force,
Some powerful passion on the sudden roused,
The animating sight of something noble;
Some fond trait of memory finely waked,
A sound, a simple song, without design,
In revolutions, tumults, wars, rebellions,
All grand events, have oft effected more
Than deepest cunning of their paltry art."—(JOANNE BAILLIE.)

Nor would we have it inferred from what has been said, that all Western orators are subject to severer criticisms in these respects, than others. Whoever has read the speeches of Henry Clay, must have been charmed with their liquid harmony, their classic beauty, and their captivating eloquence. Perhaps more perfect specimens of statesman-like oratory cannot be found in the history of our country. He seems to have an intuitive perception as to what is chaste in style, a

heart alive to all that is beautiful, and a fervor which warms, yea burns, yet never is so fierce as to mar. As an accomplished Irish Jesuit once said concerning these efforts, "*they read most beautifully.*" But Mr. Clay is too widely known to render it necessary to speak of his eloquence at any length.

And in this connection we cannot forbear speaking of one less widely known, and yet who is greatly admired as a statesman and orator. Hon. Thomas Ewing in some respects is not a Western orator, so simple is his mode of speaking, and so unadorned is his style. And yet his power to control men is amazing. He possesses not a little of the Websterian "sledge-hammer" power, and he swings his instrument like a Titan. Twice, we have heard him develop the Texas question in all its practical—(politically)—and some of its moral bearings, and should consider another repetition as a rare privilege. He has no words to spare, uses but few figures, has an eagle eye to the prejudices of his hearers; like a skilful fisherman, he flings over them the great drag-net of general principles, and forces them to his conclusions. He scarcely ever descends to that which is playful to keep attention fixed, although his laughing eye sufficiently indicates what he might do if he chose. He depends upon his earnest and luminous exhibition of truth, and he binds the ligatures of his iron-linked logic about and about his argument, until it becomes moveless as a mountain. And withal he speaks in earnest, and his hearers know that a great and sincere man is unburdening his soul of deep, inwrought conviction. It is no unmeaning compliment paid to him, that while delighting, and riveting the attention of thousands, he is not generally greeted with oft-repeated applause, until his conclusion becomes an irresistible conviction, and then loud and long acclamations make the welkin ring. No man at the West has greater power of convincing men that he is right, than this popular favorite, who, in allusion to his noble efforts to acquire an education, among the people is familiarly and fondly called "*Tom the salt-boiler!*"

We again disclaim being influenced by political bias, whilst alluding to public men. So far as the purpose of this article is concerned, the political complexion of a man is of no account whatever. Western eloquence is our theme, and we now choose an example from the party opposed to Messrs. Ewing and Corwin. Some may be inclined to rank other men in this party higher than the one we have selected. If violent gesticulation, garrulous volubility, high sounding bombast, mouthing, frowning, stamping, simpering, and such like mannerisms constitute a great orator, then our selection is a bad one. Were these the qualifications, we could easily select one who might sit for the original of the above interesting sketch.

But the gentleman whom we now cite is not such an one, and we take pleasure in according to him the prerogatives of true eloquence! He is a glaring exception to the aphorism implied in the oft quoted words of Shakspeare—

“Let me have men about me that are fat;
Sleek-headed men, and such as sleep o’ nights;
Yond’ Cassius has a lean and hungry look;
He thinks too much; such men are dangerous.”
“Would he were fatter!”

Mr. John Brough is fat enough to satisfy even a suspicious Cæsar, and yet his mind is one of restless activity, and great power. He is self-educated. First he was a printer’s boy,—then an editor, then a lawyer, then a legislator; and now his party in Ohio has not his equal. It is said that sometimes he debases his high gifts to the use of ribaldry and low abuse. But glad we are, that we never heard him do this. It was in Marietta, his native place, near the old court-house in which he was born, surrounded by his early companions, with many of whom he had kicked the foot-ball over the beautiful commons on the river bank, and most of whom were uncompromising political opponents, that he pronounced a political oration. He spoke three hours and a half to the

admiration of all parties. His language was pure Saxon, distilling from his lips sweeter

“——— than the liquid glide
Of Gallic river or Italian tide.”

He excels greatly in “making the worse appear the better reason,” with consummate skill decoying the attention from the weak points of his argument, to those which can endure the scrutiny of logic. During the time he was pronouncing this extemporaneous speech, he did not miscall or recall a single word, or attempt to refashion a single sentence when once begun. It was a rich, unbroken flow of pure English words, uttered in a voice of surpassing sweetness, and compelling the admiration of all. He was not without honor, even in his own country.

As an orator, he occupies in his own party the same prominent position that Mr. Corwin does among the Whigs, and yet the contrast between the two is striking. The eloquence of Corwin is uneven, at one moment gentle as the notes of an Eolian harp, at another impetuous as a whirlwind; the eloquence of Brough is constant, sweet, rich, never vibrating between the extremes of mirth and pathos, gentleness, and energy; the one can use the rugged, crushing humor of Dean Swift, the other the playful pleasantry of Addison; the one is reckless of the mere niceties of language, and lays hold upon such alone as may body forth the passionate workings of his mind, the other selects sweet sounding words, and rounds off his periods in the “*ore rotundo*” style, at times regarding the drapery more than the thought; the first is capable of intense excitement, when his gesticulation is energetic but natural, his voice is raised high, and his words rush out with the utmost rapidity; the second is always calm, and his mild gestures, his smooth voice, and countenance of imperturbable gravity, never betray him into the violence of high excitement; the first as an orator has greater faults than the second, but the second has not as great excellencies; the

one descends at least to the hither verge of pantomimic buffoonery, but can sweep the soul's cords like a master, and draw forth the sweetest, deepest melody, or like a storm-king, rouse human passion to a tempest, and guide it with whirlwind fierceness against the object of his loathing; the other with no less, but a different power, elicits from the soul, sweet, deep melody in a constant gush, but it never reaches down to the deepest, nor soars up to the highest; the eloquence of the first is fitful as an April day, now gilding the sky with golden light, then obscuring it with black storm-clouds; now the breath of spring steals sweetly over the earth, and anon the whirlwind hurries on in its pathway of ruin; but the eloquence of the other is steady as the light of an autumn day, mild yet bright, from the first gleam of morning to the last blush of evening. In no one particular are these orators alike, and yet you listen to both with unqualified pleasure, under the conviction that on each has been breathed the real inspiration of eloquence. The task may seem an invidious one, to pronounce upon the comparative merits of these remarkable men, although it must be acknowledged that the stormful energy, the vacillating extremes, the passionate outbursts of the first, accord more with the genius of Western eloquence, and for our parts we do prefer it. Words, though they be harsh as a tiger's growl, and rude as a back-woodman's speech, if they do but break up "the fountains of the great deep" in the soul, and pour them out in all their sublime energies, are eloquent, they are "words fitly spoken, like apples of gold in pictures of silver."

It were an easy task to select other remarkable characters as illustrations, if it were necessary, both in and out of Ohio. The illustrations have been confined to Ohio, for the simple reason that the writer wishes to be governed entirely by his own observations, and comparatively, he has seen but little of Crittenden, Marshall, C. M. Clay, Benton, Jones, Prentice, and others equally distinguished. And certainly, no apology need be penned for dwelling at such length upon the eloquence of political men, since they, to a greater extent than

all others, are thrown into contact with the peculiar and modifying influences of Western society. In discussing the eloquence of political men, we have also, in great measure, superseded the necessity of enlarging on the eloquence of the bar, since to no small extent our most gifted lawyers are also our most gifted politicians. To show that the West possesses lawyers of splendid abilities and acquirements, it is only necessary to name such as M'Lean, Hitchcock, Lane, Vinton, Swan, Stansberry, and a host like them.

But Western pulpit eloquence still holds out an inviting theme for a few remarks, for which we beg indulgence. And here may be traced the same general outlines as on the platform and at the bar; and we do believe that here exist the elements for the most perfect pulpit eloquence the world has seen, though these elements are not yet wrought into perfect symmetry. The conflicting systems of religious doctrine impose the sternest necessity upon the clergy of every denomination to be thoroughly armed at all points, ready to act in any emergency, or meet with discomfiture. This is well illustrated in the celebrated debate which took place between Mr. Campbell and Mr. Purcell. Mr. C. sustained himself with marked ability, until he made a quotation from some rare author, which proved an unfortunate one. The quotation was a centre shot at the bishop's position, and with the utmost assurance he placed the author in question on the table, and defied Mr. C. to find such a passage. The fact was, the copy was an imperfect one, and Mr. C. was not aware that such articles of religious merchandise existed. He was confounded, but not convinced, and sent to some eastern city to have the matter attested. But then it was too late. The popular effect was all on the Bishop's side, and that effect was far from being nullified by the announcement of the facts in the papers of the day. Had Mr. C. been prepared upon this point, on the instant to expose the facts, he might have expelled his adversary from the field with indignity. Western clergymen often meet just such instances, and are warned to leave no point unguarded. The tendency of all these things

has been to make them "*semper parati*," minute men, ready for action at any moment, "to do battle" with any adversary, with lance, battle-axe or sword. And this will be deemed no mean element in efficient eloquence.

The Western preacher is obliged to accommodate himself to circumstances of such a peculiar nature, that he must be an "off-hand man," or in many instances fail of success. The neighbor's house, the rude school-house, or the solemn grove, is his sanctuary in which to deliver a message from the Most High. Or, in traversing the mighty rivers, his fellow-travellers will convert the cabin of a steamer into a place of worship. In no small degree does the heterogeneous character of his audience modify his efforts. The most scrutinizing cautiousness, and the use of the broadest principles, are to be traced in his most effective efforts. In addition to all this, we have another fact of no small moment. The people are exceedingly fastidious. Poor reasoners, tame speakers, barren thinkers, meet no favor, and one cannot but be struck with the anxious search of the most insignificant churches for the most gifted preachers. That this must in the end prove a strong stimulus for clergymen to make high attainments in all the requisites of an able and successful eloquence, will readily be perceived. Nor would it be correct to assert that the majority of these efforts are not unpolished when compared with the sermons of Robert Hall or Griffin. Some chaste and powerful preachers can be found at the West, and yet it must be acknowledged that as yet elegance and polish in the highest degree do not characterize Western preaching. But for all this, there is an impassioned fervor, a strong grasping of great points at issue, skilful appeals to men's hearts and consciences, which sanction fully their claim to the name of eloquence. A distinguished man has uttered words so pertinent that we quote them. The minister's high calling, when properly apprehended, "will make the mere ornaments of rhetoric appear small. It will give seriousness to his discourse, gravity to his diction, unction to his eloquence, heart to his arguments, and success to his ministry." The truth of these re-

marks is forcibly illustrated at the West. The devoted minister, of whatever persuasion, feels that he is contributing his share of influence in forming the character of coming millions ; to rescue from error and vice a growing empire ; to break in pieces the Satanic enginery which drives on mightily the enterprise of ruin. In fact every influence to be conceived of, crowds itself upon his mind, and tends to form a holy and effective eloquence. And we hope to see the day when such a consummation shall be attained, as that Western pulpit eloquence shall not be surpassed in the whole earth. The article will be concluded with brief sketches of two or three celebrated pulpit orators, hoping they may not be altogether unacceptable.

And here, again, we shall confine ourselves to those whom we know personally, and we do not select them on account of private predilections. The most accomplished theological debater in the Western country, is Dr. Rice, of Cincinnati, so celebrated for his contest with Alexander Campbell, of Bethany, Va. He is thought to possess some of the finest qualifications for a debater. An unbounded command over language, perfect control over all that he has ever known, and a self-possession that cannot be disturbed, are his, and constitute him a knight splendidly equipped for defence and attack. Mr. Campbell must have been astonished greatly to find his opponent, with the utmost readiness, quoting his opinions and assertions as recorded in translations, notes, pamphlets, periodicals, and published debates, and in such away as to leave the impression on not a few minds, that Dr. R. knew better what his antagonist had inculcated in past times, than he did himself. And then he never hesitates for language. His words flow on perpetually, and fasten themselves to the point at issue with a singular felicity. His ridicule of an opponent is scorching, the more so, because he is the coolest and most tantalizing of disputants. You might as well shake a mountain as attempt to make him angry, and this enables him to gall an enemy with envenomed arrows, with an assurance most provoking. On some occasions he catches his vic-

tim by the hair of the head, as though he were a mere pigmy, and suspends him in mid air, whilst in the most aggravating manner, he flourishes his scimitar before his eyes, that he may suffer several deaths before the blow descends, which shall cut him through and through. As a debater he is unsurpassed, but he does not realize our ideal of a pulpit orator. There is an unimpassioned intellectualness in his rapid preaching, which fails to wake the deep emotions of the soul. Perhaps his whole failing may be expressed by saying that he has not great control of the dramatic element in human nature, and without this no orator ever reached the perfection of eloquence.

A remarkable example of real Western eloquence is found in the Rev. Joseph C. Stiles, formerly of Kentucky. His voice, his gesticulation, his manner, his fervor, his thoughts, all show that you are listening to one who has received his baptism in nature's font, and his unction from heaven. His grasp of thought is tremendous, and his words, instead of being his masters, are the mere servants to impart to others his own convictions. The imagery of nature, and the inspired delineations of heaven and hell, obey his beck, and concentrate all the hearer's attention intensely upon the subject in hand. The most energetic words flow in torrents from his lips, and bear you resistlessly along. In argumentation he is powerful, and he binds his hearers to his conclusions with mightier than iron chains. And then his fiery earnestness makes his words burning bolts, penetrating every shield and coat of mail as merest cobwebs. His restless mental activity, his powerful argumentation, his extensive knowledge, his rapid utterance, his overwhelming vehemence, combine to make him the most noted of preachers strictly Western. Judging him by his success he is no less remarkable. He knows every cord in the human soul, fastidious instrument that it is. He can make it breathe forth the dulcet notes of peace, or pour forth the impassioned notes of joy, and from the same cords can wring the wildest wails of woe.

A gentleman not long since related to us an anecdote, the truth of which we have no reason to doubt. Mr. S. was

once preaching before a crowded audience from the words, "And the great day of his wrath is come, and who shall be able to stand?" Heaven, earth, and hell were subsidized for figures and language to image forth the terrific convictions which possessed his mind. With gigantic strength he dragged his hearers from one stage of excitement to another, surrounding them with all the awful images of the day of wrath, thundrings, and quakings, and burnings, and wailings, and cursings; hell itself, with all its demoniac legions, moving from beneath, and Heaven's hosts marshalled into an array of vengeance. The excitement was intense, so much so that the storm-raiser could not say "peace, be still." He was precisely in the situation which Wirt feared for the blind preacher: "Socrates lived and died like a hero, Jesus Christ lived and died like a God." How splendidly did this afflicted child of eloquence glide to the earth from his lofty flight! But no such alighting could Mr. S. find, and he stopped, the feelings of his hearers being still wrought up to agony. The pastor of the church arose to pray, and his first words secured what the eloquent man could not: "Great Jehovah, we bless thee, that the great day of thy wrath is *not yet* come!" A sense of relief, as from something dreadful, pervaded the whole congregation, as these words were pronounced. A single remark should here be made, enhancing our estimate of this distinguished preacher, and that is, he scarcely ever fails in producing a strong impression. At times he is eloquent in the highest degree, and yet on no occasion is he contemptible.

The addition of one more character is imperatively demanded, and then we have done. And there is no mistaking this character. His influence on the West, and Western pulpit eloquence is incalculable. Strictly speaking, he is not a Western man, for the greater part of his life has been spent at the East. And yet his eloquence has been fashioned by just such influences as we have described as existing at the West. He has never been the narrow-minded man, whose vision was girt in by the boundaries of a New England parish. He has never been the calculating man, forbearing to meddle

with those things which were not popular, and because they were not so ; nor has he waited to identify himself with great enterprises for human salvation, until the very winds were burdened with the hearty acclamations of universal Christendom. His eye has been a telescope which cast searching glances over a world lying in wickedness. The mantle of prophecy seemed to rest upon him when the Missionary and Temperance enterprises were commenced, and from the first he saw the result. His boat ever rode the foremost wave, challenging others to a holy emulation. But especially has this been true of the West. His eye caught its vast outlines, and measured its prospective greatness. He watched with quaking interest the marshalling hosts of light and darkness, as they poured on to the great battle-field, to wage the last and fiercest conflict, and his eloquence has wrought its most potent effects, whilst portraying the joy or the woe which the Great West is destined to send in ocean waves around the earth. Who, that has seen his flushed face, his every muscle tense with excitement, and his voice uttering words that seemed oracular responses from the "Holy of Holies" of eloquence, as he dilated upon his theme of themes, salvation for the West, could for a moment doubt that his eloquence had been formed by the confluence of just such great themes upon his great, susceptible soul ? The mind of every reader, long before this, has anticipated us in pronouncing that venerated name, Lyman Beecher, and so well acquainted are all with him, that further enlargement seems well-nigh gratuitous. And yet so great is his influence on pulpit eloquence at the West, that a few words may not be out of place.

Dr. Beecher is an original, and no copy. His mode of gesture, attitude, style of thought, and expression, are entirely his own ; and where is his like ? Generally it is only in single passages that he shows himself to possess the characteristics of Western eloquence. Occasionally a whole sermon or speech indicates to you the full extent of the mighty energies coiled up in his mind. Some eloquent men there are—at least so the world calls them—whose brilliances are cold as

the glittering light of a diamond, or moonbeams flashing across an iceberg. You are filled with admiration unbounded, as thoughts, beautiful as ever greeted a poet's vision, are placed before you. But beautiful though they be, they chill your heart. It is an eloquence of the intellect. And some eloquent men there are whose simple appeals come home to your heart in spite of yourself, and kindle deep emotion and drive you to duty. But when you examine what they have said, it would require an intellectual microscope to detect much real substance. The intellect finds but little to gaze on with complacency, and yet it is eloquent, it springs from the heart. Dr. B. in a high degree combines the two; his eloquence is from the intellect and the heart.

In one respect he differs from most others. In the midst of remarks, from such a source seeming common-place, he will fling out some thought, meteor-like, sparkling in all the brilliancy of its own original lustre, and then, as if nothing uncommon had occurred, he will move on in the path of "common-places." We well remember an instance. It was on a Sabbath afternoon that he was addressing Christians who were desponding, telling them it would not always be so. The day had been cloudy, but just at this moment the clouds were lifted up, and the setting sun streamed brightly into the church. In an instant the Doctor appropriated the incident. "Behold it, desponding Christian. Clouds obscure your heavens during the long day, death begins to draw his sable curtains around you. You despair of seeing light. But those clouds will be lifted up, and the light of God's countenance, like that rich sunlight, be poured over your soul, before you go hence to be here no more." Nothing can be richer or more appropriate, and such occurrences are common. Indeed, in this very thing consists a marked feature of his eloquence, a seizing upon passing events and pressing them into immediate service. It is this which gives many of his speeches the freshness of newly coined gold. He was once reading a lecture to his class on the differences of minds. The particular thought occupying his attention was the difference between

embodied and disembodied spirits. Disembodied spirits were represented as looking in astonishment upon us, wondering how it is possible for us to act at all in these clay prisons. And how the mind is fettered by the feebleness of the body ! How often has the student, careering on to conquest, been checked by a jaded or diseased body, and the mind, chafing like an eager war-horse, been compelled to cease its labors ! The Doctor suddenly closed his book, drew off his spectacles, and pronounced the following extemporaneous thoughts. "Excepting freedom from sin, intense, vigorous, untiring action is the mind's highest pleasure. I would not wish to go to heaven, did I believe that its inhabitants were to sit inactive by purling streams, to be fanned into indolent slumbers by balmy breezes ! Heaven, to be a place of happiness, must be a place of activity. Has the far-reaching mind of Newton rested from its profound investigations ? Have David and Isaiah hung up their harps, useless as the dusty arms in Westminster Abbey ? Has Paul, glowing with godlike enthusiasm, ceased itinerating the universe of God ? Are Peter, and Cyprian, and Luther, and Edwards, idling away eternity in mere psalm-singing ? Heaven is a place of activity, of never-tiring thought. David and Isaiah will sweep noble and loftier strains in eternity, and the minds of saints, unclogged by cumbersome clay, for ever feast on a banquet of thought, rich, glorious thought. Young gentlemen, press on, you will never get through. An eternity of untiring activity is before you, and the universe of thought your field."

Dr. B.'s mind is a laboratory teeming with every variety of figure. He never deals in comparisons unless compelled to. Comparisons are too tame. Condensed, vivid metaphors start up before you, the living embodiments of great thoughts. This is a favorite peculiarity to be noticed both in his sermons and prayers. When laboring under intense excitement, terse exclamations, rocket-like metaphors, are crowded upon you with astonishing rapidity. They constitute the mere stepping-stones for the hearer's use, whilst the orator, with fiery impetuosity, rushes to his conclusion. One might

hear him preach a year, and yet hear no effort commensurate with his great powers. To hear a sermon or a speech, when the full energies of his mind are wrought up to intensest excitement, is an era to the person capable of appreciating true eloquence. By merest accident we saw him once when his excitement was almost frenzy, and we hardly expect to hear such another effort. His audience was made up promiscuously from all denominations, the occasion being an anniversary of the Bible Society. The influence of false religions to debase men, and of the religion of the Bible to elevate them, was his theme. Long before he arose, his face and movements gave evidence of high excitement, and so absorbed was he in his own thoughts, that he did not hear the announcement of his name by the president. A brother clergyman laid his hand upon his shoulder, and he started up. In an instant he leaped into the heart of his subject, and for almost an hour he poured out burning words. He scarcely looked at the scrap of paper in his hand. The effort was purely extemporaneous. He was a giant in a truth-quarry. He grasped his instrument and hurled vast, unbroken masses down the mountain's side. The mightiest truths were rolled down upon us in his terse metaphors, and Whitefieldian exclamations, and onward he hastened, without stopping to expand. He seemed to see deluded men struggling on a bottomless ocean, and false religions, mountain-sized, bound about their necks, and sinking them deep to hopeless ruin. On the other hand, the Bible with its doctrines, so pure, so sanctifying, so mighty, was a magnificent orb, a sun, with omnipotent attractions, drawing man upward from his degradation, as the sun moves the bosom of the ocean. The truths were so noble, the metaphors so condensed yet clear, flashing conviction upon the mind, the excitement was so great, as burst of the most brilliant eloquence succeeded burst, in rapid sequence, during the whole time, that when he ceased, one long-drawn breath of relief was heard throughout the auditory.

But we must stop. Our partialities to the West are per-

ceptible, and we trust, pardonable. We do love to fill our minds with the conceptions of that grandeur to which the West shall finally attain. At such moments we tremble. This battle-field, grander than a thousand Waterloos, these hosts, which Milton's pen could not describe, that consummation in victory, more joyful or woful, than ever perched on a conqueror's standard—these invest the West with solemn sublimity. And the wise man will not close his eyes against the mute yet striking lessons, which these foreshadowed events teach. But be this destiny joyful or woful, ELOQUENCE, a mighty spirit from heaven or from hell, according as she is subsidized, sweeping sensitive cords in a million hearts, eliciting notes which might charm an angel or delight a demon, binding those million hearts with the sweet, yet omnipotent chains of fraternal love, or driving them fiercely asunder to contend as friends, for supremacy—Eloquence, the mighty Incantator of all this, shall lead the great West up the pathway of life, or force it down the steeps of death.

ARTICLE IV.

PROFESSOR BUSH'S ANASTASIS REVIEWED.

By Rev. D. D. TOMPKINS McLACHLIN, New-York.

IN the Divine administration nothing, perhaps, is more adapted to strike us with surprise, than the methods adopted by Infinite Wisdom in the accomplishment of its glorious purposes. Agencies, which human penetration would have marked as wholly destitute of efficiency, or as directly and powerfully tending to the subversion of truth and virtue, have been chosen by God, as the best adapted of any within the range of his universal observation and summons, to the illustration and final establishment of the grand principles of faith and duty. From the hour when, in Eden, the Prince of

Darkness arrayed himself in opposition to the testimony of the Father of Lights, what has the history of our world presented but the constant antagonism of virtue and vice, of truth and falsehood; and however error and sin may have triumphed for a season, the issue will abundantly prove that "the foolishness of God is wiser than man, and the weakness of God is stronger than man." The assaults of enemies, and the mistakes of friends, by which the ark of the covenant has apparently been endangered, have all been made contributory to the settlement of Zion on an immovable foundation.

We have been led to these reflections by the interest awakened in the churches in favor of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, from the recent attempt made by Professor Bush to undermine the popular belief. Never, except on a single occasion, had we listened to an argument from the pulpit on this important topic. We had often noticed with astonishment, the rigid silence maintained on this point by the Christian ministry, when in the first ages of the Church, such prominence was given to the doctrine. It was necessary that something should transpire to break up this lethargic state, and excite the believer to a thorough examination of the nature of his faith, and of the evidence on which it rests. The belief in the resurrection of the body might otherwise become a dead letter in the creed of Christianity. But, thanks to Professor Bush, or rather to that Providence which brings good out of evil, an impulse has been given to the public mind, which will not soon spend itself; and we may thus indulge the hope, that the doctrine will hereafter be better understood, and more highly prized than it has been since the apostolic days.

In the latest work of our author, entitled, "Bush on the Resurrection of Christ," an attempt is made to invalidate the argument drawn from the resurrection of the material body of our Lord, against the theory of a spiritual resurrection, as developed in the *Anastasis*. We are not surprised that he has felt the necessity of guarding more thoroughly a point, where his theory is, if not the most indefensible, at least the

most easily assailed. He has accordingly, in the treatise before us, thrown around his position a double line of circumvallation. The inner is constructed as follows: "Our Lord's resurrection was a *pledge*, but not a *pattern* of ours," p. 80. And at an earlier stage in the discussion, "How far the resurrection of Christ is to be regarded as an *exact pattern* of the resurrection of the saints, can only be determined by determining how far, from the *nature* of each, the conditions of the one *could* find a parallel in those of the other. It is certain that the body of Christ did not 'see corruption.' It is certain that the bodies of the saints *do* see corruption. This establishes at once an immeasurable diversity, in this respect, between the two. In the one case, a body is made the subject of a change called resurrection, while its organic integrity remains unimpaired; in the other, if the common view be admitted, bodies which have been dissolved, dissipated, and formed into countless new combinations, are to be reconstructed, and vivified anew by their respective souls or spirits, and thus made to live again as the *identical* bodies which died."

"Again, it is clear that the divine-human constitution of our Lord's person *must* be the ground of an immense difference in the condition of his state and that of his people, both after and before his resurrection. We cannot justly reason from the one to the other. It does not follow, that because man, from the laws of his nature, goes into a resurrection-state as soon as he dies, without reference to his gross material body, that the same holds good of the risen Jesus.¹ Nor can any thing be more unjust than to attach such a consequence to a train of reasoning designed to show that the true doctrine of the resurrection of mankind does not involve or imply the resurrection of the same body." pp. 6, 7.

¹ How Mr. Bush can here attempt a comparison between the believer passing into a state of death, and "the risen Jesus," we see not, especially when an apostle affirms that "Christ being raised from the dead *dieth no more.*"

Of the principles thus laid down, the Professor seems not to avail himself in this essay. Whether it is because he regards these principles as so obvious, that no one will be found bold enough to call them in question, or rather, because he holds them as the *acropolis* to which he may retire, if his outposts are driven in, we leave to be determined by time. It is indeed certain that the resurrection of Christ is not "to be regarded as an *exact pattern* of the resurrection of the saints," since the one "did not see corruption," while the others "do see corruption." But does it follow, that it may not have been *so far* the pattern of the saints' resurrection, that, supposing it to have been a revivification of his material body, their resurrection will likewise be that of the material body? To such as deny the possibility of this, because the bodies of the dead "have been dissolved, dissipated, and formed into countless new combinations," we simply propound the inquiry, "Do ye not therefore err, not knowing the power of God?"

From the leading principle above presented, we do not dissent so much, as from the application it will receive in the hands of Mr. Bush. We dislike not so much that which is said, as that which *tacetur*, is passed over in silence: implied, and that in such a manner as to bear strongly in some minds in favor of the Professor's argument. We have no intention, however, to enter here on a discussion of the implied use of any of these principles. Before his application of them is entitled to any weight, he is bound to show that the diversity in the conditions is of *such* a nature, as to *preclude* the idea of a material resurrection in the case of the saints, even though it may have occurred in the case of the Redeemer. Till Professor Bush advances an argument in defence of his position, we shall not feel ourselves called upon to enter an argument, but shall simply oppose assertion to assertion, and the belief of the Christian *world* to that of an individual. The *onus probandi* certainly devolves on him who assails the popular faith.

But there is an outer line of circumvallation, which our

author has labored strongly to fortify. It is the spiritual resurrection of the Lord Jesus. Here he has erected munitions of an imposing aspect, which, if well founded, would render his position impregnable. It is incumbent, therefore, on those who conscientiously adhere to the belief in a material resurrection, to examine candidly and thoroughly the nature of the proofs adduced. The grand question at issue is this, Of what nature were the post-resurrection appearances of our Lord? Were they the exhibitions of a veritable human body, that body of flesh and bones which hung upon the cross? Or were they the manifestations of a spiritual body, invisible and undiscoverable by the physical organs of sense, and which could be known to be present only by a subjective change in the beholders, which the Professor terms "the opening of a spiritual eye"? The latter hypothesis is that which he adopts. "The supposition of the unconscious development of a spiritual sense in the spectator, affords the most probable solution of the problem. It is a question scarcely yet considered in man's philosophy, whether the human eye *can* see any thing that is not material. If an angel is seen in human form, it must either be converted to a human being, with its solid organisms, or it must be seen as it is by an internal eye, adapted to take cognizance of spiritual objects." p. 17. Accordingly he maintains that in all the *theophanies* and *angelophanies* recorded in the inspired volume, this opening of the eye of the spirit occurred, and urges in support of his opinion not only "the *improbability* of a *bonâ fide* transformation of an angelic into a human being," but also a *peculiarity* in the *diction* of the inspired penmen, by which a certain form of expression is *appropriated* to these manifestations, separating them in an undoubted manner from cases of physical vision. "The usage of the original on this subject is altogether peculiar, and opens a field of philological deduction, of the importance of which biblical students appear to have been hitherto very little aware. It may, I think, be clearly made to appear that there is an *appropriated form of expression* in relation to the whole subject of *theophanies* and

angelophanies, which has been almost entirely overlooked by critics and commentators, but the results of which must inevitably put a new phasis upon a whole class of texts bearing upon this theme, both in the Old and New Testaments." p. 20.

"To those who are conversant with the original languages of Scripture, it is well known that there is a number of distinct terms which are promiscuously rendered by our English *to see*. Thus we have in the Hebrew the two leading terms רָאָה and רָאָה, of which the former is the prevailing term for common and natural vision, while the latter רָאָה and its derivatives are more especially appropriated to that interior mental vision which was peculiar to the prophets, whence רָאָה is used to designate a *prophet* or *seer*, and רָאָה prophetic vision. Thus Gesenius, as translated by Robinson, gives as one of the leading senses of רָאָה what is presented by a divine influence to the prophet's mind, either in visions, properly so called, or in revelations, oracles, etc., as Hab. 1: 1, 'The oracle which Habakkuk saw,' i. e. which was divinely presented to his mind, which was revealed.' It is indeed true that these senses are occasionally interchanged with each other, and that רָאָה is applied to *mental*, and רָאָה to *ocular* vision. But it is, nevertheless, undeniably the fact, that what I have stated is the *dominant* usage in regard to these two terms. Thus, for instance, throughout the visions of Daniel, where he speaks of *seeing* or *beholding* the visions of the supernatural diorama spread before him, the term is invariably רָאָה.

"In like manner the Greek, also, has a striking diversity of terms, though greater, to express the idea of 'seeing.' Thus we find Εἶδω, ὁράω, βλέπω, θεωρέω, θεάομαι, and ὀπτομαι, all rendered 'see,' and though occasionally these meanings run into each other, yet there is no doubt that a *prevailing* usage can be ascertained in regard to each. The last in the list above given, ὀπτομαι, is the term which the *usus loquendi* of the sacred writers generally applies to angelic appearances, as also to the divine *theophanies*, mentioned in the Old

Testament. Though applied in repeated instances to external vision, particularly in the Septuagint, yet it is capable of absolute demonstration, that of all the different terms for 'seeing,' it is this which is more especially used to denote that internal or intellectual perception which is expressed by the Hebrew רָאָה , of which it is in several instances the Greek rendering, and which was developed in the prophets when made the subjects of supernatural revelations." p. 21. On p. 45 we find another term, θεωρέω , substituted for, or subjoined to, ὁπτομαι , as "a peculiarly fitting word," through "the legitimate import of the term and the circumstances of its frequent use," "to express the peculiar idea" of "*spiritual* or *prophetic* vision," answering, "in thirteen cases out of twenty-four, to the Heb. רָאָה ." After a "copious" illustration of the usage with respect to ὁπτομαι , the Professor having, as he supposes, made good his assertion that the prevailing sense of ὁπτομαι is that of "seeing with the spiritual eye," proceeds, pp. 59–69, to an examination of the post-resurrection appearances of our Lord; and, inasmuch as "the same term is *uniformly* employed in speaking of our Lord's manifestations of himself after his resurrection," he cannot discover, "why the inference is not legitimate, that those manifestations fall within the category of real *theophanies*; or in other words, why they are not to be regarded as purely spiritual phenomena addressed to a purely spiritual vision."

We have quoted thus largely from Professor Bush, that we may not incur the charge of misrepresentation, or of a want of candor in exhibiting the views of an opponent. As we intend in the present article not to enter on the philosophy of the thing, we are especially desirous that his opinions on the *philological* question should be fairly before our readers.

In controverting the views developed in the preceding extracts, we would by no means imply that these terms are perfectly synonymous. We think, however, that "it is capable of absolute demonstration," that these terms so run into each other, are so often substituted one for the other, that any argument on the quality of our Saviour's resurrection-body,

based on the use of one or two peculiar terms, has a foundation less firm and coherent than one of sand, and must necessarily sink from its own weight.

Let it be conceded in the outset, for the sake of the argument, that "*ὄπτομαι* is the term which the *usus loquendi* of the sacred writers generally applies to angelic appearances, as also to the divine theophanies." Does it follow from its frequent employment by the inspired amanuenses, when treating of these themes, that it is thus employed from a peculiar fitness for the expression of spiritual vision, or may not its use have possibly arisen from circumstances over which the writers had no control, *a necessity in the language*, so that they were *forced* to the admission of this term into the description, or to the maintenance of a rigid silence? If it can be made to appear that this is the very term most commonly used in certain relations of time to denote ocular vision, have we any warrant for inferring from its frequent application, in *precisely similar relations*, to theophanies, and angelophanies, that it is thus applied because it has a peculiar adaptation to the expression of *spiritual vision*; and may we advance from such premises to the conclusion that *this* and *that* manifestation, are *spiritual* manifestations, because they are denoted by *ὄπτομαι*? Every tyro knows, that when a number of kindred terms, such as those named above, exist, the common language of the Greeks (*ἡ κοινὴ*) does not employ them all, in all their tenses, and that the usage is fixed in favor of forms from one of these roots in certain tenses, and of forms from some of the kindred roots in the other tenses. No Attic writer, would employ a Present *ἐνέγκω*, or a Future from *φέρω*, or a Perfect from *οἶω*, though all these terms contribute various tenses to complete the conjugation of the verb. Those who are unacquainted with the ancient languages may be referred to "go," as an example in point, deriving some of its forms from the obsolete "wend." Who would be warranted in drawing an inference respecting the *nature* of a motion mentioned by some writer, because he says *I go*, rather than *I wend*, or *I went*, rather than *I goed*? Common sense

would set down this logician, as trying to amuse us with the oddities of fancy, or as in need of some restoratives to free him from a mental hallucination, if he were supposed to be seriously taxing our belief. And can any one justly demand our assent to an inference which he may make respecting the *nature* of the resurrection-body of Christ, from the application to it by the evangelists of certain forms of ὁπτομαι, when those were the *only* forms which general usage sanctioned? All that the sacred writers have done, in the employment of the term in question, *must* be explained on this simple principle. They were under a *necessity of resorting to these terms*, or of *departing from the common diction*. This fact, obvious as it is, has been wholly overlooked by Professor Bush, and glares through the whole treatise. By way of example, let me cite here a single passage, found on p. 25. “John 16: 16, ‘A little while, and ye shall not see (θεωρεῖτε) me; and again, a little while, and ye shall see (ὄψεσθε) me.’ So, also, v. 17, 19. This is somewhat remarkable, as the term for *seeing* in the two clauses is varied. Whether the latter term was intended to intimate the *peculiar kind of seeing* which would be requisite after his resurrection, we will not here positively affirm,¹ but certain it is, that this is the very word, in its passive form,² by which his manifestations to his disciples were indicated.”

Has the Professor overlooked an inaccuracy in the English translation, in which θεωρεῖτε appears as a Future, and

¹ Though the Professor does “not here positively affirm,” yet of course he *implies* that, in his opinion, ὄψεσθε is substituted for θεωρεῖτε, “to intimate the peculiar kind of seeing,” etc. If this has any force, it is on the supposition that he does *not* regard θεωρεῖτε as an appropriate term to express *spiritual* vision. Yet, as we have already observed, on p. 45, he labors strenuously to show “that there is something in the legitimate import of the term (θεωρεῖτε) and in the circumstances of its frequent use, which goes to render it a peculiarly fitting word by which to express the peculiar idea” of “spiritual vision.” We are irresistibly reminded of Cowper’s amusing description of the contest between “Nose and Eyes.” By which opinion would the Professor have us abide?

² We were taught, in our school-boy days, to call ὁψομαι, *Future Middle*. But perhaps the Professor means to say, *by which, in its passive form*.

not as a Present? The correct version is, "A little while, and ye *do* not see me; and again, a little while, and ye *shall* see me." (See Winer, Gram. New Test. § 41. 2.) Is it at all "remarkable" that "the term for seeing in the two clauses is varied," when the Present *ὄπτομαι* is altogether *obsolete*, and the Future *θεωρήσω* occurs *not once* in the Septuagint, Apocryphal, and New Testament writers? Must the usage of the language be violated, to save the text from a liability to perversion or misapplication at the hands of some modern theorist? That this is the correct solution will fully appear by reference to other passages in which there is a similar exchange of terms, occasioned by the necessity of the language:

Exod. 10: 28, 29. "Take heed to thyself as to seeing (*ἰδεῖν*) my face any more; in whatever day thou mayst be seen (*ὀφθῆς*) by me, thou shalt die.—I will be seen (*ὀφθήσομαι*) by thee no more."

"14: 13. "The Egyptians ye have seen (*εἰώρακατε*) to-day, ye shall see (*προσθήσεσθε ἰδεῖν*, a Hebraism for *ὄψεσθε*) them no more for ever."

"33: 20, 23. "Thou canst not see (*ἰδεῖν*) my face: for man may not see (*ἰδῆ*) my face, and live.—And then shalt thou see (*ὄψει*) my hinder parts, but my face shall not be seen (*ὀφθήσεται*) by thee."

Job 7: 7, 8. "No more shall my eye see (*ἰδεῖν*) good. The eye of him that seeth (*ὁρῶντος*) me, shall not see (*περιβλέψεται*) me."

Psalms 63: 2. (Sept. 62: 3.) "Thus in the holy place did I appear (*ὤφθην*) before thee; to see (*ἰδεῖν*) thy power and thy glory."

Ezek. 8: 6, "Son of man, hast thou seen (*εἰώρακας*) what these do? Thou shalt yet see (*ὄψει*) greater violations."

v. 15.—"thou hast seen, and shall still see" (*εἰώρακας, καὶ ἔτι ὄψει*).

Matt. 13: 17. "Many prophets and righteous men desired to see what ye see, and saw not" (*ἰδεῖν ἃ βλέπετε, καὶ οὐκ εἶδον*).

Acts 16 : 9, 10. "And a vision was seen (ὡφθη) by Paul in the night. And when he had seen (εἶδεν) the vision," etc. See also, Numb. 23 : 13. 2 Sam. 14 : 24. Dan. 1 : 13. John 1 : 33, 34, 51. 8 : 56, 57. Acts. 26 : 13, 16. Rev. 1 : 12. The same usage prevails throughout the classic writers.

For an obvious reason, theophanies and angelophanies are, for the most part, spoken of in past or future time, and in the description of them, writers were under the necessity of adopting the appropriate tenses of those verbs which were commonly used, when vision (I take the term here in its ordinary or physical sense) was the subject of discourse. Their employment of certain terms from θεωρέω and ὁραομαι arose simply from the fact that, in the required tenses, these were the forms which popular usage had sanctioned in treating of sight. They must adopt these, or introduce solecistic modes of expression, if not in their terms, at least in their style. To set this matter clearly before our readers, we have prepared several tables, illustrating the *usus loquendi* of the New Testament, Septuagint, and Apocryphal writers. The basis of our investigations in the New Testament is the text of Mill. Between this and the text of Griesbach, on the point under consideration, there are a few unimportant differences. The tables present the number of times each word occurs, and the tenses in which it is used. Middle forms, employed in an Active sense, are placed with the tenses of the Active Voice. These are distinguished by the letter M.

	<i>Active.</i>							<i>Passive.</i>					
	Pres.	Fut.	Perf.	Aor. I.	Aor. 2.	Impf.	Plup.	Pres.	Fut. I.	Perf.	Impf.	Aor. I.	
N. Testament.													
βλέπω	121	3		2		2		7					135
εἶδον			1*		350†								351
θεάομαι			3 M.	18 M.								3	24
θεωρέω	48			4		4							56
δοκίμομαι		31 M.		1 M.					2			23	57
δοκίμομαι								1					1
δράω	22		35			1	1						59
	191	34	39	25	350	7	1	8	2	0	0	26	
Septuagint.													
βλέπω	75	1. 1 M.		1. 1 M.							2		81
εἶδον					712								712
θεάομαι				1 M.									1
θεωρέω	7		1	1		16						1	26
δοκίμομαι		151 M.							29	4		63	247
δοκίμομαι								1					1
δοκίμομαι											1		1
δράω	65		65			9			1	1		3	144
	147	153	66	4	712	25		1	30	5	3	67	
Apocrypha.													
βλέπω	5												5
εἶδον					3								3
θεάομαι			1 M.	1 M.									2
θεωρέω	4			2				6				1	13
δοκίμομαι		1 M.							1			1	3
δοκίμομαι											1		1
δράω	6		6			1							13
	15	1	7	3	3	1		6	1		1	2	
	353	188	112	32	1065	38	1	15	33	5	5	95	

A glance at the above tables will be sufficient to satisfy any inquirer as to the usage of the Hellenistic writers, and to convince him that, in the employment of a simple Future in the active sense, and of a Future and an Aorist in the passive sense, they had scarcely the privilege of a selection. Thus in ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THREE passages out of ONE HUN-

* 1 Pet. 1: 8. εἰδότες, a very rare form in this sense, though common in the signification "to know."

† We omit the interjectional forms ἰδοὺ and ἰδοὺ, of which the former occurs 25, the latter, 213 times.

DRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHT in which the Future Active is required, the form is *ὄψομαι*. The Future Passive occurs **THIRTY-THREE** times ; in **THIRTY-TWO** places we find *ὀφθήσομαι*. The Aorist Passive is demanded **NINETY-FIVE** times ; and in **EIGHTY-SEVEN** instances they have adopted *ὤφθη*. The terms *peculiarly appropriated to spiritual manifestations* are the very terms *peculiarly appropriated to PHYSICAL vision* in the same relations of time. They are almost the **ONLY** terms which the language affords. Strange, that an argument should be constructed in favor of the *spiritual* resurrection of our Saviour from its being denoted in various instances by *ὀπτομαι*. Yet such is the fact.

After the citation of about thirty passages from the Septuagint and New Testament to illustrate the spiritual as well as the physical application of the term, Mr. Bush remarks, with reference to the New Testament usage, "Here are eight instances, out of fifty-seven, in which we do not refuse to admit that the original *ὀπτομαι* indicates ocular vision. The remaining forty-nine constitute so strong an array of proofs in favor of the other sense, that we see not why our asserted distinction is not made out. If so, we certainly have good grounds for the position that *the angelic appearances recorded in Scripture were not made to the natural eye.*" The *spiritual* *ὀπτομαι*, then, is to the physical *ὀπτομαι*, speaking mathematically, a little more than as *six to one* ! But, seriously, how are the "forty-nine" instances of *spiritual* vision, by which instances the predominant sense of the word is to be *proved* to be *spiritual*, made up ? **BY INCLUDING THE VERY PASSAGES WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF DISPUTE.** If this does not involve a *petitio principii*, we think that the world has never seen, and will never see an illustration of the fallacy. Why, if the Professor will only allow us to follow his example, and transfer to our side of the account all the passages in dispute, he will certainly cry in vain for a *novō στῶ* in using his *spiritual* lever.

The chain of argumentation by which the conclusion is reached "that the angelic appearances recorded in Scripture

were not made to the natural eye," is altogether of a novel description, and though capable of being *converted* (we mean not *perverted*) into the triangular form of the regular syllogism, it seems to us wholly destitute of that indispensable quality of true syllogistic reasoning, that like "a three-fold cord" it "is not quickly broken." Professor Bush first assures us that it is capable of absolute demonstration, that of all the different terms for "seeing" it is this which is more especially used to denote that internal or intellectual perception, which is expressed by the Hebrew רָאָה. This constitutes the major premise, and is *instantly* proved, or rather *disproved* by a reference to six passages in the Old Testament, (in not *one* of which רָאָה is found, but uniformly רָאָה) and to six in the New, most of them examples of theophanies, and angelophanies.¹ He then lays down the minor premise, by quoting Luke 3: 16. 17: 22. John 3: 36. Rom. 5: 21, and Heb. 12: 14, (in all of which, but the last, the term "see" is plainly used in the metaphorical sense of "experience," "enjoy,") which will serve in his opinion as "a clew" to the fact, that "the prevailing usage in regard to the term," is that of "a seeing by the eye of the mind, and not of the body." After a few additional citations, in which, "from the general usage of the term," the very point which he sets out on the preceding page to prove, he infers "that it has the import, not of a bodily, but of a mental vision," he trumpets forth the conclusion that "the angelic appearances recorded in Scripture were not made to the natural eye." If, in this unlinking of our author's chain of argumentation, we have not done him injustice, which we most sincerely deprecate, we presume that our readers will join us in the belief that the connection between the antecedents and the conclusion is about as close, as that which exists between the philosophical disquisition prefixed by Sallust to the Jugurthine War, and the body of the history.

¹ Gen. 12: 7. 35: 9. Exod. 3: 2. Judg. 6: 12. 13: 3. 1 Kings 3: 5. Luke 1: 11. 22: 43. Acts 7: 30, 35. Rev. 11: 19. 12: 1.

We confess ourselves rather dissatisfied with Professor Bush's theory and practice of classification, and present the following as the result of a minute examination of the use of *ὁπτομαι* in the New Testament.

It denotes

1. *Ocular vision*, four times.

Acts 7 : 26. "He (Moses) showed himself (*ὤφθη*) to them, as they strove."

" 20 : 25. "Ye shall see (*ὄψεσθε*) my face no more."

Heb. 13 : 23. "With whom I will see (*ὄψομαι*) you." So probably,

John 11 : 40. "Thou shalt see (*ὄψει*) the glory of God," i. e. in the resurrection of thy brother. These are the only instances in which I refer the term to ocular vision, leaving out, of course, for the present, the passages under debate.

2. *Attention, perception, experience, or enjoyment* ; this being a metaphorical use of the term ; thus used eight times.

Matt. 27 : 4. "What is that to us ? Thou shalt see to it" (*ὄψει*).

" " 24. "Ye shall see to it (*ὄψεσθε*)."

Acts 18 : 15. "Ye shall yourselves see to it (*ὄψεσθε*)."

Luke 3 : 6. "And all flesh shall see (*ὄψεται*) the salvation of God."

" 17 : 22. "Ye shall desire to see (*ἰδεῖν*) one of the days of the Son of man, and shall not see (*ὄψεσθε*) it."

John 3 : 36. "He shall not see (*ὄψεται*) life."¹

" 19 : 37. "They shall look (*ὄψονται*) on him whom they pierced."

Rom. 15 : 21. "To whom he was not spoken of, they shall see (*ὄψονται*)."

3. *Spiritual vision*, ten times.

¹ Ps. 89 : 49. "What man is there who shall live, and shall not see (*ὄψεται*) death?"

(a) Of God, or saints, in the world of glory.

Matt. 5 : 8. "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see (ὄψονται) God."

Luke 13 : 28. "When ye shall see (ὄψησθε) Abraham etc. in the kingdom of God."

Heb. 12 : 14. "Holiness, without which no man shall see (ὄψεται) the Lord."

Rev. 22 : 4. "They shall see (ὄψονται) his face."

(b) As in the prophetic ecstasy.

Acts 2 : 17. "Your young men shall see visions (ὁράσεις ὄψονται)."

" 16 : 9. "And a vision appeared (ὄραμα — ὤφθη) to Paul by night."

Rev. 11 : 19. "And the temple of God in heaven was opened, and the ark of his covenant was seen (ὤφθη) in his temple."

" 12 : 1. "And there appeared (ὤφθη) a great sign in heaven."

" " 3. "And there appeared (ὤφθη) another sign in heaven."

(c) Of God the Son by angels.

1 Tim. 3 : 8. God was manifest in the flesh—seen (ωφθη) by angels."

4. *Supernatural manifestations, twenty-three times.*

(a) The exhibition of the cloven tongues, manifestly differing from the incidents recorded Acts 16 : 9. Rev. 11 : 19, etc.

Acts 2 : 3. "There appeared (ὤφθησαν) to them cloven tongues."

(b) Angelic visitations.

Luke 1 : 11. "And an angel of the Lord was seen (ὤφθη) by him."

" 22 : 43. "And an angel from heaven appeared (ὤφθη) to him."

Acts 7 : 30. "And an angel of the Lord (the Angel-Jehovah) appeared (ὤφθη) to him in the wilderness of Mount Sina."

Acts 7: 35. "And by the hand of the angel that appeared (ὁφθέρως) to him in the bush."

(c) *The manifestation of Moses and Elijah.*

Matt. 17: 3. "Moses and Elijah appeared (ὤφθησαν) to them."

Mark 9: 4. "And Elijah, with Moses, appeared (ὤφθη) to them."

Luke 9: 31. "Moses and Elijah, who appeared (ὁφθέτεες) in glory."

(d) *The manifestations of the Saviour after his ascension.*

1. *His various appearances to Paul.*

Acts 9: 17. "The Lord Jesus, who appeared (ὁφθείς) to thee in the way."

" 26: 16. "For this purpose have I appeared (ὤφθην) to thee."

" " "in the which I will appear (ὁφθήσομαι) to thee."

1 Cor. 15: 8. "He was seen (ὤφθη) by me also."

2. *The manifestations at his παρουσία or second coming.*

Matt. 24: 30. } "They shall see (ὄψονται) the Son of man,
Mark. 13: 26. } coming," etc.
Luke 21: 27. }

Matt. 26: 64. } "Ye shall see (ὄψεσθε) the Son of man,
Mark 14: 62. } seated," etc.

John 1: 51. "Thou shalt see (ὄψαι) greater things than these."

" " 52. "Ye shall see (ὄψεσθε) heaven opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending on the Son of man."

Heb. 9: 28. "To them that look for him shall he appear (ὁφθήσεται) the second time, without sin, to salvation."

1 John 3: 2. "We shall be like him, for we shall see (ὄψομεθα) him as he is."

Rev. 1: 7. "He cometh with clouds, and every eye shall see him (ὄψεται πᾶς ὁφθαλμός)."

(e) *A Theophany.*

Acts 7: 2. "The God of glory appeared (ὤφθη) to our father Abraham."

5. *The manifestations which Jesus made of himself between the resurrection and the ascension twelve times.*

(a) *Prospectively, of his visiting his disciples.*

John 16 : 22. "But I will see (*ὄψομαι*) you again."

(b) *Prospectively, of their beholding him.*

Matt. 28 : 7. } "There shall ye see (*ὄψεσθε*) him."
Mark 16 : 7. }

Matt. 28 : 10. "And there shall they see (*ὄψονται*) me."

John 16 : 16, 17, 19. "A little while, and ye shall see (*ὄψεσθε*) me."

(c.) *Retrospectively, of his appearances.*

Luke 24 : 34. "And hath appeared (*ᾤφθη*) to Simon."

Acts 13 : 31. "And he was seen (*ᾤφθη*) many days," etc.

1 Cor. 15 : 5. "He was seen (*ᾤφθη*) of Cephas."

" " 6. "He was seen (*ᾤφθη*) of above five hundred brethren at once."

" " 7. "He was seen (*ᾤφθη*) of James."

From a review of the above, it will appear that in *eight* instances the word is used in a metaphorical sense. These passages must of course be set aside, as not bearing either way on the decision. In *thirty-five* passages the word is the subject of dispute. In the texts which remain, it is used four times of ocular, and ten times of spiritual vision. I ask then, would it be safe to erect a theory concerning the nature of our Saviour's resurrection-body on such a foundation as this? Is it philosophical to attempt to support the theory of the spiritual resurrection of our Lord by evidence so unsatisfactory? We base these inquiries on the supposition that no light can be thrown on the nature and the use of the term, but that which may be gathered from the fourteen passages to which we have referred; but is this supposition true? In not a single instance does the context indicate any thing peculiar in the application of this term to the manifestations of our Lord after his resurrection. Neither is there any thing in the original meaning of the term, nor in the manner in which it is used, indicative of a peculiar *appropriateness* or *appropriation* to the expression of *spiritual* vision. The terms em-

ployed in the disputed passages are the terms of common life ; the *every-day* terms in these tenses ; terms, which, by the condition of the language, writers were almost *compelled* to use. They are frequently applied to the sight of spiritual beings ; but where is the *proof* that these beings cannot be seen by the natural eye ? Certainly it is not afforded by the fact that the knowledge of Jesus, and salvation, and the days of the Son of man, and eternal life, cannot be made to assume bodily shapes, and thus be the objects of ocular perception. Yet it is the application of *ὁπτομαι* to these very ideas which the Professor takes as his “clew” to guide him through the mazes of the labyrinth. With this line he readily divides examples of spiritual from examples of physical vision, and marshals all things into their appropriate places. But does Mr. Bush in fact believe that a spiritual being *cannot* be seen by the natural eye ? On what principle, then, will he explain the incidents recorded Num. 22 : 23, 25, 27, 33 ? Was Balaam's ass endowed with *spiritual* vision ? If so, she must, as we conceive, have possessed a *spiritual nature*, and in this respect have excelled all other animals of the asinine species, unless perchance the whole species has been wronged by universal consent, being made the butt of obloquy in the well-known proverb, when in reality it ought, through its peculiar spiritual endowments, to have been elevated to the dignities and immunities of other ratiocinative animals. But, if the ass was not endowed with *spiritual* vision, she must have discerned the angel by the *natural* eye. And if ocular vision is sufficiently keen in the lower tribes to enable them to discern an angel, we see not why an angel might not be perceived by the *human* eye. We shall undoubtedly be reminded that, v. 31, it is said, “The Lord *opened* (Heb. *פָּתַח*; Sept. *ἀπεκάλυψε*) the eyes of Balaam,” as if this were necessary to enable him to see the angel. But does the language indicate an “opening of a *spiritual* eye,” any more than the expression concerning Hagar, Gen. 21 : 19, “And God opened her eyes, and she saw a well of living water.” Certainly the water was not *spiritual*, and not therefore incognizable by the outward

eye. Nor was Hagar, before her eyes were opened, blind. All that the expression denotes, is, that her eyes were directed by God to a particular spot, where a fountain poured forth the needed beverage. The fountain was there before, but she had failed to notice it. But the Professor will perhaps urge a difference in the original. The word is not גָּלָה, but פָּקַח. True ; but this adds to the strength of our argument against the theory of spiritual vision ; for here פָּקַח, the very term for *supernatural* vision, is applied to a case, which, we think, all will admit, was one of ocular perception. Both in the word used to mark the *opening* of the eyes, and in that indicative of the *seeing*, the phrase corresponds precisely with 2 Kings 6 : 17, וַיִּפְתָּח — וַיִּרְא : וַיִּפְתָּח — וַיִּרְא. What shall we infer from this sameness of expression ? Simply this, that even in the case of supernatural manifestations, the presentation may be made to the natural eye ; that it may be quickened so as to take cognizance of objects, which ordinarily escape its notice. Paul, notwithstanding “the *abundance* of the revelations” communicated to him, would not undertake to decide the question, whether the disclosures made to him on a certain occasion, were made to him *in* the body, or *out* of the body, and with all deference to the talents of Mr. Bush it does seem to us to savor somewhat of arrogance for him to assume a position, which an inspired Apostle dared not occupy.

And here, inasmuch as we shall not find a better opportunity, we must for a moment advert to a remark occurring, p. 32 : “ ‘ *And their eyes were opened*, and he vanished out of their sight.’ What is clearer than that this does not refer to their natural organs of sight, but to an interior mental or spiritual perception by which alone they were able to ‘discern the Lord’s body.’ Here, then, we have the most unequivocal assurance that it was by means of an inward subjective change in themselves that, on this occasion, they were enabled to recognize the Saviour in his resurrection-person.” We can discover here no such “unequivocal assurance ;” but, on the contrary, it appears most manifest, that all which is intended, Luke 24 : 31, by the expression “*their eyes were opened*,” is

the removing of that influence which was said, v. 16, to have been previously exerted upon them ; “ their eyes were **HOLDEN**, that they should not know him.” The features of their Master were perfectly familiar to them ; but on this occasion a supernatural influence was put forth, by which they were *prevented* from immediately recognizing him, as they would have done, if the miraculous interference had not occurred. All that was needed to *enable* them to discern their Teacher, was that their eyes should be *restored* to their *natural* state. We regard this passage, thus explained, as a “clew” to the other passages in which our Lord, after his resurrection, was not at once recognized by his disciples.

But to return from a digression, which has extended beyond our anticipations. If any word in the Greek language properly denotes *ocular* vision, that word is *ὁπτομαι*. This is evident from its connection with *ὀφθαλμός* “the eye,” (compare the more ancient *ὄσσομαι*, allied to *ὄσσε* “the eyes,”) as well as from numberless instances in which it is thus used. Any one wishing examples can find them scattered through the Septuagint ; or, if he would rather have an *accumulation* of them, he may turn to Levit. 13, where the word is thus applied *twenty-five* times. That it is altogether synonymous in common usage with *βλέπω*, *εἶδω*, and *ὁράω*, may be inferred from its frequent exchange with these terms in the progress of discourse.

There is left, then, but one defence, behind which the author may attempt to shelter his theory, viz., the signification of *חֵן*, and the correspondence between this term and *ὁπτομαι*. A slight examination of the Hebrew text will show that no such appropriation, as Professor Bush supposes, exists. If our investigations are correct, *חֵן* occurs in all *fifty* times, *twenty-six* times with reference to *ocular* vision, or in the ordinary *metaphorical* sense, and *twenty-four* times with reference to *prophetical* vision, or a sight of the Divine Being. The kindred Chaldee term *חֵן* is found *thirty* times and only once out of the writings of Daniel. This is used *twenty-four* times of *prophetical* vision, and only *six* times of *ocular* vision,

or *metaphorically*. Does the fact just stated militate in the least against our position? By no means. How few are the instances in which Daniel has any occasion to speak of ocular vision! Yet he introduces רָאָה in this sense five times. Had he been an annalist, instead of a prophet, the preponderance would naturally have been as large on the other side. We meet with it, even here, often enough in the ordinary sense to prove that there was nothing exclusive in its nature, and the prophetic preponderance here can never shake our opinion concerning the true signification of the word, as developed at large in the other books of the Old Testament.¹ In the *usus loquendi* of the inspired penmen, we discover nothing which would lead us to consider רָאָה more appropriate to spiritual vision than רָאָה. Is the one applied to the vision of an angel, or of the Almighty? So is the other. Is the one employed in the description of prophetic scenes? So is the other. When Jehovah promises to favor Moses with a sight of his glory, the term is רָאָה. When Elisha gazes on the ascending Elijah, it is the same רָאָה. When he prays the Lord to open the eyes of his attendant, that he may see the horses and chariots of fire, by which they are guarded, we have again רָאָה. When Isaiah writes, "I saw the Lord in his glory," he employs the same term. Out of *eighteen* instances in which the Lord appeared to the patriarchs, the children of Israel, etc., in *all but one* the word is רָאָה. In the visions of Jeremiah, ch. 1, of Ezekiel, ch. 1, 8, 10, 11, 40, 43, 44, 47, of Joel, (2: 28,)

¹ We subjoin a list of all the passages in which these words occur:—
 רָאָה, in the ordinary sense, Exod. 18: 21. Job 8: 17. 15: 17. 24: 1. 27: 12. 34: 32. 36: 25. Psalms 11: 4, 7. 17: 2. 27: 4. 46: 8. 58: 8, 10. 63: 2. (here exchanged with רָאָה, as also in Exod. 24: 10, 11, and Num. 24: 16, 17.) Prov. 22: 29. 24: 32. 29: 20. Cant. 6: 13. (7: 1.) bis. Isa. 26: 11. bis. 33: 20. 48: 6. 57: 8. Micah 4: 11. רָאָה, Ezra 4: 14. Dan. 2: 8. 3: 19, 25, 27. 5: 23. רָאָה; applied to the vision of God, Exod. 24: 11. Num. 24: 4, 16. Job 19: 26, 27. Ps. 17: 15. Isa. 33: 17; applied to prophetic vision, Isa. 1: 1. 2: 1. 13: 1. 30: 10. Sam. 2: 14. bis. Ezek. 12: 27. 13: 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 23. 21: 29. (21: 34) Amos 1: 1. Micah 1: 1. Hab. 1: 1. רָאָה, Dan. 2: 26, 31, 34, 41, bis. 43, 45. 4: 2, 6, 7, 10, 15, 17, 20. 5: 5. 7: 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 31.

of Amos, ch. 7–9, of Zechariah ch. 1–6, we have still רָאָה ; and so, Daniel, ch. 8, 9, 10, 12. And yet Professor Bush asserts, p. 21, that “throughout the visions of Daniel, where he speaks of seeing or beholding the visions of the supernatural diorama spread before him, the term is *invariably* רָאָה ”!! An imperfect examination of the writings of Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Joel, Amos, Habakkuk, and Zechariah, presents us with about *eighty* illustrations of the prophetic use of רָאָה . If, then, we are to judge of the nature of a term by the nature of the subjects to which it is applied, and more especially by the *number of times* it is thus applied, רָאָה , as a prophetic or spiritual term, must take precedence of רָאָה . The Professor speaks likewise of the derivatives of רָאָה , as “especially appropriated to mental vision.” Why this segregation? Is רָאָה used to denote a *prophet* or *seer*? So is רָאָה . Is רָאָה applied to prophetic vision? So is רָאָה . In fine, they are so similarly “appropriated,” so interchanged, that we fail to perceive any ground for the distinction which Mr. Bush has attempted to establish between these “two leading terms” of vision.

In the supposed correspondence between רָאָה and ὄπτομαι , he is equally unfortunate. “It is capable,” says he, “of absolute demonstration, that of all the different terms for ‘seeing,’ it is this which is more especially used to denote that internal or intellectual perception which is expressed by the Hebrew רָאָה .” Do facts sustain this bold assertion? ὄπτομαι has been employed by the LXX 246 times, but in only *seven* texts have they substituted it for רָאָה . In *two hundred and thirty-six* instances is it the version of רָאָה . If these translators regarded רָאָה as a peculiarly spiritual term, they certainly did not thus regard ὄπτομαι ; and *vice versa*. Nor did θεωρέω fare remarkably well at their hands; for in only *thirteen* places have they made it stand for רָאָה , while in almost *thirty* instances have they conferred this honor on “the common” εἶδον .¹

¹ I include in these enumerations the Chaldaic form, and simply add to

Enough has, doubtless, been said to satisfy the minds of all, whose judgments are not warped by attachment to a favorite theory. Yet we cannot withhold some brief observations, illustrative of the application of the several terms of vision specified in the list.

Βλέπω is applied to the Son of man's seeing the Father, John 5: 19; to the disciples beholding the ascension, Acts 1: 9; to a sight of the cloven tongues, Acts 2: 33; to the supposed sight of a vision, in the case of Peter, Acts 12: 9; to the discernment of Jesus in his glory, by the eye of faith, Heb. 2: 9; to the vision in Patmos, Rev. 1: 11; to the visions on the opening of the seals, Rev. 6: 1, 3, 5, 7, (where a various reading occurs, introduced by Griesbach into the text, omitting *βλέπε*, v. 3, and substituting *ἴδε*, v. 1, 5, 7,) and 22: 8 *bis* to the vision as a whole. We say nothing of the numerous examples in which it is used metaphorically.

Εἶδον is applied to the descent of the Holy Spirit on Jesus at his baptism, Matt. 3: 16, Mark 1: 10, (where it is said he saw the heavens opening,) and John 1: 33; to the scenes of the transfiguration, Matt. 16: 28. 17: 8. Mark 9: 1, 8, 9, and Luke 9: 27, 32; to the sight of Jesus *after* his resurrection, Matt. 28: 17, Luke 24: 39, *bis*, and John 20: 20, 25, 27, 29; to the vision of an angel, Mark 16: 5, Luke 1: 12, 29, Acts 10: 3, 17, and 11: 13; to what transpired in vision, Acts 9: 12, (*εἶδεν ἐν ὁράματι*), and 11: 5, 6, whence, as well as from other passages, we infer that Luke must have been ignorant of the peculiar "appropriation" of that which is "spiritual," as with the helps which we moderns have he would have seen to a demonstration, that he must write *ἐμοὶ ὡφθῆ ἐν ἐκστάσει ὄραμα*, and not the gross *εἶδον*. It is used of the sight of the burning bush, Acts 7: 31, of Stephen's vision of the glory of God, 7: 55, (note the transition to *θεωρέω*, v. 56, proving the two synonymous,) 9: 27. 22: 14, 18, of Paul's vision of Christ; so, likewise, 26: 16, which Professor Bush

the above, that in the translation of these words the LXX have adopted nearly *twenty* different expressions.

must regard as a *very* "remarkable" passage, since the term for seeing in the *three* clauses is varied, so that we have ὥφθην σοι—ὧν τε εἶδες, ὧν τε ὀφθήσομαι. It is applied to Paul's vision of the Macedonian, 16: 10, (in v. 9, ὄραμα ὥφθην; here τὸ ὄραμα εἶδεν,) and between *fifty and sixty* times in the Apocalypse to the various objects disclosed in vision, as the Lord Jesus, angels, the New Jerusalem, heaven opened, sights in heaven, etc. Thus we have in all about *ninety* instances, in which εἶδον is applied to, in a few cases *supposed*, in most, *real*, supernatural manifestations. What will the Professor say now of the *usus loquendi* of the sacred writers?

Θεάομαι is used of the descent of 'the Spirit on Jesus at his baptism, John 1: 32; of the sight of Jesus *after* his resurrection, Mark 16: 11, 14; of the ascension, Acts 1: 11; of the supernatural light seen by Paul and his companions on the journey to Damascus, 22: 9; and of the vision of God, 1 John 4: 11, where it is perfectly synonymous with εἶώρακε, John 1: 19.

Θεωρέω is applied to Satan's falling from heaven, (metaphorically,) Luke 10: 18; to the supposed vision of a spirit, and the real vision of Christ, 24: 37, 39; (in the latter exchanged with ἵδεε;) to the ascension, proleptically, John 6: 62; to the vision of two angels, John 20: 12, and v. 14 to Jesus himself in his resurrection-body; to the heavens opened, Acts 7: 56, and, in a different sense, Acts 10: 11, and to the two witnesses, in their resurrection-state, and in their ascension, Rev. 11: 11, 12. In our opinion, it denotes supernatural vision but *six* times, while it is more than *thirty* times used of *ocular* perception, and in the remaining instances is applied metaphorically. We perceive no peculiar adaptation to the expression of spiritual vision, in a term familiarly employed with reference to the sight of a wolf, a sepulchre, a stone, a pile of buildings, etc. We believe that not even an experimental knowledge of *clairvoyance* would sufficiently quicken our discernment for such lyncean penetration.

Ὀράω, which the Professor refers "to the outward organ of vision," is *ten* times applied to God; (so in the Septua-

gint θεὸν ἐσπᾶναι, Judges 13: 22. Some read εἶδον,) likewise to the sight of angels, Luke 1: 22. 24: 23; to the scene of the transfiguration 9: 36; to a sight of Abraham in heaven, 16: 23; of the Saviour *after* his resurrection, John 20: 18, 25, 29; after his ascension, Acts 22: 15, 1 Cor. 9: 1; and to the pattern of the tabernacle showed to Moses on the mount. It occurs in the literal sense some *ten or twelve* times, (leaving out those passages to which exception might be taken,) but is most frequently employed in a *metaphorical* manner.

These citations bring to light another mistake into which our author has fallen through an undue anxiety to prove the spiritual resurrection of Christ. Unfortunately for himself, and for the cause of truth, he has made all his investigations on this subject through lenses which are not achromatic. Being themselves of a spiritual hue, they impart the same coloring to every object which he views. What adds to the disadvantage is, that while they are of a high magnifying power, there are imperfections in the sphericity, so that they give to the investigator distorted views of facts, which distortions he places before his readers as accurate delineations. Thus, p. 59, he informs them that ὁραμαι is uniformly employed in speaking of our Lord's manifestations of himself, after his resurrection." But we have seen above that εἶδον is applied *seven* times to the appearances of our Saviour between the resurrection and ascension; θεάσαι twice; θεωρεῖς once; ὁράω, THE PHYSICAL ὁράω, *three* times. Besides these, three other terms are employed in the same connection, viz. ὁραίσαι, (cited by Prof. Bush himself,) Acts 1: 3, φαίω, Mark 16: 9, (which term is also used of angelic appearances, Matt. 1: 20. 2: 13, 19, and of the sign of the Son of man, 24: 30. It is in the Old Testament applied to Jehovah, Num. 23: 3, bis, and Isa. 60: 2, also in the Apocrypha to angelic appearances, 2 Macc. 3: 25, 33. 10: 29. 11: 8,) and γαρεῖν, Mark 16: 12, 14, and John 21: 1, bis, 14. Thus instead of a single term applied to these manifestations, we have *eight*; those which the Professor overlooks occur in *twenty* instances,

while *ὄπταμαι* is found in only twelve. The author should certainly be more careful in the announcement of facts.

We are reminded here of some additional misconceptions respecting the signification of words, connected with the general subject. *ὄρασις* is not confined to "mental vision," as is stated, p. 24. It is indeed more commonly used in this sense, but many examples might be adduced of the other sense. Thus Gen. 2: 9, "every tree beautiful to the sight," *ὁραῖον εἰς ὄρασιν*; Lev. 13: 12, "during all the inspection of the priest," *καθ' ὅλην τὴν ὄρασιν*; 1 Sam. 16: 12, "exceedingly beautiful in appearance," *ἀγαθὸς ὄράσει κυρίῳ*; Eccles. 11: 9, "in the sight of thine eyes," *ἐν ὄράσει ὀφθαλμῶν σου*. In the New Testament the word is used but four times; twice in the natural sense, Rev. 4: 3, "like in appearance to a jasper-stone—an emerald," *ὁμοιος ὄράσει*, bis; and twice in the spiritual sense, Acts 2: 17, and Rev. 9: 17.

Similar is the mistake respecting *ὀπτασία*, a rare word, employed Luke 1: 22. 24: 23, Acts 26: 19, and 2 Cor. 12: 1. In the LXX we meet with it, Dan. 9: 23. 10: 1, 7, bis, 8, 16, and Mal. 3: 2. If the prophecy in Malachi 3 had, as most suppose, at least an incipient fulfilment in the incarnation of Emmanuel, the word must here be understood literally. In Wisdom of Sirach 43: 18, it is employed metaphorically, "At the sight of him, (Jehovah,) the mountains are shaken;" but v. 2, of the same chapter, no one can hesitate about the literal application, "the sun in his appearing," *ἥλιος ἐν ὀπτασία*. So in an apocryphal fragment of Esther, (14: 16, Edit. of Van Ess, 4: 17,) quoted by Bretschneider, *ἐν ἡμέραις ὀπτασίας μου*, "in the days of my appearance," i. e. when I make my appearance before the king. These are all the passages in which we are aware of its occurrence.

We come next to the phrase *ἄφαντος ἐγένετο*, Luke 24: 31, which the Professor translates, "he became invisible," and adds the following comment: "The original *ἄφαντος*, it is true, occurs nowhere else in the Scriptures, but lexicographers remark that there is no difference in import between this and *ἀφανής*, which is several times applied in the Old Testa-

ment to the sudden disappearance of angels. Thus 2 Mac. 3: 34, "And having spoken thus, they (the angels) *appeared no more* (*ἀφανεῖς ἐγένοντο*)." Here, then, we are undoubtedly taught that our Lord suddenly and miraculously disappeared from the view of his disciples. Our author certainly deserves commendation for having recourse to the kindred *ἀφανής* to determine the signification of *ἄφαντος*. We intend to follow his example. But unfortunately, in the statement respecting the use of *ἀφανής ἐγένετο* he is, if we may rely on the concordance of Trommius, altogether in an error. Instead of the phrase being "*several times* applied in the Old Testament to the sudden disappearance of angels," it *never* occurs in *any application*. And the *only* place in the Apocryphal writings of the Old Testament in which it is thus employed is the passage quoted. It is said to occur twice in the Acts of Thomas, § 27, § 43. Another confirmation of the remark of Horace :

Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus.

Illustrious Homer sometimes takes a nap.

We may add in the words of the poet,

Verum operi longo fas est obrepere somnum.

In a *long* work you'll pardon the mishap.

But we hardly know whether the apology can be urged in the case before us.

That *ἄφαντος* is used in classic authors of miraculous disappearances admits of abundant proof. Thus Pindar, in his mythus of Pelops, represents him as being taken up to heaven, to serve as cup-bearer to the gods :

ὥς δ' ἄφαντος ἔπελες

"And that you *disappeared*."—OLYMP. 1: 72.

.So Menelaus speaks of Helen, whom Apollo snatched away, at the moment she was stabbed by Orestes :

ὥς οὐ τέθνηκεν, ἀλλ' ἄφαντος οἴχεται.

"That she is not dead, but departs unseen."—ORESTES, 1574.*

* Compare Orestes 1507. Hel. 614.

More examples may be seen in Wetstein. But do these examples prove the word to be confined to this sense? The Professor has conceded that ἀφαντος is the same in signification as ἀφανής. Let us, then, glance for a moment at the use of this term, and of its causative ἀφανίζω, equivalent to ἀφανῆ ποιῶ. Ἀφανής stands opposed in Greek writers to καταφανής. Thus Xen. Cyrop. III. 3 : 28 : “The Assyrians encamped, as has been described, in a place well fortified, (καταφανεῖ δέ,) but very conspicuous; but Cyrus (ὥς ἐδύνατο ἐν ἀφανεστάτῳ) as much out of sight as possible.” Hence it is defined with perfect propriety by ἀθεώρητος, ἀόρατος, *non conspicuus, obscurus*. So Mem. I. 1 : 2, Socrates “was openly sacrificing, (θύων — φανερός ἦν,) and in the use of divination (οὐκ ἀφανής ἦν) he was not unseen.” It is often used of one *who puts himself out of the way, absconds*; denoting a *sudden, abrupt withdrawal, and concealment*. Plato says of one who had secretly fled, εἰς αὐτὸν ἔσχευ ἀφανῆ; and Plutarch with reference to a sudden disappearance, says, Παραχρῆμα ἀφανής ἐγένετο, κ. τ. λ. “Forthwith he *disappeared*, either having killed himself, or having gone as an exile out of Beotia.” Xenophon, speaking of Xenias, and Pasion who had deserted Cyrus, says, Anab. I. iv. 7, “When therefore they were *gone, or out of sight*,” ἐπεὶ δ’ οὖν ἦσαν ἀφανεῖς. Again, IV. ii. 4, “And when they thought they would be *unseen* going away,” Ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾤοντο ἀφανεῖς εἶναι ἀπιόντες. We have said that ἀφανής never occurs in the LXX. It is found, however, in the translation of Symmachus, Job 24 : 4, “The meek of the earth hid themselves,” ἀφανεῖς ἐποίησαν. So Job 29 : 8, “When they saw me, the young men hid themselves,” ἀ. ἐ. In both passages the LXX have ἐκρύβησαν. In the Apocrypha, only in the verse quoted, and Sirach 20 : 30, where it is joined with κεκρυμμένη. “Hidden wisdom, and *concealed* treasure,” θησαυρὸς ἀφανής. In the N. T. Heb. 4 : 13, the causative ἀφανίζω involves the same idea, denoting to *obscure, conceal*. Anab. III. iv. 8, “A cloud having covered the sun, *obscured* (ἡφάνισε) the city.” Mem. I. ii. 53, “The soul having departed—they *bury* (ἀφανίζουσιν) the body.” Isocrates

against Pasio, "He *hides* the child," ἀφανίζει τὸν παῖδα. But why rely on collateral evidence when we may come directly to the point? We appeal first to Pindar, who uses ἄφαντος in the sense of *obscure, secret*. Thus, Nem. VIII. 58:

ἃ τὸ μὲν λαμπρὸν βιάται,
τῶν δ' ἀφαντῶν κῦδος ἀντείνει σαθρόν.

"Which (envy and malice) oppress that which is splendid, and exalt the vile name of the *obscure*." Pyth. XI. 46, ἀφαντὸν βράμει, "*secretly* detracts;" the interpretation of Heyne. Aeschylus, Agamem. 623:

ἀνὴρ ἄφαντος ἐξ Ἀχαιικοῦ στρατοῦ,
αὐτός τε καὶ τὸ πλοῖον.

"A man hath *disappeared* from the Achaean host; both *himself*, and his *ship*." Surely the nature of this disappearance cannot be mistaken; for, v. 657, "The ships, pushed violently by the tempest, and the raining and thundering tumult of Typhon, *went away unseen*," ὥχοντ' ἄφαντοι. They were not, however, so far spiritualized as to become invisible. For "when the bright light of the sun arose," they saw "the Aegean blooming with the corpses of the Achaeans, and the fragments of the ships." V. 695, πλάταν ἄφαντον, "the *unseen* oar," and 1007, ἄφαντον ἔρμα, "a hidden rock." Soph. Oed. R. 560:

ἄφαντος ἔρρει θανάσιμον χειρώματι.

"Goes *suddenly* to destruction by the deadly act." 831, 832:

ἀλλ' ἐκ βροτῶν,
βαίην ἄφαντος προσθεν.

"But sooner may I depart from the sight of mortals," sooner may I die. Philoct. 296, 297:

ἀλλ' ἐν πέτροισι πέτρον ἐκτρίβων, μόλις
ἔφην' ἄφαντον φῶς.

"But striking stone upon stone I brought out the *hidden* fire." Eurip. Hippol. 840, applied to the death of Phaedra, who had hung herself:

ὄρνις γὰρ ὥς τις ἐκ χειρῶν ἄφαντος εἶ.

"For like a bird, are you gone from my hands." The body was still suspended before him. Let Anacreon furnish one illustration. Ode to the Swallow, 33. 4, 5:

Χειμῶνι δ' εἰς ἄφαντος
 Ἡ Νεῖλον, ἢ 'πὶ Μέμφιν.

"But in winter you are off, either to the Nile, or to Memphis."

Here is *no vanishing into thin air*, or something akin to it; but simply a *sudden departure*. Fischer translates, "recedis, abis, avolas." Schleusner, then, is fully supported in his definition of ἄφαντος, "qui non amplius conspicitur, et quocunque modo oculis subducitur, non conspicuus."

Kuinoel has a remark on this text, Lu. 24: 31, so appropriate and just, that we cannot refrain from transcribing it. "Scripsit autem Lucas, ut scite monuit Beza, non αὐτοῖς, sed ἀπ' αὐτῶν, remotionem localem indicaturus, ne quis existimaret, Jesum presentem quidem cum ipsis mansisse, sed corpore quod cerni non posset. Jam ἄφαντος ἐγένετο ἀπ' αὐτῶν est subito ab iis discessit. Vocabulum ἄφαντος a Graecis adhibetur de omnibus, quae quocunque modo oculis subducuntur.—Non ergo e Lucae verbis consequitur, Iesum inconspicuum esse factum, priusquam e coenaculo egrederetur." Luke wrote, as Beza has well observed, not αὐτοῖς, but ἀπ' αὐτῶν, with the design of indicating a departure from the place, lest any one might suppose that Jesus had remained present with them in reality, but in a body which could not be seen. Now the phrase ἄ. ἰ. ἄ. αὐ. means, *he withdrew suddenly from them*. The word ἄφαντος is used by the Greeks of all things which are in *any* way removed from the sight. It does not follow, therefore, from the words of Luke, that Jesus became invisible, before he went out of the room." The idea of *invisibility* is, in some of the examples we have cited, wholly inadmissible. The fragments of the ship were before the eyes of the Greeks. The body of Phaedra was before Theseus. The swallow, a bird noted for the suddenness of its migrations, disappears simply through its change of place. And if this is *all* which *can* be implied by this phrase in some instances, Professor Bush has no warrant for affirming that by the same phrase¹

¹ We say, "the same phrase," for ἐγένετο is here evidently the same as ἦν. If any one doubts this, we hope he will explain the difference between

in Luke "we are undoubtedly taught that our Lord miraculously disappeared from the view of his disciples."

Under "the Fourth Appearance," our author infers "again the sudden and instantaneous apparition of our Lord. 'And as they thus spake, Jesus *stood* (ἔστη) in the midst of them.' Nothing is said of his entrance by the door, or in any other way. The first they know, he is there—they see him." The expression in Luke is ἔστη ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν; in John more fully and exactly, ἦλθεν ὁ Ἰ. καὶ ἔστη εἰς τὸ μέσον. We can discover nothing, even in the phraseology of Luke, indicative of a miraculous manifestation. That he was suddenly present, we doubt not; and what more does the language imply? The opinion that this was a miraculous appearance is traceable to the expression τῶν θυρῶν κλεισμένων; but κλείω is simply to *close*, not necessarily to *lock*, as Dr. Robinson has already remarked.¹ The silence of the historian respecting the mode of entrance, is no argument against the supposition that Jesus entered by the door, opening it miraculously, if it was locked. "But if this were so," says the Professor," "would not this miracle itself have been worthy of record?" Certainly, we reply, and in defence of our supposition refer him to the evangelist himself: "And many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book." John 20:30. See also 21:25. Every one of these signs or miracles (σημεῖα) was worthy of record, yet infinite wisdom did not see fit to record them. The silence of the evangelist proves nothing. But the author adds, "Our argument, it will be observed, is built on the assumption that our Lord's manifestations of himself from time to time to his disciples, during the forty days, were of the nature of the scriptural angelophanies." This assumption rests on the supposed fact that ὅπτομαι is the prevailing term by which angelophanies and theophanies "are expressed," and that the

Plutarch's ἀφάνης ἐγένετο and Xenophon's ἦσαν ἀφανεῖς, or between ἐγένετο, Luke 2:42, and ἦν, Luke 3:23.

¹ Judges 3:23, καὶ ἀπέκλεισε τὰς θύρας τοῦ ὑπερώου — καὶ ἐσφηνωσε. 25, καὶ λαβὼν τὴν κλεῖδα, καὶ ἤνοιξαν. "And he shut the doors of the chamber, and locked them. And they took the key, and opened."

same term is uniformly employed in speaking of our Lord's manifestations of himself after his resurrection." But as we have fully proved this supposition to be erroneous, the foundation of the argument is swept away. The quotations by which he learnedly shows that it may be said of an angel that he "*came*," or, that he "*came and stood*," ἦλθες καὶ ἔστη, are not in the least to the point, since there is not the slightest indication in any of the passages of sudden manifestation. We might as well argue that the words quoted, Nehem. 4: 11, were spoken by *demons*, as infer the spirituality of the body of Jesus from the language of Luke and John. Examine the phraseology in Nehemiah, Οὐ γνώσονται καὶ οὐκ ὄψονται ἕως ὅτου ἔλθωμεν εἰς μέσον αὐτῶν. (Compare the words of John, ἦλθες—εἰς το μέσον. Striking coincidence!) Clear *demonοëpy*! Undoubted instance of a *demonophany*, proleptically stated. Who can resist the evidence presented in the very words? Notice first the peculiar spiritual term ὄψονται. Then carry with you the evidence furnished by this word to ἔλθωμεν, which here very distinctly indicates suddenness of approach, being in the past tense, and yet applied to future time; and especially forget not that ἦλθον is an *appropriated* term, being several times applied to the approach of spiritual beings; *they shall not know, nor see, till we ARE COME into their midst*. We believe the reasoning here to be *as conclusive*, as that which the Professor has adopted.

Commenting on the words, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have," some remarks are introduced, which excite fresh surprise. "He does not say in express terms 'A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as I have,' but 'as ye see me have,' where the original is not the common word for 'see,' (εἶδετε,) but another term (θεωρεῖτε) which implies more of a mental perception, equivalent to our *consider, contemplate, apprehend*. A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as I seem to you to have—as you *contemplate* me as having." How does this appear in one, who, but a moment before, was such a stickler for literalism? "*We plant ourselves, however, upon the simple letter of the narrative as it stands.*"

We contend that the PLAIN, OBVIOUS IMPORT OF THE TEXT is," etc. But why insist so strenuously here on a literal interpretation? That interpretation will force us to the admission of a miracle, in a case where precisely the same result might have been effected in a natural way. We need only suppose that John has omitted one circumstance in the train of events. Had he written, "The doors of the apartment in which the disciples were convened, having been shut through fear of the Jews, Jesus came, and, *the doors being suddenly opened*, stood in their midst," would there have been any foundation for the supposition that Jesus entered the room in an invisible manner? Is the *supposed* omission by John, that the doors were suddenly opened, more improbable than the *actual* omission by Luke, that previous to his entrance they were closed? But let it be conceded that this circumstance may have been omitted, and nothing can be urged in favor of an unseen approach, so that every shadow of proof for the spirituality of the risen body vanishes away. Here is the necessity for the stern literalism in the present case. But when we advance a little further, the relations of things are changed, and "the simple letter of the narrative as it stands—the plain, obvious import of the text," becomes an insuperable barrier in the path of the Professor. It is so high that it cannot be scaled, so compact that it is impermeable even to the spiritual body. There is but one expedient; to stickle to the opposite side, and for the preservation of the fair child of fancy, to sacrifice "the plain, obvious import of the text"—and not this alone, but the settled principles of hermeneutics, and even common sense. The disciples "were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they were gazing on a spirit." To remove their doubts respecting the reality of his appearance, he appeals to their senses, "Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself." They supposed that the form on which their eyes were riveted, was a mere aerial outline; a spectre, without flesh and bones. The Saviour essays to convince them that the supposition was unfounded. "HANDLE me, and SEE; *for a spirit hath not*

flesh and bones, as ye see me have." But according to our author the object of the Saviour was just the reverse. I SEEM TO YOU TO HAVE—YOU CONTEMPLATE ME AS HAVING A BODY OF FLESH AND BONES; *a spirit hath not these; handle me and see—satisfy yourselves, that it is a spiritual substance, and not a body of flesh and bones, which you are viewing.* This is the only sense we can eliminate from his comments. But to say nothing of the absurd notion that the spiritual body bore the perforations of the nails, and the gaping wound produced by the spear; to say nothing of the sophistry by which an appeal addressed to the outward organs of sense,¹ (we recognize no other,) designed to convince the disciples that they were not gazing on a spirit, is perverted into an appeal to their spiritual senses, made for the express purpose of showing that they were examining a *spiritual body*, a thing, according to the Professor's own exhibition, so subtle and refined, so much nearer to spirit than matter, as not to be cognizable by the physical organs of sense; to say nothing of that crafty form of speech which, unwittingly, as we are well assured, but, nevertheless, in reality, he puts in the mouth of him who knew no guile, directing them to the use of their spiritual senses, when they seem, no more than ourselves, to have been aware of the existence of these senses, and the terms, if any terms in the language could have such an import, must of necessity lead them to the use of their physical organs, how can we account for the blunder respecting *εἶδτε*? Must the Professor be reminded that "the common word for 'see,' *εἶδτε*, is never used in the Present, but only in the 2 Aorist, and that it could not consequently stand in the position which *θεωρεῖτε* occupies? The arms of Achil-

¹ If, as Professor B. conceives, "the appeal was made to their internal senses," of course, the terms by which the appeal was made must be appropriate to the expression of *spiritual sight and touch*. They are *εἶδεν* and *ψηλαφᾶν*. The latter will undoubtedly exclaim, *Te defensore haud opus est*. But unfortunate *εἶδεν*! who shall advocate thy claims to the expression of internal vision! The champion of spirituality hath himself abandoned thee, calling thee the "common" *εἶδεν*.

les must have grown rusty through disuse ; we hope he will arise and burnish them.¹

The quotation from Romans, (6 : 4-11,) with all the reasonings upon it, we think, may safely be despatched with one remark. If, as Professor B. states, the apostle "is running a parallel between the death and resurrection of Christ, and the death to sin and the spiritual resurrection of believers," and if, when men are born again, they *begin* to live again," and if "the resurrection of the saints is but the *completest* issue of their regeneration," then does the parallelism require us to believe that Jesus Christ did not, at his resurrection, enter "upon that peculiarly spiritual condition, which was the pledge of the spiritual and eternal resurrection-life of his people." For, as in the case of his people, time must intervene between the commencement and the completion of the process of spiritualization and glorification ; so in his own case time must have intervened between the two points of the commencement and completion of his glorification ; so that, if it be supposed that Christ *rose* from the dead *in his Father's glory*, an interpretation in which we do not acquiesce, yet did he not *fully* attain to his glory till the ascension from Olivet. If pressed with the statement, "Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no more ; death hath no more dominion over him," an answer is at hand. Jesus was *never* subject to death in the sense that his life was forfeited. "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. No man taketh it from me, but *I lay it down of myself* ; I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commission did I receive from

¹ We would not willingly incur the charge of hard-heartedness by imposing too severe a task upon one who has gone through herculean labors, yet, after the reiteration, again and again, of the sentiment that spiritual phenomena may be so ordered, as to produce the same impression that a material body would produce, we cannot but indulge a wish that our author would furnish us with an argument on *the existence or non-existence of a material world*. No appeal, however, is to be made to the senses, since "the consciousness of the subject cannot discriminate between the functions of the outer and the inner."

my Father." He died voluntarily, and, having by his one offering obtained eternal redemption, he will never, a second time, succumb to the destroyer. If it be still urged by the Professor, that there is nothing from which one might infer "that the manner of Paul's seeing the Lord, after his resurrection, was any different from that in which he was seen by his apostolic compeers," since "the expression is precisely the same in regard to the whole," we reply that "the expression is precisely the same in regard to" Moses, when he showed himself to his brethren (*ὡφθη αὐτοῖς*) as they strove, and if he has any right to infer a spiritual manifestation in the case of Jesus, we have an *equal* right to infer a spiritual manifestation in the case of *Moses*; and in fine, since the historian tells us, (Gen. 1 : 9,) that "the dry land *appeared*," *ὡφθη ἡ ξηρά*, and (8 : 5) that "the tops of the mountains *appeared*," *ὡφθησαν αἱ κεφαλαὶ τῶν ὀρέων*, to argue that these appearances were spiritual manifestations, and that consequently *there is no material world*.

The passage in Peter, (1 Pet. 3 : 18,) certainly lends no support to the doctrine of a spiritual resurrection. The criticism on the English translation is obviously correct, "inasmuch as the clauses are perfectly balanced in the original," and except on the ground of style, we have no objection to the version, "Being put to death *flesh-wise*, but quickened *spirit-wise*." But, we do protest against the exposition which follows. "He came into a *spiritual* condition; and if so, why not into a *spiritual* body? as otherwise the contrast is lost. If his material body was raised, why should it not be said, he was quickened in the flesh? But it is said, he was quickened in the *Spirit*. Now Spirit here cannot mean either the human or divine soul or principle, because this did not die, and therefore could not be made alive. Quickened *spirit-wise*, we think, therefore, must mean that he entered into a *spiritual body*; his state became *spiritual*." We presume the Professor will not deny that some difference exists between body and spirit. In our view, between no two things can the opposition be more marked and distinct.

If this be the fact, the word *spirit* can never denote a *body* of *whatever* sort. The apostle Paul, when writing on the resurrection body is very precise in the use of language. "It is sown a natural body ; it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." The contrast is not between *σῶμα* and *πνεῦμα*, but between *ψυχικόν* and *πνευματικόν*, the term *σῶμα* being appended to both. The passage is yet to be adduced in which *πνεῦμα* denotes a *body*. Such a use of terms would be subversive of language itself, making it no longer a medium of thought, but a combination of enigmatical absurdities. Besides, the Professor has himself, by a single stroke, completely refuted his own interpretation. "Spirit here *cannot* mean either the human or divine soul or principle, *because this did not die, and therefore could not be made alive.*" Neither, then, can it mean the *spiritual body*, because *this did not die, and therefore could not be made alive.* Thanks, by the way, for the concession that **THAT WHICH IS QUICKENED, IS THAT WHICH DIES.**

Is the author sure, however, that he has a right view of this passage, when in his comment he uses the preposition **IN**? Do the words necessarily mean *quicken* **IN the Spirit**? In our view **BY** would more correctly represent the dative here, agreeably to the principle laid down by Buttman § 133, 3, 1. "Kindred with the instrument is *that IN which, or BY which one is or does any thing ;*" nearly the same as *on account of, in consequence of*, so that the words may be rendered, "Being put to death in consequence of the flesh, but quickened in consequence of the Spirit." That this is a legitimate interpretation of the dative, we presume, no one will deny. The only question which remains is, whether the version we have given conveys a satisfactory sense, one which harmonizes with the general tenor of Scripture, and this question must be decided by the meaning which we attach to the terms *flesh* and *spirit*.

Lightfoot, in his *Horæ Hebraïcæ* remarks, that, whenever the words *flesh* and *spirit* are contrasted by the sacred writers, the Lord Jesus being the subject of discourse, by

the term *flesh* we are to understand *the human nature* of the Redeemer, and by the term *Spirit*, *his divine nature*. In Rom. 1 : 3, it seems difficult to adopt any other interpretation, without doing violence to the most obvious principles of construction. “Concerning his Son, Jesus Christ, our Lord, who was made of the seed of David, *according to the flesh*, and declared to be the Son of God with power, *according to the Spirit of Holiness*, by (Winer, § 51, p. 297, source of proof and conviction) the resurrection from the dead.” No one can fail to perceive here the correlation between *κατὰ σάρκα*—*κατὰ πνεῦμα*, demanding that the two clauses should be similarly understood. It is the same correlation which is so often effected by *μέν* and *δέ*, (Xen. Ages. 11: 7, *τοῦ μὲν σώματος εἰκόνα στήσασθαι ἀπέσχετο, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς οὐδέποτε ἐπάνετο μνημεῖα διαπονούμενος*,) as *ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπὸν τῷ σώματι—παρὼν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι*. 1 Cor. 5 : 3, and often indeed without these particles, the correlation being indicated by a repeated preposition, (Rom. 8 : 1, 4, 5, 9, 11,) an adjective, participle, etc. But, if we here refer *πνεῦμα ἁγίου* to the third person in the Trinity, a new meaning must be attached to *κατὰ* in the second clause, (*through the operation of*,) and the symmetry of the passage will thus be destroyed. It appears, then, to be necessary to regard this passage as presenting a contrast between the *human* and *divine* natures of Christ. So probably 1 Tim. 3 : 16, *ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι*. So, undoubtedly, the words of Peter should be interpreted, *Having suffered death in consequence of his assumption of humanity, having been quickened (raised from the dead) in consequence of the union which the divine nature had effected between itself and this humanity*. Such a sense is, we think, sustained by the passage in Romans, already examined, and by 2 Cor. 13 : 4, “Though he was crucified through weakness, yet he liveth by the power of God.” His crucifixion resulted from his weakness—his having become subject to the infirmities of human nature ; but his resurrection to an unending life resulted from the exertion of his own divine power co-operating, as we believe, with that of the Father and the

Holy Spirit, for in no other way can the teachings of inspiration on the resurrection of Christ be harmonized. It is evident that, with this interpretation, "the contrast" in Peter is not "lost," as the Professor imagines must be the case, if his exposition is rejected; but, on the contrary, is presented in bold relief.

On the subject of the *παρουσία*, or second coming of Christ, we have but a word to offer. Expressing no opinion ourselves as to the nature of that coming, we assert most unhesitatingly, that so far as the argument before us depends on the import of *ὅππομαι*, it is absolutely destitute of force. We have shown most conclusively, that there is no "appropriation" of this, or of any other term, to the subject of spiritual vision.

But it is time to bring this protracted investigation to a close. We cannot, however, pause in our labors without an expression of deep regret, that in a work proceeding from such a source there has been so much occasion for animadversion. We have long admired the talents of our author, and should feel ourselves enriched with but a tithe of his attainments; and yet, in the whole of his philological argument, he has scarcely taken one position which is tenable. With a slight variation we may apply to his recent works the remark of another: "He has many new things, and some true things; but his true things are not new things, and his new things are not true things." In the treatise we have been examining, instead of opening "a field of philological deduction," "which must inevitably put a new phasis on a whole class of texts," he has busied himself in the accumulation of straws, that with these he might prop up a system, pressing already too heavily upon its foundation; unconscious of the fact that the stubble thus accumulated would serve but to light the funeral pile of "The Spiritual Resurrection."

ARTICLE VI.

EXAMINATION OF PROF. HENRY P. TAPPAN'S WORKS ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.

By Rev. BENJAMIN N. MARTIN, Hadley, Mass.

The Doctrine of the Will, determined by an Appeal to Consciousness. By HENRY P. TAPPAN.

The Doctrine of the Will, applied to Moral Agency and Responsibility. By HENRY P. TAPPAN.

NOTE—The present article was promised in a previous one, published in Bib. Repos. Jan. 1843. It has been, by unavoidable circumstance so long delayed, that the writer would scarcely feel at liberty now to offer it to the public, but for some indications which intervening numbers of the Repository afford, of an interest in one, at least, of its prominent topics of discussion.

The writer would avail himself of this opportunity, to correct an erroneous quotation of the language of Edwards, which occurred in his former article. (B. R. No. XVII., p. 43.) The sentence as quoted, runs thus: "*Whether it has any PRODUCTIVE influence or not.*" The word *productive* has no place in the original, and was carelessly supplied from a former sentence in revision. The correction would be scarcely worth making, were it not that the marked emphasis given to the word, renders it, unfortunately, an object of particular attention.

HAVING already offered our readers some observations on Prof. Tappan's views of the philosophy of Edwards, we propose to extend our examination, in the present article, to his own. These are presented in the two later volumes of his work, the titles of which, as above recited, sufficiently disclose their general character. We shall indicate them in the progress of our remarks, for the sake of convenience, as Vols. II. and III.

There is necessarily a wide difference in the style and character of the two treatises. The former, aiming to establish a theory of the will, deals with whatever is most recondite and abstruse; and requires an accurate analysis, an acute discrimination of the most elementary ideas of psychology. The latter, which seeks to apply the conclusions thus reached

to systems and creeds, calls for less of critical analysis, and more of logical connection : it has less to do with nice distinctions, and demands different qualities of thought and style. We are of opinion that the latter is to be regarded as altogether the more successful portion of the work. Prof. T.'s conclusions are generally drawn with strict accuracy, consequences are logically inferred, and both are sustained with a vigor of thought, and urged with a power of language, which gives great effect to his reasonings. His analysis, however, of elementary ideas, is scarcely sufficiently nice ; and his fundamental principles and truths are assumed with too little caution and tact. In maintaining, as he does, the entire freedom of the will, we fully coincide with him ; as well as in many of the principles with which this doctrine is connected ; as for instance, that the mind is the cause of its own acts, and that it causes voluntary acts with full power to the contrary. His general classification, too, of the mental faculties into intellect, sensitivity, and will, and the entire separation of the last two faculties, (which is a cardinal point in the system,) meet our entire approbation ; and we rejoice in the wide currency which these views are likely to obtain through the medium of his work. But the psychological theories which our author connects with these great truths, and on which some of the most important conclusions are made to rest, we are constrained to regard as unsubstantial, and even fanciful. The elementary discussions of the work, wear, in one respect, an unfavorable aspect. The positions chosen seem to have been assumed rather for their convenience, than for their strength. The author occupies the ground he does, not because there is plainly no standing elsewhere, but because he can contend to better advantage there than elsewhere, for the support of some favorite views. Deeply impressed with the importance of the doctrine of man's liberty of will, he places it on a most ample, but scarcely a very firm foundation. He frames a theory of the largest liberty, and seeks for elementary distinctions which will sustain it. The primary conceptions of things from which he reasons, seem to have been

adopted, not on account of their absolute and necessary truth, but because they furnish ground for a broad theory of liberty to rest upon. This, at least, is the aspect which the author's philosophy wears to our view. We shall afford our readers some opportunity to judge of its correctness, in a somewhat detailed examination of the principles of the system.

We took occasion, in a former article, to exhibit Prof. T.'s general use of the fundamental terms of his discussion ; and particularly to speak of his frequent identification of the idea of cause, with that of causality or power. The subsequent portions of his work are, we regret to say, chargeable with this defect to a still more unfortunate degree. In the former volume, this use of terms is found principally in the application of them—in those oft-recurring forms of speech which a writer is under the necessity of using on almost every page, and which, from the frequency of their occurrence, cannot be carefully weighed. In the latter, especially the second, it is not only in the application, but in the definition of terms that the defect manifests itself; in those controlling statements which require the most careful and accurate expression. In support of our remark, we refer our readers to p. 60 of vol. II. They will find there a brief chapter entitled "Definition of the Will," which commences thus: "Will is employed to express *the causality* of the mind." . . . "To this usage *I mean to confine it* in the following investigation." Now causality denotes something which belongs to a cause, a quality or property of a cause ; and this language implies, beyond dispute, that the will is not a cause, but only some quality or property of one. But on p. 294, in the formal announcement of the result of a lengthened discussion on motives, this language occurs: "The important conclusion at which we arrive is this: will is *cause*, and there is no cause but will." In this very chapter, the former definition of the will as causality is again and again repeated ; and yet, the matured language of this important conclusion affirms, with numerous other passages of the book, that the will is not *causality*, but *cause*.

The former of these seems the more deliberate and care-

ful statement ; while the latter is of much the more frequent occurrence. Which of them Prof. T. really deems correct, it is of course somewhat difficult to say. We are inclined to think the latter ; since, however inconsistent it may be with the formal definition above mentioned, some extended portions of the work are constructed on the theory that the will is cause.

There is another prominent term which demands notice from its remarkably wide application in the discussion ; it is the word *nisus*. It seems to have been selected by the author for the sake of having a word which should be free from the ordinary ambiguity of language. If this was the design, we regret that it is not more fully borne out in the execution. Several distinct applications of it are easily discernible. First, it is used to express the *active quality* of a cause, its power, or energy. For instance, it is called (Vol. I. p. 190) "an *energy*"—(p. 197) "its *nisus*, its self-determining *energy*"—(p. 281) "The *nisus* of the divine will is essential *power*." It denotes in these cases, the active nature of a cause ; and is identical with the will, according to Prof. T.'s use of that word ; both will and *nisus* being repeatedly explained by the same words energy and power. In other instances, it is applied to the *operating* or *acting* of power. It is defined to be "the most original *movement* of a cause ;" (p. 192)—"its first *going forth* to effects." Here it signifies not the power, but the acting—the "*movement*" of a cause. Lastly it is employed to denote the result of this movement or action—the effect. "This *nisus* to him becomes an *effect*—a phenomenon." (P. 191.) It is very frequently identified with volition, (which latter is every where termed an effect,) as in this expression, "in man the most original movement is this *nisus* likewise, which in him we call *volition*." (P. 91.)

Three distinct conceptions are thus blended into the application of a single term. *Nisus* is power or energy—*nisus* is action or movement—*nisus* is volition or the effect. Nor is *nisus* the only word which rejoices in this curious latitude of signification ; we have selected it only because the singularity of the

word marks more distinctly the peculiarity of its application. We ought, perhaps, to remark here, that Prof. Tappan contends strenuously for the identity of the last two of these three conceptions ; a point on which we shall have more to say hereafter.

This unhappy looseness of language lays the work open to the charge of numerous inconsistencies. Some of these are quite glaring, as for example the following : “ There is no intervention of any thing between the cause and the effect ; between will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by phenomena, is a manifest absurdity.” (Vol. I. p. 187.) Compare with this some statements on p. 190. “ We observe phenomena, and by a law of our intelligence we refer them to cause. But how do we conceive of cause as producing them ? By a *nisus*, or effort. Is this *nisus* itself a phenomenon ? It is when it is observed. Is it always observed ? It is not.” * * * “ Where then do we observe this *nisus* ? *Only in will.*” A cause, then, produces phenomena by a *nisus* ; in the case of will, this *nisus* is observed, and is a phenomenon ; yet a “ cause producing its phenomena by phenomena is a manifest absurdity !”

Nor is it to the charge of inconsistency alone, that the work is from this cause obnoxious. The inconsistency sustains the worst form possible of self-determination ; viz., that we choose our choices and will our volitions. Volition is the observed effect—the phenomenon—it is produced by a *nisus* ; *nisus*, however, is itself a volition ; the mind, therefore, produces volitions by volitions, effects by effects. Volition comes into existence by a power “ which at the moment of causation is conscious of ability to withhold the *causative nisus*.” (P 274.) The will produces volitions, then, by a *causative nisus* ; *nisus* is itself an effect—a volition ; of course the will produces volitions by volitions.

The extracts on which these latter remarks are founded, are taken entirely from the third part of the Review of Edwards, and might be greatly multiplied by a similar examination of the remaining volumes. This unguarded and ambigu-

ous use of terms which cannot be too rigidly confined to a single application, is a prevailing feature of Prof. T.'s style ; and forms its worst defect. Considered simply as a blemish of style, it is amply compensated by the general simplicity, and the occasional force and even beauty of the language : but viewed as a defect in the vehicle of abstruse philosophical speculations, it does not admit of compensation.

In the commencement of his discussion, Prof. T. refers all psychological truths to certain " primary conceptions," which are plainly revealed in our consciousness, and which " are necessary to account for, explain, and define, all our other knowledge." He then endeavors to ascertain the marks by which we distinguish them. Of these marks or tests, he has specified three :

- I. They are irresistibly affirmed by the understanding ;
- II. They are incapable of definition, explanation or proof ;
- III. They form the basis of knowledge and conclusions.

When it is considered that these " first truths," as our author terms them, are to determine all other questions in both mental and moral science,—are to explain and account for all our knowledge, it certainly seems highly desirable that they should themselves be ascertained with the utmost accuracy, and expressed with the utmost precision. We are by no means sure, however, that Prof. T. has carried his analysis of this part of his subject to its furthest limit ; indeed, we consider additional discrimination not only practicable, but essential to a successful discussion of the topic of which he treats. In the statement, for instance, of the second of these tests, the words *indefinable*, *inexplicable*, and *indemonstrable*, are employed as descriptive of the same quality of a first truth—" it is this very quality of inexplicableness, or of indefinableness, or indemonstrableness, which makes it a first truth." (Vol. II. p. 20.) Now it is evident enough that a first truth cannot be a truth which may be drawn by logical inference from any other ; if it could, it were not a *first* truth. But it is difficult to perceive why a first truth may not be *defined*, as well as any other truth. The only idea which can be con-

veyed by the term *define*, as applied to a truth, is the enumerating of its various elements; and this surely may be done for a first truth as well as for any other. A *truth* always contains certain elements. It is an affirmation of the agreement or disagreement of certain ideas; and when these ideas, and the facts predicated of them, are all specified, as they may certainly be, that truth is "defined" in the only sense in which any truth can be. For example:—it is a first truth that every perceived change implies a cause. This truth contains, as every truth must, its subject, its predicate, and its copula; and when these are all specified, the *truth* is perfectly defined. The idea expressed by the word *cause*, may be incapable of definition; but the characteristic of this idea is not necessarily a characteristic of the truth which contains it: the truth itself is no more incapable of definition because it has the conception of cause for one of its elements, than the truth that the will is a cause, is indefinable for the same reason.

It would seem, therefore, that the language in which this test is expressed, implies two distinct things. The quality of indemonstrableness applies to a *truth* properly so called; it implies the existence of subject and predicate; and declares that their agreement or disagreement is not capable of demonstration. The quality of indefinableness, on the other hand, is inconsistent with the idea of a *truth*, but refers to a single element of a truth, and declares that this is *simple* or incapable of being separated into parts. The one refers to first truths; the other to elementary, or uncompounded, or as we prefer to term them, simple ideas.

Our author proceeds next to apply these tests to some of the ideas which are to be prominent in the subsequent discussion; and arrives at the conclusion that time, space, cause, and substance, are first truths. If, however, we apply our foregoing observations to any one of these truths, the necessity of some closer discrimination becomes at once apparent. Cause, says Prof. T., is a first truth. But what, we ask, is true of cause? That it has actual existence, or that it has not? that it is a substance, or that it is not? That it is a

mere uniform antecedent, or that it is not? Plainly, nothing is yet predicated of it; the word stands simply as the mark of a certain conception of the author's mind, of which he has not yet affirmed even that the thing denoted by it has any real existence. The declaration that this idea does, or does not, correspond with reality—that it agrees, or disagrees, with some other idea, must be made before we have any thing which can properly be termed *a truth*, before we have any thing *to which* the terms demonstrable or indemonstrable can with propriety be applied.

Setting aside, however, all considerations of this nature, we will examine Prof. T.'s application of his criteria to some of the more important of these conceptions.

Substance is a first truth in the scheme of our author. He tests it by the marks above related, as follows:

1. "It is a positive affirmation of the intelligence;
2. Substance cannot be defined or demonstrated;
3. It is the basis of certain knowledges and conclusions."

Prof. T. in his remarks upon the application of the second of these tests, says, (Vol. II. p. 23,) "It cannot be logically defined because it does not admit of distribution into genera."—"Nor can it be metaphysically defined, because there are no metaphysical essences and properties beyond that expressed by the simple word substance." It is here implied that the word substance denotes some one idea which cannot be analyzed—cannot be separated into constituent elements. We regret that our author has not furnished some means of identifying this solitary conception. He might by some periphrasis, or some illustrations, have shown his readers what he takes this indefinable something to be; as it is, they are left without the means of judging of the correctness of his conception of it.

In opposition to this view, we cannot but consider it possible to define this idea, and thereby to furnish the most complete refutation of the indefinableness claimed for it. The term denotes, we conceive, a *necessary*, but by no means a *simple* idea. It is to be defined by specifying its elements;

which we do as follows: It is a thing which possesses *real* existence—*essential* existence—and *properties*. First, it possesses *real* existence. This statement implies a division of our conceptions into two classes, those which do, and those which do not, possess reality; and affirms that the idea of reality is an element included in the term we are defining: a mathematical point would be of the latter class. Next, it possesses *essential* existence. We here indicate a classification of *real* existences—dividing them into those which exist independently, i. e. exist by themselves, and those which exist as modifications of other things, upon which other things their existence is seen to be necessarily dependant, as motion, utility, form, sound, etc. Substance includes the former of these ideas; it is a thing which exists not as a modification of something else, but essentially; if our readers will bear a term so scholastic, it is *an entity*.

Lastly, it sustains properties. Whether any such thing as we have called an essence, or entity, can exist without properties, might perhaps be a question; but whether it can or not, the word substance contemplates it only as standing in this relation. The etymology of the term indicates this idea.—it is that which is the basis of those properties or qualities by which alone we know things.

We have thus designated three distinct and intelligible ideas, as included in the conceptions of substance: it only remains to show that they are all essential to it. Of this our readers may easily satisfy themselves, by attempting to form the conception without including them. If it should be found impossible, as we believe it will, to conceive of a substance which does not possess real existence—essential existence—and properties, it must be admitted that the term substance is defined. It is a convenient term for the designation of a certain combination of ideas; ideas which, it is true, are of the most general character; but such must the ideas be, which define any very abstract expression.

The same course of remark applies to the word cause. This also is claimed as a first truth, and pronounced indefina-

ble. Prof. T. says, (Vol. II. p. 32,) "Is there any primary conception or idea of the reason to which it can be referred as comprehending it? There is none unless it be substance or spirit. Shall we say of cause, it is substance? Then we run counter to a primary and necessary conception, because we conceive of cause as residing and acting in substance, and not as substance itself."

The position here taken that "we run counter to a necessary conception," if we refer the idea of cause to that of substance as a more general one, rests upon the following reasoning extracted from p. 25. "Cause indeed exists in physical masses, which are divisible, and may be described by an enumeration of their parts and qualities; but cause may not be confounded with the masses themselves. I appeal to the consciousness of every man, whether the cause of combustion is the same as the physical substance consumed, or dissolved into its elements? No, every one replies; fire is not wood. But is the fire some other body which, coming into juxtaposition with wood, consumes it? By no means." Another example upon the same page illustrates the same point:—"Again, is the flowing torrent, and the gravitation which is taken as the cause of its flowing, the same?"

As our limits forbid us to follow Prof. T. minutely through these illustrations, we must content ourselves with a more general objection against the mode of reasoning here adopted. It is attempting to prove a universal negative from a particular negative. The facts that wood is not the cause of its own combustion, and that water is not the cause of its own motion, no more prove that substances are not causes, than the fact that the moon is not the cause of madness, proves it. Surely it does not follow from the fact that *a certain substance* is not the cause of *a certain effect*, that *no substance* is a cause. Yet these illustrations constitute the sum of the argument, by which our author would show that substances are not causes.

After this endeavor to prove that cause cannot be defined by substance, the next step is to argue that it cannot be defined at all. Several kinds of definitions are mentioned, under the

last of which (p. 33,) the following remarks occur: "We indeed have various forms of expression which look like definitions, but which in reality are none, unless they be considered as nominal—but then as nominal, they are not clearer than the simple word cause; e. g. we may thus define cause as that which produces all changes or phenomena. But what is it to *produce*? Why simply to cause."

We suggest in respect to these, and the subsequent remarks, the inquiry whether Prof. T. is not betrayed into an error by his peculiar use of the word in question. Throughout his work he speaks of "cause" without using the article; in which form the term may be either a substantive or a verb—may denote either *the thing* which causes, or *the act* of causing. Granting then what is here argued, that *causing* is an indefinable act, this scarcely seems to be the thing to be proved. The proposition is that *causes* are, like substances, indefinable; the argument proves indefinableness, not of causes, not of those *things* which cause, but of the *act* of causing; which is a very different thing. Thinking is an indefinable act, but does it follow that that which thinks is indefinable?

But to come directly to the point here at issue, we will endeavor to define the word cause. This we do, by saying that it is a *substance* which possesses *power* to *produce* changes. We are aware that our definition is a very imperfect one; but so far as it goes we are persuaded of its correctness. It specifies distinct elements, as included in the conception of a cause, each of which is absolutely essential to it. In vindication of our definition, we shall only observe that it will scarcely be contended that a cause can exist without the latter element, power; while for the former, that of substance, innumerable examples might be adduced, of which the following may suffice; the *sun* causes the light by which we see—the *moon* is the cause of tides—the *air* causes mercury to stand in the tube of a barometer—the *weight* causes the arm of a balance to descend—*steam* causes the movement of the piston in an engine—a *bell* causes vibrations of the atmosphere. Indeed, almost every substance in nature might be

alleged. We know not how it is possible for any one to avoid the conclusion which we draw from the fact that these and almost all other substances are universally called causes, except by saying that it is only in a loose and general sense that they are so called ; an accusation which can never be brought with justice against those universal forms of speech in which the human mind clothes its conceptions of psychological truth.

We cannot resist the temptation which here seizes us, to fortify ourselves against any such evasion as this we have just mentioned, by quoting our author against himself. He maintains that there is a wide distinction between causes and substances, which renders it improper to confound the one with the other. The conception of cause he every where assigns to the will—which, again, he abundantly declares to be identical with the *me* or myself. “The will is the *person* or personality.” (P. 180.) “By personality I mean the *me* or myself.” This will, which is the *me*, or myself, is in innumerable instances declared to be “cause !” “*I myself am CAUSE—the will is cause.*” But in his discussion of substance he says, p. 42, “*We conceive of ourselves as SUBSTANCE.*” “I cannot but refer to the *substance* which I call the human spirit or *myself.*” What could more decisively evince the futility of the distinction in question, than the fact that the Professor has been unable to school his own rebellious faculties into any conformity with it ? that the usage which he thus unconsciously adopts, is, like that of other men, in decided repugnance to the usage which he laboriously advocates ?

If we have dwelt longer than may seem altogether justifiable, on topics so abstruse and barren, our vindication is found in the fact that the principles we have been examining form the basis of a novel and peculiar system ; novel and peculiar at least among the metaphysicians of our country. It is related, indeed, by affinities very obvious and strong, to the eclectic school of modern European philosophy ; but upon these connections we do not propose to remark. Our object is rather to form an estimate of the system itself ;—its original character fully entitles it to an independent examination.

Assuming, then, that cause and substance are two of the mind's most elementary conceptions, to be regarded as always distinct, inexplicable, from their extreme simplicity, yet perfectly understood by all minds, Prof. T. constructs upon them an extended theory. The relation of the will to its phenomena, he maintains to be that of cause to effect; the relation of the other faculties of the mind,—of the intellect and the sensitivity, to their phenomena, the relation of substance to attribute. In the chapter "On Motives," (Vol. II. p. 281,) these two relations are contrasted, their distinctive characteristics formally enumerated, and the relations assigned, as we have said, to the different faculties of the mind. Volitions alone are acknowledged to be effects; ideas, emotions, sensations, are not effects, they are attributes; if in any degree effects, it is the action of the will alone which produces them. The chapter on "the relations between the intelligence and the will" is a labored effort to show that in memory, abstraction, imagination, in short in all intellectual phenomena, the will, and the will alone, is concerned as a cause.

It is toward this conclusion that the whole reasoning of our author tends. His whole effort is to magnify and exalt the will. Dissatisfied with the low and narrow sphere assigned to it in our current psychology, he labors to raise it to an elevation from which no one may hope ever again to bring it down to the level of such subordinate faculties as the intellect, or the susceptibility. A remark which occurs at the conclusion of Vol. II. sufficiently indicates the character of his effort; he says, "The absorption of the will in other principles, and its virtual annihilation, is the greatest error ever made in philosophy, and the most pregnant parent of error." * * * "I have aimed to vindicate the integrity of the will, and I hope I have accomplished it." The work is accomplished emphatically. Not content with liberating the will from all bondage of necessity; not content with elevating it to the rank of an independent faculty, having its own laws, and sphere of operation; our author exalts it as the thing to which *exclusively* mental activity belongs. "Will is cause,"

it is "power," it is "activity," it is "causality," it is whatever is exalted and dignified, and supreme, in the soul; it is finally "the me or myself."

In support of the position (which forms perhaps the greatest peculiarity of the system) that the will embraces the whole of the mind's causative influence, the author makes his appeal to consciousness. Assuming that the mind first knows itself in its sensations, he labors to prove that no sensation can take place without an act of attention; it follows from this that the act of attention, to use his own language, "must be the power which really creates the sensation." Vol. II. p. 39. This act of attention, the author next seeks to identify with volition. The characteristics which serve to identify these acts, are two; that both acts are under our own control; and that in both we are conscious of a misus or effort to exert them. Of course, as the act of attention "creates" sensations, and as the power of volition and of attention is one and the same, the will is the creative faculty—the causality of the mind.

A minute examination of these reasonings would be tedious; nor is it at all necessary to the refutation of the main conclusion, in support of which they are urged. If we are not greatly in error, they authorize a consequence, which must prove absolutely fatal to their validity, viz., the most stringent and complete necessity of volition. Before proceeding, however, to establish this inference, we must acquaint our readers with one more of the prominent distinctions of this system.

They will probably suppose that the term volition denotes, in Prof. T.'s usage, the thing which it is generally used to denote—an act of choice. Very far from it: it signifies a mere executive act—an act done *in obedience* to choice. For fear, however, of misstating the theory, Prof. T. shall explain the distinction himself. He says, (Vol. II. p. 73,) "Choice and volition are indeed very generally used as perfectly synonymous; and in the system of Edwards are always thus used. I conceive, however, of a distinction which I will en-

deavor to explain. Volition, or the primary *nisus*, is the first action, or the first giving" (going) "forth of cause to effect ; choice, as used in contradistinction to volition, *precedes* the primary *nisus*, and is equivalent to predetermination, or intention." * * * "The choice precedes the actual volition, or *nisus*, by which I take the fruit ; it is the determination what to do when the moment of action shall have come." * * * "I may form a purpose or determination, or in other words make a choice, years before the time for exerting the *nisus* which is to accomplish it."

Volition, it will be observed, is here carefully restricted, so as to denote only causative *nisus*, or efforts, *put forth* "to accomplish" a choice which "*precedes*" them. The author, in the next chapter, discusses the question—"Is every act of volition predetermined by the will?" and arrives at the conclusion, that, excepting the first act of attention, and certain instinctive actions, arising from sudden fear, etc., this is the case. These excepted acts, are not deliberative, and he concedes that it may be that they are not free ; all other volitions, however, are deliberative ; and all are previously determined by acts of choice. "Every causative *nisus*, which results from deliberation, *must be predetermined.*" Deliberative volitions then, for which alone our author claims liberty, are *in all cases* predetermined, are put forth to accomplish the previous determination of the mind.

It is also a characteristic of volition, recognized most distinctly by the scheme we are considering, that it is free, is put forth with an entire ability in the cause, to withhold or to change it ; e. g. p. 78, "When determining or choosing beforehand in what way to exert the causative *nisus*, we are conscious of power to determine, or not to determine, in any given way, of possible action ; and when our determination is made up, we are conscious of power to alter it. And so, also, *when the moment of action arrives*, we are conscious of power to do or not to do according to the previous determination ; and in the very act of carrying it out, we are conscious of power to do the contrary."

To the grand characteristic of volition which Prof. Tappan here so distinctly maintains, we are constrained to regard his system as irreconcilably hostile. It would, we seriously believe, be impossible to present any view which should more effectually preclude it, than the distinction which we have just explained. Volition is not an act of choice—it has nothing in common with choice—it is simply an act put forth to accomplish a choice, to execute a determination. In some cases it does not imply even the least possible deliberation; and when it does, it is always predetermined. What liberty can be conceived to exist in such an act? Deliberative volitions can take place only as they are *previously* chosen—they follow the mind's predetermination, and *must* follow it. The mind cannot exert such a volition without first forming an antecedent choice to do so; and cannot change the volition without first changing this choice. The liberty then which this scheme allows to the mind in volition, is that of forming a volition after it has formed certain antecedents, and of changing the volition after it has changed the antecedents—no more: and this is precisely the liberty which a stone has—liberty to move when the antecedents of motion exist, and to stop moving when other antecedents occur, but no liberty to change its state without a previous change of antecedents. At the moment in which any deliberative volition was formed the mind could not form any other, because there was no predetermination of any other, and every such volition “must be predetermined.” The requisite antecedents do not exist in such a case. In given circumstances, therefore, only a given effect is possible; there must be some change of circumstances to render any other possible: and this is precisely the liberty of any physical cause—liberty to produce a different result whenever it is placed in different circumstances.

We do not mean to say that this is all the *liberty* of which the system admits; it implies a liberty *of choice* distinct from the liberty *of volition*; it includes a liberty of originating the antecedents on which volition depends, which liberty is fortunately not nullified by any necessity of determina-

tion. This liberty *of choice*, is strenuously and consistently advocated throughout the work. But, as we have seen, our author claims both liberty for the choice, and *for the volition*; and it is only to the latter of these claims that our remarks apply.

Still further; not only is this theory inconsistent with liberty of volition, but it renders such liberty positively absurd. For if, *while* a predetermination to exert a certain volition remains, the mind is competent to form a different volition, then the mind may have at the same moment a predetermination or choice in one direction, and a volition in the other; which, as choice and volition are both acts of will, amounts to willing both ways at once. If it is contended that the mind is competent to put forth a volition at variance with an existing predetermination, then it is contended that the mind is competent to will in opposite ways at the same moment. The thing, therefore, comes down to a very simple dilemma. Either the mind *can*, while under the influence of a predetermination, exert a volition in opposition to that predetermination, or it *cannot*. If it can, it can will both ways at once; if it cannot, there is an end to the liberty of *volition*. The necessary predetermination of deliberative volitions is absolutely fatal to their freedom. It would seem, therefore, that Prof. Tappan must, in consistency, abandon either the liberty or the predetermination of volitions.

The latter principle, however, is a constituent element of his system; and cannot be abandoned without necessitating an abandonment of the system itself. For as volition is not itself choice, it *must* be determined by some previous act of choice, otherwise it would be exerted necessarily, and, unintelligently. When once the volition and choice are thus distinguished, predetermination becomes essential. There is, therefore, no escape from the necessity which this predetermination involves, without an entire change of the system. Every volition must be acknowledged to be a choice; and then the first act of sensation, and acts of instinctive impulse, can be no longer volitions—no longer acts of *the will*—must be

caused by the mind in some other mode of causal action—and will demonstrate the existence of a causal agency in the mind distinct from the will; which brings us to what we conceive to be the original error of our author. He attempts, as we have said, to confine the causality of the mind to the will—but as the first act of sensation, and instinctive acts, are caused by something, he is compelled to consider them acts of will, *volitions*; it would be absurd however to call them *choices*; there must be therefore a distinction between choice and volition. This requires the predetermination of the latter; which results, as we have seen, in the absolute necessity of *volition*; a consequence which by universal consent is fatal to any scheme which authorizes or involves it.

Another subject which calls for a careful examination, is an earnest assault upon a principle fundamental to the philosophy of Edwards. Our author claims with some confidence that he is entirely successful in this effort; and evidently regards it as one of the most important and useful of his labors. He says, Vol. III. p. 334, “Now I claim to have refuted the celebrated argument of Edwards against a self-determining will; and this claim I make in no spirit of vain boasting, which is far beneath the dignity of the subject, but under the deep convictions of truth.” His essay in this behalf has found support in two very interesting articles published in our own journal, in which his positions are maintained with great force and plausibility.¹ As the latter writer has developed the argument of Prof. Tappan with greater minuteness, we crave his indulgence, if, without the formality of a separate article, we discuss the subject with a particular reference to his views of it.

The obnoxious principle of Edwards is quoted in the following words: “*No agent can bring any effects to pass, but what are consequent upon his acting.*” Of which statement the reviewer just mentioned speaks thus: “There is no

¹ See two reviews of the philosophy of the younger Edwards in the Bib. Repos. for January and April 1843, by Rev. Samuel T. Spear.

escape when once this canon of necessity is allowed ; it is omnipotent in demonstration ; it has power to make every cause in the universe the grossest absurdity. If we say that no cause or agent can bring any *effect* to pass but what is consequent upon its *acting* ; if we then distinguish between the *acting* and the *effect* brought to pass ; if we make the *acting* prior to, and separate from, the *effect*—it then follows that the cause of the effect cannot be the cause of the acting ; the acting must have some other cause. If we generalize this mode of reasoning, we drive every cause out of the universe.”
—*Bib. Repos.*, April, 1843, p. 301.

We readily assent to the remark that this canon applies to all causes as well as to the mind ; the very statement is that “no cause can bring,” etc. Another remark of Prof. Tappan, however, we cannot regard as possessing the same authority, viz., that the power of originating its own acting, *in this sense*, must be conceded to the great First Cause. The necessity adduced as the ground of this claim is, that by the very supposition there can be no other cause in existence, of which this acting can be the effect ; an argument which will find its answer as we advance.

It is thus objected to our principle that it destroys all causation. It is said that if a cause can produce an effect only by *previously acting* to produce it, then *this acting*—this preliminary exercise of the cause, is itself to be accounted for. What produces the acting ? If we reply that it is produced by another, and this again by a third, still previous to the second, we are at once in the acknowledged absurdity of an infinite series of causative actings. If, however, we attribute the acting to something else, then the cause under consideration, not being the originator of its own preliminary actings, is not the originator of *the effects* in which those actings result, its causality is destroyed—it is not a cause. Moreover, the other agent which is introduced to account for the acting, shares the same fate. If it produced the preliminary exercise in question, it must do so, upon this theory, by a previous acting of its *own* ; it becomes then the real cause—

its previous acting requires to be accounted for—the fatal difficulty is thus created at every step; and the explanation of any instance of causation becomes, on the principle of Edwards, forever impossible.

The objection assumes that the previous acting which this principle affirms to be essential to all causation, is a change in the state of the cause; a movement which commences at a moment immediately prior to the taking place of the effect: and it spends its whole force in showing, that, upon this principle, it is absolutely impossible to account for this assumed change. Says the Reviewer above quoted, (Bib. Repos., April, 1843, p. 321,) “It is not possible] for a thing to be the cause of events without itself, unless it originate and cause *the changes within* itself, whatever they may be, which are antecedent to the changes without.” It is here distinctly intimated that the acting in question is to be regarded as a change which takes place within the cause, immediately prior to the effect. This point is assumed as the basis of the whole objection; for surely the impossibility of accounting for a change would be no argument against our principle, unless there was some change to be accounted for.

Our defence against the objection consists in questioning the correctness of this assumption. In affirming the principle, we do not conceive that it involves any such change as the objection contemplates. On the contrary, we maintain that the cause in acting to produce an effect, may exist in precisely the same state, precisely the same *mode*, as that in which it existed before, and in which it will continue to exist after, the occurrence of the effect. There is no change to be accounted for—nothing which demands a cause at all; and therefore the logic we have been considering, though very forcible, is entirely superfluous.

But here we are met with a host of new objections. We shall be asked, if there is absolutely no difference in the state of the cause, no change in the exercise of its activity, how comes it that an effect is produced at one instant, and not at another? and how comes it that different effects are produced

at successive moments? Waiving, for a moment, the consideration of these objections, we request that it may be observed, how entirely conclusive is the reply we have given to the reasoning above recited. In demanding a cause for the acting in question, it is implied indisputably that this acting is to be regarded as a change—an effect; we have seen, indeed, that it is distinctly called a change. Of course, then, if there is no change whatever implied in our account of the process of causation, the objection falls to the ground. This we maintain to be the case. The canon, that no cause can produce any effect except by previously acting to produce it, does not imply that this previous acting is a change; and does not therefore lie open to the objection which is alleged as so decisive against it. The only just idea of a cause can, we think, be shown to include the three following things,—the substance, its active nature or power, and the exercise of that nature. In order for any thing to be capable of producing effects, that is in order for it *to be a cause*, it must be a substance possessing an active nature *in exercise*. This exercise of its active nature, it is impossible that the cause itself should originate; it might as well be supposed to originate its own existence. A thing which is not in a state of activity, cannot put itself into such a state. The exercise or acting of every cause begins when the cause begins to exist, and continues while the cause continues to exist. It is not, therefore, a change which takes place in the cause at a moment immediately antecedent to the occurrence of the effect. The cause is acting continually; its active nature, which qualifies it to produce changes, is necessarily in unceasing exercise; an exercise which is as permanent, and, in respect to the cause itself, as unavoidable, as its existence. The question, therefore, what produces this acting, is precluded. The cause acts by a necessity of its nature. The very idea of a cause is the idea of a thing which is *competent* to act, *and acting*. If now this idea of a cause can be sustained against whatever other objections it may have to encounter, it will be perceived that it affords us a means of successfully avoiding the consequences, urged upon Edwards's theory of causation.

Let us then revert to the objections suggested above, and see whether our conception of a cause can be vindicated against them.

I. It may be alleged that if a cause is necessarily and constantly in a state of exercise, as this exercise is all which by our theory is requisite for the production of effects, effects must constantly be produced. This we grant; in its application, at least, to causes which act in circumstances in which effects are possible. Matter may exist, and its power of attraction may be in constant exercise, but if there be no other matter within the sphere of that attraction, no effect can take place. So far as the objection relates to causes acting in their appropriate circumstances, we assent to it, and admit that such causes must continuously produce effects. Should it be said that the mind stands in no need of such external circumstances in order to its producing effects, and that, therefore, upon our theory effects must incessantly be produced, we concede this also, and contend that this is actually the case. The mind *does* continuously produce effects, thoughts, emotions, volitions, etc., up to the very moment of any specified act.

II. It may be said, that as volition is an effect which differs in important respects from every other, it must upon this theory demand some difference in the mode of the acting by which it is produced. To this we reply, by adducing a general law, applicable to all causes, that they do by the same mode of operation produce different effects, whenever the objects differ upon which the cause acts. For example, the effect of galvanic electricity when applied to the human system, is to produce muscular contraction; when applied to a compound fluid, the effect is decomposition. Fire, when applied to one object produces evaporation, to another, induration: the effects vary as the objects vary. In entire harmony with this law, the mind, when applied to an object of knowledge, produces a cognition, or act of knowledge; when to an object of emotion, an act of emotion; and when to an object of volition, a volition.

Should it be said that these different effects are produced

by different powers residing in the causes we have mentioned, or by the operation of the same power in different modes, we reply as follows :

1. There is no ground for such an affirmation. Our knowledge either of the nature, or of the operation, of external causes is not sufficient to authorize it in respect to any one of them ; while in our own causative movements, we have no consciousness of difference, either in the power, or in the mode of its operation.

2. It is at variance with consciousness. Men do not refer the differences which mark their mental phenomena, either to different powers or to different modes of operation. The idea of a tree differs from the idea of a horse, but who supposes there is one power for conceiving of trees, and another for conceiving of horses ? or who supposes that in each instance of such difference as this, there must be a difference in the mode of our causal action ? The idea of virtue differs from the idea of equality, but who supposes that this difference implies either different powers, or different modes of intellectual operation, as necessary to account for it ? Should it be said that a volition differs far more from an idea than one idea from another, we reply that the *degree* of difference is of no moment when the *fact* is admitted. It is undeniable, that by the same operation of the same power, effects are produced, which differ, as the objects differ : and this is enough for our purpose. If the degree of difference between the objects be greater in one instance than in another, *of course* the difference in the effects will be greater also.

We affirm it, therefore, as a universal law, that the *same power, acting in the same manner upon different objects, produces different effects* : it follows, that if the same intellectual activity be directed in the same mode of operation to the different objects we have mentioned above, the corresponding effects must result. The diversity in the effects which the mind is continuously producing, does not, upon the theory in debate, imply necessarily any other difference to account for it, than that which must be admitted to exist between the

objects within the mind's view; and, therefore, does not involve any change in the mode of this exercise.

III. Another difficulty which may seem to embarrass our theory, is, that it renders a volition, in all appropriate circumstances, absolutely necessary. It may be thought that, if a cause *must* produce effects corresponding to the nature of the objects toward which it acts, and if it is necessarily in unceasing activity, whenever objects of volition are brought into view, volition must unavoidably take place. In reply to this objection, we observe that it would by no means follow from the admission that *a* volition is a necessary result, that our theory is at all hostile to the fullest liberty of volition. It may be that choice must take place—that volition must be exerted, but this by no means implies that *the* choice, *the* volition actually resulting, is the only one possible. Indeed, it is capable of demonstration, that in any circumstances which render volition possible, it is in one sense a necessary result. If the mind is in circumstances which admit of choice, it cannot but choose. For, if when a certain choice is possible, the mind forbears to exert it, in this forbearing it must act in one of two ways—either by forming some other volition, or without volition. If it avoids the volition supposed to be possible, by forming another, then still it acts by a volition; which is what we contend it must do. If, however, it forbears without any volition, then it acts *involuntarily*; that is, it acts *necessarily*—acts without a possibility of acting otherwise; which is contrary to the supposition that volition was possible. Whenever, therefore, volition is possible, the mind *must* will. It must do, or refuse to do—take, or refuse to take; there is no escape, there *can* be no escape, from this necessity of willing. This acknowledgment, however, it will be perceived, does not, even by the remotest consequence, imply any necessity of willing *as we do*.

Up to this point in our discussion, it will be perceived that we have placed the mind upon the same level with other causes, and predicted the same things of them all. We have maintained that every cause must be a substance,

possessing an active nature, (termed its power,) and continuously in a state of exercise. At the moment antecedent to the occurrence of any effect, it must be such a *thing*, and in such a *state* as we have described : a thing competent to act, and acting. We now proceed to affirm in respect to the mind, a fact in which it differs widely from all other known causes ; viz., that in all circumstances appropriate to the production of volition, *it possesses the liberty of giving existence to either of several volitions*. The activity of the mind, which in the circumstances *must* produce *an* effect of that kind, is by no means limited to the production of the one which actually takes place ; but possesses a capacity of originating, in precisely the same circumstances, either of several effects. In the fact now predicated, we place the sum total of human liberty—the possibility, implied in the nature of the cause, that in every instance of volition the result should be different.

The question *how the mind acts* in these peculiar circumstances for the production of this peculiar effect, we do not pretend to answer. We can no more describe the mode of its action in this instance, than in any other. The difficulty is no less, and no greater, than the difficulty of telling how, in circumstances appropriate to the production of thought, the mind originates thought. We maintain that the mind possesses an active nature, *in constant, unvarying, and necessary exercise* ; that the results of this exercise vary as the objects toward which it is directed vary ; that when these objects embrace all the requisite antecedents of volition, it is competent to produce either of several volitions ; and this fact, which is the ultimate fact of our consciousness, is the ultimate fact of our philosophy also. We rest in the affirmation of the mind's power to produce, in the same circumstances, either of several effects, a point beyond which our theory does not require us to go.

In these endeavors to vindicate the principles upon which Edwards constructed his scheme, we have no wish to intimate an approval of the use he made of it. Indeed, it must in

fairness be allowed, that many of his reasonings upon it are justly liable to the exceptions Prof. T. has taken. It seems frequently to be very directly maintained, in the Inquiry, that this preliminary acting is a change, is even a volition, and demands some cause external to the mind to account for its existence; a mode of argument which calls for a reply, and to which our author has replied, in our apprehension, conclusively. The principle itself, however, (against which the objections of the reviewer above mentioned more particularly bear,) we are constrained to regard as a just one; and as his discussion of it has attracted no small attention among the readers of the Repository, and possesses considerable interest, it will not, perhaps, be deemed superfluous if we proceed to adduce some considerations, tending directly to sustain our views.

Edwards has assumed the obnoxious canon without any attempt at proof, as a universal and necessary conception. Is there any thing to be alleged in support of this assumption? Here we remark:

I. That there is nothing to be alleged against it. The very ingenious efforts, which we have noticed, to impugn this principle of causation, bear upon it only as it is supposed to imply that the preliminary acting of a cause involves some change in the state of the cause. We have endeavored to show that it does not involve this implication; if our effort is at all successful, the principle must be acknowledged to stand beyond the reach of the only objections which have ever been made to it.

II. We re-affirm it, on the ground that the universal conceptions of mankind imply its truth. It would be a mere waste of words for us to assert our consciousness in opposition to that of the writer we are controverting; we carry our appeal, therefore, at once to the consciousness of mankind at large, as it is developed in the structure and use of human language. The form in which men universally express their conception of causation, implies the separate existence of the things in question. The form of statement universally em-

ployed to describe this process, is, that "*causes PRODUCE effects.*" Now, in the absence of all proof to the contrary, it must be held, that the copula, the word which connects the subject with the predicate of this proposition, denotes something distinct from either of them. The *producing* is a distinct thing, both from the *cause* which produces and from the *effect* produced; else why do mankind at large give it distinct expression? The fact that the acting, and the effect, of a cause, are denoted in all languages, and in every man's usage, by entirely different words, is all the proof we can have in such cases that all men consider the things distinct; which is the highest evidence that they *are* distinct.

III. It is unphilosophical to suppose another mode of giving existence to effects. That effects are sometimes produced in the mode for which we contend, is beyond question. It will scarcely be denied that the world's beginning to exist, was strictly an effect—an effect, too, caused by a *previous* exercise of Divine power. We have thus an admission that effects are sometimes produced by an acting which is "prior to, and separate from the effect." Of course it becomes unphilosophical to suppose another mode, unless some necessity of doing so can be made out. Some effects must be adduced, for the existence of which the acknowledged mode of producing is insufficient to account. It is contended by these writers that volition is such an effect; on the ground that, if in this effect we admit a prior acting of the cause, it is absolutely impossible to account for that acting. This objection we have shown to be groundless—the previous acting, even in this instance, does not require, does not admit of, any account. The acknowledged mode of causation is entirely sufficient to account for all which demands to be accounted for; of course, the formation of a second hypothesis is inadmissible.

IV. The principle of our opponents is inconsistent with the simplicity of our idea of causation.

The conception denoted by the words produce, cause, etc., is absolutely simple—it contains but a single element of

thought. What this element is, an illustration will show. When the first human soul began to exist, that beginning of existence was, *in the strictest sense*, an effect, of which God was, *in the strictest sense*, the cause. But it is inconceivable that God should have been the cause of this effect, unless it took place in consequence of his *previous* action. A previous action of the cause is, therefore, in this instance, *absolutely essential* to its producing. If then, there is any instance of causation in which a previous acting of the cause is not essential, the idea of causation is no longer a simple idea. Its essential element is different in different instances. Those who acknowledge a causation of this kind, may, therefore, be justly called upon to define the words *cause*, *produce*, etc.; nor can they, while maintaining that something else than previous action of the cause constitutes causation, excuse themselves from the obligation of telling what that extraordinary something is.

Furthermore; this previous acting is *all* that is essential to causation, in the illustration we have adduced. It is inconceivable that the effect should *not* follow this previous acting of the Divine mind. If, then, there is any instance of causation from which this idea is excluded, some other *must* be substituted, else the word *cause* will denote, in that instance, absolutely *no* idea. *All* that constitutes causation in one instance, is stricken from the conception in another; some other idea must be substituted, or we have literally nothing left. If, when the word *produce* does not denote a previous acting of the cause, nothing can be named which it *does* denote, we confess ourselves utterly unable to perceive that it denotes any thing.

We forego with some reluctance other topics of remark, which would add materially to the force of our argument; but the discussion has been protracted already perhaps too long. If the canon of Edwards has been vindicated successfully from the objection of involving an infinite series of causative acts, our argument for its support will, we trust, be deemed sufficient; if it has not, additional reasoning would scarcely make it so.

The remainder of Prof. Tappan's work is occupied, for the most part, and the last volume exclusively, with an application of his psychological principles to important subjects of morals and theology. His remarks extend to a wide range of topics, and many of them are of a new and pleasing character. The great fact of the mind's freedom is illustrated in a variety of its applications; and frequently with an elevation of thought, a power of language, and a beauty of sentiment rarely surpassed. The reader will find at Vol. III. pp. 89-90, 97, 140-144, and 179-80, passages of uncommon merit in these respects, with which (if the length to which this article has grown, did not positively forbid extracts) we should be glad to enrich our pages. The author's characteristic defects of style and analysis, are unfortunately evident; still, to most readers, this will be a very interesting portion of his work. In its theological relations, the work will furnish to a certain class of divines but scanty satisfaction. Men whose whole system is circumscribed within the limits of a triangle, or even a hexagon; who recognize only the few combinations of thought which depravity and sovereignty and inability can be made to produce, will find food enough in it, or rather troublesome reflection, nor do we profess any unqualified approbation of it. Some of our author's remarks, in respect to decrees, election, and some other topics, we regard as unhappy and erroneous; and to others of them we should take exception as being couched in a phraseology which is needlessly obnoxious, and which gives them, even when true, an aspect of error. But throughout this portion, and indeed the whole of the work, there is a sense of the importance of the truth that man is free, and a lofty and fearless assertion of it, which it is refreshing to witness. Prof. T.'s earnestness in defence of this great fact, carries him not unfrequently beyond just limits; and of this none can be more sensible than ourselves. Still we say, without hesitation, that the great principles he maintains will come with conviction to many a mind dissatisfied with the barren and meagre philosophy to which it is now forced to stoop.

The ardor and enthusiasm with which he has sought to vindicate to the utmost, the weightier matters of human liberty and accountability, ought to secure from every generous mind a lenient treatment for any errors into which they may have betrayed him, and a kind reception for a work, which is destined, we doubt not, to exert a powerful, and on the whole, a healthful influence in the promotion of moral and metaphysical science in our country.

ARTICLE VII.

DOMINICI DIODATI I. C. NEAPOLITANI, DE CHRISTO GRÆCE LOQUENTE EXERCITATIO.

Translated by Rev. O. T. DOBBIN, LL. D., of Western Independent College, Exeter, Eng.

Continued from page 564, Vol. I.

§ 3. *The preface of Josephus and the close of his Antiquities explained.*

WE are now to examine certain ambiguous passages of the great Jewish historian that seem to oppose our opinion. And first of all, in the procœmium of his Antiquities he says that he had undertaken to translate out of Hebrew books into Greek, the history of the Jewish people for the benefit of the Grecians, and then goes on thus: *Χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τοῖς μεγάλων ἄπτεσθαι διανοομένοις, ὄκνος μοὶ καὶ μέλλησις ἐγένετο τηλικαύτην μετενεγκεῖν ὑπόθεσιν εἰς ἄλλοδαπὴν ἡμῖν καὶ ξένης διαλέκτου συνήθειαν.* That is, “in process of time, as usually happens to those who undertake difficult tasks, serious delays were occasioned by attempting to transfer so great a body of matter into a foreign and unfamiliar tongue.”¹ Then again to the same effect in the end of the Antiquities he writes: *Καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δὲ γραμμάτων ἐσπόνδασα μετασχεῖν,*

¹ Josephus, in procœm. Antiq. p. 2, § 2.

τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀναλαβὼν, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὴν προφορὰν ἀκρίβειαν πάτριος ἐκώλυσσε συνήθεια. "I gave myself to the study of the Greek language after I had learned the grammar, although the place of my birth forbade the hope that I should ever obtain that exquisite accuracy of pronunciation which distinguishes a native Greek."¹ These statements of the historian, it is owned, seem to establish the point that the Greek language was to Josephus, a native of Jerusalem, *ξένη*, καὶ ἀλλοδαπή, not vernacular.

But notwithstanding appearances, there is nothing to which a more ready answer is supplied. For in the first place, the difficulty is removed by the own words of Josephus. He does not say *μετενεγκεῖν ξένης γλώττης*, but *ξένης διαλέκτου*, which the Latin translator (Hudson) has mistakenly rendered a foreign *tongue*, whereas it should have been *dialect*. *Διάλεκτος* properly signifies the peculiarity that marks a particular language—the distinctive features of a tongue, that set it apart from others. Now Josephus does not say that the Greek in the general was strange (*ξένη*) to him; but that particular dialect which he studied, (eam speciatim dialectum, quam aggressus est.) This is plain enough from his own words: In the tenth book of his Antiquities he repeats what has been said above: Καὶ γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἱστορίας, πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιζητήσοντας τὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ μεμφομένους ἡσφαλισάμην, μόνον τε μεταφράζειν τὰς Ἑβραίων βίβλους εἰπὼν εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα γλῶτταν. "From the very beginning of this history I specially warned those who desiderate something I never intended to give, or find fault with my plan, that my sole purpose was to translate the books of the Hebrews into the Greek language."² Here it will be perceived, where the author uses the word *γλῶτταν tongue*, he does not speak of it as strange to him, as he did of the more polished *dialect* which he had occasion to mention above. For the dialect which was vernacular to Josephus, as an inhabitant of Jerusalem, was the Hellenistic or

¹ Idem in fine libr. Antiq. p. 982.

² Joseph. in lib. 10, cap. 10, [tom. 1 Huds. p. 458,] § 6, Antiq.

Græco-barbario, and this, as we have repeatedly said, differed both in style and phraseology from the other dialects of Greece more than the Bruttian from the Tuscan, the Gascon from the Parisian, the Welsh from that of London, and the Portuguese from the Spanish. This colloquial dialect, which the other Jews used in writing, appeared too rude to Josephus; and though he studied the Grecian literature from day to day, yet could he not acquire those graces of native Greek style, which persons born and brought up in Greece possessed. If a modern Sicilian were to attempt to write the history of his country in the same elegant dialect in which Francis Guicciardini, the Florentine, composed his history of Italy, what a task would it be to the writer! what study and effort would it demand! Yet, this was the task to be accomplished by Josephus in producing his golden work upon the antiquities of his country, in a more correct and brilliant style than that spoken around him: nor does he disguise the fact that in his Greek he availed himself of the aid of others. But in addition to these difficulties must be named the length of the work, the variety of the incidents, the composition of it amid the Romans, who held Judaism and Jewish authors in contempt, as so many circumstances all contributing to retard him in the execution of it. Not the Greek language, then, was the grand obstacle to the historian, but the chaste and accurate dialect in which he desired to write. This presents us with the solution of another difficulty, (*prope est alterius nodi solutio*;) namely, the study of the Greek grammar by Josephus. This study was pursued not to obtain a knowledge of a language already known, but to qualify himself for correct composition. The grammar of a language may be studied by both foreigners and natives, but in each case with a different object; the foreigner seeks to learn a language not known before; the native to perfect himself in his own tongue by the discipline of rule and ascertained usage. Thus the Italians, French, English, Germans, Dutch, Spaniards, all make it a point to study in early life the grammar of their own language, if they would speak it correctly; a reason the most imperative, if their native dialect

be not pure. That Josephus should have done so with the Greek, is perfectly natural ; the more so, as his vernacular dialect of that language abounded in solecisms and barbarous words. Equally natural was it that the exquisiteness of the true pronunciation should be a thing unattainable by him, his organs having been schooled in the peculiarities of his provincial dialect. To illustrate this point by an example. Although a Sicilian should speak Italian grammatically correct, and again, should speak the Tuscan, the purest dialect of Italian, yet never could he catch the exquisite pronunciation of Sienna. So the Jews, used of old to speaking Hebrew and Chaldee, even after they had adopted the Greek, could not conquer their old peculiarity of a guttural enunciation, (*collidentes verba in gutture*,) such as the Arabs use at the present day. Accustomed then to that course of Jewish pronunciation, as he applied himself without the aid of a teacher to the study of the Greek grammar, it is quite obvious that Josephus could never have attained that nicely accurate pronunciation, which the aid of the living voice and long intercourse with educated Greeks alone could have bestowed.

§ 4. *Why Josephus wrote his Books of the War in Chaldee.*

Neither do we find an insuperable difficulty in the words of Simon : “ Josephus, who was a Jew of Jerusalem, informs us that before he published his history of the wars of the Jews in Greek, he had written the same work in Chaldee, which he calls the language of his country.”¹ Simon concludes that Chaldee was vernacular in Judea. But attention to the exact expressions of Josephus will remove this difficulty also. The historian says, in the beginning of his book : *Προῦθέμην ἐγὼ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ρωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν, Ἑλλάδι γλώσση μεταβαλὼν, αὐτοῖς ἄνω βαρβάροις τῇ πατρίῳ συντάξας ἀνέπεμψα πρότερον, ἀφηγήσασθαι.*² “ I therefore purposed, for the sake of those who live under the dominion of the Romans, to translate into

¹ Simon Hist. Critiq. du N. T. p. 70.

² Joseph in procem. de Bel. pp. 47, 48.

Greek, and publish, what I had before written in the language of the country for the upper barbarians." The illustrious Hudson renders the phrase τοῖς ἄνω βαρβάροις in his Latin version *mediterraneis barbaris*, meaning hereby the Babylonians, Assyrians, and Trans-Euphratic Jews—that is, in short, the inhabitants of the upper continent, as Voss,¹ Spanheim, Aldrich,² and others, rightly explain it. Josephus himself very clearly shows whom he meant by the phrase, naming the Parthians, Babylonians, the most remote Arabs, and the Jews beyond the Euphrates: Πάρθους, καὶ Βαβυλωνίους, Ἀράβων τε τοὺς πορρωτάτω, καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ Εὐφράτην ὁμόφυλον ἡμῶν. Josephus therefore says that before he wrote his War in Greek, he wrote the same narration in his native tongue, that is, the Chaldee, for the use of the barbarian Jews who lived over the Euphrates, beyond the bounds of the Roman empire, who having long cast off the yoke of the Greeks, succeeded in retaining the language of their fathers. In that trans-Euphratic region, neither the Greek dominion nor language had struck their roots very deeply down. Thus Josephus explains the reason of the course he took. He first composed his history for the information of the Chaldean Jews beyond the Euphrates, that they might learn the evils that had befallen their brethren of Jerusalem. But afterward he wrote the same in Greek for the sake of those who lived under the Roman dominion in Palestine. Simon, indeed, translates τοῖς ἄνω as an adverb of time, so that with him τοῖς ἄνω βαρβάροις is the *elder barbarians*—but he is wrong. It is true that ἄνω may be taken in either sense at times, as an adverb of time, signifying *before, after*; or as an adverb of *place*, signifying *above, upper*. Here it can only be used in the latter sense. For the historian says that his work was published in Greek for the Jews who dwelt in the Roman empire, to whom he opposes the Jews living beyond the empire, for whom he wrote previously in the Chaldee. If ἄνω be taken for an adverb of time, and you render τοῖς ἄνω βαρβάροις

¹ Vossius de Sibyll. Orac. p. 374.

² Spanhemius, Aldrichius, in not. ad. Jos. ibid.

the *Jews formerly barbarian*, it would mean that Josephus had written his history for those elder Jews, who living at an earlier period were barbarians, and would imply, absurd enough, the dead ! Our explanation, therefore, meets the sense of the passage much better than that of Simon.

§ 5. *Josephus is examined, who, addressing the Jews, spoke Hebrew, 'Εβραΐζε.*

There remains yet to be explained a passage of Josephus in his Jewish War, the sixth book, which although not adduced by any of our opponents, I dare not pass over in silence. The historian is showing how, by the command of Titus, he undertook to persuade the Jews and John to surrender the city, and proceeds thus: *Καὶ ὁ Ἰώσηπος, ὥς ἂν εἰ μὴ τῷ Ἰωάννῃ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἐν ἐπηκόῳ στὰς, τάτε τοῦ Καίσαρος δίηγγεilen 'Εβραΐζων, καὶ πολλὰ προσηντιβόλει.* “ And Josephus, not only to John, but also to many of the Jews besides, for he stood where he could be heard, reported the commands of Cæsar in the Hebrew tongue ; and strongly importuned them to yield.”¹ Here the translators, and Hudson among the number, render *'Εβραΐζων Hebraice* or *Hebraica lingua*, which is in my judgment altogether wrong. For *'Εβραΐζειν* does not only mean to speak Hebrew, but to side with the Hebrews—to act, imitate, appear the Hebrew, just as *'Ιουδαΐζειν*, means not merely to speak as do the Jews, but to adopt their religion and habits ; *'Ελληνίζειν* is also to live after the Greek fashion, as well as to speak the Greek tongue ;² *Ρωμαΐζειν* is to affect the Roman party, as well as to adopt the Latin language ; and *Περσίζειν, Μηδιζειν, Σικελίζειν, Ξανίζειν*, have the same latitude of signification. Our proper inquiry is, in what sense *'Εβραΐζειν* is to be taken here, whether in that of speaking the language or taking

¹ Joseph. de Bello, lib. 6, cap. 2, § 1, p. 374.

² [Cf. Auctores supra laudatos, pp. 54, 55. Hæc vox idem sonat apud Eusebium. Μεταβὰς δ' ἐκ τούτων βασιλεὺς πραγμάτων ἐνεργῶν ἤπτετο. Καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τοῖς κατ' ἐπαρχίας διηρημένοις ἔθνεσιν, ἡγεμόνας κατέπεμψε, τῇ σωτηρίᾳ πίστει καθωσιωμένους τοὺς πλείους· ὅσοι δ' Ἑλληνίζειν ἐδόκουν τοῦτοις θέειν ἀπείρητο. De Vita. Const. lib. ii. 44.—ED.]

the part of the Hebrews. After a diligent examination of the passage of Josephus, the latter, I am inclined to think, is the true sense, to which result many things concur. When Josephus joined himself to the Romans, and began to be held in high estimation by Vespasian and Titus, the Hebrews conceived so great a hatred of him, whom they regarded as a traitor to his country, that he thus wrote of it in his Life: *Κἀκεῖθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἱεροσολύμων πολιορκίαν συμπεμφθεὶς Τίτῳ, πολλάκις ἀποθανεῖν ἐκινδύνευσα, τῶν τε Ἰουδαίων διὰ σπουδῆς ἔχόντων ὑποχείριόν με λαβεῖν τιμωρίας ἔνεκεν*. "From thence (namely from Alexandria), sent together with Titus to the siege of Jerusalem, I was more than once in imminent danger of my life; the Jews using effort to get me into their power, that they might sacrifice me to their revenge."¹

When Jerusalem was besieged, Titus, hearing such wonders of the city, and especially of the temple, conceived it would be detrimental to his fame should he be accessory to their destruction. Wherefore, calling for Josephus, he bade him exhort the Jews to surrender for their country's sake—and that their city and its temple might escape destruction. But what means should Josephus take to persuade them to this, who had no confidence in his honor, nay, who regarded him as a traitor? What other than that he should Hebraize *Ἑβραϊζῇ*, that is, show himself to be the friend of the Hebrews, the which he openly professed himself to be to John, the leader of the rebels, at the same interview: "Remember that I am one of thine own people, who counsel thee, and a Jew who promise thee. Far be it from me ever to be such a slave as that I shall cease to hold my kindred in remembrance, or forget those who are my countrymen." Josephus adopted this style of address in communicating the instructions of Titus—the more successfully to gain his object: professing himself a Hebrew, and a patriot burning for his country's salvation, and making this more his concern than the success of the Romans. To Hebraize *Ἑβραϊζειν* in this sense jumped

¹ Joseph. in ejus Vita, tom. 2, § 75, p. 38.

with Josephus's purpose—and in no other sense do I conceive the word can here be taken.

§ 6. *Of the Books of the Rabbins.*

I may not here pass unnoticed an objection which a learned man has lately urged against the Hellenism of Christ and the Jews. It is that there are extant innumerable works composed by the Rabbins about the time of Christ, and in Palestine too, which were written solely in Chaldee—such as the Targums of Jonathan and Onkelos, the Mischna and Gemara of Jerusalem, and other works. These in their pages seem to give silent testimony to the Chaldee as the vernacular of Judea, and not the Greek at the date of their composition.

I own that this is so,—if you put faith in the Rabbins, or in those who depend upon such vain authorities, (sycophantistis) and who consequently puff off these books as of extreme antiquity. But these silly pretensions of the Rabbins have been long since exposed by John Marsham, Paul Person, Isaac Voss, and other men of distinguished learning, among whom worthy of especial notice is John Morin, who in the latter part of his *Biblical Exercitations*, examining these books one by one, proves in ample detail that no comment on Holy Scripture, or on their traditions, was produced by them before the fifth century of the Christian era: that no historical work of theirs is older than the year 1000 of Christ; that the Mischna of Jerusalem was compiled about the age of Justinian; the Gemara of Jerusalem about the year 600 A. D., and that the Chaldee paraphrases of Jonathan and Onkelos, which the Jewish Doctors boast of as published anterior to Christ, or at least directly after his death, are even later than the Jerusalem Talmud. The same sentence he passes upon the paraphrase of Jerusalem, which is anonymous: the *Seder Olam Rabba*, an historical work, to which the Jews assign a date earlier by three hundred years than any other of their books, but which is really later than their Talmud; and upon Josephus Hebraicus, which he proves to have been com-

posed by some Jew about six hundred years before his own time : not one of the ancient writers names these books : not Flavius Josephus, that accomplished student of Hebrew antiquity ; not Origen, nor Epiphanius, although they report various Jewish and Rabbinical traditions ; nor does Jerome, from the Barrabban of Tyler and Lydda ; while Augustine expressly says that no such work existed among the Jews. The internal testimony, moreover, is entirely against their antiquity. So many Persic, Arabic, and Babylonian words occur, together with others which savor of Gothic barbarism, while the name of Constantinople and of the Turks is mentioned, as to make it plain that the Rabbins have been making empty pretensions (*Rabbinos fumum vendere*,) when they have been bragging of the early date of their composition. Who, with such facts as these before him, can believe all this trash of the Jewish Doctors, and still conceive that these books were written in the time of Christ ?

On the other hand, we know for certain, that the authors of the Maccabees, the inspired writers, Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, Paul, Peter, James, together with Josephus and the other Jews who wrote in Greek, flourished either before or about the time of Christ ; and that about this fact no one has ever entertained a doubt. If from these you look to the writers of a later age in Palestine and the neighboring regions, you find them all writing in Greek—Justin Martyr, Symmachus, Eusebius of Cesarea, Cyril of Jerusalem, Joannes, Climachus, Sophronius, Hesychias, Joannes Moschus, and others. This being the case, I am bold to affirm that no book in Chaldee saw the light until the seventh century after Christ. Nothing in the East occurred before that period of sufficient influence to displace the Greek language and literature, introduced by Alexander and his successors. Chosroes I. was the first who disturbed the dominion of the Greek language in the Orient. This king of the Persians, called the Great, moved with envy, because the Romans held the fairest regions of Asia and Africa under their sway, made several successful invasions of their territory during the reign

of Justinian, and especially in Syria, made important conquests, as may be seen at length in Procopius¹ and Theophylact.² Chosroes II., the son of Hormisdas, followed him in the career of victory, and in the beginning of the seventh century entered Armenia, Syria, and Judea with a conquering army, plundered Jerusalem, and laid all Palestine waste.³ To him succeeded the Arabs who, about the year of Christ 636, bursting forth from their deserts, expelled Persians and Greeks alike from Asia and Africa, and seized by right of conquest on Judea, Egypt, and Mesopotamia.⁴ Nor must it be omitted that the celebrated El Walid Ebn Abdolmelek, thirteenth Caliph, ordered all the Christian writers to compose their works in Arabic, as Gregory Abul-Pharajus records.⁵ These various conquerors, if they did not actually stamp the type of their own language upon the people they had vanquished, at least so corrupted the Greek and its literature among them, that divers new idioms sprang up in their midst. Hence in Syria, out of the mixture of Persian, Arabic, and Greek, arose that called the modern Syriac, or Aramean. The Greek, which was vernacular in Egypt, combined with the Arabic, became the Coptic, and in Judea arose that dialect, called the Rabbinical or Chaldeo-Syriac, which has many Greek, Latin, Persian, and Arabic words mixed up in it—the dialect in fact in which the Gemara is written. It was after this period, then, that Rabbi Judas, the Holy, composed the Mishna; the Targums and Gemara of Jerusalem followed; and after these the great mass of Rabbinical books. This accounts for the incalculable number of Persian, Arabic and Greek words in these writings. Such a strange intermixture of languages has made these books so excessively obscure,

¹ Procopius Cæsariens. lib. 2 de Bello Persico.

² Theophylactus Simocat. lib. 4 et 5 Historiar.

³ Evagrius, lib. 6 Hist. a cap. 18, usque ad finem. Theophanes in Chron. p. 197 et seq. ed. Ven.

⁴ Abul-Pharajus in Dyn. 9, tom. 1, p. 159 ad 179; 2, p. 100. Chronicon Oriental. de Moelaminor. Imperio, p. 41.

⁵ Tom. 1, p. 201; tom. 2, p. 129, ex edit. Pocock.

that neither Jew nor Christian has ventured upon the task of translating them hitherto. This labor, however, which will confer a deserved immortality upon the enterprising translator, has at length been undertaken by the distinguished Venetian, Blasius Ugolinus, who has published some treatises of the Gemara in a Latin translation in his imperishable Thesaurus of Hebrew Antiquities. These, then, reader, are the objections I have thought worthy of refutation. The learned will decide the weight to be allowed to these or to others.

APPENDIX.

HOW CERTAIN PHILOLOGICAL KNOTS ARE OPENED BY MEANS OF THIS SCHEME.

Unless I am greatly mistaken in the judgment I form of my work, I have already proved to the satisfaction of my reader, that neither Hebrew, Syriac, nor Latin, was the prevailing language of Judea, but Greek—and that this was the native tongue of Christ, his apostles, and all the Jews. If the position I have ventured to defend be safe, then with ease may any one unloose, by its help, many a perplexing knot of sacred criticism. I will present a specimen or two.

§ 1. *Of the Gospels of Matthew and Mark.*

Whether the Gospel by Matthew was originally written in Chaldee, or, like the other Books of the New Testament, in Greek, has long been the subject of keen controversy among the learned. The later critics have maintained its Hellenistic origin, and have relied upon the following arguments in support of that opinion: I. Because it has the marks of an original work rather than of a translation from a Chaldean Codex. For certain Chaldee words are admitted into it, accompanied with a translation into Greek: as “Emmanuel, which is interpreted God with us.”¹ “Eli, Eli, lama sabac-tani? that is, My God, my God, to what hast thou forsaken

¹ Matthæus, cap. 1, v. 23.

me?"¹ But if the whole work had been rendered from a Chaldee original, there seems no reason why these only should be retained, and others equally worthy of regard be omitted. II. Because the Scripture quotations are made, not from the Hebrew of the Old Testament, but from the version of the Seventy. III. Because the Chaldee original could never have fallen into such perfect oblivion had it ever had existence. IV. Because those ancient Fathers themselves, who declared the autograph of Matthew to have been Chaldee, and expend their encomiums upon it, yet nullify that declaration by their practice. For they always put the authority of the Greek before that of the Chaldee Codex; and when Jerome was engaged with the revisal of the New Testament, or by order of Damasus in the task of translating it, instead of the Aramean archetype, he appeals to the Greek copy alone. V. Because the Gospel in Greek was found in the tomb of Barnabas the apostle, in the Island of Cyprus, which Zeno the Emperor deposited in a chamber in the Church of St. Stephen in Daphne, and which was used to be read every year thereafter at Constantinople, on the feast of the fifth day of the passover.² Nevertheless, the greater part of the learned being fully convinced that the Palestinian Jews spoke the Chaldee, and that for them Matthew wrote his Gospel, will rather allow themselves to be silenced by the force of these arguments, than gracefully yield the victory. But if Matthew did write in Chaldee, how came the Greek Gospel to be found in the bosom of Barnabas? Mazocchi, the most distinguished man of our times, and an honor to Naples, has endeavored to compound the matter thus: "The discovery of Barnabas with a Greek Gospel certainly proves that that apostle received a Greek and not a Hebrew or Syriac copy from Matthew. To what conclusion does this lead? In my judgment to this—that although Matthew wrote his Gospel in the first place in Hebrew, for the use of the Christian Jews (*Judæorum*

¹ *Matthæus*, cap. 27, v. 46.

² *Theodorus Lector*, initio lib. 2 *Hist. n. 2*. *Suidas in Θρίνα*. *Cedrenus aliique*.

Χριστιανίζόντων) afterwards translated the same into Greek, for the use of those apostles who went to preach to the Gentiles.”¹ But this ingenious conjecture, which in some measure goes to support the opposite opinion, itself falls to the ground from the absence of all support by argument or testimony. But now, having re-introduced the Greek language into Judea, the whole thing becomes clear, and it is ascertained that this Book, like all the others of the New Testament, was composed in the Hellenistic tongue which the Jews commonly used. Hence it follows that the Greek was the genuine autograph, and not a version from the Chaldee. We must pronounce the same sentence upon Mark, whatever Baronius² and Ciacconius³ may urge for its having been originally written in Latin. Their arguments are completely demolished by R. Simon,⁴ whose work on the criticism of the New Testament should here be consulted.

§ 2. *The Epistle of Paul to the Hebrews.*

Again, there has been no slight controversy among scholars, about the language in which Paul wrote his Epistle to the Hebrews, whether it was in Greek or Hebrew. The great majority of critics, both of earlier days and the present, consider it to have been written in Hebrew, which has been lost—a Greek translation alone remaining, although the arguments in favor of a Greek original are numerous. The opinion of a Hebrew original bases itself upon the fact that it was addressed to Hebrews, and assuming them to have spoken Hebrew, that it was consequently written in the same tongue. But most formidable difficulties stand in the way of this hypothesis. The most formidable of all throws itself into the following shape. Many heretics and catholics also have called in question the genuineness of this Epistle, and reason thus in

¹ Mazochius, Comm. in Kalend. Neap. vol. 2, p. 564.

² Baronius ad Annum Christi 45, n. 37 et seq.

³ Ciacconius in Vit. summor. Pontif. in Petro.

⁴ Simonius, Hist. Crit. du Text. du N. T. cap. 11, p. 111 et seq.

the work of the illustrious Melchior Canus : “ If this were the work of the apostle Paul, he doubtless wrote to the Hebrews in the Hebrew language. But that it was not written in that tongue it is certain for some very obvious reasons. For instance, the author of this Epistle says Melchizedeck is interpreted, King of Righteousness ; but if this sentence were written in Hebrew, it would be a mere absurdity, for it would read, Melchizedeck is interpreted Melchizedeck. The same author, too, cites the Hebrew Scriptures, not according to the Hebrew verity, but according to the Septuagint translation. He could not then have been a Hebrew writing in Hebrew to the Hebrews. Besides, this epistle is not found in Hebrew in any part of the world. It is not probable that if it ever existed, this alone should have perished. All the other writings of the apostle are preserved to us in the very idiom in which they were composed.”¹ Wonderful pains have been expended by our theologians in meeting and refuting such opinions as these, but they will pardon me when I say that they have labored to little purpose, as appears in Canus himself. Your ready answer, reader, to all such cavils against this sacred writing, will be that the Jews had by that time adopted the Greek language, as we have proved above, and that the Epistle was composed in the same. In this way, you not only get rid of the objections of the infidel—but by the concession of the point for which he contends, catch him in his own snare.

§ 3. *Of the Hellenists and of the Hellenistic tongue.*

It is scarcely to be told with what fierceness Heinsius, Salmasius, Martin Schoockius, Joannes Crojus, and other critics named in Fabricius’ *Bibliotheca Græca*, have discussed the questions of the Hellenistic language and the Hellenists mentioned in the New Testament. But by the help of our scheme you may at once understand what tongue this was,

¹ Canus de Loc. Theolog. lib. 2, cap. 10.

to what persons peculiar, whence it took its rise, and who the Hellenists themselves were. Adopting our view, the whole quarrel subsides into amity and peace.

§ 4. *Of the First Book of the Maccabees.*

By the same rule we learn that the language of the first book of the Maccabees, generally concluded to be Hebrew, was in fact Greek, like the other books, which the critics allow to be Hellenistic, but make an exception, we conceive without good grounds, in regard to the first. As in the Maccabean age, the Hellenistic speech was vernacular among the Jews, in this doubtless was that book composed originally by its author, so that the Greek Codex of the present day claims to be regarded as the archetype, and not as a copy from a lost one in another tongue.

§ 5. *Of the Greek Version of the Seventy Interpreters.*¹

I come now to the notorious and long moved controversy concerning the history of that Greek version which is known by the name of the Septuagint, on which I must crave the liberty of dwelling a little more in detail. That we may be the better prepared to pronounce our judgment upon that controversy, we must touch upon a point or two of its history.

When Ptolemy Philadelphus erected his splendid library at Alexandria, and sought to fill it with books from all quarters of the world, having been informed by his librarian Demetrius Phalereus that the Jews had sacred books in Hebrew worthy of a place in it, he immediately resolved to have them translated into Greek for the purpose. Ambassadors were despatched by the king of Egypt to the Jewish high priest, begging Eleazar to send the volumes, together with persons able to translate them, to Alexandria. Eleazar complied with the

¹ Humphredi Hodii de Bibliorum Textibus Originalibus, Versionibus Græcis, &c., &c. Lei proleg. ad Bib. Octoglott. Londini, 1831, Bagster, pp. 32—34. Lectures on Biblical Criticism, auctore Samuele Davidson, LL.D., p. 35.—Ed.

request of the monarch, and sent seventy-two men with the legates, who took with them the books of the Law. When these persons arrived at Alexandria, they completed their version all in the same spot, in the island of Pharos, in the course of seventy-two days. The Greek translation was read, when finished, before the king and a select body of learned Jews and Greeks, and highly was it approved and commended by all. When this was done, the king permitted the Alexandrian Jews to make copies for their own use, and dismissed the translators with all honorable treatment into their own country.

This is the report of Aristeas, who first published this history, and who declares himself to have been an eye-witness of the whole and one of the translators of the work. This narration Josephus and Philo Judæus received 350 years after Ptolemy Philadelphus. It afterward passed through the hands of Theodoret, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, Eusebius, Clement of Alexandria, and other Fathers of a later age, together with the Talmudists, receiving accessions from each, as is usual in such cases.

But more modern critics, who have applied severer tests, have demonstrated the falsehood of the story. They consider that the Talmudists and Fathers, who have drawn all their information from Aristeas alone, are to be reduced to his single testimony. And rightly do they judge of this matter; for none of them lived within centuries of Philadelphus and the supposed Aristeas, and there was no other authority for the story but he. The whole controversy then comes to hinge upon this single question, Is the narration of Aristeas genuine which is given in his book entitled "Of the translation of the divine law from the Hebrew tongue by the Seventy Interpreters?" If it be proved to be fabulous, the statements of the other writers which lean upon it are of no value whatsoever. But the learned have already decided that part of the work at least is supposititious, on the ground of its evidently Jewish cast, and of its pandering so coarsely as it does to the national vanity. For this reason Ludovicus Vives,

Leo a Castro, Alphonsus Salmeron, Joseph Scaliger, Richard Simon, Antony Van Dale, Humphrey Hody, John Albert Fabricius, and very many besides, have fancied this to be a base coin struck in the mint of the Alexandrian Jews, to win respect for their Greek version of the Sacred Scriptures. I have neither time nor inclination to bring forward their arguments, nor to expose the inconsistencies of the Talmudist historians and the Fathers who support Aristeeas ; nor yet to introduce what has been alleged by Natalis ab Alexandro, Augustine Calmet, and the authors just quoted in proof of the spuriousness of the document. What these last have urged, however, we conceive establishes their point beyond the possibility of doubt.

Yet there have been and now are many among the learned whose patronage this story still enjoys, and who so stoutly and steadily maintain its truth, that they will scruple nothing in its defence, [*Jovem lapidem jurare.*] But I will not name them, restricting myself to the expression of the opinion that Humphrey Hody, Richard Simon, and other critics of great celebrity and learning, have amply refuted those statements upon which they rely. To demonstrate still more fully the spuriousness (*νοθείαν*) of the narrative I will subjoin a few observations concerning it, which, so far as I can learn, have never yet been urged against it.

Our first argument is derived from the silence of contemporary and synchronous (*συγχρόνων* scriptorum) writers, especially of those who lived in Ægypt under the same Philadelphus ; for the saying of Josephus has all the truth of an axiom : *Τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀληθοῦς ἐστὶ τεκμήριον ἱστορίας, εἰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἅπαντες ταῦτὰ καὶ λέγουσιν καὶ γράφουσιν* . “ Especially is the truth of history approved, when all contemporary writers record and describe the same facts.”¹ The teachers of the art of criticism also tell us, “That that history is true which narrates the same incidents that are recorded in contemporaneous books, or in those composed shortly after the

¹ Josephus, lib. 1 contra Apionem, § 5, p. 440.

events have taken place ; if these are silent in regard to them, that history is manifestly false." On this subject consult Huet¹ and Leclerc.² If axioms of this kind are of force in any case, they certainly ought to be here, for the circumstance, as Aristeas tells it, is very surprising, and could not fail to be recorded by the writers of the day, for the following reasons :

1. The extreme concern and anxiety of Ptolemy would have provoked a record. The Egyptian monarch we are told was inflamed with such a desire to possess the sacred volume, that he set at liberty one hundred and twenty thousand Jews, who were slaves in the country, with a view to obtain it, wrote to Eleazar importuning the conveyance of the manuscript to him, and despatched an embassy to Jerusalem, with the costliest gifts with them for the temple of God. No sooner was the arrival of the interpreters announced, than he dismissed the persons who had visited the palace on business, and impatiently hastened to salute them as they came. As soon as he saw the books, he paused for some time, gave thanks to God, to the high priest and the interpreters, and poured forth tears of joy.

2. But secondly, contemporary writers could scarcely have failed to make mention of it, on account of the extraordinary celebrity this version is said to have at once attained. For the monarch entertained the interpreters for seven days in the most sumptuous manner, and made experiment of their wisdom by questions relating to civil government, in the presence of the philosophers and sages of the court. He then made the entire translation be read publicly in an assembly of the priests, the wise men, the nobles, and the people, when it gained the highest approbation of them all. Finally, he sent them home loaded with the most munificent gifts, both for themselves and the high priest. He is reported, moreover, to have been so anxious to learn the artistic excellence of the presents selected for the temple, that he repeatedly visited the

¹ Huetius, Demonstr. Evangel. Axiom 2.

² Clericus, de Art. Crit. Par. 3, § 3, c. 3.

workmen during the execution of their task ; and made the following remarkable declaration to the interpreters : *Μεγάλην δὲ τέθειμαι τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην, ἐν ᾗ παραγέγονατε, καὶ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπίσημος ἔσται πάντα τῆς ζωῆς ἡμῶν χρόνον*. “ This day on which ye have come to me, shall be a day of solemn and special observance through every year of my future life.”¹

3. We cannot account for the silence of contemporary historians, when we calculate the sums of money disbursed upon the occasion, in the purchase of goblets, vases, tables, pitchers, and other presents, to the amount of twelve hundred talents, equal to about a hundred and twenty millions of Neapolitan ducats. Be it remembered further, in connexion with this topic, that this sum would have absorbed the entire revenues of Egypt for three years.

Had these things really been as Aristeas feigns them to have been, the fame of this version and the munificence of the king would have been spread over the world, and would have adorned the page of many a courtly author. There was no lack, too, of men of learning at that time, at the court of Philadelphus, in whose society the king took great delight, and who repaid his patronage by celebrating his praises in their works. These were Manetho Sebennyta the historian, Zoilus Amphipolitanus, who both dedicated their works to the king ; Perseus and Dionysius Heracleota, philosophers ; Aratus the poet, born at Soli in Cilicia, Lycophron Chalcidensis, Callimachus of Cyrene,² who more than once has complimented Philadelphus in his works ; Theocritus of Syracuse, who also praises the king in his fourteenth and seventeenth Idylls, especially in the latter, in which he professedly sings an *ἐγκόμιον εἰς Πτολεμαῖον*, and heaps eulogies upon the monarch on all conceivable grounds ; yet do all these writers maintain a rigid silence concerning this transaction. Among the authors of other countries who flourished at the same period, and especially those of Greece, eager to learn, and

¹ Aristeas exst. apud. Jos. Op. tom. 2, p. 119.

² Callimachus, Hymno in Delum et in Apollinem.

ready to second any thing new or strange, the same deep silence prevails. But had so remarkable a circumstance occurred, it is not possible but they should have known it, nor knowing it, but they should have described it. To these add the writers of a following age, who have treated more or less of Philadelphus; namely, Justin, Dexippus, Eutropius, Diodorus, Strabo, Pausanias, Ælian, Plutarch, Arrian, Pliny, Appian, Memnon, etc., etc., one of whom has written of the learning, another of the munificence, a third of the buildings, and many of the library and books of the king of Egypt. Taking all these particulars into account, it is impossible that ever a tyro in criticism should be deluded into the belief that Aristeas's story is true.

Our second argument is derived from the neglect of Ptolemy himself to perpetuate the memory of so signal an event by monument, record, or any other means. Neither coin, nor inscription, nor any other of the many memorials used by the ancients, conveys to posterity an authenticated record of the circumstance. Yet Ptolemy considered himself as deriving so much glory from it, that he said to the seventy elders, according to Aristeas, "This day in which ye have come to me shall be one of solemn and special observance to me through every year of my future life." That this monarch should have taken no measures to perpetuate the remembrance of such an occurrence, while so many memorials of other incidents of his reign continue to our day, is absolutely incredible.

Nor is it less worthy of note that the Jewish writers, and more remarkable still, the sacred writers who flourished about the same time, maintain a silence as expressive. The Jews were prone enough to blazon abroad any honors paid to their nation by foreigners; and here was an occasion presented, not only to magnify themselves, but those books also which they most revered. The translation of which we write was also so acceptable to the Jews, according to Philo, that they instituted a feast in commemoration of its being made. But the sacred writers, although they say much of the kings of

Egypt, and of the affairs of the Hebrews at that day, say not so much as a word about this version. The authors of the First and Third Books of the Maccabees; Simon of Cyrene, who wrote the history of his own time in five books; and he who compressed the work of Simon into one volume, which is the Second Book of the Maccabees; the author of the Book of Wisdom, who is commonly thought to be Philo the Elder, the son of Sirach, who translated the Book of Ecclesiasticus out of Hebrew into Greek, in Egypt, under Ptolemy Evergetes, and who mentions in his preface having found many sacred books in Egypt, and having undertaken the translation of this alone; neither he nor the others say a word regarding this particular version of the Seventy. We must close our enumeration of the sacred writers by adducing those of the New Testament, who, although perpetually quoting from the Septuagint, maintain a profound silence regarding its history.

Our last argument on this head shapes itself into a question. We ask the patrons of this absurd and childish narrative, whether these interpreters translated all the books of the Hebrew Canon, or only a part of them, the Pentateuch for instance, as Aristeas seems to imply. If it be said, a part of them only, then the story holds not well together. It is not at all credible that Ptolemy Philadelphus, who expended such a sum of money upon the affair, would have neglected the remaining volumes, the moral, prophetic, and historical, equally worthy of regard with the others, nor less stimulating to curiosity. Perceiving this difficulty, Irenæus, Tertullian, Clemens of Alexandria, Hilary, Augustine, and others who patronize the marvellous tale, contend that all the books of the Old Testament were translated under Ptolemy. Nor is Epiphanius content with even this; he asserts that in addition to the genuine books, they translated seventy or seventy-two apocryphal productions besides.

But should my opponents take up this opinion, and maintain that *all were* translated, they then fall into a new class of difficulties. For in the Second Book of the Maccabees, letters are extant from the Jews of Jerusalem to those

of Alexandria, written about the year 153, after this version is said to have been completed, in which Judas Maccabeus is described as imitating Nehemiah, and collecting the sacred volumes that had been scattered during the persecution by Antiochus. Then this is added: "He has collected all, and they are with us: if ye then wish for them, send persons who may convey them to you."¹ In the Greek it is still stronger; *ὅν οὖν χρεία ἔχετε*,—"if ye are in want of them." If then this version had been set out in Egypt, wherefore should the Jews of Jerusalem offer to their Egyptian brethren copies of the Sacred Scriptures, to whom, moreover, permission had been given by Philadelphus to make copies for their own use? Judas had in that case better sent from Judea for a supply to Egypt, than have taken all these superfluous pains. We shall do wisely then, if, following the testimony of the most learned critics, and this most convincing proof drawn from the Sacred Books themselves, we deposit this story of Aristeas amongst the convicted old wives' fables.

It may be worth while, however, to inquire into the age, place and origin of this Greek version, that we may arrive at the foundation of this Aristean fable—which inquiry we must premise, meanwhile, with a remark or two calculated to expedite our progress.

In the first place, then, be it understood that this Greek version was not the work of any single translator, but almost every single book had a different translator. This is proved by the variety in the style, and by the mode of interpretation, which is not uniform, as learned men have observed.² Of the same Hebrew word, the rendering is not always the same; the order and arrangement pursued is far from regular throughout; and while in some books the very letter of the text is scrupulously adhered to, in others a more liberal translation is given. The version of the Pentateuch is more

¹ V. lib. 2 Machab. cap. 1 et 2, v. 14 et 15.

² V. Ludovic. Cappelli in *Critica Sacra*. Clericum Com. in Pent. et lib. Hist. in Indice, v. 70.

closely in accordance with the Hebrew, and more accurate than that of the remaining portions of Scripture, as even Jerome acknowledges, who was not partial to the Seventy: "Which books we own," says he, "correspond with the Hebrew more closely than the others."¹ But the translation of Esther differs so widely from the Hebrew, that many additions are read in it, which do not appear in the Hebrew at all. The Pentateuch has, therefore, had demonstrably a totally different translator from the Book of Esther. We must pass the same judgment on the other books, some of which have been rendered to the word, and others to the sense. All these circumstances prove that the entire work which passes under the name of the Septuagint, was not produced by a concerted effort, but was compiled out of various independent translations.

But, in the second place, these various versions, and the collection of them into one volume, were not attended with any celebrity at first, won no public *eclat*, but were the work of private zeal and munificence. For, as the story of Aristeas has been demonstrated to be sheer fable, inasmuch as of this story and the version it commemorates no mention is made by contemporaneous writers either among the Jews or foreigners, not even by the inspired writers who used this very version, it follows that the version itself, and the collection of its various parts into a volume, must have owed their origin to the private zeal of some of the Jews. The fame which this translation has acquired, has all followed it from a considerably later period, and in vain do you seek for authentic notices of its early history. The same fate has attended the Canons, which are called those of the Apostles, the collection of the Mosaic and Roman laws, and the Latin version called the Vulgate, as well as unnumbered volumes of common occurrence in every house, the authors of which we seek in vain, since that same lapse of time which has heaped fame upon the work, has buried in oblivion the name of the writer.

¹ Hieronymus Proleg. in Quæst. Hebr. in Genesim.

In the third place, we observe that these translations and the collection of them, (*συναγωγή*) were accomplished before the time of Christ. Proof of this is supplied in the fact of the citation of them by the Lord, by the Apostles, and by the Evangelists, when they have occasion to quote the Old Testament. From these observations, I conceive we shall easily arrive at the truth of the inquiry in hand. The diligence of the Jews in the study of their sacred books is too well known to need extended proof. They read no other books but their own, and upon these they expended no little application. Men, women, the aged and the young, soldiers, artificers, doctors, all, of every condition, were in the habit of frequently perusing the sacred Scriptures in their own, that is, the Hebrew tongue. But after the Babylonian captivity, the Scriptures were rendered into Chaldee for the common use. Afterward, when by means of Alexander's dominion the Greek language had extended its sway to the East, and came to be taken up in Judea, then either for their own private use, or for the sake of others, certain of the Jews began to turn this and the other book into the vulgar tongue, the Greek, as we read that the son of Sirach did, who translated the Book of Ecclesiasticus into Greek, according to the statement in his prologue: "I therefore thought it good and necessary both myself to add some diligence, and the labor of interpreting this book." So also did Lysimachus the Book of Esther, as Calmet satisfactorily proves.¹ The number of these versions was increased after Judas Maccabeus had carefully sought out the books that had been saved from the impotent rage of Antiochus Epiphanes, and had them bound in a volume:² especially, as from that period Hellenism struck such deep root in Judea, as we have proved above. (Part I. chap. ii. § 13: Part III. chap i. § 3.) As they then spoke and wrote Greek, and this was the language in common use, many private persons began to turn the Sacred Books into the

¹ Calmet, Proleg. ad Librum Esther, p. 462.

² Lib. 2 Machabæorum, c. 2.

vulgar tongue, so that in a short time various versions of the several books sprang into existence, precisely in the same way as, in the early ages of the church, when the Latin language flourished in the West, many translations of the Greek books of the New Testament were made into Latin, as Augustine reports: "Whenever a Greek Codex came into the hands of any one in early times, who had ever so small a portion of knowledge of either tongue, he straightway attempted a translation."¹ Just so do I conceive it to have happened in Judea, when the Greek prevailed to such an extent after the age of the Maccabees, that a number of Greek translations were made by private hands. Then were executed in Greek, versions of the books of Judith, Tobias, Job, Chronicles, and many others which we now have, the certainty of their execution by private individuals being proved by our utter ignorance of the names and circumstances of their authorship.

From the period, however, in which the Chaldee tongue began to fall into disuse, and the people ceased to understand it as well as the Hebrew, as amid such a host of Greek versions many would be wanting in the qualities of fidelity and neatness, the greater Sanhedrim I conceive would take care to collect into one volume for the use of the commons, the most approved translations of the several books, or rather perhaps would stamp with their approbation some collection already made by some private person, appoint it to be read in the Synagogues, and thus it would naturally receive the sanction of Christ, and fall into use with the apostles and the Catholic Church. But as this greater Sanhedrim (by whose approbation it was received, or by whose permission it was used in public) consisted of 70 or 72 elders, hence it came to pass that this particular collection came to be known as that of the 70 elders, as Simon has very happily conjectured.² Here then is the origin of the fable of the 70 interpreters, namely that this translation came forth under the sanction of the college of 70, and thus made its way into common use. But long after this

¹ Augustinus, de Doctr. Christ. lib. 2, cap. 2, n. 16.

² Simon, Hist. Crit. du V. T. lib. 2, cap. 2, p. 191.

event, some short time posterior to Christ, (a period but too fertile in spurious writings,) some few, finding that the history of this collection had never been made public, made this bold invasion upon truth, and to increase the glory of his nation forged the tale of Aristeas. Enough has been said to explain the time, place, and circumstances of this celebrated translation, and to show the ground on which the Pseudo-Aristeas built his fanciful story.

§ VI. You are now, gentle reader, in possession of what has occurred to me in the shape of observation and argument in support of my novel opinion up to this period. If any thing should appear to thee imperfectly wrought out, and scarcely in harmony with the rigid requirements of criticism, whatever fails to commend itself to thee in approval of this exercitation, pardon: bethinking thee of the poverty of our human genius, as well expressed by Tully: *Nihil esse simul et inventum et perfectum.*

L I C E N S E S.

Illustriss. ac Reverendiss. Dominus D. Salvator Filucci Can. hujus Metropolitane Eccl. S. Th. Prof. et Curie Archiep. Exam. Synodalis revideat, et in scriptis referat. Datum die 27, Decembris, 1766.

PHIL. EP. ALLIFANVS, VIC. GEN.

JOSEPH SPARANVS, CAN. DEP.

EMINENTISSIME PRINCEPS,

Eminentie tue jussu "*Dominici Diodati Exercitationem,*" quæ est "*De Christo Græce loquente,*" cum ea, quæ par erat diligentia evolverim; tum nihil, quod aut bonis moribus, aut catholicæ fidei absonum reperi. Quin gratulandum huic juveni est, quem licet non sit ex Ecclesiasticorum ordine, cum juris scientia socias fecisset sanctorum voluminum scientiam, atque orientalium linguarum peritiam, atque ad communem Christianorum utilitatem, ac quæstum tot sæculorum intercapedine ignotam hanc sacræ historiæ potissimam, ac principem partem sane quam erudito commentario, et evidentissimorum monumentorum ac rationum ope aperuisse, ingentemque nomini suo famam conquisivisse. Quare quantocius usuræ publicæ libellum hunc faciendi libenter danda est potestas. Neapoli, die 15 Februarii, 1767.

SALVATOR CANONICUS FILUCCI.

Attenta relatione Domini Revisoris imprimatur. Datum die 19 mensis Februarii, 1767.

PHIL. EP. ALLIFANVS, VIC. GEN.

JOSEPH SPARANVS, CAN. DEP.

Adm. Rev. D. Januarius Giordano in hæc Regia Studiorum Universitate Professor revideat, et in scriptis referat. Datum Neapoli, die 1 Augusti, 1766.

NIC. EPISC. PUT. CAP. MAJOR.

ILLUSTRISS. ET REVERENDISS. DOM.

Perlegi librum, cujus epigraphe est "De Christo Hellenista Exercitatio Auctore Dominico Diodati;" atque ex ejus lectione summam animo voluptatem cepi. Nihil in eo reperi, quod vel bonis moribus, vel Augusti Regis Nostri sacro-sancto juri noceat. Præterea acre ingenium, ingentem eruditionem, styli elegantiam, et Latinæ, Græcæ, Hebraicæque, &c. linguæ scientiam, ostendit hic Auctor supra ætatem suam, et supra opinionem omnium; novamque de Christo Hellenista sententiam exquisitis argumentis tuetur, atque confirmat. Equidem nova sententia multos excitare solet adversarios; sed hoc commodum rei literariæ accidit, ut collatis cognitisque utriusque partis argumentis veritas facile eruatur atque affulgeat. Quare hunc librum, ex quo magna utilitas processura est, publicis typis edi posse puto, si idem tibi arriserit. Neapoli XI. Kal. Jan. an. 1767.

Obsequentissimus, tibi que Addictissimus,

JANUARIUS GIORDANO, SAC. CAN. ANT. REG.

Die 18 mensis Februarii, 1767, Neap.

Viso Rescripto Suse Regalis Majestatis sub die 7 currentis mensis et anni, ac relatione Rev. D. Januarii Giordano, de commissione Rev. Regii Cappellani Majoris ordine præfatæ Regalis Majestatis;

Regalis Camera Sanctæ Claræ providet, decernit, atque mandat, quod imprimatur cum inserta forma presentis supplicis libelli, ac approbationis dicti Rev. Revisoris; verum in publicatione servetur Regia Pragmatica hoc eum.

GAETA.

DE FIORI.

VARGAS MAOCTVCCA.

Ill. Marchio Citus Præses S. R. C. et Ill. Caput Aulæ Dux Perrelli, tempore subscriptionis impediti.

Reg. fol. 127 t.

CARULLI.

ATHANASIUS.

ARTICLE VIII

REPLY TO MR. WILSON'S REVIEW OF COMMON SCHOOL HISTORIES.

IN the July number of the Repository, there is a criticism on American Common School Histories, by a gentleman, who, being about to publish one himself, very naturally seeks to destroy public confidence in his rivals, and that the most strenuously where the most annoyance is apprehended.

Mrs. Willard's Histories of the American Republic, especially the abridged one, appears to have received this distinction. These works have been commended by those who have used them, for the diffusive glow of patriotic, moral, and religious feeling which pervades them. On this point, Mr. Wilson has said nothing. The only *fact* of any consequence, in which he accuses Mrs. Willard of error,¹ is where she asserts that the territory first discovered by the Cabots was Newfoundland. Here Mrs. Willard is right, and Mr. Bancroft, whom Mr. Wilson follows, in a different statement, is in error. That Mrs. Willard's assertion is correct, is shown from the name "Prima Vesta," given to the island at the time of its discovery, and never changed; and also, by the concurrent testimony of all historians since, until within the last twenty years; when the specious writer of a "Memoir of Sebastian Cabot," in making a furious attack on Hackluyt's history, undertook to unsettle this point. But this writer has been conclusively answered, (and probably since Mr. Bancroft penned the first part of his history,) by Mr. Tytler, the well known author of the "History of Scotland."

Mr. Wilson asserts that Mrs. Willard pursues in her history the synchronistic method of arrangement, which, as he says, is unsuited to the purposes of instruction. Mrs. Willard does not pursue this method, neither does she confine herself to the ethnographical, but, after a clearly defined plan, she unites both, with a view to avoid the inconveniences and combine the excellences of each.

Mr. Wilson makes great account of the confusion of dates, which he says all English and American histories have fallen into, from the exchange of old style to new: and he is at a loss to account for the indifference of later writers to the subject. We suppose the true reason of this to be, that the time when this confusion occurs, is now so distant, that they have

¹ We make no account of Mr. W.'s grave comments on the accidental exchange of the word east for west, by which he infers an attempt to show that Delaware was settled in New Jersey.

regarded it as of too small importance, whether an event was ten or eleven days sooner or later, to give themselves much trouble about it. We do not undervalue chronology, for the grand connexion of events by cause and effect is linked to the order of time. Mrs. Willard, by devising a series of maps corresponding to the principal epochs of our country's early history, and by her late invention of the "American Chronographer," may justly claim to have done for American chronology what no other writer has done. But as the astronomer, in calculating the appearances of the heavens, finds that the visual angle of the distance between any two bodies, becoming less and less as they recede, is at length nothing, so in history, ten or eleven days, at a hundred years' distance, becomes, to the mental vision, an imperceptible difference in time. It matters as little whether the day kept in honor of the Pilgrims' landing, is or is not the actual anniversary, as it does whether Christmas, which is celebrated by so great a part of Christendom, is or is not the real anniversary of our Lord's nativity. If the events, with their consequences, be duly and gratefully apprehended, that is all which is essential.

In Mr. Wilson's attempts at the correction of Mrs. Willard's style, we shall not follow him through the minutiae of his hypercriticism ; in which, however, he has made sundry incorrect assertions, and some unfair quotations. Of the words which he cites as incorrectly used, *there is not one* in which the definitions given by Mr. Webster in his large dictionary do not justify Mrs. Willard. We would not assert that there is not a word in Mrs. Willard's books used in an incorrect signification, but this we do assert, that Mr. Wilson has not found one. In winding up his article, he uses expressions by which he would have it believed, that he only stated, here and there as it happened, some small part of the errors which he had detected in Mrs. Willard's books. But in the paragraph preceding we find, from observing the pages to which he refers, that he had looked regularly through the questions in small type at the foot of the pages in the small history, where he gleaned a few colloquialisms, which, though proba-

bly contained in the first edition, have been since corrected.¹ After dealing in this small way, we can hardly suppose, especially considering Mr. Wilson's zeal "for the cause of education," that he would keep from the public *any thing* which he supposed to be inaccurate.

We have now, out of respect to your readers, replied to Mr. Wilson's main charges against Mrs. Willard's history, keeping within the limits of the defensive, as we shall avoid controversy.

X. Y.

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*The Book of Peace. A Collection of Essays on War and Peace.*
Boston: Geo. C. Beckwith. New-York: M. W. Dodd.

HERE is a series of fifty-two essays, or tracts, in nearly 500 closely printed pages, on a variety of important and interesting topics connected with the subject of peace—the history of the cause, its principles, and its measures, or modes of operation;—sketches of war, its nature and effects;—testimonies of eminent men in different ages against war, both Pagans and Christians, warriors, statesmen, philosophers, men of letters, ministers of the Gospel;—the points of glaring contrariety between war and the Bible, the Old Testament as well as the New;—the possibility of abolishing the custom;—military discipline, or the treatment and punishment of warriors, both on land and sea;—various illustrations of war, especially in modern times, as in the Russian campaign, the Peninsular wars, sieges, battles, etc., etc.;—the suicidal folly of preparations for war;—waste of property by war, a very comprehensive view;—loss of life by war, a most startling array of facts;—war-debts of Europe, authentic, but almost incredible;—substitutes for war, four mentioned, but only arbitration and a congress of nations discussed at length, and these as fully as most readers will need or wish;—inefficacy of war as a mode of protection or redress;—safety of pacific principles, illustrated

¹ Three of these have been corrected since the publication of Mr. Wilson's article, also, three or four slight errors in point of fact, and about as many in the arrangement of sentences.

with singular brevity, yet with much fullness of facts and examples ;—military hospitals, or the treatment of wounded sick and disabled soldiers ;—war-prayers, unchristian ;—militia-drills, superfluous even on the war-principle, and attended with great expense, and bad moral influences ;—the United States Navy a useless waste of money and morals ;—answers to a great variety of objections to the cause of peace ;—war a destroyer of souls ;—influence of war on domestic happiness ;—the strictest principles of peace consistent with the legitimate operations of government in controlling and punishing its own subjects ;—claims of peace on Christians, on women, etc. ;—the chief evil of war seen in its moral nature and results ;—criminality of war ;—war unlawful under the Christian dispensation, etc., etc., etc.

This book certainly comprises a rich and brilliant constellation of genius, learning, and taste. Here we have the able and eloquent productions on this subject of *Erasmus*, the prince of modern scholars ; of *Neckar*, the illustrious financier of France ; of *Robert Hall*, perhaps the finest mind, certainly the most accomplished writer of the last age ; of *Chalmers*, in some of the most vivid and powerful strains of his eloquence ; of the gifted *Channing*, of *Worcester*, and *Ladd*, *Noyes*, and *Clarkson*, and others not unknown to fame. The work is a casket of the richest gems on peace ; a judicious selection of the best articles or essays that have ever been written on the subject, with a considerable number, obviously prepared for the volume with much care, ability, and taste. It contains a vast amount of information in a small space, enough for most minds, on nearly all the points connected with the cause of peace. It is a rich thesaurus of facts, statistics, and anecdotes illustrating the nature and effects of war, and the ways or means by which an end may be put to this great scourge of the world. The variety of its topics and its style, can hardly fail to interest every class of minds ; and the names of the different authors are a most ample guaranty for the great value and excellence of its contents. We wish it, what it richly deserves, a circulation through the land, and a careful perusal by all patriots, as well as by all the professed followers of the Prince of Peace. We hope hereafter for a fuller exhibition both of the book and the subject.

2.—*Critical History and Defence of the Old Testament Canon.* By M. STUART, Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary, Andover, Mass. Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. New York: Mark H. Newman, 199 Broadway. 1845. pp. 452, 12mo.

The Christian world will, doubtless, feel grateful to Prof. Stuart for this contribution to the critical history of the Old Testament Canon. The Old Testament has been especially assailed of late ; and even in a work entitled "Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels,"

Mr. Norton, its author, has made a bold attack on the genuineness and authenticity of the books of the Old Testament. It was time, then, for some able critic to take up the subject and enter upon a critical history and defence of the Canon. This, Prof. Stuart has done, we think, with a master's hand, and with great effect.

His object, especially, is to show that the Jewish Canon, as received by the Jews, in the days of Christ and the Apostles, was declared by them to be of Divine origin and authority, and so treated. This, we think, he does show; and, being shown, it follows that it has received the sanction of one from whose decision there is no appeal; and that they, who admit the Divine origin and authority of the Christian religion as developed by Christ and his Apostles in the New Testament, must be very inconsistent, if they reject the authority of the Old Testament Scriptures.

The man who can stand up boldly before this critical defence of the Old Testament Canon, and declare himself an unbeliever as to its Divine origin and authority, may as well yield the genuineness of the New Testament, and place himself in the ranks of universal skeptics.

3.—*The Preacher and Pastor.* By FENELON, HERBERT, BAXTER, and CAMPBELL. Edited and accompanied with an Introductory Essay by Edwards A. Park, Bartlet Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. New-York: M. H. Newman. 1845. pp. 468, 12mo.

New works we have, to some extent, on the duties of the ministry of reconciliation, but they cannot, nor should they, supersede the old standard volumes, which have enlightened and refreshed so many of God's under-shepherds in days gone by. And although we need a very few new things adapted to the age, yet Fenelon, Herbert, Baxter, and Campbell, contain all the essential points, and speak with an emphasis and authority, which no living author can possess.

As Lamb said, "books that are books," so we say that ministers who are ministers, will find in this volume incitement, instruction, and consolation. Let them hold communion with these holy men, in respect to their duties and encouragements, and they will find their hearts burn within them, as they turn over the pages of this volume, or when, having laid it down, they pursue their pastoral labors.

We like this reproduction of the old standards, and hope to see more issuing from the same useful press.

4.—*The True Grandeur of Nations. An Oration delivered before the Authorities of the City of Boston, July 4th, 1845.* By CHARLES SUMNER. Boston: Wm. D. Ticknor & Co.

For a Fourth of July, this is certainly a rare and unique performance. Quitting all the topics of war, military glory, and martial patri-

otism, so hacknied on that occasion, Mr. Sumner launches forth at once on the broad theme of *Peace as the chief want and glory of the times*, and begins with the startling proposition, "*in our age there can be no peace that is not honorable, and no war that is not dishonorable.*" The whole oration is in the same strain of bold, sweeping denunciations against war, as incompatible with Christianity, disgraceful to mankind, and immensely injurious to their highest interests, the legacy of a bygone barbarism, and a foul libel on the civilization of the age.

It is a treatise, rather than an oration, and fills more than a hundred pages, and no inconsiderable part of them with small and dense type. It discusses first, the character of war, next the evils it occasions, then its insufficiency as an instrument of justice, and finally the causes or influences which still conspire to perpetuate the war-system. On the last point, Mr. Sumner puts forth his greatest strength, and comes out boldly against preparations for war as not only expensive beyond endurance, but unnecessary, and likely to produce the very evils they are designed to prevent.

We cannot follow Mr. Sumner through his long and elaborate discourse; but, while its perusal must, as its delivery did, occasion diversity of opinion respecting the correctness of some few positions which he takes, no fair mind can refuse its admiration of the talent and learning, the eloquence, taste, and manly spirit evinced through the whole performance. It is a splendid production, and would do credit to any mind. We do not assent to every one of his positions, nor deem his logic always correct, or his rhetoric entirely faultless; but the oration breathes throughout an excellent spirit, corruscates with beauties of style, and contains a vast amount of truth that well deserves to be pondered by every friend of God and man.

We feel little disposition to carp at such a noble contribution to the cause of Christian philanthropy; but, were we to criticise Mr. Sumner's oration, we should say, it attempts far too much for the occasion; its style is too diffuse, ambitious, and ornate; its logic too often takes to itself the wings of a declamatory rhetoric; it is sometimes deficient in metaphysical and moral discrimination, and is quite overloaded with the lumber of a pertinent but superfluous learning. There certainly was no need of quoting more than a hundred authors, in half-a-dozen languages or more, of disfiguring the foot of almost every page with learned references, and adding to the whole an appendix of some twenty dense pages in minion. We may admire the scholarship that could do all this, but must protest against the wisdom of such a tax on the patience of modern readers.

We should be glad to make a few pregnant extracts on some points of great interest, such as are found on pp. 47-50, 51-53, etc.

The chief *heresy* of our author, however, "the head and front of his offending," will be found on pp. 58-64. Read and ponder!

- 5.—*Journal of the Texian Expedition against Mier ; subsequent imprisonment of the author ; his sufferings and final escape from the Castle of Perote, with Reflections on the present political and probable future relations of Texas, Mexico and the United States.* By GEN. THOMAS I. GREEN. Illustrated by drawings, taken from life, by Charles M'Laughlin, a fellow prisoner. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 487, 8vo.

To those who take an interest in wars and rumors of wars, as most people unfortunately do, this will be a volume adapted to their tastes. It tells of blood-stained fields, of wholesale murders, of thrilling incidents of warfare, of hair-breadth escapes, etc. At the present time, Gen. Green's narration of his and others' sufferings and imprisonment, will excite especial interest, as having a bearing on the present relations of Texas, Mexico and the United States. Those who desire it will here find a full demand for the annexation of Texas, and the extension of our authority over Mexico, California, and the whole of North America. Verily, we shall be large enough then, if we are not smaller than now, ere that time arrive. The style of the book is worthy of one of our first publishing houses.

- 6.—*The Elements of Morality, including Polity.* By WILLIAM WHEWELL, D. D., *Author of the History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.* New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. 2 vols. 12mo.

These are the first fruits of "Harper's New Miscellany," and they certainly promise a rich harvest. May our hopes not be disappointed. We trust they read rightly the taste of the times, and that there is a growing demand for the more solid and valuable parts of literature and science. The volumes of this "New Miscellany" are to be uniformly printed, and bound in stamped muslin gilt, and sold at *fifty cents* each. They will embrace works on philosophy, history, biography, voyages, travels, etc., etc.

Prof. Whewell's work on Morality and Polity we can safely recommend as decidedly one of the best treatises on those subjects; presenting the principles of moral and political science in a methodical manner and in a lucid and interesting style.

- 7.—*Essays.* By JOHN ABERCROMBIE, M. D., F. R. G. E. *From the 19th Edinburgh edition.* New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 295, 18mo.

Dr. Abercrombie's works on Intellectual and Moral Philosophy are deservedly so popular with us, that a ready sale may be expected for his *Essays*. The 19th edition in Scotland is, in itself, a high commendation of the value of these *Essays*, which will be found to contain much matured thought, worthy the consideration of all.

- 8.—*The Duty of American Women to their Country.* New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 164, 18mo.

This little volume is, at once, intended to awaken interest in the cause of education in the West, and to be a contribution toward the execution of a plan for the accomplishment of that desirable end. The plan is, to select judiciously, and to sustain in the wilder portions of the Great Valley, a corps of well-educated young women as teachers of schools, especially for the destitute. Why can it not be done? why should it not? All our aid should not be extended to colleges: let us not forget that the "Excelsior" is often ultimately reached by beginning with the Humilior. This book describes the condition of the West briefly, and unfolds a plan for its salvation: and then a portion of the profits of sale is to be appropriated to the furtherance of the cause.

- 9.—*Notes, Explanatory and Practical, on the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians, to Timothy, to Titus, and to Philemon.* By ALBERT BARNES. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 355, 12mo.

This is another volume of Mr. Barnes's useful commentaries, marked by the same excellences which have characterized his Notes on the Gospels, and rendered them so acceptable to private Christians and teachers in Sabbath Schools and Bible Classes. The commentary on that part of Philemon which relates to Onesimus is worthy of consideration, and will probably correct mistakes which have possession of many minds.

- 10.—*A Grammar of the Latin Language, on the basis of the Grammar of Dr. Alexander Adam, of Edinburgh.* By C. D. CLEVELAND. Third edition. Philadelphia: Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1845. pp. 320, 12mo.

The Grammar of Dr. Adam has long been in use both in this country and Great Britain, and was, when it first appeared, a great improvement on most of its predecessors. In the advanced state of philological inquiries, itself needed additions and changes, to make it a suitable book for our schools. These improvements it has been the design of Prof. Cleveland to introduce in the present edition: and we think he has succeeded so far as to make it decidedly the best edition of Adam's Latin Grammar yet published. We do not think it the very best Grammar of the Latin language, but among the best; and when Adam's is used, we decidedly recommend the introduction of Prof. Cleveland's third edition.

- 11.—*Second Latin Book—the First Part of Jacob's and Döring's Elementarbuch, or Latin Reader, with an enlarged and critical Vocabulary, and notes adapted to the author's Latin Grammar.* By C. D. CLEVELAND. Philadelphia: Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1845. Pp. 299, 12mo.

This is one of a series of Latin Books designed by Prof. Cleveland. The style of execution will commend it to teachers and scholars. Its chief excellence consists, we think, in its correct and extensive vocabulary. These are generally meagre and worthless. We are no friends of mere vocabularies at the end of a book. Let the student use a large dictionary at once. But if they must be used, then let them, by all means, be full, and founded on a radical knowledge of the significations of words.

- 12.—*A Practical Manual of Elocution: embracing Voice and Gesture. Designed for Schools, Academies, and Colleges, as well as for private learners.* By MERRITT CALDWELL, A. M., Professor of Metaphysics and Political Economy, and Teacher of Elocution, in Dickinson College. Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball. New-York: Huntington & Savage. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1845. pp. 331, 12mo.

We confess ourselves greatly pleased with this manual. It is well digested and comprehensive, embracing rules both for the regulation of the voice, and the cultivation of gesticulation. Dr. Rush's philosophical work on the voice, and Austin's Chironomia, are the basis of Prof. Caldwell's system; but he certainly is entitled to the merit of combining the two departments of elocution, and exhibiting them lucidly, and with sufficient extension for all practical purposes.

A text book of this description, in order to be useful in accomplishing the end for which it was written, must be thoroughly and practically studied. Thus used, we think its introduction into schools and colleges would tend, at least, to give a facility and appropriateness of articulation and expression, which else would not be attained.

- 13.—*Practical Christianity, in a Series of Essays.* By JOHN BOWDLER, Jr., Esq., of Lincoln's Inn. First American from the Edinburgh edition. Boston: Benjamin Perkins & Co. 1845. p. 285, 18mo.

Books on Practical Christianity ought to be ever welcome; for with these corrupt natures of ours, we need all the helps we can obtain, to cherish our piety; and it is particularly grateful to find those who are barristers devoting their leisure hours to the composition of essays on the practical matters of Christianity—such as Submission to God, Trust in God, Love of God, Thankfulness, Prayer, Humility, etc., etc.

- 14.—*The Miscellaneous Works of Thomas Arnold, D. D., Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford. First American edition, with nine additional Essays, not included in the English collection.* New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 519, 8vo.

This is a beautiful volume, and the most complete collection of the miscellaneous writings of Dr. Arnold. It contains much more than is found in the English edition: to wit, "Christian Politics; Essays on Church and State; The Church; Church of England; Early Roman History; Faith and Reason; Oxford Malignants and Dr. Hampden; Sixth Chapter of the Gospel by John; Tracts for the Times; Tradition."

Every thing from Dr. Arnold possesses interest. He was unquestionably one of the lights of the age; and the very fact that this light was so soon and so suddenly quenched, throws a peculiar beauty over the daguerreotyped surfaces on which its impressions remain. Who has not read his life and correspondence with a zest of pleasure; and as he pored over its illuminated pages, mourned that he was no longer left among us? His was a beautiful exhibition of Christian character; and although we are far from adopting all his views on Church, State, and Establishments, yet there is so much of heart, so much that is noble and independent in his thinking, that we sympathize deeply with him, and heartily wish an extensive circulation of his writings. Their tendency is *excelsior*.

In the volume before us we have interesting dissertations on Discipline of Public Schools, Divisions and Regulations of knowledge, Poetry of Common Life, Social Progress of States, etc.

- 15.—*Introductory Lectures on Modern History, delivered in Lent Term, 1842; with the Inaugural Lecture of December, 1841.* By THOMAS ARNOLD, D. D. Edited from the second London edition, with a Preface and Notes, by Henry Reed, M. A., Professor of English Literature in the University of Pennsylvania. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 428, 12mo.

Another valuable volume from the pen of Dr. Arnold, and one worthy of a place in every scholar's library, and on every student's table. It could, certainly, be used advantageously as a text-book in the higher classes of our colleges. It contains the first lectures of Dr. Arnold after his appointment as Professor in the University of Oxford; but they are to be regarded as only the trunk and branches of a stately tree, on which time and genial warmth were to develop a beautiful foliage and fruit.

These lectures embrace his definition of History and delineation of the duties of its Professor—the study of history, including its chief

topics—a survey of European history, and the nature of credible historical testimony. All are characterized by originality, power, perspicuity, and felicitous illustration.

- 16.—APPLETON'S *Literary Melange. Gertrude.* By the Author of "*Amy Herbert*," etc. Edited by the Rev. W. Jewell, B. D., Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. Two volumes of the London edition in one. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 332, 12mo.

This is the first volume of "Appleton's Literary Melange," of which it may, perhaps, be well to give our readers some knowledge. It is announced as a uniform series of superior productions in the less erudite department of popular literature, to combine amusement with instruction and moral benefit. The selection will be only from the *élite* of such works, and will be determined by their manifest excellence, excluding every thing, however attractive, which inculcates irreligious opinions and practice, either by precept or example.

This plan and purpose, we trust, will be rigidly executed: as there is, unquestionably, a strong temptation to publish a popular and valuable work, although hurtful in its sentiments. The present volume is of the better class of fictions, and its tendency virtuous.

- 17.—*My Uncle Hobson and I; or Slashes at Life with a free Broadaxe.* By PASCAL JONES. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 267, 12mo.

This is a pleasantly written book, in somewhat of the Dickens style: touching off some of the follies and fanaticisms of life, with a free pencil.

- 18.—*The Mission; or Scenes in Africa, written for Young People.* By CAPTAIN MARRYAT. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton. 1845. 2 vols. 18mo.

This is a third work of Captain Marryat, included in the series of "Tales for the People and their Children." Of the "*Settlers in Canada*," the previous one to this, we spoke well; and there seems to be but one voice about it, among those who have read it.

The present volumes are equally interesting, and more instructive, intended to represent diversified scenes in Southern Africa; gathered up principally from the reports of British Missionaries.

The incidents are often thrilling; and the impression obtained from the whole is good—favorable to revealed truth and Christian philanthropy.

- 19.—WILEY & PUTNAM'S *Library of American Books.*

This is a series by American Authors, in the same style with the

other Library. Three volumes have been issued, viz: *Journal of an African Cruiser*, by Nathaniel Hawthorne—*Edgar Poe's Tales*—*Headley's Letters from Italy*. Mr. Hawthorne edits the work for the author, who in this volume has given us some pleasant observations on the Canaries, Cape de Verdes, and the Western Coast of Africa. Poe's *Tales* are much praised by some, as indicating superior genius; for ourselves, while a portion of them are well-wrought and fascinating, others of them are extravagant, and one, at least, of hurtful tendency. *Headley's Letters* are written in an off-hand, easy style, and are meritorious, as they unfold to us much of the every-day life of the Italians. A little girl, speaking of them, said to me, "I think Mr. H. must have gone to the theatre." That impression is made, and would certainly not be very acceptable to some of his good old Puritan friends.

20.—WILEY & PUTNAM'S *Library of Choice Reading*.

This Library must be exceedingly popular, to encourage the enterprising and worthy publishers to issue so rapidly as they do, having already reached the *twenty-fourth* volume.

Since our last notice, have been issued: Hazlitt's *Age of Elizabeth*—Legh Hunt's *Indicator*, two parts—Zschöкке's *Tales*—Hood's *Prose and Verse*, two parts—Hazlitt's *Characters of Shakspeare's Plays*—Tupper's *Crock of Gold*—Wilson's *Genius and Character of Burns*—Lamb's *Essays of Elia*, first and second series—Sir Francis Head's *Bubbles from the Brunnen*; just one half of the volumes already published. These twelve numbers are, without exception, interesting and valuable. The last, perhaps, the least so. Nearly all of them are works which created a sensation at the time of their original publication—works of celebrated authors in the department of criticism and polite literature. Hazlitt, Hunt, Lamb, and Wilson, are well known—Zschöкке and Tupper, less so. The *Crock of Gold*, by the latter, will awaken a desire to know more of the author, and see more from him. In Lamb there are some dreamy things—some things he had better not spoken; and if read, he needs to be read with caution, and by persons of fixed principles.

21.—*Travels in North America, in the years 1841-2; with Geological Observations on the United States, Canada, and Nova Scotia*. By CHARLES LYELL, Esq., F. R. S. In two volumes. (The two in one.) New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1845. pp. 472, 12mo.

This is a beautiful and highly valuable contribution to science; for although denominated *Travels*, it is principally a geological description of our country and Canada. The observations of so celebrated a geologist as Mr. Lyell, are, of course, of great value, and the work is illustrated by excellent geologically colored maps. Every scholar should endeavor to read this book. He will find in it interesting

and important information in respect to almost every section of the country. The observations are those of a man of science and of good manners.

22.—*Profession is not Principle ; or the name of Christian is not Christianity.* By GRACE KENNEDY, author of *The Decision*, etc. From the sixth Edinburgh edition.—*Perfect Peace. Letters-Memorial of the late John Warren Howell, M. D., of Bath.* By Rev. DAVID PITCAIRN. With an Introduction by Rev. John Stevenson. From the ninth London edition.—*Gospel Promises.* By Rev. JOSEPH ALLEINE.—*Life in Earnest. Six Lectures on Christian Activity and Ardor.* By the Rev. JAMES HAMILTON, Author of *Harp on the Willows*. New-York: Robert Carter.

These are small volumes belonging to Carter's Cabinet Library, neatly bound in muslin with gilt backs. They are all, moreover, good books. The first is one of the very best things we ever read ; and we had just been wishing for a republication of it when Mr. Carter came out with it. We advise all our friends, who have not already, to read it now. The second is an interesting account of the last illness and death of a scientific and popular physician, who, although once skeptical, found that the Cross was the only place of hope and rest for the sinner. The Gospel Promises are well known. Life in Earnest, the fourth, is a charming view of the proper relations of business and religion, and will be read with great interest.

23.—*The Works of Rev. Richard Cecil, late Minister of St. John's Chapel, Bedford Row, London.* New-York: Robert Carter. 1845. 3 vols. 12mo.

The Christian public will be grateful to Mr. Carter for this very neat edition of Cecil's works. The first volume contains Sermons ; the second, Miscellanies ; the third, Remains. With his "Remains" most persons are familiar, and of these we have before spoken. His Sermons are simple, biblical, and addressed to the heart. They will be read with interest by the humble Christian. The Miscellanies, too, are in the same style with his other writings, and contain many articles on subjects both interesting and profitable ; also, Visit to the House of Mourning, Advice to Servants, Early Piety, etc.

24.—*Christian Retirement ; or, Spiritual Exercises of the Heart.* By the Author of *Christian Experience*, etc. From the fourteenth London edition. New-York: Robert Carter. 1845. pp. 476, 12mo.

This book we have recommended before ; and on the appearance of a new issue, we cheerfully call the attention of our readers again to its valuable pages. It is a most excellent practical work ; few bet-

ter. The Christian who reads it carefully will be profited by its wholesome lessons, on Unbelief, Keeping the Heart, Love of God, The Almost Christian, The Two Pillars, Watchfulness, etc., etc.

25.—*The Works of Charlotte Elizabeth*—vol. III. *Judea Capta.—The Deserter.—Falsehood and Truth.—Judah's Lion.—Conformity.—Wrongs of Women.* New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1845. pp. 502, 8vo.

This is the third, and, as we presume, the last volume of Mr. Dodd's beautiful edition of Charlotte Elizabeth's Works. We have before spoken of the works separately, as they appeared, and need not therefore, repeat. Suffice it to say, that every library furnished with these three volumes, will be adorned by their external appearance, and rendered more interesting and valuable, by their internal excellence.

26.—*Penny Magazine.* Nos. 6–11. New-York: J. S. Redfield & Co.

We need only announce the continued issue of this work, and refer to our previous notice for our opinion of its merits.

27.—*Fletcher's Devotional Family Bible.* Each part illustrated with an elegant engraving on steel. New-York: R. Martin & Co.

Our opinion of this beautiful Bible, formerly expressed, is unchanged. Every thing about it is pure and elegant. The ninth number reaches to Exodus xxix.

28.—*Praise and Principle.* By the author of *Woman an Enigma, Self Conquest, &c.* New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1845.

The author of this work is a lady of education, talent, and piety. She first appeared before the public in a series of beautiful and deeply interesting Tales, entitled "Aunt Kitty's Tales." All her writings are remarkable for a vigorous yet disciplined imagination, for a lively and pure style, and for their high moral tone. They are books which will interest mature readers as well as children and youth. As an author she will take her place among that fine and elevated class to which Miss Sedgwick and Mrs. Child belong: authors whose writings unite with the graces of composition a deep sympathy with all that is human, and a noble philanthropy.

Praise and Principle is the contrast of two very opposite forms of character, as appearing first in the schoolboy, and as developed afterward in the maturity of life. It is a book most worthy to be put into the hands of youth engaged in their educational course, and cannot but inspire the love of truth and goodness for their own sakes.

29.—THE MEDICI SERIES OF ITALIAN PROSE.—*The Challenge of Barletta*, by MASSIMO D'AZEGLIO.—*The Florentine Histories*, by NICCOLÒ MACCHIAVELLI, 2 vols.—*The Citizen of a Republic*, by ANSALDO CEBÀ.—All translated and edited by C. EDWARDS LESTER, U. S. Consul at Genoa. New York: Paine & Burgess. 1845. Price of each vol. 50 cts.

This publishing house has recently come to our city with the good intent of encouraging home products, that is, of confining themselves to the publication of books by American authors.

They have commenced with what they call *The Medici Series*, intending to embrace in it translations of works from the Italian, illustrative of the times of the Medici. The translations thus far have been executed by C. Edwards Lester, our Consul at Genoa, who evinces a thorough knowledge of the Italian language, and has certainly transferred its idioms into our own, in a happy, easy style.

The Challenge of Barletta belongs to the class of romances, yet, like some of Scott's novels, it beautifully interweaves historical incidents, setting them in bright, attractive colors. As a specimen of romance from the land of soft sounds and lovely skies, it bespeaks attention; yet, with our views of romances, we are glad to learn that the series will be made up with works of more solidity and value.

The following volumes are of this description: *The Florentine Histories*, and *the Citizen of a Republic*. The former, by the celebrated Florentine Secretary, cannot but be acceptable to *American* readers, the lovers of freedom. This history, although probably inaccurate in some minutiae, is the most vivid, and on the whole, truthful representation of the glory and power of the fair Florentine Republic: and although the author's name has become a stereotyped symbol of cunning and treachery, yet was he unquestionably the ablest and most liberal statesman of his age.—*The Citizen*, by Ansaldo Cebà, one of the most illustrious of the bold republicans of the times of the Medici, "is a work," says the *Biblioteca Enciclopedica Italiana*, "enriched with elegant learning, and written with all that terseness and solemn earnestness of style, which characterized the great writers of the brilliant ages of the republics of antiquity. The man who best restrains his appetites and lusts—who is the most prudent in public deliberations—the most just in every private and public relation of family and of society, is, in the estimation of Ansaldo Cebà, the best citizen." Would there were more of this mind in our own blest republic.

ARTICLE X.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

Books: Die Versöhnungslehre der evangelisch—protestantischen Kirche, Von Dr. Schneeman.—Einleitung in die heiligen Schriften des alten und neuen Testaments, Von. Dr. J. M. Aug. Scholz, author of the well known Greek Testament.—Geschichte der Philosophie, Von Dr. H. Ritter. The 7th Vol. is out, or the 3d of the History of Christian Philosophy. It embraces an account of the mediæval scholastic philosophy—Reinhold has also published, Geschichte der Philosophie nach den Hauptmomenten ihrer Entwicklung—Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V., Aus dem Königlichen archiv und der Bibliothèque de Bourgogne zu Brüssel, Von Dr. K. Lanz.—Hengstenbergs, Vol. III., on the Psalms does not complete the work, extending only to Ps. 91.—Die Römische Topographie, Von Prof. L. Ulrichs. The Professor, in this tract, maintains views differing from those of Becker.

France.

A valuable work has been published by F. de Brotonne, keeper of the Library of St. Geneviève, at Paris, entitled, Civilization primitive : ou Essai de restitution de la période ante-historique ; pour servir d'introduction à l'Histoire Universelle.—Histoire de Bernadotte, Charles XIV., Jean, Roi de Suède et de Norvège. Par B. Sarrans, jeune.—New Philological Journal, Revue de Philologie, de Literature, et d'Histoire anciennes.

England.

A Greek-English Lexicon, by Liddell and Scott, 2nd edition, enlarged—based on that of Passow.—J. W. Donaldson's Rules of Greek Construction.—Metcalf's Translation of W. A. Becker's Charicles, or Illustrations of the Private Life of the ancient Greeks.

INDEX TO VOL. I.

A.

Abercrombie, John, M. D. His Essays noticed 771.
Adopted Child, The, by Charles Burdett, noticed 387.
Advice to a Young Christian, with an Essay by Dr. Alexander, noticed 383.
Alden, Rev. Joseph, D. D. His "Great Secret Discovered," noticed 384. Baird's Religion in America, reviewed by, 487.
Alison, Archibald, LL. D. His Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste, noticed 185.
American Common School Histories. A Critical Review of, by M. Wilson, 517.
Anastasis; or the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, by George Bush, noticed 181. Reviewed, by Rev. D. D. Tompkins McLaughlin 669. New interest awakened in the doctrine of the resurrection of the body 670. Statement of Prof. Bush's views 671. Outer line of circumvallation, the spiritual resurrection of Christ 673. Distinction made by Prof. Bush as to the Hebrew and Greek words for the English *to see* 674. Examination of the philological question 675. *ἀπτομαι* used from a necessity of the language 676. Examples of the interchange of *ἀπτομαι*, *θεωρέω*, etc. 678. Table showing the uses of these words 680. Mr. Bush, in his calculation, includes the disputed passages 681. Classification of the uses of *ἀπτομαι* in the New Testament 683. Review of the classification and results 666. On the phrase, "their eyes were opened" 688. Signification of *ἰνῆ* and correspondence with *ἀπτομαι* 689. *Βλέπω*, *εἶδον*, 692. *Θεάομαι*, *θεωρέω*, 693, *Ὁρασις*,

δρασία, *ἀφαντες ἐγένετο*, Luke 24 : 31, 695. Kuinoel on this text 699. Christ's fourth appearance 700 Romans 6 : 4-11, 704. Passage in 1 Pet. 3 : 18, 705. Meaning of the prep. *ἐν*, 706. Christ's second coming 708.
Apocalypse. Commentary on, by Prof. Moses Stuart, noticed 565.
Apocrypha. Arguments of Romanists in behalf of, by James H. Thornwell, noticed 190.
Appleton's Literary Melange noticed 775.
Arnold, Thomas, D. D. His Miscellaneous Works noticed 774.
 ———. His Introductory Lectures on History noticed 774.
 ———. Life and Correspondence of, by A. P. Stanley, noticed 379.
Arts, Manufactures, and Mines. Recent Improvements in, by Andrew Ure, M. D., noticed 380.

B.

Baird's Religion in America. Reviewed by Prof. J. Alden, D. D., 487.
Barnes, Albert, D. D. His Notes on Job, noticed 186—on the Epistles of Paul to Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, noticed 567. His Notes on Thessalonians, etc., noticed 772.
Bible, Devotional Family, by Rev. Alexander Fletcher, noticed 388, 778.
Blair, Rev. Hugh, D. D. His Sermons noticed 183.
Bonnechese, Emile. His Reformers before the Reformation noticed 186.
Bossingault, G. B. His Rural Economy noticed 379.
Book of Peace, noticed 767.
Bowdler, John, Esq. His Practical Christianity noticed 773.

- Boyd, J. R.* His Elements of Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, for the use of Schools, noticed 184.
- Boynton, Rev. C. B.*, Influence of Faith upon Intellectual Character, by, 391.
- Brown, John, of Haddington.* His Explanation of the Shorter Catechism noticed 383.
- Burdett, Charles.* His Adopted Child noticed 387
- Burke, Hon. Edmund.* His Inquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful noticed 185.
- Bush, Prof. George.* His Anastasis noticed 181. Reviewed by Rev. Samuel T. Spear 212—by Rev. D. D. Tompkins McLaughlin 669.
- C.
- Californias, Travels in the,* by Thos. J. Farnham, noticed 568.
- Calvert, Geo. H.* His Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe noticed 384.
- Calvin, Luther and,* noticed 187.
- Caldwell, Prof. Merritt.* His Elocution noticed 773
- Campbell, George, D. D.* His Philosophy of Rhetoric noticed 182.
- Carter's Cabinet Library* noticed 777.
- Catechism.* Explanation of the Assembly's Shorter, by John Brown, noticed 383.
- Cecil.* Works of Rev. Richard, noticed 777.
- Centurion, The,* or Scenes in Rome, by William W. Taylor, noticed 190.
- Charlotte Elizabeth.* Her Works noticed 187, 387, 778. Her Deserter noticed 187—her Judæa Capta noticed 383—her Church Visible in all Ages noticed 384.
- Chemistry,* applied to Agriculture, by J. B. Boussingault, noticed 379.
- Christianity, Practical,* by John Bowdler, Esq., noticed 773.
- Christian Retirement* noticed 777.
- Church Visible in all Ages,* by Charlotte Elizabeth, noticed 384.
- Church, Theses on the Unity of the,* by Prof. Henry Tappan, D D., 617.
- Clark, Rev. Caleb,* Exposition of Matthew 16 : 18, by, 413.
- Cleveland, Prof. C. D.* His Adam's Latin Grammar noticed 772.
- Cleveland, Prof. C. D.* His second Latin Book noticed 773.
- Colquhoun, Lady,* her World's Religion noticed 383.
- Commentary on the Apocalypse,* by Prof. Stuart, noticed 565.
- Confirmation,* Romish and Prelatical Rite of, examined by Rev. Thomas Smyth, [D D., noticed 568.
- Copley, Mrs.* Her Kind Words for the Kitchen noticed 384.
- Cormenin, Louis Marie De.* His History of the Popes noticed 567.
- Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe* noticed 384.
- Course of English Reading,* by Rev. James Pycroft, noticed 385.
- Cox, Rev. Samuel H., D. D.* Lane's Refuge of Lies and Covert from the Storm, reviewed by, 52.
- Creeds, Use of Church,* by Rev. John G. Hall, 577. Some disavow all creeds 578. Instance of the Baptists 579. A creed should define the sense of Scripture—Scriptural authority 580. Acts 15-16 considered 582. Creeds necessary to harmony 583. Difference between a society and a church—necessary to church-discipline 585. Some symbol of belief unavoidable 587 Subject needs attention 588.
- Critical Notices* 181, 377, 565. 767. :
- Criticism of Rhetoric,* by Prof. Henry N. Day, 589.
- Cromwell, Life of Oliver,* by Robert Southey, LL. D., noticed 191.
- Cunningham, J. W.* His World without Souls noticed 383.
- Cyclopædia, the Pulpit,* noticed 188.
- D.
- D'Aubigne, J. H. Merle, D. D.* Lutheranism and the Reform, by, 130. His Miscellany noticed 386.
- Davies, Rev. Samuel.* His Sermons noticed 383.
- Day, Prof. Henry N.* Criticism of Rhetoric 589.
- Devotional Family Bible,* Alex. Fletcher's, noticed 388, 778.
- Dictionary of the English Language,* by Noah Webster, LL D , noticed 574

Dictionary of the English Language, by Alexander Reid, A. M., noticed 573.

Dictionary. Supplement to Ure's noticed 380.

Diodati, de Christo Græce loquente, Exercitatio, translated by O. T. Dobbin, LL. D. of Exeter, England, 169. The Jews taught their children Greek in their schools 169. Used Greek Bibles 172. That they spoke Greek proved by Josephus 174. Judea and its cities had Greek names 175. Greek names given to feasts, edifices, moneys, etc 177. Summary of the chapter 180. Christ and his Apostles spoke the Hellenistic tongue—Jesus assumed a Greek name 359. The band of disciples called by a Greek name—Christ used Greek Bibles 360. Greek proverbs 362. The Greek alphabet 363. Hellenism vernacular to the Apostles 364. Various opinions of the language of Christ described and refuted 540. The Hebrew tongue neither vernacular to Christ nor the Jews of his day 541. Hardouin's opinion confuted 542. Neither the Chaldee nor Syriac vernacular to Christ or the Jews of that time 545. Of Paul speaking to the Jews in Hebrew 555. Of the Syriac words which occur in the New Testament 561. Preface of Josephus and close of his antiquities explained 738. Why Josephus wrote his books of the war in Chaldea 741. Josephus examined as to his addressing the Jews in Hebrew 743. Of the books of the Rabbins 745. Appendix—Philological Knots opened—Gospels of Matthew and Mark 748. Epistle of Paul to the Hebrews 750. Of the Hellenists and Hellenistic tongue 751. First book of Maccabees—Greek version of the Seventy 752. Falseness of the account of Aristæus 753. Arguments against it 754–758. Inquiry into the age, place and origin of the Septuagint 759. Conclusion—Licences 763.

Dobbin, Rev. Orlando T., LL. D., Dominici Diodati J. C. Neapoli-

tani, de Christo Græce loquente Exercitatio, by, 169, 359, 540.

Duncan, Mary Lundie. Her Memoirs noticed 187.

Duty of American Women to their Country, noticed 772.

E.

Economy, Rural, in relation with Chemistry, etc., by J. B. Bous-singault, noticed 379.

Eddy, Rev. Ansel D., D. D. Prelatical Principles, Anti-republican and Unscriptural, by, 315.

Eloquence. The West and Western, by Rev. Joseph F. Tuttle, 638. Anecdotes of the West—its broad territory 639. In any light, its greatness overwhelms the mind 640. A few facts about the West 641. Statistics 642. Heterogeneity of Western Society—great mental activity 644. The people acquire more by hearing than reading 645. Effect of the contact with the West 647. Western eloquence possesses a fiery energy 648. Western audiences 649. Great political meeting at Dayton, Ohio, in 1842, 650. Thomas Corwin's eloquence 651. The faults and excellences of Western prominent in him 654. Thomas Ewing 656. John Brough 657. Comparison between Corwin and Brough 658. Western pulpit eloquence 660. The Western preacher must be an off-hand man 661. Dr. Rice of Cincinnati a most accomplished debater 662. Rev. Joseph C. Stiles 663. Dr. Lyman Beecher 665. Excels in taking advantage of incidents 666.

Elocution. Practical Manual of, by Prof. M. Caldwell, noticed 773.

Essays. Dr. Abercrombie's noticed 771.

Etherology, or the Philosophy of Mesmerism and Phrenology, by J. Stanley Grimes, noticed 387.

Exercitatio de Christo Græce loquente, by Diodati, 169.

Exposition of Romans 7: 7–24, by Olshausen, 393.

Exposition of Matthew 16: 18, by Rev. Caleb Clark, 413.

F.

Faith. Influence of, upon Intellectual Character, by Rev. C. B. Boynton, 391. This a matter of fact era 391. Danger of banishing the true with the false as to a spiritual world 392. Evangelical faith not exclusively intended here—see its influence among the Greeks and Romans 393. Features of their religion 394. Characters of some of the spiritual dwellers in that ancient world 395. The idea of the Lares beautiful 396. The origin of this religious system to be found in the earliest revelations of God to man 397. The Greek intellectually great, because of his faith in the reality of a spiritual world around him 399. Our own age an era of physical rather than spiritual life 400. Have modern improvements awakened the exalted powers of the soul? 401. Power of faith upon the intellect as illustrated among the Hebrews 402. Unparalleled in a literary point of view 403. Influence of faith upon intellect as exhibited among the Pilgrims of New England 404. Genuine poetry on board the Mayflower 405. Christendom falls short because not baptized with the spirit of the Gospel 406. The human mind will yet surpass all her past achievements 407. The result of a true and controlling religious feeling 408. Sanctified intellect will effect glorious things 411. The scholar and the Gospel minister should stand side by side 412.

Farnham, Thomas J. His travels in the Californias noticed 568.

Ferdinand and Isabella. History of the Reign of, by Wm. H. Prescott, noticed 381.

Fletcher Rev. Alexander. His Devotional Family Bible noticed 388.

Fletcher's Devotional Family Bible noticed 778.

Forensic Medicine. Principles of, by W. A. Guy, M. B., noticed 382.

France. History of, from the earli-

est period to the present time, by M. Michelet, noticed 380.

Frost, John, LL. D. His Book of the Indians of North America noticed 188.

Fry, Caroline. Her Sabbath Musings noticed 189.

G.

Germany. A History of, by Prof. Frederick Kohlrausch, noticed 573.

Goethe. Correspondence between Schiller and, translated by Geo. H. Calvert, noticed 384.

Government, Human. Three Progressive Experiments in, by Rev. Joseph F. Tuttle 1. Progress a law of the Rational Universe—hence experiments on national government 2. Three grand experiments, Grecian Democracy, Roman Law, Christian Republicanism 3. The Athenian government the model of Grecian Democracy 4. The Areopagus, 5. The perfection of this government attained between 600 and 322 B. C. 6. Roman Law the second experiment 7. Its striking characteristic, the power of law, entire submission to it 8. Especially in the soldiery 9. Instance Fabricius, Camillus, Brutus 10. The Roman Senate conservative 11. Her zenith about the time of the destruction of Carthage 12. Last experiment, Christian Republicanism 15. Belongs not to a single nation nor age, its elements belong to man 15. The Jewish polity peculiar, union of two extremes, democracy and sovereignty of God 16. Yet not a perfect model for all nations 17. The great cause of national ruin, the want of controlling moral power in individuals—the principle of the Theocracy applied to this cause 18. Some of its practical results 19. Expulsive power in respect to slavery, property, etc. 21. The principle of national immortality evolved by this people 22. Other nations and experiments—Constantine's mistake 24. Alfred's glorious reign 25. Magna Charta—Wars

of the Roses 26. Charlemagne—Chivalry 27; English Puritanism 28; The Pilgrims—the Mayflower 30; Our own Republic, its theory—has it expulsive energy? 32; We hope well for our country 34.

Great Secret Discovered. A tale for children, by Rev. Joseph Alden, D. D., noticed 384.

Greece. History of, by Bishop Thirlwall, noticed 381.

Green, Gen. Thomas I. His Journal of the Texan Expedition against Mier noticed 771.

Griffin, Edward Dorr, D. D. His Sermons noticed 184.

Grimes, J. Stanley. His Philosophy of Mesmerism noticed 387.

Guy, William A. His Principles of Forensic Medicine, with notes by Chas. A. Lee, M. D., noticed 382.

H.

Hall, Rev. John G. Exposition of 1 Pet. 3: 18–20, by, 266.—Use of Church Creeds, by, 577.

Haucker, Robert, D. D. His Poor Man's Portion noticed 189.

Hemans, Mrs. Complete works of, noticed 191.

Hervey. His Meditations noticed 187.

Hickok, Prof. L. P. Christian Theology as a Science, by, 457.

History. A Manual of Ancient and Modern, by W. C. Taylor, LL. D., noticed 378.

History of the Popes, by Louis Marie de Cormenin, noticed 567.

— *of Germany,* by Prof. Frederick Kohlrausch, noticed 573.

Histories, American Common School. A Critical Review of, by M. Wilson, 517. Subject important 517. Under four heads—Arrangement, Anachronisms, Accuracy, Literary Merits—Two modes of arrangement 518. Introduction of maps in school histories 519. Anachronisms 520. Instances of discrepancy 522–528. Accuracy in statement of facts 528–533. Literary merits 533–539.

Histories. Reply to M. Wilson's Review of Common School 764.

History and Defence of the Old

Testament Canon, by Prof. Stuart, noticed 768.

History. Dr Arnold's Lectures on, noticed 774.

Holy Spirit's Influence. Necessity of, in the work of Man's Redemption, by Rev. Seth Williston, D. D., 493. All parts of the created universe alike dependent on the Creator 493. But a special influence to produce and preserve holiness attributed to the Holy Ghost—the Scriptures ascribe supreme importance to the Spirit's influences—they represent all not subject to it as under the dominion of sin—a change of character ascribed to it 495. Preservation of holy principle—eminence in holiness 496. Spoken of as the most important particular in the qualification of ministers 497. Spiritual harvests—the millennium ascribed to it 498. The orthodoxy of the Church and ministry depend on it 499. Comprehends all the good secured by Christ's sufferings—all we ask in prayer 500. The fellowship of the moral system—all true happiness attributed to it 501. Nature and extent of the Spirit's agency 502. Exerts a direct agency—the renovation of the heart an operation peculiar to God 503. A most mighty exhibition of the power of God—the Spirit quickens whom he will 504. Infant regeneration proves direct agency 505. Direct agency does not impair man's freedom 505. Does not paralyze human effort—Spirit's operation not necessary to constitute an obligation to possess holy character 507. Exerted in such way as not to affect our freedom 508. Does not represent means of grace as useless 509. Harm of the moral suasion scheme 510. Makes no difference between the agency of God and that of man—tends to quench the spirit of prayer 511. To produce spurious conversions 512. Strikes at the doctrine of native depravity 513. The saints' perseverance 414. Not likely to promote faith and humility 515.

Home Missions, by Rev. Thos. Lippincott, 277.

Homer. *Lexicon of the Poems of*, by Prof. Henry Smith, noticed 192.

Hopkins, Rev. T. M. Examination of Joshua 10: 12-15, by, 97.

Horne, Bishop. His Commentary on the Psalms noticed 382.

Hydropathy, or the Water Cure, by Joel Shew, M. D., noticed 386.

I.

Indians of North America. Book of the, by John Frost, LL. D., 188.

Influence of Faith upon Intellectual Character, by Rev. C. B. Boynton, 391.

Intelligence, Literary, 193, 389, 576, 780.

J.

Jay, Rev. William. His works noticed 185.

Job. Notes Critical and Practical on the Book of, by Albert Barnes, noticed 186.

Joshua 10: 12-15 Examination of, by Rev. T. M. Hopkins, 97. No part of the sacred record 98. Extract from the book of Jasher—Preliminary remarks 99. The text not needed to confirm the doctrine of Providence—yet may be true 100. Not too difficult for Almighty power 101. Singular fact that, if a real miracle, it is never once referred to by prophet, apostle, or Jesus Christ—theories invented to explain the passage—some take it literally 102. Some say God caused an extraordinary refraction of the solar and lunar rays 103. Difficulties as to this view 104. Another opinion is that unusual atmospheric phenomena at the close of day supplied the office of the sun, and by poetic license called the sun and moon 105. A highly wrought figurative expression for a signal victory in a *single day* 106. In our own view, the passage is a quotation—evidently an interruption of the narrative 107. Claims to be a quotation 109. Reference to the book of Jasher in 2 Sam. 1: 18, a seeming difficulty 111. Other serious objections to receiving this passage as part of

the inspired word—contains in itself the elements of its own destruction 113. Examination of these 114-117. Remarkable that such an event should have perished from the memory of man 117. It is said this tradition was found by Herodotus among the Egyptians 119. Not so in our opinion 120. Objection from the position assigned to Joshua in respect to the sun and moon 122. Is it referred to in Habakkuk 3: 11, 124. The impression left by the passage is contrary to the corrected and true narrative of the campaign 127.

Jones, Pascal. His Uncle Hobson and I noticed 775.

Judea Capta, by Charlotte Elizabeth, noticed 383.

K.

Kind Words for the Kitchen, or Illustrations of Humble Life, by Mrs. Copley, 384.

Kohlrausch, Prof. Frederick. His History of Germany noticed 573.

L.

Lane's Refuge of Lies and Covert from the Storm. Reviewed by Rev. Samuel H. Cox, D. D., 52.

Language, Dictionary of the English, by Alexander Reid, A. M., noticed 573.

Language, Dictionary of the English, by Noah Webster, LL. D., noticed 573.

Latin Language. Grammar of the, Adam's, by Prof. C. D. Cleveland, noticed 772.

—— Book, second, by Prof. C. D. Cleveland, noticed 773.

Lectures, Expository, or Discourses on Scriptural Subjects, by Lewis Mayer, D. D., noticed 570.

Leibnitz. Life of, by John M. Mackie, noticed 377.

Lewis, Prof. Tayler, LL. D. His Plato contra Atheos noticed 566.

Lexicon of the Poems of Homer and the Homerida noticed 192.

Library of Choice Reading. Wiley and Putnam's, noticed 386, 572, 775.

Library. Carter's Cabinet, noticed 777.

Library. Wiley and Putnam's, noticed 775-6.

Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D. D., noticed 379.

Lippincott, Rev. Thomas. Home Missions, by, 277.

Literary Intelligence, 193, 389, 576, 780.

Lord, William W. His Poems noticed 574.

Luther and Calvin, noticed 187.

——— *Last Days and Death of,* by Prof. C. E. Stowe, D. D., 195. Premature false report of his death and its circumstances 195. Luther's treatment of the pamphlet 196. The disorders at Wittenberg vexed his soul 197. His determination to leave the place, and the public feeling about it 198. His will 198-201. Count of Mansfield's difficulty 201. Luther's last letter to his wife 203. His death 208. The funeral 209. His grave 211.

Lutheranism and the Reform: their Diversity essential to their Unity, by J. H. Merle D'Aubigné, D. D., 130. Lutheranism and the Reform possess distinct characters, but separated rather by diversities than errors 131. Unity between them 132. Time approaching for a union 133. The Reform should not yield to Lutheranism 134. The groundwork of Christianity with the Reformed, is that the word of God is the source of faith and of the Christian life—Luther's justification by faith, 136. The Church of England a reformed Church, not Lutheran 137. Exclusive authority of the word of God the grand principle with the Reform 138. The Reform pre-eminently the confession of the Bible 139. Evangelism and Ecclesiasticism the adversaries in the battle of the 19th century 140. The Reform also places faith above the Church 141. Evils resulting from too strict an application of the Lutheran principles 143. The Reform also distinguished by a liberal spirit of Christian charity 145. Exclusiveness a feature of Lutheranism 146. A spirit of

fraternity in the Reform 148. Not less distinguished for a genuineness than profoundness 150. High moral character 152. More decided than Lutheranism in its principles and progress—a principle, to abolish in the Church all not prescribed in the word of God 154. A difference between these Churches as to liberty of the Church and of the State 159. The Reform possesses freedom and gives it to the State 162. Christ and the Church every thing to Calvin 164. The Reform will bring to the united Church grace, catholicism, liberty 168.

Lyell, Charles, Esq. His travels in North America, etc., noticed 776.

M.

Mackie, John M. His Life of Leibnitz noticed 377.

Marryat, Capt. His Settlers in Canada noticed 191. His Mission, or Scenes in Africa, noticed 775.

Martin, Rev. Benjamin N. Examination of Prof. Tappan's Works on the Will, by, 709.

Matthew 16: 18. Exposition of, by Rev. Caleb Clark, 413. Import of my Church—of *οἰκοδομῶ*, I will build 413. What is to be understood by the Rock?—three views, Christ, the Confession of Peter, and Peter 415. Reasons for adopting the third view, viz., that it refers to Peter, 416-19. This gives no ground for the claims of the Papacy 420.

Mayer, Lewis, D. D. His Expository Lectures noticed 570.

Medicine, Principles of Forensic, by William A. Guy, noticed 382.

Meditations, Hervey's, noticed 187.

Merle D'Aubigné, J. H., D. D. Lutheranism and the Reform, by, 130.

Mesmerism and Phrenology. The Philosophy of, noticed 387.

Melange. Appleton's Literary, noticed 775.

Mission, The, or Scenes in Africa, by Capt. Marryat, noticed 757.

Michelet. His History of France noticed 380.

Miscellany. D'Aubigné's noticed 386.

Missions, Home. By a Missionary, Rev. Thos. Lippincott, 277. Christ's command and promise 277. A principle of human action 278. Importance of the home-field not realized 280. The obligation of Christians 281. Its ground, force and extent 282. Not chiefly on ministers or missionaries 283. Illustration of the obligation of lay Christians 285. Their engagements to the Lord 286. The man who is not sensitive is not fit for a missionary 289. The missionary has a right to share the comforts of the secular members of the church 291. Growth of the West 292.

Moore's Lalla Rookh noticed 192.

Morality. Elements of, including Polity, by W. Whewell, D. D., noticed 771.

N

Necessity of the Holy Spirit's Influence in the Work of Man's Redemption, by Rev. Seth Williston, D. D., 493.

Notes, Explanatory and Practical, on the Epistles of Paul to the Ephesians, Philippians and Colossians, by Albert Barnes, noticed 567.

———, on Thessalonians, etc., by Albert Barnes, noticed 772.

O

Ocean Work. Ancient and Modern, by J. Hall Wright, noticed 573.

Olshausen's Commentary on Rom. 7: 7-24, 293.

Opie, Mrs. Her White Lies, Tale of Trials, Fashionable Wife and Unfashionable Husband, noticed 388.

P

Park, Prof. E. A., D. D. His edition of the Preacher and Pastor noticed 769.

Pastoral Duty. Dr. Pond's Lectures on, reviewed 36. This a full, methodical treatise on the subject, much needed—style simple and direct 37. The book is

sound in its doctrines, and free from prolixity in statement 38. On delay in settlement 39. Resident Licentiates 40. Young men mistaken often as to their real desires in respect to preparation 41. Desirableness of a temporary itinerancy 42. Pastoral visiting 43. Discipline—Revivals—Evangelists 44. Conviction of sin 45. Early admission to the Church 46. Protracted meetings 48. Objects of benevolence—agencies 50.

Peace, Book of noticed 767.

Penny Magazine. Republication of, noticed 571, 778.

Peter (1) 3: 18-20. Exposition of, by Rev. John G. Hall 266. The common interpretation, the extraordinary 266. The strong points of the extraordinary interpretation—the antithesis of the 18th verse—redundancy of the words "he went," sanctioned by other passages 267. Signification of ζωοποιήσε's 269. Further observations 270. Argument from the heathen finding mercy 272. Antediluvians not heathen 273. Peter's opinion of their character and state 274.

Philosophy. Sketches in Grecian, by Prof. Wm. S. Tyler, 421. Object to give a brief abstract of the thoughts and words of Aristotle and Plato 422. Taylor's enlogy of Plato—number of Plato's dialogues and epistles 423. Classification and chronological arrangement 424. Euthyphron, or concerning Holiness, written after the accusation and before the condemnation of Socrates 425. Euthyphron's definitions of holiness and Plato's replies 426-28. The dialogue truly Socratic and negative in its nature 429. The defence of Socrates on his trial 430. The Introduction 431. The charges 432-3. The hostility of the multitude chiefly to the learned 434. Crito, or what ought to be done? 437. Socrates in prison, his dream 437. Refusal to escape 438. Discussion with Crito 439. Phædo, or the Immortality of the

Soul 441. The dialogue 442. Immateriality as a proof of immortality 445. Objection to the idea of the soul's being a sort of harmony 447. Plato not a strong reasoner 449. Narrative part of the *Phædo* singularly beautiful 452. Fruitful in valuable suggestions 454.

Plato, contra Atheos, with Critical Notes and Dissertations, by Prof. Tayler Lewis, LL D., noticed 566.

Poems, by William W. Lord, noticed 574.

Pollok's Course of Time noticed 192.

Pond's Lectures on Pastoral Duty reviewed 36

Poor Man's Morning Portion, by Robert Hawker, D. D.

Popery. Persecutions of, by Frederic Shoberl, noticed 187.

Popery. The Spirit of, noticed 190.

Preacher and Pastor, edited by Prof. E. A. Park, D. D., noticed 769.

Praise and Principle noticed 778.

Prelatical Principles Anti-Republican and Unevangelical, by Rev. A. D. Eddy, D. D., 315. These principles require attention 316. Messrs. Badger and Southgate 317. The importance given to the Episcopacy demands discussion 319. The tendencies of Episcopacy 320. Hostile to republican institutions and equality of rights 321. Not softened in its character by transplantation to this republican soil 323. The principles being universally embraced, we have an established hierarchy 325. Dr. Onderdonk and Mr. Duer 327. Advances of popery and prelacy 330. Unscriptural character and tendencies of prelatical principles 332. "Fasts and Festivals of the Church" 333. Dr. Hobart 334. Their forms and liturgy not an effectual barrier against error 337. Loose Arminianism 339. Distinction between the righteous and wicked disregarded 341. Fruits of Evangelical faith not abundant 342. Moral character

too little regarded 344. Little provision for doctrinal purity 347. These principles lead to Romanism 357.

Prescott, William H. His History of Ferdinand and Isabella noticed 381.

Prime, Samuel Irenæus. His Elizabeth Thornton noticed 569

Progressive Experiments in American Government, by Rev. Joseph F. Tuttle, 1.

Psalms. Commentary on the Book of, by Lord Bishop of Norwich, Horne, noticed 382.

Pulpit Cyclopædia noticed 188.

Pycroft, Rev. James. His Course of English Reading noticed 385.

R.

Randolph, Philip, by Mary Gertrude, noticed 191.

Reading, A course of English, by Rev. James Pycroft, noticed 385.

Reformation, The, in Europe, by the author of the Council of Trent, noticed 185.

Reformers before the Reformation, by Emile Bonnechose, noticed 168.

Refuge of Lies and Covert from the Storm. Lane's, reviewed by Rev. Samuel H. Cox, D. D. 52. Universalism demands attention 52. Its practical influence great and tremendous 53. Calvin's observation in respect to arguments against the truth 54. General reflections, 1. A plain, common sense man, reading his Bible, would not think of Universalism existing there. 2. A proper estimate of God's veracity would forbid such an interpretation of his revelation 55. Certain principles laid down 56. The testimony of God for any thing, the best evidence, and that decidedly the opposite of Universalism 57. Commendation of Mr. Lane's book 58. Analysis of it 59. Specimens of his style 60.

Reid, Alexander, his Dictionary of the English language, noticed 573.

Religion in America reviewed.—Baird's, by Prof. J. Alden, D. D. 487. Dr. Baird's qualifications for writing the book—its circula-

- tion and its usefulness 488. History of the world yet to be written in view of God's providence 489. Views of the origin of society and of the state 490. Members of society without our consent—liberty is security against wrong 491. Church and State 492.
- Reply to M. Wilson's Review of Common School Histories* 764.
- Retirement, Christian*, noticed 777.
- Resurrection, Bush on the*, reviewed, by Rev. Samuel T. Spear 212. Truth and virtue the ends of all rational inquiry 212. Spirit and aim of the author 214. Claim of originality 215. Knowledge of Revelation progressive 216. The author places reason, operating by intuition, induction and deduction, first in all his inquiries 217. His elasticity of import in the scripture 218. A dangerous assumption 221. In his supremacy of reason, he crosses the track of almighty power 222. The declaration is self-evidently absurd, which affirms that the thing implied in a proposition is impossible to almighty power 223. Essential difference between the action of reason, as proving or disproving the truth of the Bible, and the action of reason on the Bible after it is proved 225. Romantic glorification over the achievements of science 226. General philosophical scope 227.
- Positive Department* of his system—his view of the future life 228. Suggestions as to his hypothesis—the attitude of his mind remarkable 231. Does not propose to rest his defence on biblical evidence 232. His self-contradiction 234. The theory gives a resurrection body to animals 236. An assumption not proved by one fact 237. *The Negative Department*, consisting in what he denies, and his reasons for the denial 240. The generic objection and the reasoning on it 241. Strictures on the argument—is not the almighty power of God a fact worthy of consideration in this issue 243. His argument from the nature of the resurrection body inconclusive 246. That from the flux and reflux of the particles in our bodies has not much power 249. The fatality of his argument from the numerous future combination of the particles of the dead body 254. His difficulty on the score of identity 258. What the sense of the identity between the present and future bodies 260. See *Anastasis*.
- Revolution, History of the French*, by F. Maclean Rowan, noticed 191.
- Rhetoric, the Philosophy of*, by George Campbell, D. D., noticed 183.
- *and Literary Criticism, Elements of*, by J. R. Boyd, noticed 184.
- *Criticism of*, by Prof. Henry N. Day, 589. Present systems defective—reconstruction on a firm philosophical basis desirable 590. Relations between rhetoric, logic, grammar and eloquence 591. Particulars in which the art of rhetoric may be improved 592. Subject matter of rhetoric must be determined—Aristotle's definition 593. Quintilian's views 594. Campbell's—Whateley's 595. The Germans—Schott 596. Richter 597. Hoffman 598. Address-oratory the proper subject matter of rhetoric 599. Particular aim of rhetoric 601. Distinction between science and art 602. Distinctions between logic and grammar 603. Distinction between rhetoric and criticism or taste 604. Disproportionate education of taste 607. Particular mode by which the art of rhetoric is to effect its aim 608. Provision of the thought or invention—topical system 610. Disposition of the thought—embodiment in appropriate language 613. What is necessary in order to the development of a practical system 615.
- Romans 7: 7-24, Exposition of*, from Olshausen's Commentary 293. Paul speaks here not of himself only, but evidently of a state analogous to his own, of himself as a man 294. Different interpretations 294. The apostle

designs to give a picture of the successive steps of development in the Christian life 295. Four steps distinctly marked 296. The passage [14—24] refers to a state prior to regeneration, but is applicable to many experiences of the regenerate 296, 7. Particular commentary—vs. 7, 8—relation between ἀμαρτία and ἐκδημία 298. Vs. 9, 10, 299. Meaning of χαρὶς νόμον ἀμαρτία νικᾷ 301. Vs. 11—13, ἀπαρτή 302—3. Vs. 14, signification of πνεῦμα σάπξ, ψυχὴ 304—6. Vs. 15—20 306—8. Vs. 21—23, νόμος τοῦ νόξ, 309—11. Vs. 24, the turning point in the inner spiritual life 312—14.

Royal Sisters, by Agnes Strickland, noticed 388.

Ruling Elders, name, nature and functions of, by Thomas Smyth, D. D., noticed 569.

S.

Stowe, Prof. C. E., D. D. Teutonic Metaphysics; or Modern Transcendentalism, by, 64. *Last Days and Death of Luther*, by, 195.

Sermons, by Hugh Blair, D. D., noticed 183.

—— by Edward Dorr Griffin, D. D., noticed 184.

Sublime and Beautiful; Inquiry into the origin of our Ideas of the, by Hon. Edmund Burke, noticed 185.

Skoberl, Frederic. His Persecutions of Popery noticed 187.

Sorrowing, yet Rejoicing; or Narrative of recent successive bereavements in a minister's family, noticed 189.

Sabbath Musings, by Caroline Fry, noticed 189.

Southey, Robert, LL. D. His Life of Cromwell noticed 191.

Settlers in Canada, by Capt. Marryat, noticed 191.

Smith, Prof. Henry. His Complete Lexicon of the Poems of Homer and the Homeridæ, noticed 192.

Spear, Rev. Samuel T. Bush on the Resurrection reviewed by, 212.

Sabbath. Change of the, from the seventh to the first day of the week, by Rev. R. Weiser, 366. Efforts of Seventh Day Baptists

367. The Apostles uniformly kept the first day as the Sabbath 368. Meaning of ἐν μιᾷ τῶν σαββάτων 369. Of πληρώσαι 371. Examination of Acts 20: 7. and of εἰς, μία, ἐν, 373. Of Cor. 16: 2. κατὰ μίαν σαββάτων 374. The celebration of the first day not called in question in the apostolic age, 375.

Stanley, Arthur P. His Life of Arnold noticed 379.

Sermons, by Rev. Samuel Davies, with an Essay, by Albert Barnes, noticed 388.

Schiller. Correspondence between Goethe and, noticed 384

Shew, Joel, M. D. His Water Cure noticed 386.

Strickland, Agnes. Her Royal Sisters noticed 388.

Sketches in Grecian Philosophy, by Prof. W. S. Tyler, 421.

Stuart, Prof. Moses. His Commentary on the Apocalypse noticed 565.

—— ——— His Critical History and Defence of the Old Testament Canon, noticed 768.

Smyth, Rev. Thomas, D. D. His Romish and Prelatical Rite of Confirmation examined, noticed 568. His Name, Nature, and Functions of Ruling Elders noticed 569.

Slavery. Domestic, Correspondence on, noticed 570.

Sumner, Charles. His True Grandeur of Nations noticed 769.

T.

Tappan, Prof. Henry P. Theses on the Unity of the Church 617.

—— ——— Examination of his works on the Will, by Rev. Benj. N. Martin 709.

Tasts. Essays on the Nature and Principles of, by Archibald Alison, M. D. noticed 185.

Taylor, W. C., LL. D. His Manual of History, noticed 378.

Taylor, Wm. W. His Centurion noticed 190.

Teutonic Metaphysics, or Modern Transcendentalism, by Prof. C. E. Stowe, D. D. 64. See Transcendentalism.

Texian Expedition against Mier,

- Journal of*, by Gen. Thomas I. Green, noticed 771.
- Theology, Christian, as a Science*, by Prof. L. P. Hickok, D. D. 457. Christian Theology admits of strictly scientific investigation 457. All science involves facts and the laws of their being and combination 458. In reference to Facts 459. In reference to Principles 460. Hipparchus and Newton 461. Theology requires the same combination of facts within their principles, as other sciences 462. The facts connected with the Mission of Christ 463. Division of the field of Theological Science into the ritual of religion—the doctrinal of religion—the spiritual of religion 465. Different principles applied to the explanation of ritual observances 466. Suppose this principle, that they are designed to awaken emotion—congenial with religious affections 466. Or as auxiliaries to genuine devotion 467. Another principle, that the officially administered rite is the divinely constituted channel for the supernatural communication of the spiritual grace 468. The true principle, the only one combining all the facts, is this: the ceremony is a divinely appointed symbol for presenting and enforcing some spiritual truth 470. The doctrinal in religion, the facts of the plan of redemption 472. The true system can be found and vindicated 473. The true principle here, which combines all the facts, is the complete harmonizing of righteous authority with mercy 474. Vary from this, and our facts become confused 475. The spiritual of religion, the most important 477. Abundance of facts respecting this inner vitality 478. The harmonizing principle here, is faith in the Son of God 479. Three particulars as matters of practical importance—the proper limits of philosophical speculation 481. A man may be speculatively wrong, yet, holding essential truth, he is to be received as a Christian 483. Hereby can we determine where the true church of Christ is 484. An efficient ministry hereby secured 485.
- Thirlwall, Rev. Connop*. His history of Greece noticed 381.
- Thornton, Elizabeth, or Flower and Fruit of Female Piety*, by Samuel Irenæus Prince, noticed 369.
- Thornwell, Prof. James H.* his arguments of Romanists in behalf of the Apocrypha noticed 190.
- Transcendentalism, Modern, Teutonic Metaphysics, or*, by Prof. C. E. Stowe, D. D. 64. German writers too much lauded, too indiscriminately, praised 64. Locke's system has long prevailed in England, France, and the United States, but men now looking for something better 65. German philosophy feared—outline of it 66.—System of Kant—Berkely and Hume's views 67. Account of Kant's birth, etc. 68. Kant's starting point, *necessary truths*, not from experience 69. His distinctions, his categories 70. System of Fichte—out-kanted Kant 71. Analysis of his philosophy 72. Called the Scientific Theory 74. System of Schelling—transcends Fichte 75. Analysis of it 76. Called the Identity Theory 78. System of Hegel difficult to be understood 79. Hegel's last definition of Idea 80. Of Something, nothing 81. Analysis of his philosophy 82. Marheinecke's Theology 87. Schelling 88. Paulus 89. This German philosophy substituted for the Bible 91. In our philosophy the Bible must be pre-eminent 92. The West needs New England Institutions 94. Protestantism must be awake as to the West 96.
- Travels in North America*, by Charles Lyell, Esq. noticed 776.
- True Grandeur of Nations*, by Charles Sumner, noticed 769.
- Turnbull, Rev. Robert*, his translation of Vinet's *Vital Christianity* noticed 571.
- Tuttle, Rev. Joseph F.* Three experiments in Human Govern-

ment 1. The West and Western Eloquence 638.

Tyler, Prof. Wm. S. Sketches in Grecian Philosophy 421.

U

Unity of the Church, Theses on the, by Prof. Henry R. Tappan 617. Christianity not a system of philosophy 617. It identifies all who receive it. Nobody of men have a right to exclude a true disciple from communion. All ministers of equal authority and dignity. Word of God the supreme rule 618. Creeds and confessions convenient summaries of scriptural doctrine 619. Connexion of philosophy with revelation 620. Reformation recalled men to the simple word of God 622. Two Popes in the world 624. Creeds of the Reformed Churches should be simplified 624. An evil that great names should have been affixed to them 626. Coleridge's conception of heresy 628. How far does the Bible authorize creeds 629. A simple summary of things to be believed can easily be arranged 631. When absolute law exists, a resort to expediency not allowable 633. Protestant sects should form a visible union, as the true catholic church 635. Peculiar mission of Protestantism to give every man the Bible in his own tongue 637.

Ure, Andrew, M. D., his Supplement to his Dictionary, noticed 380.

Use of Church Creeds, by Rev. John G. Hall 577.

V.

Vinet, Alexander, D. D., his *Vital Christianity* noticed 571.

Vital Christianity, by Alexander Vinet, D. D., noticed 571.

W.

Webster, Noah, LL. D., his octavo Dictionary of the English language noticed 574.

Weiser, Rev. R. Change of the Sabbath from the seventh to the first day of the week, 366.

West, The, and Western Eloquence, by Rev. Joseph F. Tuttle 638.

Whewell, Rev. Wm., D. D. His Elements of Morality noticed 77.

Wiley & Putnam's Library of Choice Reading noticed 386, 572.

Wiley & Putnam's Library of American Books noticed 776

Will, Examination of Prof. Tappan's Works on the Doctrine of the, by Rev. Benj. N. Martin, 709. Excellences of Prof. T's. works 710 His identification of cause with causality 711. Use of the term *nexus* 712. Looseness of language 713 Three tests of "primary conceptions" 714. Substance a first truth according to Prof. T., but we think it definable 716 Three distinct ideas included in the conception of substance 717. So of the word cause 718. Defined 719. Prof. T's. exaltation of the will 721. His use of the term volition 722. His system hostile to his view of volition 724. Examination of the assault on a principle of Edwards 726. Objections to our view 728-730. A universal law, that the same power, acting in the same manner on different objects, produces different effects 731. Another difficulty 732. Anything to be alleged in support of Edwards's principle 734. The principle of Prof. T. inconsistent with the simplicity of our idea of causation 735. Application of his psychological principles to morals and theology 737.

Williston, Rev. Seth, D. D. Necessity of the Holy Spirit's Influence in the work of man's redemption, by, 493.

Wilson, M. A Critical Review of American Common School Histories, by, 517.

———. Reply to his Review of Common School Histories 764.

Women, Duty of American, to their Country, noticed 772.

Works of Rev. Richard Cecil noticed 777.

——— of *Charlotte Elizabeth* noticed 778.

——— *Miscellaneous, of Thomas Arnold, D. D.* noticed 774.

——— of *Rev. William Jay* noticed 185.

Works of Mrs Hemans noticed 191.

World without Souls, by J. M. Cunningham, noticed 383.

World's Religion, contrasted with Genuine Christianity, by Lady Colquhoun, noticed 383.

Wright, J. Hall. His Ocean Work noticed 573.

Y.
Young's Night Thoughts noticed 192.

9

244

